From the Brain to the Field: The Applications of Social Neuroscience to Economics, Health and Law

How Does Motivation Modulate the Operation of the Mentalizing Network in Person Evaluation?

The mentalizing network is theorized to play a central role in making sense of people (compared with nonsocial targets), but is its involvement affected when we make sense of people in a nondispassionate manner (e.g., favoritism toward others on the basis of group membership)? First, mixed findings and small samples have prevented strong conclusions about whether intergroup evaluation increases or decreases activation regions associated with the mentalizing network. Second, little is known about the psychological mechanism underlying mentalizing network activation shaped by ingroup versus outgroup evaluations. Psychological models suggest two hypotheses that can be challenging to disentangle with self-report: Ingroup trait evaluations may benefit from a priori expectations and/or preferential evidence accumulation. Therefore, the current study (n = 50) drew on a combination of drift diffusion modeling and fMRI to examine how group membership affects the engagement of the mentalizing network for trait evaluation and whether group-differentiated activation is associated with a priori expectations and/or preferential evidence accumulation. Outgroup trait evaluations engaged dorsomedial pFC activation, whereas ingroup trait evaluations engaged ventromedial pFC activation as well as other regions associated with mentalizing such as precuneus, posterior cingulate cortex, and right TPJ. Furthermore, the ventromedial pFC and posterior cingulate cortex activation was associated with differential expectations applied to ingroup trait evaluation. The current findings demonstrate the importance of combining motivational factors, computational modeling, and fMRI to deepen our understanding of the neural basis of person evaluation.

Does concealing familiarity evoke other processes than concealing untrustworthiness? - Different forms of concealed information modulate P3 effects

It was investigated whether concealing learned stimulus attributes (i.e., trustworthiness vs. untrustworthiness) has similar effects on the P3 amplitude than concealing stimulus familiarity. According to salience hypothesis, known, deceptive stimuli (probe) are (perceived) more relevant than truthful, unknown stimuli (irrelevant) evoking a more positive probe P3 amplitude. When all stimuli are known, concealing information is more cognitively demanding than non-concealing information evoking a less positive P3 amplitude according to the mental effort account. Ninety-seven participants concealed knowledge of previously learned faces in the familiarity condition (probe vs. irrelevant stimuli). In the trustworthiness condition, participants concealed untrustworthiness to previously learned faces and responded truthfully to previously learned trustworthy and untrustworthy faces (known, concealed vs. known, truthful stimuli). The parietal mean P3 amplitude was more positive for probe stimuli than for irrelevant stimuli in the familiarity condition providing evidence for the salience hypothesis. In the trustworthiness condition, concealing untrustworthiness showed the smallest parietal mean P3 amplitude suggesting evidence for the mental effort hypothesis. Individual differences of perpetrator's sensitivity to injustice modulated the P3 amplitude in the trustworthiness condition.

Criminal Responsibility and Neuroscience: No Revolution Yet

Since the 1990's, neurolaw is on the rise. At the heart of heated debates lies the recurrent theme of a neuro-revolution of criminal responsibility. However, caution should be observed: the alleged foundations of criminal responsibility (amongst which free will) are often inaccurate and the relative imperviousness of its real foundations to scientific facts often underestimated. Neuroscientific findings may impact on social institutions, but only insofar as they also engage in a political justification of the changes being called for, convince populations, and take into consideration the ensuing consequences. Moreover, the many limits of neuroscientific tools call for increased vigilance when, if ever, using neuroscientific evidence in a courtroom. In this article, we aim at setting the basis for future sound debates on the contribution of neuroscience to criminal law, and in particular to the assessment of criminal responsibility. As such, we provide analytical tools to grasp the political and normative nature of criminal responsibility and review the current or projected use of neuroscience in the law, all the while bearing in mind the highly publicized question: can neuroscience revolutionize criminal responsibility? Answering this question implicitly requires answering a second question: should neuroscience revolutionize the institution of criminal responsibility? Answering both, in turn, requires drawing the line between science and normativity, revolution and dialogue, fantasies and legitimate hopes.

Neuroimaging 'will to fight' for sacred values: an empirical case study with supporters of an Al Qaeda associate

Violent intergroup conflicts are often motivated by commitments to abstract ideals such as god or nation, so-called 'sacred' values that are insensitive to material trade-offs. There is scant knowledge of how the brain processes costly sacrifices for such cherished causes. We studied willingness to fight and die for sacred values using fMRI in Barcelona, Spain, among supporters of a radical Islamist group. We measured brain activity in radicalized individuals as they indicated their willingness to fight and die for sacred and non-sacred values, and as they reacted to peers' ratings for the same values. We observed diminished activity in dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC), inferior frontal gyrus, and parietal cortex while conveying willingness to fight and die for sacred relative to non-sacred values-regions that have previously been implicated in calculating costs and consequences. An overlapping region of the dlPFC was active when viewing conflicting ratings of sacred values from peers, to the extent participants were sensitive to peer influence, suggesting that it is possible to induce flexibility in the way people defend sacred values. Our results cohere with a view that 'devoted actors' motivated by an extreme commitment towards sacred values rely on distinctive neurocognitve processes that can be identified.