Dissociating what and when of intentional actions

Can neuroscience enlighten the philosophical debate about free will?

Free will has been at the heart of philosophical and scientific discussions for many years. However, recent advances in neuroscience have been perceived as a threat to the commonsense notion of free will as they challenge two core requirements for actions to be free. The first is the notion of determinism and free will, i.e., decisions and actions must not be entirely determined by antecedent causes. The second is the notion of mental causation, i.e., our mental state must have causal effects in the physical world, in other words, actions are caused by conscious intention. We present the classical philosophical positions related to determinism and mental causation, and discuss how neuroscience could shed a new light on the philosophical debate based on recent experimental findings. Overall, we conclude that the current evidence is insufficient to undermine free will.

Task-based functional connectivity identifies two segregated networks underlying intentional action

While much of motor behavior is automatic, intentional action is necessary for the selection and initiation of controlled motor acts and is thus an essential part of goal-directed behavior. Neuroimaging studies have shown that self-generated action implicates several dorsal and ventral frontoparietal areas. However, knowledge of the functional coupling between these brain regions during intentional action remains limited. We here studied brain activations and functional connectivity (FC) of thirty right-handed healthy participants performing a finger pressing task instructed to use a specific finger (externally-triggered action) or to select one of four fingers randomly (internally-generated action). Participants performed the task in alternating order either with their dominant right hand or the left hand. Consistent with previous studies, we observed stronger involvement of posterior parietal cortex and premotor regions when contrasting internally-generated with externally-triggered action. Interestingly, this contrast also revealed significant engagement of medial occipitotemporal regions including the left lingual and right fusiform gyrus. Task-based FC analysis identified increased functional coupling among frontoparietal regions as well as increased and decreased coupling between occipitotemporal regions, thus differentiating between two segregated networks. When comparing results of the dominant and nondominant hand we found less activation, but stronger connectivity for the former, suggesting increased neural efficiency when participants use their dominant hand. Taken together, our results reveal that two segregated networks that encompass the frontoparietal and occipitotemporal cortex contribute independently to intentional action.

Motor awareness: a model based on neurological syndromes

Motor awareness is a complex, multifaceted construct involving the awareness of both (i) one's motor state while executing a movement or remaining still and (ii) one's motor abilities. The analysis of neurological syndromes associated with motor disorders suggests the existence of various different components which are, however, integrated into a model of motor awareness. These components are: (i) motor intention, namely, a conscious desire to perform an action; (ii) motor monitoring and error recognition, that is, the capacity to check the execution of the action and identify motor errors; and (iii) a general awareness of one's own motor abilities and deficits, that is, the capacity to recognize the general state of one's motor abilities about the performance of specific actions and the potential consequences of motor impairment. Neuroanatomical correlates involving the parietal and insular cortices, the medial and lateral frontal regions, and subcortical structures (basal ganglia and limbic system) support this multi-component model. Specific damage (or disconnections) to these structures results in a number of different disorders in motor awareness, such as anosognosia for hemiplegia and apraxia, and a number of symptoms which are specific to motor intention disorders (e.g., the Anarchic Hand Syndrome and Tourette's Syndrome) or motor monitoring (e.g., Parkinson's and Huntington's diseases). All of these clinical conditions are discussed in the light of a motor awareness model.

Action effect predictions in 'what', 'when', and 'whether' intentional actions

It has been proposed that intentional action can be separated into three major types depending on the nature of the action choice - what (selecting what to do), when (selecting when to act) and whether (to perform the action or not). While many theories on action control assume that intentional action involves the prediction of action effects, there has not been any attempt to compare the three types of intentional actions (what, when, whether) with respect to action-effect prediction. Here, we employ an action-effect prediction paradigm where participants select the action on every trial based on either the what (choosing between alternative actions), when (choosing to respond at different time points) or whether (choosing to perform an action or not) action components, and each action choice is followed by either a predicted (standard) or a mispredicted (deviant) tone. We found a significant P2 difference between standard/deviant tones reflecting the formation of action-effect predictions regardless of whether the action choice was based on the 'what', 'when' or 'whether' decision. Furthermore, our analysis revealed that this P2 difference for the prediction effect was not observable in non-action trials within the 'whether' condition, which suggests an action-specific prediction process.

Identification of a Brain Network Underlying the Execution of Freely Chosen Movements

Action selection refers to the decision regarding which action to perform in order to reach a desired goal, that is, the "what" component of intention. Whether the action is freely chosen or externally instructed involves different brain networks during the selection phase, but it is assumed that the way an action is selected should not influence the subsequent execution phase of the same movement. Here, we aim to test this hypothesis by investigating whether the modality of movement selection influences the brain networks involved during the execution phase of the movement. Twenty healthy volunteers performed a delayed response task in an event-related functional magnetic resonance imaging design to compare freely chosen and instructed unimanual or bimanual movements during the execution phase. Using activation analyses, we found that the pre-supplementary motor area (preSMA) and the parietal and cerebellar areas were more activated during the execution phase of freely chosen as compared to instructed movements. Connectivity analysis showed an increase of information flow between the right posterior parietal cortex and the cerebellum for freely chosen compared to instructed movements. We suggest that the parieto-cerebellar network is particularly engaged during freely chosen movement to monitor the congruence between the intentional content of our actions and their outcome.

