What's Special about Human Imitation? A Comparison with Enculturated Apes

Simultaneous invasive and non-invasive recordings in humans: A novel Rosetta stone for deciphering brain activity

Simultaneous noninvasive and invasive electrophysiological recordings provide a unique opportunity to achieve a comprehensive understanding of human brain activity, much like a Rosetta stone for human neuroscience. In this review we focus on the increasingly-used powerful combination of intracranial electroencephalography (iEEG) with scalp electroencephalography (EEG) or magnetoencephalography (MEG). We first provide practical insight on how to achieve these technically challenging recordings. We then provide examples from clinical research on how simultaneous recordings are advancing our understanding of epilepsy. This is followed by the illustration of how human neuroscience and methodological advances could benefit from these simultaneous recordings. We conclude with a call for open data sharing and collaboration, while ensuring neuroethical approaches and argue that only with a true collaborative approach the promises of simultaneous recordings will be fulfilled.

Are there dedicated neural mechanisms for imitation? A study of grist and mills

Are there brain regions that are specialized for the execution of imitative actions? We compared two hypotheses of imitation: the mirror neuron system (MNS) hypothesis predicts frontal and parietal engagement which is specific to imitation, while the Grist-Mills hypothesis predicts no difference in brain activation between imitative and matched non-imitative actions. Our delayed imitation fMRI paradigm included two tasks, one where correct performance was defined by a spatial rule and another where it was defined by an item-based rule. For each task, participants could learn a sequence from a video of a human hand performing the task, from a matched "Ghost" condition, or from text instructions. When participants executed actions after seeing the Hand demonstration (compared to Ghost and Text demonstrations), no activation differences occurred in frontal or parietal regions; rather, activation was localized primarily to occipital cortex. This adds to a growing body of evidence which indicates that imitation-specific responses during action execution do not occur in canonical mirror regions, contradicting the mirror neuron system hypothesis. However, activation differences did occur between action execution in the Hand and Ghost conditions outside MNS regions, which runs counter to the Grist-Mills hypothesis. We conclude that researchers should look beyond these hypotheses as well as classical MNS regions to describe the ways in which imitative actions are implemented by the brain.

Understanding Imitation in Papio papio: The Role of Experience and the Presence of a Conspecific Demonstrator

What factors affect imitation performance? Varying theories of imitation stress the role of experience, but few studies have explicitly tested its role in imitative learning in non-human primates. We tested several predictions regarding the role of experience, conspecific presence, and action compatibility using a stimulus-response compatibility protocol. Nineteen baboons separated into two experimental groups learned to respond by targeting on a touch screen the same stimulus as their neighbor (compatible) or the opposite stimulus (incompatible). They first performed the task with a conspecific demonstrator (social phase) and then a computer demonstrator (ghost phase). After reaching a predetermined success threshold, they were then tested in an opposite compatibility condition (i.e., reversal learning conditions). Seven baboons performed at least two reversals during the social phase, and we found no significant difference between the compatible and incompatible conditions, although we noticed slightly faster response times (RTs) in the compatible condition that disappeared after the first reversal. During the ghost phase, monkeys showed difficulties in learning the incompatible condition, and the compatible condition RTs tended to be slower than during the social phase. Together, these results suggest that (a) there is no strong movement compatibility effect in our task and that (b) the presence of a demonstrator plays a role in eliciting correct responses but is not essential as has been previously shown in human studies.

Dynamic emotional expressions do not modulate responses to gestures

The tendency to imitate the actions of others appears to be a fundamental aspect of human social interaction. Emotional expressions are a particularly salient form of social stimuli (Vuilleumier & Schwartz, 2001) but their relationship to imitative behaviour is currently unclear. In this paper we report the results of five studies which investigated the effect of a target's dynamic emotional stimuli on participants' tendency to respond compatibly to the target's actions. Experiment one examined the effect of dynamic emotional expressions on the automatic imitation of opening and closing hand movements. Experiment two used the same basic paradigm but added gaze direction as an additional factor. Experiment three investigated the effect of dynamic emotional expressions on compatibility responses to handshakes. Experiment four investigated whether dynamic emotional expressions modulated response to valenced social gestures. Finally, experiment five compared the effects of dynamic and static emotional expressions on participants' automatic imitation of finger lifting. Across all five studies we reliably elicited a compatibility effect however, none of the studies found a significant modulating effect of emotional expression. This null effect was also supported by a random effects meta-analysis and a series of Bayesian t-tests. Nevertheless, these results must be caveated by the fact that our studies had limited power to detect effect sizes below d = 0.4. We conclude by situating our findings within the literature, suggesting that the effect of emotional expressions on automatic imitation is, at best, minimal.

