Break the Cycle of Collusion: Simulation to Influence Mechanism of Cognitive Bias on To-Collude Decision Making

Proliferation mechanism of collusive alienation in tendering for government investment projects

Collusion between governments and enterprises has occurred in many economies around the world in the context of government investment projects and tenders. Not only is collusion an illegal act, but it may also lead to learning and imitation by non-colluding parties. Therefore, to control collusion and ensure the quality of government investment projects, investigating the spread of collusion in the bidding process of such projects is important. This study presents a simulation of the diffusion process of collusion among multiple entities through NetLogo, drawing on a contagious disease model. The effectiveness of the hypothesised control tools is validated through the changing trend of collusion in bidding in China. The findings provide a new approach to controlling collusion based on the perspective of the proliferation of bidding behaviour and have some reference value for the government to formulate policies.