Functional localization and categorization of intentional decisions in humans: A meta-analysis of brain imaging studies

Brain-imaging research on intentional decision-making often employs a "free-choice" paradigm, in which participants choose among options with identical values or outcomes. Although the medial prefrontal cortex has commonly been associated with choices, there is no consensus on the wider network that underlies diverse intentional decisions and behaviours. Our systematic literature search identified 35 fMRI/PET experiments using various free-choice paradigms, with appropriate control conditions using external instructions. An Activation Likelihood Estimate (ALE) meta-analysis showed that, compared with external instructions, intentional decisions consistently activate the medial and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, the left insula and the inferior parietal lobule. We then categorized the studies into four different types according to their experimental designs: reactive motor intention, perceptual intention, inhibitory intention, and cognitive intention. We conducted conjunction and contrast meta-analyses to identify consistent and selective spatial convergence of brain activation within each specific category of intentional decision. Finally, we used meta-analytic decoding to probe cognitive processes underlying free choices. Our findings suggest that the neurocognitive process underlying intentional decision incorporates anatomically separated components subserving distinct cognitive and computational roles.

The auditory brain in action: Intention determines predictive processing in the auditory system-A review of current paradigms and findings

According to the ideomotor theory, action may serve to produce desired sensory outcomes. Perception has been widely described in terms of sensory predictions arising due to top-down input from higher order cortical areas. Here, we demonstrate that the action intention results in reliable top-down predictions that modulate the auditory brain responses. We bring together several lines of research, including sensory attenuation, active oddball, and action-related omission studies: Together, the results suggest that the intention-based predictions modulate several steps in the sound processing hierarchy, from preattentive to evaluation-related processes, also when controlling for additional prediction sources (i.e., sound regularity). We propose an integrative theoretical framework—the extended auditory event representation system (AERS), a model compatible with the ideomotor theory, theory of event coding, and predictive coding. Initially introduced to describe regularity-based auditory predictions, we argue that the extended AERS explains the effects of action intention on auditory processing while additionally allowing studying the differences and commonalities between intention- and regularity-based predictions—we thus believe that this framework could guide future research on action and perception.

What exactly is missing here? The sensory processing of unpredictable omissions is modulated by the specificity of expected action-effects

We select our actions according to the desired outcomes; for instance, piano players press certain keys to generate specific musical notes. It is well-described that the omission of a predicted action-effect may elicit prediction error signals in the brain, but what happens in the case of simultaneous effector-specific (by contrast to effector-unspecific) predictions? To answer this question, we asked participants to press left and right keys to generate tones A and B; based on the action-effect association, the tones' identity was either predictable or unpredictable, while rarely, the expected input was omitted. Crucially, the data show that omissions following hand-specific associations reliably elicited a late omission N1 (oN1) component, by contrast to the hand-unspecific associations, where the late oN1 was rather weak. An additional condition where both key-presses generated a unique tone was implemented. Here, rare omissions of the expected tone generated both early and late oN1 responses, by contrast to the condition in which two simultaneous action-effect representations had to be maintained, where only late oN1 responses were elicited. Finally, omission P3 (oP3) responses were strongly elicited for all omission types without differences, indicating that a general expectation based on a tone presentation (rather than which tone), is likely indexed at this stage. The present results emphasize the top-down effects of action intention on the sensory processing of omissions, where unspecific (vs. specific) and multiple (vs. single) action-effect representations are associated with processing costs at the early sensory levels.

Differential Reorganization of SMA Subregions After Stroke: A Subregional Level Resting-State Functional Connectivity Study

Background and Purpose: The human supplementary motor area (SMA) contains two functional subregions of the SMA proper and preSMA; however, the reorganization patterns of the two SMA subregions after stroke remain uncertain. Meanwhile, a focal subcortical lesion may affect the overall functional reorganization of brain networks. We sought to identify the differential reorganization of the SMA subregions after subcortical stroke using the resting-state functional connectivity (rsFC) analysis. Methods: Resting-state functional MRI was conducted in 25 patients with chronic capsular stroke exhibiting well-recovered global motor function (Fugl-Meyer score >90). The SMA proper and preSMA were identified by the rsFC-based parcellation, and the rsFCs of each SMA subregion were compared between stroke patients and healthy controls. Results: Despite common rsFC with the fronto-insular cortex (FIC), the SMA proper and preSMA were mainly correlated with the sensorimotor areas and cognitive-related regions, respectively. In stroke patients, the SMA proper and preSMA exhibited completely different functional reorganization patterns: the former showed increased rsFCs with the primary sensorimotor area and caudal cingulate motor area (CMA) of the motor execution network, whereas the latter showed increased rsFC with the rostral CMA of the motor control network. Both of the two SMA subregions showed decreased rsFC with the FIC in stroke patients; the preSMA additionally showed decreased rsFC with the prefrontal cortex (PFC). Conclusion: Although both SMA subregions exhibit functional disconnection with the cognitive-related areas, the SMA proper is implicated in the functional reorganization within the motor execution network, whereas the preSMA is involved in the functional reorganization within the motor control network in stroke patients.

From Freedom From to Freedom To: New Perspectives on Intentional Action

There are few concepts as relevant as that of intentional action in shaping our sense of self and the interaction with the environment. At the same time, few concepts are so elusive. Indeed, both conceptual and neuroscientific accounts of intentional agency have proven to be problematic. On the one hand, most conceptual views struggle in defining how agents can adequately exert control over their actions. On the other hand, neuroscience settles for definitions by exclusion whereby key features of human intentional actions, including goal-directness, remain underspecified. This paper reviews the existing literature and sketches how this gap might be filled. In particular, we defend a gradualist notion of intentional behavior, which revolves around the following key features: autonomy, flexibility in the integration of causal vectors, and control.

