How Organisms Gained Causal Independence and How It Might Be Quantified

How biological codes break causal chains to enable autonomy for organisms

Autonomy, meaning freedom from exogenous control, requires independence of both constitution and cybernetic regulation. Here, the necessity of biological codes to achieve both is explained, assuming that Aristotelian efficient cause is 'formal cause empowered by physical force'. Constitutive independence requires closure to efficient causation (in the Rosen sense); cybernetic independence requires transformation of cause-effect into signal-response relations at the organism boundary; the combination of both kinds of independence enables adaptation and evolution. Codes and cyphers translate information from one form of physical embodiment (domain) to another. Because information can only contribute as formal cause to efficient cause within the domain of its embodiment, translation can extend or restrict the range over which information is effective. Closure to efficient causation requires internalised information to be isolated from the cycle of efficient causes that it informs: e.g. Von Neumann self-replicator requires a (template) source of information that is causally isolated from the physical replication system. Life operationalises this isolation with the genetic code translating from the (isolated) domain of codons to that of protein interactions. Separately, cybernetic freedom is achieved at the cell boundary because transducers, which embody molecular coding, translate exogenous information into a domain where it no longer has the power of efficient cause. Information, not efficient cause, passes through the boundary to serve as stimulus for an internally generated response. Coding further extends freedom by enabling historically accumulated information to be selectively transformed into efficient cause under internal control, leaving it otherwise stored inactive. Code-based translation thus enables selective causal isolation, controlling the flow from cause to effect. Genetic code, cell-signalling codes and, in eukaryotes, the histone code, signal sequence based protein sorting and other code-dependent processes all regulate and separate causal chains. The existence of life can be seen as an expression of the power of molecular codes to selectively isolate and thereby organise causal relations among molecular interactions to form an organism.

Free energy and inference in living systems

Organisms are non-equilibrium, stationary systems self-organized via spontaneous symmetry breaking and undergoing metabolic cycles with broken detailed balance in the environment. The thermodynamic free-energy (FE) principle describes an organism's homeostasis as the regulation of biochemical work constrained by the physical FE cost. By contrast, recent research in neuroscience and theoretical biology explains a higher organism's homeostasis and allostasis as Bayesian inference facilitated by the informational FE. As an integrated approach to living systems, this study presents an FE minimization theory overarching the essential features of both the thermodynamic and neuroscientific FE principles. Our results reveal that the perception and action of animals result from active inference entailed by FE minimization in the brain, and the brain operates as a Schrödinger's machine conducting the neural mechanics of minimizing sensory uncertainty. A parsimonious model suggests that the Bayesian brain develops the optimal trajectories in neural manifolds and induces a dynamic bifurcation between neural attractors in the process of active inference.

Is information the other face of causation in biological systems?

Is information the other face of causation? This issue cannot be clarified without discussing how these both are related to physical laws, logic, computation, networks, bio-signaling, and the mind-body problem. The relation between information and causation is also intrinsically linked to many other concepts in complex systems theory such as emergence, self-organization, synergy, criticality, and hierarchy, which in turn involve various notions such as observer-dependence, dimensionality reduction, and especially downward causation. A canonical example proposed for downward causation is the collective behavior of the whole system at a macroscale that may affect the behavior of each its member at a microscale. In neuroscience, downward causation is suggested as a strong candidate to account for mental causation (free will). However, this would be possible only on the condition that information might have causal power. After introducing the Causal Equivalence Principle expanding the relativity principle for coarse-grained and fine-grained linear causal chains, and a set-theoretical definition of multiscale nested hierarchy composed of modular ⊂-chains, it is shown that downward causation can be spurious. It emerges only in the eyes of an observer, though, due to information that could not be obtained by "looking" exclusively at the behavior of a system at a microscale. On the other hand, since biological systems are hierarchically organized, this information gain is indicative of how information can be a function of scale in these systems and a prerequisite for scale-dependent emergence of cognition and consciousness in neural networks.

Why it hurts: with freedom comes the biological need for pain

We argue that pain is not needed to protect the body from damage unless the organism is able to make free choices in action selection. Then pain (including its affective and evaluative aspects) provides a necessary prioritising motivation to select actions expected to avoid it, whilst leaving the possibility of alternative actions to serve potentially higher priorities. Thus, on adaptive grounds, only organisms having free choice over action selection should experience pain. Free choice implies actions must be selected following appraisal of their effects, requiring a predictive model generating estimates of action outcomes. These features give organisms anticipatory behavioural autonomy (ABA), for which we propose a plausible system using an internal predictive model, integrated into a system able to produce the qualitative and affective aspects of pain. Our hypothesis can be tested using behavioural experiments designed to elicit trade-off responses to novel experiences for which algorithmic (automaton) responses might be inappropriate. We discuss the empirical evidence for our hypothesis among taxonomic groups, showing how testing for ABA guides thinking on which groups might experience pain. It is likely that all vertebrates do and plausible that some invertebrates do (decapods, cephalopods and at least some insects).

