Should Behavior Harmful to Others Be a Sufficient Criterion of Mental Disorders? Conceptual Problems of the Diagnoses of Antisocial Personality Disorder and Pedophilic Disorder

Pathways to antisocial behavior: a framework to improve diagnostics and tailor therapeutic interventions

The Antisocial Personality Disorder (ASPD), and antisocial behavior (ASB) in general, is associated with significant impact on individuals themselves, their environment, and society. Although various interventions show promising results, no evidence-based treatments are available for individuals with ASPD. Therefore, making informed choices about which treatment can be applied to an individual patient is complicated. Furthermore, contradictory findings on therapy effectiveness and underlying factors of ASB, such as cognitive impairments and personality traits, fuel the debate whether the conceptualization of ASPD in the DSM-5 is accurate and whether this population can be seen as homogeneous. A conceptual framework, based on the reciprocal altruism theory, is presented in which we propose different pathways to ASB. These pathways suggest underlying dynamics of ASB and provide an explanation for previous contradictory research outcomes. This framework is intended to serve as a clinically relevant model that provides directions for improving diagnostics and matching treatments to underlying dynamics in the antisocial population.

The evolution of personality disorders: A review of proposals

Personality disorders (PDs) are currently considered dysfunctions. However, personality differences are older than humanity and are ubiquitous in nature, from insects to higher primates. This suggests that a number of evolutionary mechanisms-other than dysfunctions-may be able to maintain stable behavioral variation in the gene pool. First of all, apparently maladaptive traits may actually improve fitness by enabling better survival or successful mating or reproduction, as exemplified by neuroticism, psychopathy, and narcissism. Furthermore, some PDs may harm important biological goals while facilitating others, or may be globally beneficial or detrimental depending on environmental circumstances or body condition. Alternatively, certain traits may form part of life history strategies: Coordinated suites of morphological, physiological and behavioral characters that optimize fitness through alternative routes and respond to selection as a whole. Still others may be vestigial adaptations that are no longer beneficial in present times. Finally, variation may be adaptative in and by itself, as it reduces competition for finite resources. These and other evolutionary mechanisms are reviewed and illustrated through human and non-human examples. Evolutionary theory is the best-substantiated explanatory framework across the life sciences, and may shed light on the question of why harmful personalities exist at all.

The Societal Response to Psychopathy in the Community

The harm usually associated with psychopathy requires therapeutically, legally, and ethically satisfactory solutions. Scholars from different fields have, thus, examined whether empirical evidence shows that individuals with psychopathic traits satisfy concepts, such as responsibility, mental disorder, or disability, that have specific legal or ethical implications. The present paper considers the less discussed issue of whether psychopathy is a disability. As it has been shown for the cases of the responsibility and mental disorder status of psychopathic individuals, we argue that it is undecided whether psychopathy is a disability. Nonetheless, based on insights from disability studies and legislations, we propose that interventions to directly modify the propensities of individuals with psychopathic tendencies should be balanced with modifications of the social and physical environments to accommodate their peculiarities. We also suggest how this social approach in some practical contexts that involve non-offender populations might be effective in addressing some of the negative effects of psychopathy.

Scientism, Ethics and Evil: From Mens Rea to Cerebrum Reus

Can criminology thrive on quantitative studies alone? Can evil be operationalized? Quantitative work may have, for the time being, supplanted common sense, personal experience and resulting in an improbable "Periodic Table of humanity". Has the construction of the psychopathic concept surpassed positivist "constitutional" formulations and translated into effective (re)habilitation of individuals lacking affiliative ethical behaviors? Or has it simply fueled a deterministic neo-Lombrosian truism: moral development has a brain. Has it helped so far? Has letting go of fundamental moral concepts, implicit in organized religion - but pervasive in most cultures irrespective of religious affiliation and devotion - in favor of causal explanations based solely on neuroimaging, personality inventories or structured emotional decoding tasks, made a difference in the life - or in the defense for that matter - of wrongdoers diagnosed as intrinsically evil?