The Brain in (Willed) Action: A Meta-Analytical Comparison of Imaging Studies on Motor Intentionality and Sense of Agency

Voluntary actions can be fractionated in different phenomena: from the emergence of intentions and the ensuing motor plans and actions, to the anticipation and monitoring of their outcomes, to the appreciation of their congruency with intentions and to the eventual emergence of a sense of agency. It follows that motor intention and the sense of agency should occur at different stages in the normal generation of willed actions. Both these processes have been associated with a fronto-parietal motor network, but no study has investigated to what extent the two experiences can be dissociated for the brain regions involved. To this end, we assessed the PET/fMRI literature on agency and intentionality using a meta-analytic technique based on a hierarchical clustering algorithm. Beside a shared brain network involving the meso-frontal and prefrontal regions, the middle insula and subcortical structures, we found that motor intention and the sense of agency are functionally underpinned by separable sets of brain regions: an “intentionality network,” involving the rostral area of the mesial frontal cortex (middle cingulum and pre-supplementary motor area), the anterior insula and the parietal lobules, and a “self-agency network,” which involves the posterior areas of the mesial frontal cortex (the SMA proper), the posterior insula, the occipital lobe and the cerebellum. We were then able to confirm this functional organization by a subsequent seed-based fMRI resting-state functional connectivity analysis, with seeds derived from the intentionality/sense of agency specific clusters of the medial wall of the frontal lobe. Our results suggest the existence of a rostro-caudal gradient within the mesial frontal cortex, with the more anterior regions linked to the concept of motor intentionality and the brain areas located more posteriorly associated with the direct monitoring between the action and its outcome. This suggestion is reinforced by the association between the sense of agency and the activation of the occipital lobes, to suggest a direct comparison between the movement and its external (e.g., visual) consequences. The shared network may be important for the integration of intentionality and agency in a coherent appreciation of self-generated actions.

Abnormal intrinsic functional activity in patients with cervical spondylotic myelopathy: a resting-state fMRI study

PURPOSE

We employed resting-state fMRI analyses to reveal central functional reorganization in the brains of patients with cervical spondylotic myelopathy (CSM) and to provide complementary evidence of cortex reorganization in these patients.

PATIENTS AND METHODS

We obtained Fisher's z transformation amplitude of low-frequency fluctuations (zALFF) and Fisher's z transformation regional homogeneity (zReHo) measurements from 33 patients with CSM and 33 healthy controls (HC) and used the brain regions with significant alterations in the zALFF or zReHo values as seed regions. Then, we calculated Pearson's correlation coefficients between the resting-state time courses of each seed and the time series of the rest of the brain. Lastly, we computed correlations between the altered zALFF, zReHo, and functional connectivity with Japanese Orthopaedic Association scores, Neck Disability Index score, and the duration of symptoms in patients with CSM.

RESULTS

zALFF and zReHo values were increased in the left medial superior frontal gyrus (lSFGmed) and left supramarginal gyrus (lSMG) in patients with CSM compared with those in the HC group. Selecting lSFGmed as the seed, we observed increased functional connectivity between it and the left postcentral gyrus (lPoCG) and left rolandic operculum and decreased functional connectivity with the right medial superior frontal gyrus in patients with CSM. In addition, there was a significant increase in the functional connectivity between the lSMG (seed) and the left calcarine and lPoCG in patients with CSM. However, we did not find any significant correlation between the resting-state findings and the clinical performance of patients with CSM.

CONCLUSION

These observed intrinsic functional changes in the patients with CSM may be related to functional reorganization and reflect the innate cortical plasticity in patients with CSM. Notably, the increased connectivity between the lPoCG and the two seed ROIs indicates the adaptive changes in patients with CSM. These findings provide complementary evidence of cortex reorganization in CSM.

Time scale properties of task and resting-state functional connectivity: Detrended partial cross-correlation analysis

Functional connectivity analysis is an essential tool for understanding brain function. Previous studies showed that brain regions are functionally connected through low-frequency signals both within the default mode network (DMN) and task networks. However, no studies have directly compared the time scale (frequency) properties of network connectivity during task versus rest, or examined how they relate to task performance. Here, using fMRI data collected from sixty-eight subjects at rest and during a stop signal task, we addressed this issue with a novel functional connectivity measure based on detrended partial cross-correlation analysis (DPCCA). DPCCA has the advantage of quantifying correlations between two variables in different time scales while controlling for the influence of other variables. The results showed that the time scales of within-network connectivity of the DMN and task networks are modulated in opposite directions across rest and task, with the time scale increased during rest vs. task in the DMN and vice versa in task networks. In regions of interest analysis, the within-network connectivity time scale of the pre-supplementary motor area - a medial prefrontal cortical structure of the task network and critical to proactive inhibitory control - correlated inversely with Barratt impulsivity and stop signal reaction time. Together, these findings demonstrate that time scale properties of brain networks may vary across mental states and provide evidence in support of a role of low frequency fluctuations of BOLD signals in behavioral control.

