Global Workspace Theory (GWT) and Prefrontal Cortex: Recent Developments

Slow ramping emerges from spontaneous fluctuations in spiking neural networks

The capacity to initiate actions endogenously is critical for goal-directed behavior. Spontaneous voluntary actions are typically preceded by slow-ramping activity in medial frontal cortex that begins around two seconds before movement, which may reflect spontaneous fluctuations that influence action timing. However, the mechanisms by which these slow ramping signals emerge from single-neuron and network dynamics remain poorly understood. Here, we developed a spiking neural-network model that produces spontaneous slow ramping activity in single neurons and population activity with onsets ~2 s before threshold crossings. A key prediction of our model is that neurons that ramp together have correlated firing patterns before ramping onset. We confirmed this model-derived hypothesis in a dataset of human single neuron recordings from medial frontal cortex. Our results suggest that slow ramping signals reflect bounded spontaneous fluctuations that emerge from quasi-winner-take-all dynamics in clustered networks that are temporally stabilized by slow-acting synapses.

Bridging flexible goal-directed cognition and consciousness: The Goal-Aligning Representation Internal Manipulation theory

Goal-directed manipulation of internal representations is a key element of human flexible behaviour, while consciousness is commonly associated with higher-order cognition and human flexibility. Current perspectives have only partially linked these processes, thus preventing a clear understanding of how they jointly generate flexible cognition and behaviour. Moreover, these limitations prevent an effective exploitation of this knowledge for technological scopes. We propose a new theoretical perspective that extends our 'three-component theory of flexible cognition' toward higher-order cognition and consciousness, based on the systematic integration of key concepts from Cognitive Neuroscience and AI/Robotics. The theory proposes that the function of conscious processes is to support the alignment of representations with multi-level goals. This higher alignment leads to more flexible and effective behaviours. We analyse here our previous model of goal-directed flexible cognition (validated with more than 20 human populations) as a starting GARIM-inspired model. By bridging the main theories of consciousness and goal-directed behaviour, the theory has relevant implications for scientific and technological fields. In particular, it contributes to developing new experimental tasks and interpreting clinical evidence. Finally, it indicates directions for improving machine learning and robotics systems and for informing real-world applications (e.g., in digital-twin healthcare and roboethics).

Insights into conscious cognitive information processing

For over a century, the neuro- and pathophysiological, behavioral, and cognitive correlates of consciousness have been an active field of theoretical considerations and empirical research in a wide range of modern disciplines. Conscious cognitive processing of information cannot be observed directly, but might be inferred from step-like discontinuities in learning performance or sudden insight-based improvements in problem solving behavior. It is assumed that a sudden step of knowledge associated with insight requires a creative reorganization of mental representations of task- or problem-relevant information and the restructuration of the task, respectively problem to overcome an cognitive dead-end or impasse. Discontinuities in learning performance or problem solving after an insight event can be used as time-tags to capture the time window in which conscious cognitive information processing must have taken place. According to the platform theory of conscious cognitive information processing, the reorganization and restructuration processes, require the maintenance of task- or problem-relevant information in working memory for the operation of executive functions on these mental representations. Electrophysiological evidence suggests that the reorganization and restructuration processes in working memory, that precede insight-based problem solutions are accompanied by an increase in the power of gamma oscillations in cortical areas including the prefrontal cortex. Empirical evidence and theoretical assumptions argue for an involvement of gap junction channels and connexin hemichannels in cortical gamma-oscillations and working memory processes. Discontinuities in learning or problem solving performance might be used as time-tags to investigate the implication of gap junction channels and hemichannels in conscious cognitive processing.