How an information perspective helps overcome the challenge of biology to physics

Living systems have long been a puzzle to physics, leading some to claim that new laws of physics are needed to explain them. Separating physical reality into the general (laws) and the particular (location of particles in space and time), it is possible to see that the combination of these amounts to efficient causation, whereby forces are constrained by patterns that constitute embodied information which acts as formal cause. Embodied information can only be produced by correlation with existing patterns, but sets of patterns can be arranged to form reflexive relations in which constraints on force are themselves formed by the pattern that results from action of those same constrained forces. This inevitably produces a higher level of pattern which reflexively reinforces itself. From this, multi-level hierarchies and downward causation by information are seen to be patterns of patterns that constrain forces. Such patterns, when causally cyclical, are closed to efficient causation. But to be autonomous, a system must also have its formative information accumulated by repeated cycles of selection until sufficient is obtained to represent the information content of the whole (which is the essential purpose of information oligomers such as DNA). Living systems are the result of that process and therefore cannot exist unless they are both closed to efficient causation and capable of embodying an independent supply of information sufficient to constitute their causal structure. Understanding this is not beyond the scope of standard physics, but it does recognise the far greater importance of information accumulation in living than in non-living systems and, as a corollary, emphasises the dependence of biological systems on the whole history of life, leading up to the present state of any and all organisms.

Naturalising Agent Causation

The idea of agent causation—that a system such as a living organism can be a cause of things in the world—is often seen as mysterious and deemed to be at odds with the physicalist thesis that is now commonly embraced in science and philosophy. Instead, the causal power of organisms is attributed to mechanistic components within the system or derived from the causal activity at the lowest level of physical description. In either case, the ‘agent’ itself (i.e., the system as a whole) is left out of the picture entirely, and agent causation is explained away. We argue that this is not the right way to think about causation in biology or in systems more generally. We present a framework of eight criteria that we argue, collectively, describe a system that overcomes the challenges concerning agent causality in an entirely naturalistic and non-mysterious way. They are: (1) thermodynamic autonomy, (2) persistence, (3) endogenous activity, (4) holistic integration, (5) low-level indeterminacy, (6) multiple realisability, (7) historicity, (8) agent-level normativity. Each criterion is taken to be dimensional rather than categorical, and thus we conclude with a short discussion on how researchers working on quantifying agency may use this multidimensional framework to situate and guide their research.

Quantifying the Autonomy of Structurally Diverse Automata: A Comparison of Candidate Measures

Should the internal structure of a system matter when it comes to autonomy? While there is still no consensus on a rigorous, quantifiable definition of autonomy, multiple candidate measures and related quantities have been proposed across various disciplines, including graph-theory, information-theory, and complex system science. Here, I review and compare a range of measures related to autonomy and intelligent behavior. To that end, I analyzed the structural, information-theoretical, causal, and dynamical properties of simple artificial agents evolved to solve a spatial navigation task, with or without a need for associative memory. By contrast to standard artificial neural networks with fixed architectures and node functions, here, independent evolution simulations produced successful agents with diverse neural architectures and functions. This makes it possible to distinguish quantities that characterize task demands and input-output behavior, from those that capture intrinsic differences between substrates, which may help to determine more stringent requisites for autonomous behavior and the means to measure it.

The Shared Origins of Embodiment and Development

As a domain of study centering on the nature of the body in the functioning of the individual organism, embodiment encompasses a diverse array of topics and questions. One useful organizing framework places embodiment as a bridge construct connecting three standpoints on the body: the form of the body, the body as actively engaged in and with the world, and the body as lived experience. Through connecting these standpoints, the construct of embodiment shows that they are not mutually exclusive: inherent in form is the capacity for engagement, and inherent in engagement is a lived perspective that confers agency and meaning. Here, we employ this framework to underscore the deep connections between embodiment and development. We begin with a discussion of the origins of multicellularity, highlighting how the evolution of bodies was the evolution of development itself. The evolution of the metazoan (animal) body is of particular interest, because most animals possess complex bodies with sensorimotor capacities for perceiving and acting that bring forth a particular sort of embodiment. However, we also emphasize that the thread of embodiment runs through all living things, which share an organizational property of self-determination that endows them with a specific kind of autonomy. This realization moves us away from a Cartesian machine metaphor and instead puts an emphasis on the lived perspective that arises from being embodied. This broad view of embodiment presents opportunities to transcend the boundaries of individual disciplines to create a novel integrative vision for the scientific study of development.