Tracking the will to attend: Cortical activity indexes self-generated, voluntary shifts of attention

The neural substrates of volition have long tantalized philosophers and scientists. Over the past few decades, researchers have employed increasingly sophisticated technology to investigate this issue, but many studies have been limited considerably by their reliance on intrusive experimental procedures (e.g., abrupt instructional cues), measures of brain activity contaminated by overt behavior, or introspective self-report techniques of questionable validity. Here, we used multivoxel pattern time-course analysis of functional magnetic resonance imaging data to index voluntary, covert perceptual acts-shifts of visuospatial attention-in the absence of instructional cues, overt behavioral indices, and self-report. We found that these self-generated, voluntary attention shifts were time-locked to activity in the medial superior parietal lobule, supporting the hypothesis that this brain region is engaged in voluntary attentional reconfiguration. Self-generated attention shifts were also time-locked to activity in the basal ganglia, a novel finding that motivates further research into the role of the basal ganglia in acts of volition. Remarkably, prior to self-generated shifts of attention, we observed early and selective increases in the activation of medial frontal (dorsal anterior cingulate) and lateral prefrontal (right middle frontal gyrus) cortex-activity that likely reflects processing related to the intention or preparation to reorient attention. These findings, which extend recent evidence on freely chosen motor movements, suggest that dorsal anterior cingulate and lateral prefrontal cortices play key roles in both overt and covert acts of volition, and may constitute core components of a brain network underlying the will to attend.

The What, the When, and the Whether of Intentional Action in the Brain: A Meta-Analytical Review

In their attempt to define discrete subcomponents of intentionality, Brass and Haggard (2008) proposed their What, When, and Whether model (www-model) which postulates that the content, the timing and the possibility of generating an action can be partially independent both at the cognitive level and at the level of their neural implementation. The original proposal was based on a limited number of studies, which were reviewed with a discursive approach. To assess whether the model stands in front of the more recently published data, we performed a systematic review of the literature with a meta-analytic method based on a hierarchical clustering (HC) algorithm. We identified 15 PET/fMRI studies well-suited for this quest. HC revealed the existence of a rostro-caudal gradient within the medial prefrontal cortex, with the more anterior regions (the anterior cingulum) involved in more abstract decisions of whether to execute an action and the more posterior ones (the middle cingulum or the SMA) recruited in specifying the content and the timing components of actions. However, in contrast with the original www-model, this dissociation involves also brain regions well outside the median wall of the frontal lobe, in a component specific manner: the supramarginal gyrus for the what component, the pallidum and the thalamus for the when component, the putamen and the insula for the whether component. We then calculated co-activation maps on the three component-specific www clusters of the medial wall of the frontal/limbic lobe: to this end, we used the activation likelihood approach that we applied on the imaging studies on action contained in the BrainMap.org database. This analysis confirmed the main findings of the HC analyses. However, the BrainMap.org data analyses also showed that the aforementioned segregations are generated by paradigms in which subjects act in response to conditional stimuli rather than while driven by their own intentions. We conclude that the available data confirm that the neural underpinnings of intentionality can be fractionated in discrete components that are partially independent. We also suggest that intentionality manifests itself in discrete components through the boosting of general purpose action-related regions specialized for different aspects of action selection and inhibition.

Elucidating the neural circuitry underlying planning of internally-guided voluntary action

In an attempt to elucidate the neural circuitry of planning of internally guided voluntary action, Ariani et al. (2015) used a delayed-movement design and multivariate pattern analysis of functional MRI data and found areas decoding internally elicited action plans, stimulus-elicited action plans, and both types of plans. In interpreting their results in the context of a heuristic decision model of voluntary action, encompassing "what" action to perform, "when" to perform it, and "whether" to perform it at all, we highlight at least some neural dissociation of these components. More to that, we note that the exact neural circuitry of each component might vary depending on the performed action type, and finally, we underscore the importance of understanding the temporal specifics of such circuitries to further elucidate how they are involved and interact during voluntary action planning.

The ideomotor recycling theory for tool use, language, and foresight

The present theoretical framework highlights a common action-perception mechanism for tool use, spoken language, and foresight capacity. On the one hand, it has been suggested that human language and the capacity to envision the future (i.e. foresight) have, from an evolutionary viewpoint, developed mutually along with the pressure of tool use. This co-evolution has afforded humans an evident survival advantage in the animal kingdom because language can help to refine the representation of future scenarios, which in turn can help to encourage or discourage engagement in appropriate and efficient behaviours. On the other hand, recent assumptions regarding the evolution of the brain have capitalized on the concept of "neuronal recycling". In the domain of cognitive neuroscience, neuronal recycling means that during evolution, some neuronal areas and cognitive functions have been recycled to manage new environmental and social constraints. In the present article, we propose that the co-evolution of tool use, language, and foresight represents a suitable example of such functional recycling throughout a well-defined common action-perception mechanism, i.e. the ideomotor mechanism. This ideomotor account is discussed in light of different future ontogenetic and phylogenetic perspectives.

Increased Event-Related Potentials and Alpha-, Beta-, and Gamma-Activity Associated with Intentional Actions

Objective: Internally guided actions are defined as being purposeful, self-generated and offering choices between alternatives. Intentional actions are essential to reach individual goals. In previous empirical studies, internally guided actions were predominantly related to functional responses in frontal and parietal areas. The aim of the present study was to distinguish event-related potentials and oscillatory responses of intentional actions and externally guided actions. In addition, we compared neurobiological findings of the decision which action to perform with those referring to the decision whether or not to perform an action.

Methods: Twenty-eight subjects participated in adapted go/nogo paradigms, including a voluntary selection condition allowing participants to (1) freely decide whether to press the response button or (2) to decide whether they wanted to press the response button with the right index finger or the left index finger.

