Prosocial Gains and Losses: Modulations of Human Social Decision-Making by Loss-Gain Context

Common and distinct equity preferences in children and adults

Fairness plays a crucial role in children's social life and has garnered considerable attention. However, previous research and theories primarily examined the development of children's fairness behaviors in the conflict between self-interest motivation and fairness-complying motivation, neglecting the influence of advantage-seeking motivation. Moreover, despite the well-established role of gain/loss frame in human decision-making, it remains largely unclear whether the framing effect modulates fairness behaviors in children. It was hypothesized that children would exhibit advantage-seeking motivation resulting in more selfish behaviors in the loss context. To examine the hypothesis, we combined an adapted dictator game and computational modeling to investigate various motivations underlying fairness behaviors of children in both loss and gain contexts and to explore the developmental directions by contrasting children and adults. In addition, the current design enabled the dissociation between fairness knowledge and behaviors by asking participants to decide for themselves (the first-party role) or for others (the third-party role). This study recruited a total of 34 children (9-10 years, Mage = 9.82, SDage = 0.38, 16 females) and 31 college students (Mage = 19.81, SDage = 1.40, 17 females). The behavioral results indicated that children behaved more selfishly in first-party and more fairly in third-party than adults, without any significant framing effects. The computational results revealed that both children and adults exhibited aversion to advantageous and disadvantageous inequity in third-party. However, they showed distinct preferences for advantageous inequity in first-party, with advantage-seeking preferences among children and aversion to advantageous inequity among adults. These findings contribute to a deeper understanding of children's social preferences and their developmental directions.

Rewards for information provision in patient referrals: A theoretical model and an experimental test

We study whether bonus payments for information provision can improve the information flow between physicians. A primary care physician (PCP) decides on the provision of information of varying qualities to a specialist while referring a patient. Our theoretical model, which includes altruism and loss aversion, predicts that bonus payments increase the provision of both high- and low-quality information. Running a controlled laboratory experiment we find support for this prediction. If the beneficiary of information provision receives a higher payoff than the PCP, we observe that PCPs more often pass on high-quality information when the beneficiary is a patient. If the beneficiary receives a lower payoff than the PCP, the type of the beneficiary (specialist or patient) does not affect the provision of high-quality information.