Spearman’s Hypothesis Tested on Black Adults: A Meta-Analysis

Does Socio-Economic Status Have Different Impact on Fluid and Crystallized Abilities? Comparing Scores on Raven’s Progressive Matrices, Kaufman Assessment Battery for Children II Story Completion and Kilifi Naming Test Among Children in Ghana

Current literature shows an association between intelligence and socio-cultural or socio-economic factors. The available evidence supports a stronger effect of exogenous factors on measures of crystalized intelligence than on fluid intelligence. Despite this, the sources of variability in fluid and crystalized intelligence have not been explored adequately in intelligence research. The purpose of this study was to compare performance on tests that measure fluid and crystallized intelligence among children selected from public and private schools in Ghana. We tested the assumption that socio-economic status (SES) will have a stronger effect on tests that measure crystallized intelligence than on fluid intelligence. We selected 185 children between 6 and 12 years from private and public schools, and used inclusion in a private or public school as a proxy for SES. We administered the Raven’s Coloured Progressive Matrices (RCPM), a fluid intelligence test, the KABC II story completion subtest as a measure of inductive reasoning and crystallized intelligence and the Kilifi Naming Test, a verbal ability measure designed to minimize the effect of school on vocabulary. The results showed age-related improvement in scores on all three tests with effect sizes ranging from 0.42 to 0.52. We also found significant effect for type of school on all the tests with effect sizes ranging from 0.37 to 0.66. The results also showed an increasing disparity in performance on the tests favoring children selected from private schools. These suggest that fluid and crystalized intelligence are affected by socioeconomic factors. The results also showed that SES factors tend to affect crystallized ability more than it affects fluid ability. The results are discussed in the context of differences in socioeconomic resources available to children such as quality of education in low- and middle-income countries.

Social Adversity Reduces Polygenic Score Expressivity for General Cognitive Ability, but Not Height

It has been hypothesized that even 'perfect' polygenic scores (PGSs) composed of only causal variants may not be fully portable between different social groups owing to gene-by-environment interactions modifying the expression of relevant variants. The impacts of such interactions involving two forms of social adversity (low socioeconomic status [SES] and discrimination) are examined in relation to the expressivity of a PGS for educational attainment composed of putatively causal variants in a large, representatively sampled and genotyped cohort of US children. A relatively small-magnitude Scarr-Rowe effect is present (SES × PGSEDU predicting General Cognitive Ability [GCA]; sR = .02, 95% CI [.00, .04]), as is a distinct discrimination × PGSEDU interaction predicting GCA (sR = -.02, 95% CI [-.05, 00]). Both are independent of the confounding main effects of 10 ancestral principal components, PGSEDU, SES, discrimination and interactions among these factors. No sex differences were found. These interactions were examined in relation to phenotypic and genotypic data on height, a prospectively more socially neutral trait. They were absent in both cases. The discrimination × PGSEDU interaction is a co-moderator of the differences posited in modern versions of Spearman's hypothesis (along with shared environmentality), lending support to certain environmental explanations of those differences. Behavior-genetic analysis of self-reported discrimination indicates that it is nonsignificantly heritable (h2 = .027, 95% CI [-.05, .10]), meaning that it is not merely proxying some underlying source of heritable phenotypic variability. This suggests that experiences of discrimination might stem instead from the action of purely social forces.

Between-Group Mean Differences in Intelligence in the United States Are >0% Genetically Caused: Five Converging Lines of Evidence

The past 30 years of research in intelligence has produced a wealth of knowledge about the causes and consequences of differences in intelligence between individuals, and today mainstream opinion is that individual differences in intelligence are caused by both genetic and environmental influences. Much more contentious is the discussion over the cause of mean intelligence differences between racial or ethnic groups. In contrast to the general consensus that interindividual differences are both genetic and environmental in origin, some claim that mean intelligence differences between racial groups are completely environmental in origin, whereas others postulate a mix of genetic and environmental causes. In this article I discuss 5 lines of research that provide evidence that mean differences in intelligence between racial and ethnic groups are partially genetic. These lines of evidence are findings in support of Spearman’s hypothesis, consistent results from tests of measurement invariance across American racial groups, the mathematical relationship that exists for between-group and within-group sources of heritability, genomic data derived from genome-wide association studies of intelligence and polygenic scores applied to diverse samples, and admixture studies. I also discuss future potential lines of evidence regarding the causes of average group differences across racial groups. However, the data are not fully conclusive, and the exact degree to which genes influence intergroup mean differences in intelligence is not known. This discussion applies only to native English speakers born in the United States and not necessarily to any other human populations.