Results: The reaction times were increased when participants freely decided whether and how they wanted to respond compared to the go condition. Intentional processes were associated with a fronto-centrally located N2 and P3 potential. N2 and P3 amplitudes were increased during intentional actions compared to instructed responses (go). In addition, increased activity in the alpha-, beta- and gamma-frequency range was shown during voluntary behavior rather than during externally guided responses.

Conclusion: These results may indicate that an additional cognitive process is needed for intentional actions compared to instructed behavior. However, the neural responses were comparatively independent of the kind of decision that was made (1) decision which action to perform; (2) decision whether or not to perform an action).

Significance: The study demonstrates the importance of fronto-central alpha-, beta-, and gamma oscillations for voluntary behavior.

Preconscious Prediction of a Driver's Decision Using Intracranial Recordings

While driving, we make numerous conscious decisions such as route and turn direction selection. Although drivers are held responsible, the neural processes that govern such decisions are not clear. We recorded intracranial EEG signals from six patients engaged in a computer-based driving simulator. Patients decided which way to turn (left/right) and subsequently reported the time of the decision. We show that power modulations of gamma band oscillations (30–100 Hz) preceding the reported time of decision (up to 5.5 sec) allow prediction of decision content with high accuracy (up to 82.4%) on a trial-by-trial basis, irrespective of subsequent motor output. Moreover, these modulations exhibited a spatiotemporal gradient, differentiating left/right decisions earliest in premotor cortices and later in more anterior and lateral regions. Our results suggest a preconscious role for the premotor cortices in early stages of decision-making, which permits foreseeing and perhaps modifying the content of real-life human choices before they are consciously made.

Anticipating conflict: Neural correlates of a Bayesian belief and its motor consequence

Previous studies have examined the neural correlates of proactive control using a variety of behavioral paradigms; however, the neural network relating the control process to its behavioral consequence remains unclear. Here, we applied a dynamic Bayesian model to a large fMRI data set of the stop signal task to address this issue. By estimating the probability of the stop signal - p(Stop) - trial by trial, we showed that higher p(Stop) is associated with prolonged go trial reaction time (RT), indicating proactive control of motor response. In modeling fMRI signals at trial and target onsets, we distinguished activities of proactive control, prediction error, and RT slowing. We showed that the anterior pre-supplementary motor area (pre-SMA) responds specifically to increased stop signal likelihood, and its activity is correlated with activations of the posterior pre-SMA and bilateral anterior insula during prolonged response times. This directional link is also supported by Granger causality analysis. Furthermore, proactive control, prediction error, and time-on-task are each mapped to distinct areas in the medial prefrontal cortex. Together, these findings dissect regional functions of the medial prefrontal cortex in cognitive control and provide system level evidence associating conflict anticipation with its motor consequence.

Neurocognitive mechanisms of perception-action coordination: a review and theoretical integration

The present analysis aims at a theoretical integration of, and a systems-neuroscience perspective on, a variety of historical and contemporary views on perception-action coordination (PAC). We set out to determine the common principles or lawful linkages between sensory and motor systems that explain how perception is action-oriented and how action is perceptually guided. To this end, we analyze the key ingredients to such an integrated framework, examine the architecture of dual-system conjectures of PAC, and endeavor in an historical analysis of the key characteristics, mechanisms, and phenomena of PACs. This analysis will reveal that dual-systems views are in need of fundamental re-thinking, and its elements will be amalgamated with current views on action-oriented predictive processing into a novel integrative theoretical framework (IMPPACT: Impetus, Motivation, and Prediction in Perception-Action Coordination theory). From this framework and its neurocognitive architecture we derive a number of non-trivial predictions regarding conative, motive-driven PAC. We end by presenting a brief outlook on how IMPPACT might present novel insights into certain pathologies and into action expertise.

The role of the striatum in effort-based decision-making in the absence of reward

Decision-making involves weighing costs against benefits, for instance, in terms of the effort it takes to obtain a reward of a given magnitude. This evaluation process has been linked to the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (dACC) and the striatum, with activation in these brain structures reflecting the discounting effect of effort on reward. Here, we investigate how cognitive effort influences neural choice processes in the absence of an extrinsic reward. Using functional magnetic resonance imaging in humans, we used an effort-based decision-making task in which participants were required to choose between two options for a subsequent flanker task that differed in the amount of cognitive effort. Cognitive effort was manipulated by varying the proportion of incongruent trials associated with each choice option. Choice-locked activation in the striatum was higher when participants chose voluntarily for the more effortful alternative but displayed the opposite trend on forced-choice trials. The dACC revealed a similar, yet only trend-level significant, activation pattern. Our results imply that activation levels in the striatum reflect a cost-benefit analysis, in which a balance is made between effort discounting and the intrinsic motivation to choose a cognitively challenging task. Moreover, our findings indicate that it matters whether this challenge is voluntarily chosen or externally imposed. As such, the present findings contrast with classical findings on effort discounting that found reductions in striatum activation for higher effort by finding enhancements of the same neural circuits when a cognitively challenging task is voluntarily selected and does not entail the danger of losing reward.

