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Campillo-Ferrer T, Alcaraz-Sánchez A, Demšar E, Wu HP, Dresler M, Windt J, Blanke O. Out-of-body experiences in relation to lucid dreaming and sleep paralysis: A theoretical review and conceptual model. Neurosci Biobehav Rev 2024; 163:105770. [PMID: 38880408 DOI: 10.1016/j.neubiorev.2024.105770] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/30/2024] [Revised: 05/31/2024] [Accepted: 06/11/2024] [Indexed: 06/18/2024]
Abstract
Out-of-body experiences (OBEs) are characterized by the subjective experience of being located outside the physical body. Little is known about the neurophysiology of spontaneous OBEs, which are often reported by healthy individuals as occurring during states of reduced vigilance, particularly in proximity to or during sleep (sleep-related OBEs). In this paper, we review the current state of research on sleep-related OBEs and hypothesize that maintaining consciousness during transitions from wakefulness to REM sleep (sleep-onset REM periods) may facilitate sleep-related OBEs. Based on this hypothesis, we propose a new conceptual model that potentially describes the relationship between OBEs and sleep states. The model sheds light on the phenomenological differences between sleep-related OBEs and similar states of consciousness, such as lucid dreaming (the realization of being in a dream state) and sleep paralysis (feeling paralyzed while falling asleep or waking up), and explores the potential polysomnographic features underlying sleep-related OBEs. Additionally, we apply the predictive coding framework and suggest a connecting link between sleep-related OBEs and OBEs reported during wakefulness.
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Affiliation(s)
- Teresa Campillo-Ferrer
- Donders Institute for Brain, Cognition and Behaviour, Radboud University Medical Center, Nijmegen, the Netherlands; Department of Neuropsychology, Faculty of Psychology, Ruhr University Bochum, Bochum, Germany.
| | - Adriana Alcaraz-Sánchez
- Centre for Philosophical Psychology, Department of Philosophy, University of Antwerp, Antwerp, Belgium
| | - Ema Demšar
- Monash Centre for Consciousness and Contemplative Studies, Melbourne, Australia; Monash University, Department of Philosophy, Melbourne, Australia
| | - Hsin-Ping Wu
- Laboratory of Cognitive Neuroscience, Neuro-X Institute & Brain Mind Institute, Faculty of Life Sciences, Ecole Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne, Geneva, Switzerland; Department of Clinical Neuroscience, Geneva University Hospital, Geneva, Switzerland
| | - Martin Dresler
- Donders Institute for Brain, Cognition and Behaviour, Radboud University Medical Center, Nijmegen, the Netherlands
| | - Jennifer Windt
- Monash Centre for Consciousness and Contemplative Studies, Melbourne, Australia; Monash University, Department of Philosophy, Melbourne, Australia
| | - Olaf Blanke
- Laboratory of Cognitive Neuroscience, Neuro-X Institute & Brain Mind Institute, Faculty of Life Sciences, Ecole Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne, Geneva, Switzerland; Department of Clinical Neuroscience, Geneva University Hospital, Geneva, Switzerland
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Troncoso A, Soto V, Gomila A, Martínez-Pernía D. Moving beyond the lab: investigating empathy through the Empirical 5E approach. Front Psychol 2023; 14:1119469. [PMID: 37519389 PMCID: PMC10374225 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2023.1119469] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/08/2022] [Accepted: 06/05/2023] [Indexed: 08/01/2023] Open
Abstract
Empathy is a complex and multifaceted phenomenon that plays a crucial role in human social interactions. Recent developments in social neuroscience have provided valuable insights into the neural underpinnings and bodily mechanisms underlying empathy. This methodology often prioritizes precision, replicability, internal validity, and confound control. However, fully understanding the complexity of empathy seems unattainable by solely relying on artificial and controlled laboratory settings, while overlooking a comprehensive view of empathy through an ecological experimental approach. In this article, we propose articulating an integrative theoretical and methodological framework based on the 5E approach (the "E"s stand for embodied, embedded, enacted, emotional, and extended perspectives of empathy), highlighting the relevance of studying empathy as an active interaction between embodied agents, embedded in a shared real-world environment. In addition, we illustrate how a novel multimodal approach including mobile brain and body imaging (MoBi) combined with phenomenological methods, and the implementation of interactive paradigms in a natural context, are adequate procedures to study empathy from the 5E approach. In doing so, we present the Empirical 5E approach (E5E) as an integrative scientific framework to bridge brain/body and phenomenological attributes in an interbody interactive setting. Progressing toward an E5E approach can be crucial to understanding empathy in accordance with the complexity of how it is experienced in the real world.