Spearman's hypothesis tested comparing Korean young adults with various other groups of young adults on the items of the Advanced Progressive Matrices

Spearman's hypothesis tested at the subtest level of an IQ battery states that differences between races on the subtests of an IQ battery are a function of the g loadings of these subtests, such that there are small differences between races on subtests with low g loadings and large differences between races on subtests with high g loadings. Jensen (1998) stated that Spearman's hypothesis is a law-like phenomenon. It has also been confirmed many times at the level of items of the Raven's Progressive Matrices. This study hypothesizes that with concern to Spearman's hypothesis, subtests and items function in fundamentally the same way, and tested whether Spearman's hypothesis is confirmed at the item level for White-East Asian comparisons. A group of Korean young adults (N=205) was compared with other groups of young adults from Canada, the US, Russia, Peru and South Africa (total N=4770) who took the Advanced Progressive Matrices. Spearman's hypothesis was strongly confirmed with a sample-size-weighted r with a value of 0.63. Computing the g loadings of the items of the Raven with either the Raven-g or the Wechsler-g led to the same conclusions. Tests of Spearman's hypothesis yielded less-strong outcomes when the 36-item Advanced Progressive Matrices were used than when the 60-item Standard Progressive Matrices were used. There is a substantial correlation between sample size and the outcome of Spearman's hypothesis. So, all four hypotheses were confirmed, showing that a part of the subtest-level nomological net replicates at the item level, strengthening the position that, with concern to Spearman's hypothesis, subtests and items function fundamentally the same. It is concluded that Spearman's hypothesis is still a law-like phenomenon. Detailed suggestions for follow-up research are made.

A Meta-Analysis of Spearman’s Hypothesis Tested on Latin-American Hispanics, Including a New Way to Correct for Imperfectly Measuring the Construct of g

Spearman’s hypothesis states that the difference in intelligence between groups is a function of the g loadings of the subtests, where larger differences are found on tests with higher g loadings. This finding has consistently been supported on various groups. In this study we look at samples of Latin-American Hispanics in comparison to Whites. We carried out a meta-analysis based on 14 data points and a total of 16,813 Latin-American Hispanics, including a new way to correct for imperfectly measuring the construct of g. Spearman’s hypothesis was strongly supported with a mean r of 0.63. After correction for various statistical artifacts this value became rho = 0.91. Therefore, we conclude that Spearman’s hypothesis also holds true for White/Latin-American Hispanic differences.

A Meta-Analysis of Spearman’s Hypothesis Tested on Latin-American Hispanics, Including a New Way to Correct for Imperfectly Measuring the Construct of g

Spearman’s hypothesis states that the difference in intelligence between groups is a function of the g loadings of the subtests, where larger differences are found on tests with higher g loadings. This finding has consistently been supported on various groups. In this study we look at samples of Latin-American Hispanics in comparison to Whites. We carried out a meta-analysis based on 14 data points and a total of 16,813 Latin-American Hispanics, including a new way to correct for imperfectly measuring the construct of g. Spearman’s hypothesis was strongly supported with a mean r of 0.63. After correction for various statistical artifacts this value became rho = 0.91. Therefore, we conclude that Spearman’s hypothesis also holds true for White/Latin-American Hispanic differences.