Getting the timing right: experimental protocols for investigating time with functional neuroimaging and psychopharmacology

Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) is an effective tool for identifying brain areas and networks implicated in human timing. But fMRI is not just a phrenological tool: by careful design, fMRI can be used to disentangle discrete components of a timing task and control for the underlying cognitive processes (e.g. sustained attention and WM updating) that are critical for estimating stimulus duration in the range of hundreds of milliseconds to seconds. Moreover, the use of parametric designs and correlational analyses allows us to better understand not just where, but also how, the brain processes temporal information. In addition, by combining fMRI with psychopharmacological manipulation, we can begin to uncover the complex relationship between cognition, neurochemistry and anatomy in the healthy human brain. This chapter provides an overview of some of the key findings in the functional imaging literature of both duration estimation and temporal prediction, and outlines techniques that can be used to allow timing-related activations to be interpreted more unambiguously. In our own studies, we have found that estimating event duration, whether that estimate is provided by a motor response or a perceptual discrimination, typically recruits basal ganglia, SMA and right inferior frontal cortex, and can be modulated by dopaminergic activity in these areas. By contrast, orienting attention to predictable moments in time in order to optimize behaviour, whether that is to speed motor responding or improve perceptual accuracy, recruits left inferior parietal cortex.

Brain correlates of subjective freedom of choice

The subjective feeling of free choice is an important feature of human experience. Experimental tasks have typically studied free choice by contrasting free and instructed selection of response alternatives. These tasks have been criticised, and it remains unclear how they relate to the subjective feeling of freely choosing. We replicated previous findings of the fMRI correlates of free choice, defined objectively. We introduced a novel task in which participants could experience and report a graded sense of free choice. BOLD responses for conditions subjectively experienced as free identified a postcentral area distinct from the areas typically considered to be involved in free action. Thus, the brain correlates of subjective feeling of free action were not directly related to any established brain correlates of objectively-defined free action. Our results call into question traditional assumptions about the relation between subjective experience of choosing and activity in the brain's so-called voluntary motor areas.

Hippocampus and consciousness

An important assumption concerning the physiology of consciousness is that all varieties of conscious experience are closely related to each other and, hence, are subserved by the same neural mechanism. There are several considerations that lead us to implicate the hippocampus in the generation of conscious perception and, ultimately, of conscious experiences of all kinds. Firstly, conscious perception of external events is intricately linked with the formation of episodic (declarative) memories, a key function attributed to the hippocampus. Secondly, conscious experience is allocentric and contextualized. Consciousness creates or simulates an image of the world that appears to surround us and to be independent of our observation of it. What is characteristic of wakeful consciousness and dreaming alike is that objects or events are experienced as being embedded in an external, that is, allocentric, frame of space and time. The hippocampus has been implicated in the rapid formation and memorization of allocentric representations that embed objects or events in a world context. Thirdly, the hippocampus is ideally positioned to bind information processed in different sensory association cortices. It is argued that rapidly forming patterns of neuronal ensemble firing in the hippocampus, particularly in region CA3, which encode arbitrary associations between objects and their spatiotemporal and emotional context, that is, associations between information derived from different neocortical processing streams, define the informational content of consciousness. Evidence suggestive of an important contribution of the hippocampus to conscious observation, mental imagery, dreaming, conscious anticipation of outcomes, and hallucinations will be reviewed.

Neural bases of individual variation in decision time

People make decisions by evaluating existing evidence against a threshold or level of confidence. Individuals vary widely in response times even when they perform a simple task in the laboratory. We examine the neural bases of this individual variation by combining computational modeling and brain imaging of 64 healthy adults performing a stop signal task. Behavioral performance was modeled by an accumulator model that describes the process of information growth to reach a threshold to respond. In this model, go trial reaction time (goRT) is jointly determined by the information growth rate, threshold, and movement time (MT). In a linear regression of activations in successful go and all stop (Go+Stop) trials against goRT across participants, the insula, supplementary motor area (SMA), pre-SMA, thalamus including the subthalamic nucleus (STN), and caudate head respond to increasing goRT. Among these areas, the insula, SMA, and thalamus including the STN respond to a slower growth rate, the caudate head responds to an elevated threshold, and the pre-SMA responds to a longer MT. In the regression of Go+Stop trials against the stop signal reaction time (SSRT), the pre-SMA shows a negative correlation with SSRT. These results characterize the component processes of decision making and elucidate the neural bases of a critical aspect of inter-subject variation in human behavior. These findings also suggest that the pre-SMA may play a broader role in response selection and cognitive control rather than simply response inhibition in the stop signal task.

Value of freedom to choose encoded by the human brain

Humans and animals value the opportunity to choose by preferring alternatives that offer more rather than fewer choices. This preference for choice may arise not only from an increased probability of obtaining preferred outcomes but also from the freedom it provides. We used human neuroimaging to investigate the neural basis of the preference for choice as well as for the items that could be chosen. In each trial, participants chose between two options, a monetary amount option and a "choice option." The latter consisted of a number that corresponded to the number of everyday items participants would subsequently be able to choose from. We found that the opportunity to choose from a larger number of items was equivalent to greater amounts of money, indicating that participants valued having more choice; moreover, participants varied in the degree to which they valued having the opportunity to choose, with some valuing it more than the increased probability of obtaining preferred items. Neural activations in the mid striatum increased with the value of the opportunity to choose. The same region also coded the value of the items. Conversely, activation in the dorsolateral striatum was not related to the value of the items but was elevated when participants were offered more choices, particularly in those participants who overvalued the opportunity to choose. These data suggest a functional dissociation of value representations within the striatum, with general representations in mid striatum and specific representations of the value of freedom provided by the opportunity to choose in dorsolateral striatum.