An Unavoidable Mind-Set Reversal: Consciousness in Vision Science

In recent decades, the debate on consciousness has been conditioned by the idea of bottom-up emergence, which has influenced scientific research and raised a few obstacles to any attempt to bridge the explanatory gap. The analysis and explanation of vision conducted according to the accredited methodologies of scientific research in terms of physical stimuli, objectivity, methods, and explanation has encountered the resistance of subjective experience. Moreover, original Gestalt research into vision has generally been merged with cognitive neuroscience. Experimental phenomenology, building on the legacy of Gestalt psychology, has obtained new results in the fields of amodal contours and color stratifications, light perception, figurality, space, so-called perceptual illusions, and subjective space and time. Notwithstanding the outcomes and the impulse given to neuroscientific analyses, the research carried out around these phenomena has never directly confronted the issue of what it means to be conscious or, in other words, the nature of consciousness as self-referentiality. Research has tended to focus on the percept. Therefore, explaining the non-detachability of parts in subjective experience risks becoming a sort of impossible achievement, similar to that of Baron Munchausen, who succeeds in escaping unharmed from this quicksand by pulling himself out by his hair. This paper addresses how to analyze seeing as an undivided whole by discussing several basic dimensions of phenomenal consciousness on an experimental basis and suggesting an alternative way of escaping this quicksand. This mind-set reversal also sheds light on the organization and dependence relationships between phenomenology, psychophysics, and neuroscience.

A measure centrality index for systematic empirical comparison of consciousness theories

Consciousness science is marred by disparate constructs and methodologies, making it challenging to systematically compare theories. This foundational crisis casts doubts on the scientific character of the field itself. Addressing it, we propose a framework for systematically comparing consciousness theories by introducing a novel inter-theory classification interface, the Measure Centrality Index (MCI). Recognizing its gradient distribution, the MCI assesses the degree of importance a specific empirical measure has for a given consciousness theory. We apply the MCI to probe how the empirical measures of the Global Neuronal Workspace Theory (GNW), Integrated Information Theory (IIT), and Temporospatial Theory of Consciousness (TTC) would fare within the context of the other two. We demonstrate that direct comparison of IIT, GNW, and TTC is meaningful and valid for some measures like Lempel-Ziv Complexity (LZC), Autocorrelation Window (ACW), and possibly Mutual Information (MI). In contrast, it is problematic for others like the anatomical and physiological neural correlates of consciousness (NCC) due to their MCI-based differential weightings within the structure of the theories. In sum, we introduce and provide proof-of-principle of a novel systematic method for direct inter-theory empirical comparisons, thereby addressing isolated evolution of theories and confirmatory bias issues in the state-of-the-art neuroscience of consciousness.

Toward a universal theory of consciousness

While falsifiability has been broadly discussed as a desirable property of a theory of consciousness, in this paper, we introduce the meta-theoretic concept of "Universality" as an additional desirable property for a theory of consciousness. The concept of universality, often assumed in physics, posits that the fundamental laws of nature are consistent and apply equally everywhere in the universe and remain constant over time. This assumption is crucial in science, acting as a guiding principle for developing and testing theories. When applied to theories of consciousness, universality can be defined as the ability of a theory to determine whether any fully described dynamical system is conscious or non-conscious. Importantly, for a theory to be universal, the determinant of consciousness needs to be defined as an intrinsic property of a system as opposed to replying on the interpretation of the external observer. The importance of universality originates from the consideration that given that consciousness is a natural phenomenon, it could in principle manifest in any physical system that satisfies a certain set of conditions whether it is biological or non-biological. To date, apart from a few exceptions, most existing theories do not possess this property. Instead, they tend to make predictions as to the neural correlates of consciousness based on the interpretations of brain functions, which makes those theories only applicable to brain-centric systems. While current functionalist theories of consciousness tend to be heavily reliant on our interpretations of brain functions, we argue that functionalist theories could be converted to a universal theory by specifying mathematical formulations of the constituent concepts. While neurobiological and functionalist theories retain their utility in practice, we will eventually need a universal theory to fully explain why certain types of systems possess consciousness.