Specialization in the vicarious learning of novel arbitrary sequences in humans but not orangutans

Sequence learning underlies many uniquely human behaviours, from complex tool use to language and ritual. To understand whether this fundamental cognitive feature is uniquely derived in humans requires a comparative approach. We propose that the vicarious (but not individual) learning of novel arbitrary sequences represents a human cognitive specialization. To test this hypothesis, we compared the abilities of human children aged 3-5 years and orangutans to learn different types of arbitrary sequences (item-based and spatial-based). Sequences could be learned individually (by trial and error) or vicariously from a human (social) demonstrator or a computer (ghost control). We found that both children and orangutans recalled both types of sequence following trial-and-error learning; older children also learned both types of sequence following social and ghost demonstrations. Orangutans' success individually learning arbitrary sequences shows that their failure to do so in some vicarious learning conditions is not owing to general representational problems. These results provide new insights into some of the most persistent discontinuities observed between humans and other great apes in terms of complex tool use, language and ritual, all of which involve the cultural learning of novel arbitrary sequences. This article is part of the theme issue 'Ritual renaissance: new insights into the most human of behaviours'.

The evolution of high-fidelity social learning

A defining feature of human culture is that knowledge and technology continually improve over time. Such cumulative cultural evolution (CCE) probably depends far more heavily on how reliably information is preserved than on how efficiently it is refined. Therefore, one possible reason that CCE appears diminished or absent in other species is that it requires accurate but specialized forms of social learning at which humans are uniquely adept. Here, we develop a Bayesian model to contrast the evolution of high-fidelity social learning, which supports CCE, against low-fidelity social learning, which does not. We find that high-fidelity transmission evolves when (1) social and (2) individual learning are inexpensive, (3) traits are complex, (4) individual learning is abundant, (5) adaptive problems are difficult and (6) behaviour is flexible. Low-fidelity transmission differs in many respects. It not only evolves when (2) individual learning is costly and (4) infrequent but also proves more robust when (3) traits are simple and (5) adaptive problems are easy. If conditions favouring the evolution of high-fidelity transmission are stricter (3 and 5) or harder to meet (2 and 4), this could explain why social learning is common, but CCE is rare.

Cognitive novelties, informational form, and structural-causal explanations

Recent work has established a framework for explaining the origin of cognitive novelties-qualitatively distinct cognitive traits-in human beings. This niche construction approach argues that humans engineer epistemic environments in ways that facilitate the ontogenetic and phylogenetic development of such novelties. I here argue that attention to the organized relations between content-carrying informational vehicles, or informational form, is key to a valuable explanatory strategy within this project, what I call structural-causal explanations. Drawing on recent work from Cecilia Heyes, and developing a case study around a novel mathematical capacity, I demonstrate how structural-causal explanations can contribute to the niche construction approach by underwriting the application of explanatory tools and generating new empirical targets.

Movement Imitation via an Abstract Trajectory Representation in Dorsal Premotor Cortex

Humans are particularly good at copying novel and meaningless gestures. The mechanistic and anatomical basis for this specialized imitation ability remains largely unknown. One idea is that imitation occurs by matching body configurations. Here we propose an alternative route to imitation that depends on a body-independent representation of the trajectory path of the end-effector. We studied a group of patients with strokes in the left frontoparietal cortices. We found that they were equally impaired at imitating movement trajectories using the ipsilesional limb (i.e., the nonparetic side) that were cued either by an actor using their whole arm or just by a cursor, suggesting that body configuration information is not always critical for imitation and that a representation of abstract trajectory shape may suffice. In addition, imitation ability was uncorrelated to the ability to identify the trajectory shape, suggesting that imitation deficits were unlikely to arise from perceptual impairments. Finally, a lesion-symptom mapping analysis found that imitation deficits were associated with lesions in left dorsal premotor but not parietal cortex. Together, these findings suggest a novel body-independent route to imitation that relies on the ability to plan abstract movement trajectories within dorsal premotor cortex.SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT The ability to imitate is critical for rapidly learning to produce new gestures and actions, but how the brain translates observed movements into motor commands is poorly understood. Examining the ability of patients with strokes affecting the left hemisphere revealed that meaningless gestures can be imitated by succinctly representing only the motion of the hand in space, rather than the posture of the entire arm. Moreover, performance deficits correlated with lesions in dorsal premotor cortex, an area not previously associated with impaired imitation of arm postures. These findings thus describe a novel route to imitation that may also be impaired in some patients with apraxia.