An organisational systems-biology view of viruses explains why they are not alive

Whether or not viruses are alive remains unsettled. Discoveries of giant viruses with translational genes and large genomes have kept the debate active. Here, a fresh approach is introduced, based on the organisational definition of life from within systems biology. It views living as a circular process of self-organisation and self-construction which is 'closed to efficient causation'. How information combines with force to fabricate and organise environmentally obtained materials, given an energy source, is here explained as a physical embodiment of informational constraint. Comparing a general virus replication cycle with Rosen's (M,R)-system shows it to be linear, rather than closed. Some viruses contribute considerable organisational information, but so far none is known to supply all required, nor the material nor energy necessary to complete their replication cycle. As a result, no known virus replication cycle is closed to efficient causation: unlike cellular obligate parasites, viruses do not match the causal structure of an (M,R)-system. Analysis based in identifying a Markov blanket in causal structure proved inconclusive, but using Integrated Information Theory on a Boolean representation, it was possible to show that the causal structure of a virocell is not different from that of the host cell.

The Causal Closure of Physics in Real World Contexts

The causal closure of physics is usually discussed in a context free way. Here I discuss it in the context of engineering systems and biology, where strong emergence takes place due to a combination of upwards emergence and downwards causation (Ellis, Emergence in Solid State Physics and Biology, 2020, arXiv:2004.13591). Firstly, I show that causal closure is strictly limited in terms of spatial interactions because these are cases that are of necessity strongly interacting with the environment. Effective Spatial Closure holds ceteris parabus, and can be violated by Black Swan Events. Secondly, I show that causal closure in the hierarchy of emergence is a strictly interlevel affair, and in the cases of engineering and biology encompasses all levels from the social level to the particle physics level. However Effective Causal Closure can usefully be defined for a restricted set of levels, and one can experimentally determine Effective Theories that hold at each level. This does not however imply those effective theories are causally complete by themselves. In particular, the particle physics level is not causally complete by itself in the contexts of solid state physics (because of interlevel wave-particle duality), digital computers (where algorithms determine outcomes), or biology (because of time dependent constraints). Furthermore Inextricably Intertwined Levels occur in all these contexts.

Finding continuity and discontinuity in fish schools via integrated information theory

Collective behaviours are known to be the result of diverse dynamics and are sometimes likened to living systems. Although many studies have revealed the dynamics of various collective behaviours, their main focus has been on the information processing performed by the collective, not on interactions within the collective. For example, the qualitative difference between three and four elements in a system has rarely been investigated. Tononi et al. proposed integrated information theory (IIT) to measure the degree of consciousness Φ. IIT postulates that the amount of information loss caused by the minimum information partition is equivalent to the degree of information integration in the system. This measure is not only useful for estimating the degree of consciousness but can also be applied to more general network systems. Here, we obtained two main results from the application of IIT (in particular, IIT 3.0) to the analysis of real fish schools (Plecoglossus altivelis). First, we observed that the discontinuity on 〈Φ(N)〉 distributions emerges for a school of four or more fish. This transition was not observed by measuring the mutual information or the sum of the transfer entropy. We also analysed the IIT on Boids simulations with respect to different coupling strengths; however, the results of the Boids model were found to be quite different from those of real fish. Second, we found a correlation between this discontinuity and the emergence of leadership. We discriminate leadership in this paper from its traditional meaning (e.g. defined by transfer entropy) because IIT-induced leadership refers not to group behaviour, as in other methods, but the degree of autonomy (i.e. group integrity). These results suggest that integrated information Φ can reveal the emergence of a new type of leadership which cannot be observed using other measures.

Causal Composition: Structural Differences among Dynamically Equivalent Systems

The dynamical evolution of a system of interacting elements can be predicted in terms of its elementary constituents and their interactions, or in terms of the system’s global state transitions. For this reason, systems with equivalent global dynamics are often taken to be equivalent for all relevant purposes. Nevertheless, such systems may still vary in their causal composition—the way mechanisms within the system specify causes and effects over different subsets of system elements. We demonstrate this point based on a set of small discrete dynamical systems with reversible dynamics that cycle through all their possible states. Our analysis elucidates the role of composition within the formal framework of integrated information theory. We show that the global dynamical and information-theoretic capacities of reversible systems can be maximal even though they may differ, quantitatively and qualitatively, in the information that their various subsets specify about each other (intrinsic information). This can be the case even for a system and its time-reversed equivalent. Due to differences in their causal composition, two systems with equivalent global dynamics may still differ in their capacity for autonomy, agency, and phenomenology.

Harnessing stochasticity: How do organisms make choices?

Choice in the behavior of organisms involves novelty, which may be unpredictable. Yet in retrospect, we can usually provide a rationale for the choice. A deterministic view of life cannot explain this. The solution to this paradox is that organisms can harness stochasticity through which they can generate many possible solutions to environmental challenges. They must then employ a comparator to find the solution that fits the challenge. What therefore is unpredictable in prospect can become comprehensible in retrospect. Harnessing stochastic and/or chaotic processes is essential to the ability of organisms to have agency and to make choices.