Updating functional brain units: Insights far beyond Luria

This paper reviews Luria's model of the three functional units of the brain. To meet this objective, several issues were reviewed: the theory of functional systems and the contributions of phylogenesis and embryogenesis to the brain's functional organization. This review revealed several facts. In the first place, the relationship/integration of basic homeostatic needs with complex forms of behavior. Secondly, the multi-scale hierarchical and distributed organization of the brain and interactions between cells and systems. Thirdly, the phylogenetic role of exaptation, especially in basal ganglia and cerebellum expansion. Finally, the tripartite embryogenetic organization of the brain: rhinic, limbic/paralimbic, and supralimbic zones. Obviously, these principles of brain organization are in contradiction with attempts to establish separate functional brain units. The proposed new model is made up of two large integrated complexes: a primordial-limbic complex (Luria's Unit I) and a telencephalic-cortical complex (Luria's Units II and III). As a result, five functional units were delineated: Unit I. Primordial or preferential (brainstem), for life-support, behavioral modulation, and waking regulation; Unit II. Limbic and paralimbic systems, for emotions and hedonic evaluation (danger and relevance detection and contribution to reward/motivational processing) and the creation of cognitive maps (contextual memory, navigation, and generativity [imagination]); Unit III. Telencephalic-cortical, for sensorimotor and cognitive processing (gnosis, praxis, language, calculation, etc.), semantic and episodic (contextual) memory processing, and multimodal conscious agency; Unit IV. Basal ganglia systems, for behavior selection and reinforcement (reward-oriented behavior); Unit V. Cerebellar systems, for the prediction/anticipation (orthometric supervision) of the outcome of an action. The proposed brain units are nothing more than abstractions within the brain's simultaneous and distributed physiological processes. As function transcends anatomy, the model necessarily involves transition and overlap between structures. Beyond the classic approaches, this review includes information on recent systemic perspectives on functional brain organization. The limitations of this review are discussed.

Slow ramping emerges from spontaneous fluctuations in spiking neural networks

1. We reveal a mechanism for slow-ramping signals before spontaneous voluntary movements. 2. Slow synapses stabilize spontaneous fluctuations in spiking neural network. 3. We validate model predictions in human frontal cortical single-neuron recordings. 4. The model recreates the readiness potential in an EEG proxy signal. 5. Neurons that ramp together had correlated activity before ramping onset. The capacity to initiate actions endogenously is critical for goal-directed behavior. Spontaneous voluntary actions are typically preceded by slow-ramping activity in medial frontal cortex that begins around two seconds before movement, which may reflect spontaneous fluctuations that influence action timing. However, the mechanisms by which these slow ramping signals emerge from single-neuron and network dynamics remain poorly understood. Here, we developed a spiking neural-network model that produces spontaneous slow ramping activity in single neurons and population activity with onsets ∼2 seconds before threshold crossings. A key prediction of our model is that neurons that ramp together have correlated firing patterns before ramping onset. We confirmed this model-derived hypothesis in a dataset of human single neuron recordings from medial frontal cortex. Our results suggest that slow ramping signals reflect bounded spontaneous fluctuations that emerge from quasi-winner-take-all dynamics in clustered networks that are temporally stabilized by slow-acting synapses.

(Dis)confirming theories of consciousness and their predictions: towards a Lakatosian consciousness science

The neuroscience of consciousness is undergoing a significant empirical acceleration thanks to several adversarial collaborations that intend to test different predictions of rival theories of consciousness. In this context, it is important to pair consciousness science with confirmation theory, the philosophical discipline that explores the interaction between evidence and hypotheses, in order to understand how exactly, and to what extent, specific experiments are challenging or validating theories of consciousness. In this paper, I examine this intricate relationship by adopting a Lakatosian lens. I propose that Lakatos' philosophy of science can aid consciousness scientists to better interpret adversarial collaborations in consciousness science and, more generally, to develop a confirmation-theoretic model of theory-appraisal in this field. I do so by suggesting that such a model be built upon three Lakatos-inspired criteria for assessing the relationship between empirical evidence and theoretical predictions: (i) the model should represent the 'distinction between prediction and accommodation'; (ii) the model should represent the 'structural relevance' of predictions; (iii) the model should represent the 'boldness' of the predictions. I argue that a Lakatosian model of theory-appraisal has both normative and descriptive virtues, and can move the debate forward by acknowledging that theory-appraisal needs to consider the diachronic development of theories, their logical structure, and their relationship with background beliefs and knowledge.

