The Path to Fully Representational Theory of Mind: Conceptual, Executive, and Pragmatic Challenges

Holding multiple category representations: The role of age, theory of mind, and rule switching in children's developing cross-classification abilities

Cross-classification, the ability to categorize multifaceted entities in many ways, is a remarkable cognitive milestone for children. Past work has focused primarily on documenting the timeline for when children reach cross-classification competence. However, it is not well understood what cognitive factors underpin children's improvements. The current study aimed to examine the contributions of age, theory of mind, and rule switching to children's cross-classification development. We tested 3- to 5-year-old children (N = 75) using a cross-classification task, the Theory of Mind Task Battery, and the Three-Dimensional Change Card Sort test. The results revealed that age and theory of mind predict children's cross-classification over and above the effects of rule switching. The results also revealed that advanced-level theory of mind reasoning is a particularly strong predictor of cross-classification development. These findings increase understanding of cross-classification within children's broader cognitive development.

Development of representational theory of mind: Concepts of mental states, awareness of thinking, and self-permanence

In a recent monograph, my students, colleagues, and I reported on a comprehensive set of tests of the theory of Perceptual Access Reasoning (PAR), a new theory of the development of representational theory of mind (ToM). The central tenet of the theory is that young children acquire a hitherto undetected non-representational ToM (i.e., PAR), the use of which allows them to pass standard false belief tasks without understanding false beliefs. Thus, PAR theory capitalizes on an unrecognized flaw in all standard false belief tasks. In what follows, I present an overview of PAR theory, the tests that we have conducted of the theory, and logical arguments for how PAR explains the classic findings in the ToM literature. Next, I evaluate two recent alternate accounts that have been offered by critics, and I discuss some of the issues raised by three invited commentaries on the monograph. Finally, I consider the question, "What is the development of representational ToM the development of?" Insights from philosophy of mind point to the primacy of children's understanding of mental states in themselves, leading to a new concept of self-permanence that can provide the basis for a unified theory of the development of children's understanding of the mental and physical worlds. As a final thought, I consider how PAR was able to hide in plain sight for so long.

Enactive-Dynamic Social Cognition and Active Inference

This aim of this paper is two-fold: it critically analyses and rejects accounts blending active inference as theory of mind and enactivism; and it advances an enactivist-dynamic understanding of social cognition that is compatible with active inference. While some social cognition theories seemingly take an enactive perspective on social cognition, they explain it as the attribution of mental states to other people, by assuming representational structures, in line with the classic Theory of Mind (ToM). Holding both enactivism and ToM, we argue, entails contradiction and confusion due to two ToM assumptions widely known to be rejected by enactivism: that (1) social cognition reduces to mental representation and (2) social cognition is a hardwired contentful 'toolkit' or 'starter pack' that fuels the model-like theorising supposed in (1). The paper offers a positive alternative, one that avoids contradictions or confusion. After rejecting ToM-inspired theories of social cognition and clarifying the profile of social cognition under enactivism, that is without assumptions (1) and (2), the last section advances an enactivist-dynamic model of cognition as dynamic, real-time, fluid, contextual social action, where we use the formalisms of dynamical systems theory to explain the origins of socio-cognitive novelty in developmental change and active inference as a tool to demonstrate social understanding as generalised synchronisation.

Perceptual Access Reasoning (PAR) in Developing a Representational Theory of Mind

An important part of children's social and cognitive development is their understanding that people are psychological beings with internal, mental states including desire, intention, perception, and belief. A full understanding of people as psychological beings requires a representational theory of mind (ToM), which is an understanding that mental states can faithfully represent reality, or misrepresent reality. For the last 35 years, researchers have relied on false‐belief tasks as the gold standard to test children's understanding that beliefs can misrepresent reality. In false‐belief tasks, children are asked to reason about the behavior of agents who have false beliefs about situations. Although a large body of evidence indicates that most children pass false‐belief tasks by the end of the preschool years, the evidence we present in this monograph suggests that most children do not understand false beliefs or, surprisingly, even true beliefs until middle childhood. We argue that young children pass false‐belief tasks without understanding false beliefs by using perceptual access reasoning (PAR). With PAR, children understand that seeing leads to knowing in the moment, but not that knowing also arises from thinking or persists as memory and belief after the situation changes. By the same token, PAR leads children to fail true‐belief tasks. PAR theory can account for performance on other traditional tests of representational ToM and related tasks, and can account for the factors that have been found to correlate with or affect both true‐ and false‐belief performance. The theory provides a new laboratory measure which we label the belief understanding scale (BUS). This scale can distinguish between a child who is operating with PAR versus a child who is understanding beliefs. This scale provides a method needed to allow the study of the development of representational ToM.

In this monograph, we report the outcome of the tests that we have conducted of predictions generated by PAR theory. The findings demonstrated signature PAR limitations in reasoning about the mind during the ages when children are hypothesized to be using PAR. In Chapter II, secondary analyses of the published true‐belief literature revealed that children failed several types of true‐belief tasks.

Chapters III through IX describe new empirical data collected across multiple studies between 2003 and 2014 from 580 children aged 4–7 years, as well as from a small sample of 14 adults. Participants were recruited from the Phoenix, Arizona metropolitan area. All participants were native English‐speakers. Children were recruited from university‐sponsored and community preschools and daycare centers, and from hospital maternity wards. Adults were university students who participated to partially fulfill course requirements for research participation. Sociometric data were collected only in Chapter IX, and are fully reported there.

In Chapter III, minor alterations in task procedures produced wide variations in children's performance in 3‐option false‐belief tasks. In Chapter IV, we report findings which show that the developmental lag between children's understanding ignorance and understanding false belief is longer than the lag reported in previous studies. In Chapter V, children did not distinguish between agents who have false beliefs versus agents who have no beliefs. In Chapter VI, findings showed that children found it no easier to reason about true beliefs than to reason about false beliefs. In Chapter VII, when children were asked to justify their correct answers in false‐belief tasks, they did not reference agents’ false beliefs. Similarly, in Chapter VIII, when children were asked to explain agents’ actions in false‐belief tasks, they did not reference agents’ false beliefs. In Chapter IX, children who were identified as using PAR differed from children who understood beliefs along three dimensions—in levels of social development, inhibitory control, and kindergarten adjustment.

Although the findings need replication and additional studies of alternative interpretations, the collection of results reported in this monograph challenges the prevailing view that representational ToM is in place by the end of the preschool years. Furthermore, the pattern of findings is consistent with the proposal that PAR is the developmental precursor of representational ToM. The current findings also raise questions about claims that infants and toddlers demonstrate ToM‐related abilities, and that representational ToM is innate.