Conscious experience and episodic memory: hippocampus at the crossroads

If an instance of conscious experience of the seemingly objective world around us could be regarded as a newly formed event memory, much as an instance of mental imagery has the content of a retrieved event memory, and if, therefore, the stream of conscious experience could be seen as evidence for ongoing formation of event memories that are linked into episodic memory sequences, then unitary conscious experience could be defined as a symbolic representation of the pattern of hippocampal neuronal firing that encodes an event memory – a theoretical stance that may shed light into the mind-body and binding problems in consciousness research. Exceedingly detailed symbols that describe patterns of activity rapidly self-organizing, at each cycle of the θ rhythm, in the hippocampus are instances of unitary conscious experience that jointly constitute the stream of consciousness. Integrating object information (derived from the ventral visual stream and orbitofrontal cortex) with contextual emotional information (from the anterior insula) and spatial environmental information (from the dorsal visual stream), the hippocampus rapidly forms event codes that have the informational content of objects embedded in an emotional and spatiotemporally extending context. Event codes, formed in the CA3-dentate network for the purpose of their memorization, are not only contextualized but also allocentric representations, similarly to conscious experiences of events and objects situated in a seemingly objective and observer-independent framework of phenomenal space and time. Conscious perception, creating the spatially and temporally extending world that we perceive around us, is likely to be evolutionarily related to more fleeting and seemingly internal forms of conscious experience, such as autobiographical memory recall, mental imagery, including goal anticipation, and to other forms of externalized conscious experience, namely dreaming and hallucinations; and evidence pointing to an important contribution of the hippocampus to these conscious phenomena will be reviewed.

Imaging volition: what the brain can tell us about the will

The question of how we can voluntarily control our behaviour dates back to the beginnings of scientific psychology. Currently, there are two empirical research disciplines tackling human volition: cognitive neuroscience and social psychology. To date, there is little interaction between the two disciplines in terms of the investigation of human volition. The aim of the current article is to highlight recent brain imaging work on human volition and to relate social psychological concepts of volition to the functional neuroanatomy of intentional action. A host of studies indicate that the medial prefrontal cortex plays a crucial role in voluntary action. Accordingly, we postulate that social psychological concepts of volition can be investigated using neuroimaging techniques, and propose that by developing a social cognitive neuroscience of human volition, we may gain a deeper understanding of this fascinating and complex aspect of the human mind.

The "what" and "when" of self-initiated movements

The ability to generate intentional behavior is undeniably at the core of what makes us acting subjects. Intentional actions consist of at least 2 components (Brass M, Haggard P. 2008. The what, when, whether model of intentional action. Neuroscientist. 14:319-325.): choosing an appropriate behavior (what) and selecting the moment of execution (when). The aim of this study was to identify differing and overlapping neural networks underlying the "what" and "when" of intentional movement initiation. While scanned with functional magnetic resonance imaging, 35 healthy subjects performed self-initiated and reactive, that is, internally and externally triggered movements of the right or left index finger in 3 experimental conditions: 1) "Free Choice" (free timing: when/choice of hand: what), 2) "Timed Choice" (external timing/choice of hand: what), and 3) "No Choice" (external timing/cued hand). The what-component specifically employed the presupplementary motor area (SMA) and dorsal premotor cortex bilaterally. The when-network consisted of superior SMA together with insula and Area 44 bilaterally as well as bilateral anterior putamen, globus pallidus, and left cerebellum subcortically. These 2 components recruited different networks, pointing to a partially distinct neuronal realization of the relating functions. Finally, the more intentional components were involved, the higher was activity in the anterior midcingulate cortex, which highlighted its role in intentional initiation of behavior.

How Predictable are "Spontaneous Decisions" and "Hidden Intentions"? Comparing Classification Results Based on Previous Responses with Multivariate Pattern Analysis of fMRI BOLD Signals

In two replication studies we examined response bias and dependencies in voluntary decisions. We trained a linear classifier to predict “spontaneous decisions” and in the second study “hidden intentions” from responses in preceding trials and achieved comparable prediction accuracies as reported for multivariate pattern classification based on voxel activities in frontopolar cortex. We discuss implications of our findings and suggest ways to improve classification analyses of fMRI BOLD signals that may help to reduce effects of response dependencies between trials.

Sensorimotor integration and psychopathology: motor control abnormalities related to psychiatric disorders

OBJECTIVES

Recent evidence is reviewed to examine relationships among sensorimotor and cognitive aspects in some important psychiatry disorders. This study reviews the theoretical models in the context of sensorimotor integration and the abnormalities reported in the most common psychiatric disorders, such as Alzheimer's disease, autism spectrum disorder and squizophrenia.

METHODS

The bibliographical search used Pubmed/Medline, ISI Web of Knowledge, Cochrane data base and Scielo databases. The terms chosen for the search were: Alzheimer's disease, AD, autism spectrum disorder, and Squizophrenia in combination with sensorimotor integration. Fifty articles published in English and were selected conducted from 1989 up to 2010.

RESULTS

We found that the sensorimotor integration process plays a relevant role in elementary mechanisms involved in occurrence of abnormalities in most common psychiatric disorders, participating in the acquisition of abilities that have as critical factor the coupling of different sensory data which will constitute the basis of elaboration of consciously goal-directed motor outputs. Whether these disorders are associated with an abnormal peripheral sensory input or defective central processing is still unclear, but some studies support a central mechanism.

CONCLUSION

Sensorimotor integration seems to play a significant role in the disturbances of motor control, like deficits in the feedforward mechanism, typically seen in AD, autistic and squizophrenic patients.