The pulvinar as a hub of visual processing and cortical integration

The pulvinar nucleus of the thalamus is a crucial component of the visual system and plays significant roles in sensory processing and cognitive integration. The pulvinar's extensive connectivity with cortical regions allows for bidirectional communication, contributing to the integration of sensory information across the visual hierarchy. Recent findings underscore the pulvinar's involvement in attentional modulation, feature binding, and predictive coding. In this review, we highlight recent advances in clarifying the pulvinar's circuitry and function. We discuss the contributions of the pulvinar to signal modulation across the global cortical network and place these findings within theoretical frameworks of cortical processing, particularly the global neuronal workspace (GNW) theory and predictive coding.

Structural and Functional Neuroanatomy of Core Consciousness: A Primer for Disorders of Consciousness Clinicians

Understanding the structural and functional neuroanatomy of core consciousness (ie, wakefulness and awareness) is an asset to clinicians caring for persons with disorders of consciousness. This article provides a primer on the structural and functional neuroanatomy of wakefulness and awareness. The neuroanatomical structures supporting these elements of core consciousness functions are reviewed first, after which brief description of the clinically evaluable relationships between disruption of these structures and disorders of consciousness (ie, brain-behavior relationships) are outlined. Consideration of neuroanatomy at the mesoscale (ie, the mesocircuit hypothesis) as well as in relation to several large-scale neural networks is offered.

A construct-first approach to consciousness science

We propose a new approach to consciousness science that instead of comparing complex theoretical positions deconstructs existing theories, takes their central assumptions while disregarding their auxiliary hypotheses, and focuses its investigations on the main constructs that these central assumptions rely on (like global workspace, recurrent processing, metarepresentation). Studying how these main constructs are anchored in lower-level constructs characterizing underlying neural processing will not just offer an alternative to theory comparisons but will also take us one step closer to empirical resolutions. Moreover, exploring the compatibility and possible combinations of the lower-level constructs will allow for new theoretical syntheses. This construct-first approach will improve our ability to understand the commitments of existing theories and pave the way for moving beyond them.

Simultaneity of consciousness with physical reality: the key that unlocks the mind-matter problem

The problem of explaining the relationship between subjective experience and physical reality remains difficult and unresolved. In most explanations, consciousness is epiphenomenal, without causal power. The most notable exception is Integrated Information Theory (IIT), which provides a causal explanation for consciousness. However, IIT relies on an identity between subjectivity and a particular type of physical structure, namely with an information structure that has intrinsic causal power greater than the sum of its parts. Any theory that relies on a psycho-phyiscal identity must eventually appeal to panpsychism, which undermines that theory's claim to be fundamental. IIT has recently pivoted towards a strong version of causal emergence, but macroscopic structures cannot be stronger causally than their microphysical parts without some new physical law or governing principle. The approach taken here is designed to uncover such a principle. The decisive argument is entirely deductive from initial premises that are phenomenologically certain. If correct, the arguments prove that conscious experience is sufficient to create additional degrees of causal freedom independently of the content of experience, and in a manner that is unpredictable and unobservable by any temporally sequential means. This provides a fundamental principle about consciousness, and a conceptual bridge between it and the physics describing what is experienced. The principle makes testable predictions about brain function, with notable differences from IIT, some of which are also empirically testable.