The functions of imitative behaviour in humans

This article focuses on the question of the function of imitation and whether current accounts of imitative function are consistent with our knowledge about imitation's origins. We first review theories of imitative origin concluding that empirical evidence suggests that imitation arises from domain-general learning mechanisms. Next, we lay out a selective account of function that allows normative functions to be ascribed to learned behaviours. We then describe and review four accounts of the function of imitation before evaluating the relationship between the claim that imitation arises out of domain-general learning mechanisms and theories of the function of imitation.

Enrichment of genetic markers of recent human evolution in educational and cognitive traits

Higher cognitive functions are regarded as one of the main distinctive traits of humans. Evidence for the cognitive evolution of human beings is mainly based on fossil records of an expanding cranium and an increasing complexity of material culture artefacts. However, the molecular genetic factors involved in the evolution are still relatively unexplored. Here, we investigated whether genomic regions that underwent positive selection in humans after divergence from Neanderthals are enriched for genetic association with phenotypes related to cognitive functions. We used genome wide association data from a study of college completion (N = 111,114), one of educational attainment (N = 293,623) and two different studies of general cognitive ability (N = 269,867 and 53,949). We found nominally significant polygenic enrichment of associations with college completion (p = 0.025), educational attainment (p = 0.043) and general cognitive ability (p = 0.015 and 0.025, respectively), suggesting that variants influencing these phenotypes are more prevalent in evolutionarily salient regions. The enrichment remained significant after controlling for other known genetic enrichment factors, and for affiliation to genes highly expressed in the brain. These findings support the notion that phenotypes related to higher order cognitive skills typical of humans have a recent genetic component that originated after the separation of the human and Neanderthal lineages.

Neural responses when learning spatial and object sequencing tasks via imitation

Humans often learn new things via imitation. Here we draw on studies of imitation in children to characterise the brain system(s) involved in the imitation of different sequence types using functional magnetic resonance imaging. On each trial, healthy adult participants learned one of two rule types governing the sequencing of three pictures: a motor-spatial rule (in the spatial task) or an object-based rule (in the cognitive task). Sequences were learned via one of three demonstration types: a video of a hand selecting items in the sequence using a joystick (Hand condition), a computer display highlighting each item in order (Ghost condition), or a text-based demonstration of the sequence (Text condition). Participants then used a joystick to execute the learned sequence. Patterns of activation during demonstration observation suggest specialisation for object-based imitation in inferior frontal gyrus, specialisation for spatial sequences in anterior intraparietal sulcus (IPS), and a general preference for imitation in middle IPS. Adult behavioural performance contrasted with that of children in previous studies—indicating that they experienced more difficulty with the cognitive task—while neuroimaging results support the engagement of different neural regions when solving these tasks. Further study is needed on whether children’s differential performance is related to delayed IPS maturation.

Culture extends the scope of evolutionary biology in the great apes

Discoveries about the cultures and cultural capacities of the great apes have played a leading role in the recognition emerging in recent decades that cultural inheritance can be a significant factor in the lives not only of humans but also of nonhuman animals. This prominence derives in part from these primates being those with whom we share the most recent common ancestry, thus offering clues to the origins of our own thoroughgoing reliance on cumulative cultural achievements. In addition, the intense research focus on these species has spawned an unprecedented diversity of complementary methodological approaches, the results of which suggest that cultural phenomena pervade the lives of these apes, with potentially major implications for their broader evolutionary biology. Here I review what this extremely broad array of observational and experimental methodologies has taught us about the cultural lives of chimpanzees, gorillas, and orangutans and consider the ways in which this knowledge extends our wider understanding of primate biology and the processes of adaptation and evolution that shape it. I address these issues first by evaluating the extent to which the results of cultural inheritance echo a suite of core principles that underlie organic Darwinian evolution but also extend them in new ways and then by assessing the principal causal interactions between the primary, genetically based organic processes of evolution and the secondary system of cultural inheritance that is based on social learning from others.

Advances in Animal Cognition

This editorial endorses a diverse approach to the study of animal cognition and emphasizes the theoretical and applied gains that can be made by embracing this approach. This diversity emerges from cross-talk among scientists trained in a variety of backgrounds and theoretical approaches, who study a variety of topics with a range of species. By shifting from an anthropocentric focus on humans and our closest living relatives, and the historic reliance on the lab rat or pigeon, modern students of animal cognition have uncovered many fascinating facets of cognition in species ranging from insects to carnivores. Diversity in both topic and species of study will allow researchers to better understand the complex evolutionary forces giving rise to widely shared and unique cognitive processes. Furthermore, this increased understanding will translate into more effective strategies for managing wild and captive populations of nonhuman species.