Resting-state functional connectivity of the medial superior frontal cortex

The medial superior frontal cortex (SFC), including the supplementary motor area (SMA) and presupplementary motor area (preSMA), is implicated in movement and cognitive control, among other functions central to decision making. Previous studies delineated the anatomical boundaries and functional connectivity of the SMA. However, it is unclear whether the preSMA, which responds to a variety of behavioral tasks, comprises functionally distinct areas. With 24 seed regions systematically demarcated throughout the anterior and posterior medial SFC, we examined here the functional divisions of the medial SFC on the basis of the "correlograms" of resting-state functional magnetic resonance imaging data of 225 adult individuals. In addition to replicating segregation of the SMA and posterior preSMA, the current results elucidated functional connectivities of anterior preSMA-the most anterior part of the medial SFC. In contrast to the caudal medial SFC, the anterior preSMA is connected with most of the prefrontal but not with somatomotor areas. Overall, the SMA is strongly connected to the thalamus and epithalamus, the posterior preSMA to putamen, pallidum, and subthalamic nucleus, and anterior preSMA to the caudate, with the caudate showing significant hemispheric asymmetry. These findings may provide a useful platform for future studies to investigate frontal cortical functions.

Time and category information in pattern-based codes

Sensory stimuli are usually composed of different features (the what) appearing at irregular times (the when). Neural responses often use spike patterns to represent sensory information. The what is hypothesized to be encoded in the identity of the elicited patterns (the pattern categories), and the when, in the time positions of patterns (the pattern timing). However, this standard view is oversimplified. In the real world, the what and the when might not be separable concepts, for instance, if they are correlated in the stimulus. In addition, neuronal dynamics can condition the pattern timing to be correlated with the pattern categories. Hence, timing and categories of patterns may not constitute independent channels of information. In this paper, we assess the role of spike patterns in the neural code, irrespective of the nature of the patterns. We first define information-theoretical quantities that allow us to quantify the information encoded by different aspects of the neural response. We also introduce the notion of synergy/redundancy between time positions and categories of patterns. We subsequently establish the relation between the what and the when in the stimulus with the timing and the categories of patterns. To that aim, we quantify the mutual information between different aspects of the stimulus and different aspects of the response. This formal framework allows us to determine the precise conditions under which the standard view holds, as well as the departures from this simple case. Finally, we study the capability of different response aspects to represent the what and the when in the neural response.

The hidden side of intentional action: the role of the anterior insular cortex

Cognitive neuroscience research has begun to reveal the functional neuroanatomy of intentional action. This research has primarily pointed to the role of the medial frontal cortex for the voluntary control of behaviour. However, a closer inspection of the literature reveals that the anterior insular cortex (AIC) is also routinely activated in tasks that involve different aspects of intentional action. In the present article, we outline studies that have found AIC activation in various intentional action paradigms. Based on these findings, we discuss two hypotheses about the AIC's contribution to voluntary control. One hypothesis states that AIC is involved in forming intentions, by providing information about the internal states of the system. The alternative view suggests that AIC evaluates the outcomes of intentional action decisions that have been previously formed elsewhere. The limited evidence so far favours the evaluative hypothesis. AIC may provide interoceptive signals that play an essential role in evaluating the consequences of intentional action. AIC is therefore a key structure for the adaptive, affective training of the individual will, on which human society depends.

Contribution of hippocampal region CA3 to consciousness and schizophrenic hallucinations

Recent advances in understanding hippocampal information processing offer new vistas on the mind-body and binding problems. Information encoded by the autoassociation network of cornu ammonis 3 (CA3) situates landmarks and objects within an allocentric framework of space and time. Guiding locomotion across the spatial environment, and generally organizing behaviour that transcends space and time, the hippocampus creates phenomenal space and time themselves, thus laying the foundations for conscious awareness. It is argued that conscious experience describes/symbolizes the informational content of self-organizing activity patterns in CA3. Imagery, conscious perception or hallucinations do not in themselves affect the physical trajectory of behaviour but are evidence for patterns of neuronal activity that, acting via the medial prefrontal cortex, modulate action dispositions and influence prefrontal top-down attentional control of sensory processing and thus subsequent event memory formation. Evidence for GABAergic deficit and pyramidal cell hyperexcitability in CA3 in patients with schizophrenia is consistent with the notion that binding, by the CA3 network, of cortical modules representing weakly related sensory representations underlies hallucinations in this disorder.

Action selection and action awareness

Human actions are often classified as either internally generated, or externally specified in response to environmental cues. These two modes of action selection have distinct neural bases, but few studies investigated how the mode of action selection affects the subjective experience of action. We measured the experience of action using the subjective compression of the interval between actions and their effects, known as ‘temporal binding’. Participants performed either a left or a right key press, either in response to a specific cue, or as they freely chose. Moreover, the time of each keypress could either be explicitly cued to occur in one of two designated time intervals, or participants freely chose in which interval to act. Each action was followed by a specific tone. Participants judged the time of their actions or the time of the tone. Temporal binding was found for both internally generated and for stimulus-based actions. However, the amount of binding depended on whether or not both the choice and the timing of action were selected in the same way. Stronger binding was observed when both action choice and action timing were internally generated or externally specified, compared to conditions where the two parameters were selected by different routes. Our result suggests that temporal action–effect binding depends on how actions are selected. Binding is strongest when actions result from a single mode of selection.