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Affiliation(s)
- Alejandro Troncoso
- Center for Social and Cognitive Neuroscience, School of Psychology, Adolfo Ibáñez University, Santiago, Chile
| | - Vicente Soto
- Center for Social and Cognitive Neuroscience, School of Psychology, Adolfo Ibáñez University, Santiago, Chile
| | - Antoni Gomila
- Department of Psychology, University of the Balearic Islands, Palma de Mallorca, Spain
| | - David Martínez-Pernía
- Center for Social and Cognitive Neuroscience, School of Psychology, Adolfo Ibáñez University, Santiago, Chile
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Fingelkurts AA, Fingelkurts AA. Patients with Disorders of Consciousness: Are They Nonconscious, Unconscious, or Subconscious? Expanding the Discussion. Brain Sci 2023; 13:brainsci13050814. [PMID: 37239286 DOI: 10.3390/brainsci13050814] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/24/2023] [Revised: 05/14/2023] [Accepted: 05/16/2023] [Indexed: 05/28/2023] Open
Abstract
Unprecedented advancements in the diagnosis and treatment of patients with disorders of consciousness (DoC) have given rise to ethical questions about how to recognize and respect autonomy and a sense of agency of the personhood when those capacities are themselves disordered, as they typically are in patients with DoC. At the intersection of these questions rests the distinction between consciousness and unconsciousness. Indeed, evaluations of consciousness levels and capacity for recovery have a significant impact on decisions regarding whether to discontinue or prolong life-sustaining therapy for DoC patients. However, in the unconsciousness domain, there is the confusing array of terms that are regularly used interchangeably, making it quite challenging to comprehend what unconsciousness is and how it might be empirically grounded. In this opinion paper, we will provide a brief overview of the state of the field of unconsciousness and show how a rapidly evolving electroencephalogram (EEG) neuroimaging technique may offer empirical, theoretical, and practical tools to approach unconsciousness and to improve our ability to distinguish consciousness from unconsciousness and also nonconsciousness with greater precision, particularly in cases that are borderline (as is typical in patients with DoC). Furthermore, we will provide a clear description of three distant notions of (un)consciousness (unconsciousness, nonconsciousness, and subconsciousness) and discuss how they relate to the experiential selfhood which is essential for comprehending the moral significance of what makes life worth living.