Altered brain dynamics index levels of arousal in complete locked-in syndrome

Complete locked-in syndrome (CLIS) resulting from late-stage amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS) is characterised by loss of motor function and eye movements. The absence of behavioural indicators of consciousness makes the search for neuronal correlates as possible biomarkers clinically and ethically urgent. EEG-based measures of brain dynamics such as power-law exponent (PLE) and Lempel-Ziv complexity (LZC) have been shown to have explanatory power for consciousness and may provide such neuronal indices for patients with CLIS. Here, we validated PLE and LZC (calculated in a dynamic way) as benchmarks of a wide range of arousal states across different reference states of consciousness (e.g., awake, sleep stages, ketamine, sevoflurane). We show a tendency toward high PLE and low LZC, with high intra-subject fluctuations and inter-subject variability in a cohort of CLIS patients with values graded along different arousal states as in our reference data sets. In conclusion, changes in brain dynamics indicate altered arousal in CLIS. Specifically, PLE and LZC are potentially relevant biomarkers to identify or diagnose the arousal level in CLIS and to determine the optimal time point for treatment, including communication attempts.

An implementation of integrated information theory in resting-state fMRI

Integrated Information Theory was developed to explain and quantify consciousness, arguing that conscious systems consist of elements that are integrated through their causal properties. This study presents an implementation of Integrated Information Theory 3.0, the latest version of this framework, to functional MRI data. Data were acquired from 17 healthy subjects who underwent sedation with propofol, a short-acting anaesthetic. Using the PyPhi software package, we systematically analyze how Φ^max, a measure of integrated information, is modulated by the sedative in different resting-state networks. We compare Φ^max to other proposed measures of conscious level, including the previous version of integrated information, Granger causality, and correlation-based functional connectivity. Our results indicate that Φ^max presents a variety of sedative-induced behaviours for different networks. Notably, changes to Φ^max closely reflect changes to subjects' conscious level in the frontoparietal and dorsal attention networks, which are responsible for higher-order cognitive functions. In conclusion, our findings present important insight into different measures of conscious level that will be useful in future implementations to functional MRI and other forms of neuroimaging.

Consciousness in a Rotor? Science and Ethics of Potentially Conscious Human Cerebral Organoids

Human cerebral organoids are three-dimensional biological cultures grown in the laboratory to mimic as closely as possible the cellular composition, structure, and function of the corresponding organ, the brain. For now, cerebral organoids lack blood vessels and other characteristics of the human brain, but are also capable of having coordinated electrical activity. They have been usefully employed for the study of several diseases and the development of the nervous system in unprecedented ways. Research on human cerebral organoids is proceeding at a very fast pace and their complexity is bound to improve. This raises the question of whether cerebral organoids will also be able to develop the unique feature of the human brain, consciousness. If this is the case, some ethical issues would arise. In this article, we discuss the necessary neural correlates and constraints for the emergence of consciousness according to some of the most debated neuroscientific theories. Based on this, we consider what the moral status of a potentially conscious brain organoid might be, in light of ethical and ontological arguments. We conclude by proposing a precautionary principle and some leads for further investigation. In particular, we consider the outcomes of some very recent experiments as entities of a potential new kind.

Continuous Theta Burst Stimulation to the left anterior medial prefrontal cortex influences metacognitive efficiency

The contribution of the prefrontal areas to visual awareness is critical for the Global Neuronal Workspace Theory and higher-order theories of consciousness. The goal of the present study was to test the potential engagement of the anterior medial prefrontal cortex (aMPFC) in visual awareness judgements. We aimed to temporarily influence the neuronal dynamics of the left aMPFC via neuroplasticity-like mechanisms. We used different Theta Burst Stimulation (TBS) protocols in combination with a visual identification task and visual awareness ratings. Either continuous TBS (cTBS), intermittent TBS (iTBS), or sham TBS was applied prior to the experimental paradigm in a within-participant design. Compared with sham TBS, we observed an increase in participants' ability to judge their perception adequately (metacognitive efficiency) following cTBS but not iTBS. The effect was accompanied by lower visual awareness ratings in incorrect responses. No significant differences in the identification task performance were observed. We interpret these results as evidence of the involvement of PFC in the brain network that underlies metacognition. Further, we discuss whether the results of TMS studies on perceptual metacognition can be taken as evidence for PFC involvement in awareness itself.