Spearman’s Hypothesis Tested Comparing 47 Regions of Japan Using a Sample of 18 Million Children

Many groups differ in their mean intelligence score. Spearman’s hypothesis states that the differences are a function of cognitive complexity. There tend to be large differences on subtests of high cognitive complexity and small differences on subtests of low cognitive complexity. Spearman’s hypothesis has been supported by a large number of studies. Can Spearman’s hypothesis be generalized to regions of a country, where these regions differ in mean intelligence? We utilized data from 86 different cognitive tests from all 47 Japanese prefectures and correlated the g loadings of 86 subtests with standardized differences on the same subtests. Spearman’s hypothesis was clearly supported: the biggest differences between the regions were on the tests that were of the greatest complexity, meaning that Spearman’s hypothesis may be generalizable from groups to regions. In Japan, g loadings offer a better explanation of group differences in intelligence than cultural differences. Future research should explore whether Spearman’s hypothesis is also supported for differences between regions of other countries.

Spearman’s Hypothesis Tested Comparing 47 Regions of Japan Using a Sample of 18 Million Children

Many groups differ in their mean intelligence score. Spearman’s hypothesis states that the differences are a function of cognitive complexity. There tend to be large differences on subtests of high cognitive complexity and small differences on subtests of low cognitive complexity. Spearman’s hypothesis has been supported by a large number of studies. Can Spearman’s hypothesis be generalized to regions of a country, where these regions differ in mean intelligence? We utilized data from 86 different cognitive tests from all 47 Japanese prefectures and correlated the g loadings of 86 subtests with standardized differences on the same subtests. Spearman’s hypothesis was clearly supported: the biggest differences between the regions were on the tests that were of the greatest complexity, meaning that Spearman’s hypothesis may be generalizable from groups to regions. In Japan, g loadings offer a better explanation of group differences in intelligence than cultural differences. Future research should explore whether Spearman’s hypothesis is also supported for differences between regions of other countries.

Biogeographic Ancestry, Cognitive Ability and Socioeconomic Outcomes

The cause(s) of ubiquitous cognitive differences between American self-identified racial/ethnic groups (SIREs) is uncertain. Evolutionary-genetic models posit that ancestral genetic selection pressures are the ultimate source of these differences. Conversely, sociological models posit that these differences result from racial discrimination. To examine predictions based on these models, we conducted a global admixture analysis using data from the Pediatric Imaging, Neurocognition, and Genetics Study (PING; N = 1,369 American children). Specifically, we employed a standard methodology of genetic epidemiology to determine whether genetic ancestry significantly predicts cognitive ability, independent of SIRE. In regression models using four different codings for SIRE as a covariate, we found incremental relationships between genetic ancestry and both general cognitive ability and parental socioeconomic status (SES). The relationships between global ancestry and cognitive ability were partially attenuated when parental SES was added as a predictor and when cognitive ability was the outcome. Moreover, these associations generally held when subgroups were analyzed separately. Our results are congruent with evolutionary-genetic models of group differences and with certain environmental models that mimic the predictions of evolutionary-genetic ones. Implications for research on race/ethnic differences in the Americas are discussed, as are methods for further exploring the matter.

Biogeographic Ancestry, Cognitive Ability and Socioeconomic Outcomes

The cause(s) of ubiquitous cognitive differences between American self-identified racial/ethnic groups (SIREs) is uncertain. Evolutionary-genetic models posit that ancestral genetic selection pressures are the ultimate source of these differences. Conversely, sociological models posit that these differences result from racial discrimination. To examine predictions based on these models, we conducted a global admixture analysis using data from the Pediatric Imaging, Neurocognition, and Genetics Study (PING; N = 1,369 American children). Specifically, we employed a standard methodology of genetic epidemiology to determine whether genetic ancestry significantly predicts cognitive ability, independent of SIRE. In regression models using four different codings for SIRE as a covariate, we found incremental relationships between genetic ancestry and both general cognitive ability and parental socioeconomic status (SES). The relationships between global ancestry and cognitive ability were partially attenuated when parental SES was added as a predictor and when cognitive ability was the outcome. Moreover, these associations generally held when subgroups were analyzed separately. Our results are congruent with evolutionary-genetic models of group differences and with certain environmental models that mimic the predictions of evolutionary-genetic ones. Implications for research on race/ethnic differences in the Americas are discussed, as are methods for further exploring the matter.