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Martínez-Pernía D, Cea I, Troncoso A, Blanco K, Calderón Vergara J, Baquedano C, Araya-Veliz C, Useros-Olmo A, Huepe D, Carrera V, Mack Silva V, Vergara M. "I am feeling tension in my whole body": An experimental phenomenological study of empathy for pain. Front Psychol 2023; 13:999227. [PMID: 36687843 PMCID: PMC9845790 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2022.999227] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/20/2022] [Accepted: 11/28/2022] [Indexed: 01/06/2023] Open
Abstract
Introduction Traditionally, empathy has been studied from two main perspectives: the theory-theory approach and the simulation theory approach. These theories claim that social emotions are fundamentally constituted by mind states in the brain. In contrast, classical phenomenology and recent research based on the enactive theories consider empathy as the basic process of contacting others' emotional experiences through direct bodily perception and sensation. Objective This study aims to enrich the knowledge of the empathic experience of pain using an experimental phenomenological method. Materials and methods Implementing an experimental paradigm used in affective neuroscience, we exposed 28 healthy adults to a video of sportspersons suffering physical accidents while practicing extreme sports. Immediately after watching the video, each participant underwent a phenomenological interview to gather data on embodied, multi-layered dimensions (bodily sensations, emotions, and motivations) and temporal aspects of empathic experience. We also performed quantitative analyses of the phenomenological categories. Results Experiential access to the other person's painful experience involves four main themes. Bodily resonance: participants felt a multiplicity of bodily, affective, and kinesthetic sensations in coordination with the sportsperson's bodily actions. Attentional focus: some participants centered their attention more on their own personal discomfort and sensations of rejection, while others on the pain and suffering experienced by the sportspersons. Kinesthetic motivation: some participants experienced the feeling in their bodies to avoid or escape from watching the video, while others experienced the need to help the sportspersons avoid suffering any injury while practicing extreme sports. The temporality of experience: participants witnessed temporal fluctuations in their experiences, bringing intensity changes in their bodily resonance, attentional focus, and kinesthetic motivation. Finally, two experiential structures were found: one structure is self-centered empathic experience, characterized by bodily resonance, attentional focus centered on the participant's own experience of seeing the sportsperson suffering, and self-protective kinesthetic motivation; the other structure is other-centered empathic experience, characterized by bodily resonance, attentional focus centered on the sportsperson, and prosocial kinesthetic motivation to help them. Discussion We show how phenomenological data may contribute to comprehending empathy for pain in social neuroscience. In addition, we address the phenomenological aspect of the enactive approach to the three dimensions of an embodiment of human consciousness, especially the intersubjective dimension. Also, based on our results, we suggest an extension of the enactive theory of non-interactive social experience.
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Affiliation(s)
- David Martínez-Pernía
- School of Psychology, Center for Social and Cognitive Neuroscience (CSCN), Universidad Adolfo Ibáñez, Santiago, Chile,Faculty of Medicine, Geroscience Center for Brain Health and Metabolism (GERO), University of Chile, Santiago, Chile,Faculty of Medicine, Memory and Neuropsychiatric Clinic (CMYN), Neurology Service, Hospital del Salvador, University of Chile, Santiago, Chile,*Correspondence: David Martínez-Pernía,
| | - Ignacio Cea
- School of Psychology, Center for Social and Cognitive Neuroscience (CSCN), Universidad Adolfo Ibáñez, Santiago, Chile,Philosophy Department, Faculty of Philosophy and Humanities, Universidad Alberto Hurtado, Santiago, Chile
| | - Alejandro Troncoso
- School of Psychology, Center for Social and Cognitive Neuroscience (CSCN), Universidad Adolfo Ibáñez, Santiago, Chile
| | - Kevin Blanco
- School of Psychology, Center for Social and Cognitive Neuroscience (CSCN), Universidad Adolfo Ibáñez, Santiago, Chile
| | - Jorge Calderón Vergara
- School of Psychology, Center for Social and Cognitive Neuroscience (CSCN), Universidad Adolfo Ibáñez, Santiago, Chile
| | - Constanza Baquedano
- School of Psychology, Center for Social and Cognitive Neuroscience (CSCN), Universidad Adolfo Ibáñez, Santiago, Chile
| | | | - Ana Useros-Olmo
- Unidad de Daño Cerebral, Hospital Beata María Ana, Madrid, Spain,Departamento de Fisioterapia and Motion in Brains Research Group, Institute of Neuroscience and Sciences of the Movement (INCIMOV), Centro Superior de Estudios Universitarios La Salle, Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, Madrid, Spain
| | - David Huepe
- School of Psychology, Center for Social and Cognitive Neuroscience (CSCN), Universidad Adolfo Ibáñez, Santiago, Chile
| | - Valentina Carrera
- School of Psychology, Center for Social and Cognitive Neuroscience (CSCN), Universidad Adolfo Ibáñez, Santiago, Chile
| | - Victoria Mack Silva
- School of Psychology, Center for Social and Cognitive Neuroscience (CSCN), Universidad Adolfo Ibáñez, Santiago, Chile
| | - Mayte Vergara
- School of Psychology, Center for Social and Cognitive Neuroscience (CSCN), Universidad Adolfo Ibáñez, Santiago, Chile
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