Non-Separability of Physical Systems as a Foundation of Consciousness

A hypothesis is presented that non-separability of degrees of freedom is the fundamental property underlying consciousness in physical systems. The amount of consciousness in a system is determined by the extent of non-separability and the number of degrees of freedom involved. Non-interacting and feedforward systems have zero consciousness, whereas most systems of interacting particles appear to have low non-separability and consciousness. By contrast, brain circuits exhibit high complexity and weak but tightly coordinated interactions, which appear to support high non-separability and therefore high amount of consciousness. The hypothesis applies to both classical and quantum cases, and we highlight the formalism employing the Wigner function (which in the classical limit becomes the Liouville density function) as a potentially fruitful framework for characterizing non-separability and, thus, the amount of consciousness in a system. The hypothesis appears to be consistent with both the Integrated Information Theory and the Orchestrated Objective Reduction Theory and may help reconcile the two. It offers a natural explanation for the physical properties underlying the amount of consciousness and points to methods of estimating the amount of non-separability as promising ways of characterizing the amount of consciousness.

What if consciousness is not an emergent property of the brain? Observational and empirical challenges to materialistic models

The nature of consciousness is considered one of science's most perplexing and persistent mysteries. We all know the subjective experience of consciousness, but where does it arise? What is its purpose? What are its full capacities? The assumption within today's neuroscience is that all aspects of consciousness arise solely from interactions among neurons in the brain. However, the origin and mechanisms of qualia (i.e., subjective or phenomenological experience) are not understood. David Chalmers coined the term "the hard problem" to describe the difficulties in elucidating the origins of subjectivity from the point of view of reductive materialism. We propose that the hard problem arises because one or more assumptions within a materialistic worldview are either wrong or incomplete. If consciousness entails more than the activity of neurons, then we can contemplate new ways of thinking about the hard problem. This review examines phenomena that apparently contradict the notion that consciousness is exclusively dependent on brain activity, including phenomena where consciousness appears to extend beyond the physical brain and body in both space and time. The mechanisms underlying these "non-local" properties are vaguely suggestive of quantum entanglement in physics, but how such effects might manifest remains highly speculative. The existence of these non-local effects appears to support the proposal that post-materialistic models of consciousness may be required to break the conceptual impasse presented by the hard problem of consciousness.

Evolutionary Advantages of Stimulus-Driven EEG Phase Transitions in the Upper Cortical Layers

Spatio-temporal brain activity monitored by EEG recordings in humans and other mammals has identified beta/gamma oscillations (20-80 Hz), which are self-organized into spatio-temporal structures recurring at theta/alpha rates (4-12 Hz). These structures have statistically significant correlations with sensory stimuli and reinforcement contingencies perceived by the subject. The repeated collapse of self-organized structures at theta/alpha rates generates laterally propagating phase gradients (phase cones), ignited at some specific location of the cortical sheet. Phase cones have been interpreted as neural signatures of transient perceptual experiences according to the cinematic theory of brain dynamics. The rapid expansion of essentially isotropic phase cones is consistent with the propagation of perceptual broadcasts postulated by Global Workspace Theory (GWT). What is the evolutionary advantage of brains operating with repeatedly collapsing dynamics? This question is answered using thermodynamic concepts. According to neuropercolation theory, waking brains are described as non-equilibrium thermodynamic systems operating at the edge of criticality, undergoing repeated phase transitions. This work analyzes the role of long-range axonal connections and metabolic processes in the regulation of critical brain dynamics. Historically, the near 10 Hz domain has been associated with conscious sensory integration, cortical "ignitions" linked to conscious visual perception, and conscious experiences. We can therefore combine a very large body of experimental evidence and theory, including graph theory, neuropercolation, and GWT. This cortical operating style may optimize a tradeoff between rapid adaptation to novelty vs. stable and widespread self-organization, therefore resulting in significant Darwinian benefits.