The Effect of Analytic Cognitive Style on Credulity

Thinking false and slow: Implausible beliefs and the Cognitive Reflection Test

Why do people believe implausible claims like conspiracy theories, pseudoscience, and fake news? Past studies using the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) suggest that implausible beliefs may result from an unwillingness to effortfully process information (i.e., cognitive miserliness). Our analysis (N = 664) tests this account by comparing CRT performance (total score, number and proportion of incorrect intuitive responses, and completion time) for endorsers and non-endorsers of implausible claims. Our results show that endorsers performed worse than non-endorsers on the CRT, but they took significantly longer to answer the questions and did not make proportionally more intuitive mistakes. Endorsers therefore appear to process information effortfully but nonetheless score lower on the CRT. Poorer overall CRT performance may not necessarily indicate that those who endorse implausible beliefs have a more reflexive, intuitive, or non-analytical cognitive style than non-endorsers.

Paranormal beliefs and cognitive function: A systematic review and assessment of study quality across four decades of research

BACKGROUND

Research into paranormal beliefs and cognitive functioning has expanded considerably since the last review almost 30 years ago, prompting the need for a comprehensive review. The current systematic review aims to identify the reported associations between paranormal beliefs and cognitive functioning, and to assess study quality.

METHOD

We searched four databases (Scopus, ScienceDirect, SpringerLink, and OpenGrey) from inception until May 2021. Inclusion criteria comprised papers published in English that contained original data assessing paranormal beliefs and cognitive function in healthy adult samples. Study quality and risk of bias was assessed using the Appraisal tool for Cross-Sectional Studies (AXIS) and results were synthesised through narrative review. The review adhered to the Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses (PRISMA) guidelines and was preregistered as part of a larger registration on the Open Science Framework (https://osf.io/uzm5v).

RESULTS

From 475 identified studies, 71 (n = 20,993) met our inclusion criteria. Studies were subsequently divided into the following six categories: perceptual and cognitive biases (k = 19, n = 3,397), reasoning (k = 17, n = 9,661), intelligence, critical thinking, and academic ability (k = 12, n = 2,657), thinking style (k = 13, n = 4,100), executive function and memory (k = 6, n = 810), and other cognitive functions (k = 4, n = 368). Study quality was rated as good-to-strong for 75% of studies and appears to be improving across time. Nonetheless, we identified areas of methodological weakness including: the lack of preregistration, discussion of limitations, a-priori justification of sample size, assessment of nonrespondents, and the failure to adjust for multiple testing. Over 60% of studies have recruited undergraduates and 30% exclusively psychology undergraduates, which raises doubt about external validity. Our narrative synthesis indicates high heterogeneity of study findings. The most consistent associations emerge for paranormal beliefs with increased intuitive thinking and confirmatory bias, and reduced conditional reasoning ability and perception of randomness.

CONCLUSIONS

Although study quality is good, areas of methodological weakness exist. In addressing these methodological issues, we propose that authors engage with preregistration of data collection and analysis procedures. At a conceptual level, we argue poorer cognitive performance across seemingly disparate cognitive domains might reflect the influence of an over-arching executive dysfunction.

Conspiratorial Beliefs and Cognitive Styles: An Integrated Look on Analytic Thinking, Critical Thinking, and Scientific Reasoning in Relation to (Dis)trust in Conspiracy Theories

The tendency to believe in conspiracy theories (implying secret and malevolent plots by scheming groups or individuals), incites growing decennial interest among psychological researchers (exploring the associated personality traits, worldviews and cognitive styles of people). The link between the conspiratorial beliefs and the cognitive styles remains of particular interest to scholars, requiring integrated theoretical considerations. This perspective article will focus on the relationship between the propensity to (dis)trust conspiracy theories and three cognitive styles: analytic thinking, critical thinking, and scientific reasoning. Analytic thinking (inclination toward slow and deliberate processing of information in a conscious effort to mitigate biases and reach objective understanding of facts), is a well-studied concept in the context of conspiratorial beliefs, while the negative mutual relationship seems well-evidenced. On the other hand, the evidence on the link with the critical thinking (readiness to consider, reason, appraise, review, and interpret facts to update existing beliefs) has only started to emerge in the last years. Finally, scientific reasoning (ability to apply principles of scientific inquiry to formulate, test, revise and update knowledge in accordance with new evidence), is the least studied of the three cognitive styles in relation to conspiracy theories. The present article will: (a) revise the (lack of) scientific consensus on the definitional and conceptual aspects (by providing theoretical framework); (b) summarize the state of the art on the subject (by providing overview of empirical evidence); (c) discuss directions for future research (especially in relation to the COVID-19 pandemic). An integrated perspective on the relationship between conspiratorial beliefs and cognitive styles of people, may serve to inspire future behavioral interventions.