Full Implementation of the River Chief System in China: Outcome and Weakness

Central policy attitudes and innovation diffusion of local government: the case of China's river chief system

The central government's policy attitude will affect local governments' innovation adoption behavior, but the diffusion process is not static, which shows dynamic changes. This essay illustrates the spreading process of the Chinese River Chief System (RCS). It discusses how the factors influencing the diffusion of the RCS alter dynamically under various policy attitudes of the central government by using the segmented Event History Analysis (EHA) and Piecewise Constant Exponential (PCE) models. The results found that, under the central government's implicit policy attitude, peer city pressure and official promotion increase the probability of adoption of the RCS. When the central government's policy encourages the attitude, intra-city factors and peer city pressure affect the diffusion of the RCS. Still, official promotion is no longer an influential influencing factor. All three factors are no longer practical when the central government introduces mandatory regulations. In addition, vertical higher-level pressure and horizontal peer city pressure on adopting the RCS are competitive rather than complementary relationships. Local governments' attitudes regarding the RCS went through a path of "good governance signal-governance tool-authority obedience" under the varied policy philosophies of the central government. Local governments pay more attention to the actual circumstances in the region due to the non-mandatory central government direction, which advances the art of adopting policies. Contrarily, the central government's stipulations render the other factors' policies obsolete.

Exploring the contribution of the river chief system on controlling industrial water pollution under quasi-natural experimental conditions

The innovative environmental system known as the river chief system (RCS) was developed in China to limit water pollution by appointing provincial, prefectural, county, and township officials as "river chiefs" as guardians of every river under their control. Our research project developed a quasi-natural experiment to investigate if the RCS effectively reduces the intensity of industrial water pollution. A multi-period difference-in-difference (DID) method was employed in the experiment with a total of 3808 samples from 272 prefecture-level cities. The samples gathered represented the years from 2007 to 2020. Our results demonstrated that the southern region has far more industrial water contamination than other locations, and the intensity of industrial sewage discharge decreased by 10.25% in pilot cities following the implementation of the RCS compared with what we observed in non-pilot cities. Furthermore, according to the mechanism analysis we used, cities that increased investment in technical advancement and modernized industrial structures may also account for this decreasing trend. Additionally, the results of geographical heterogeneity demonstrate that the RCS's influence on curbing industrial water pollution is greater in cities with a higher intensity of environmental regulation and higher fiscal balance pressure than in locations with low environmental regulation and low fiscal balance pressure. In summary, the Chinese government needs to continue to strengthen the RCS's implementation; this can be done by adjusting to local circumstances as needed and by carrying out the policy accurately and effectively across the country. Our research sheds light on how to prevent water pollution in China and in other countries and supports the positive effects and effectiveness of RCS.

Can River Chief System Policy Improve Enterprises' Energy Efficiency? Evidence from China

The river chief system (RCS) is an autonomous environmental policy implemented by local governments in China that incorporates environmental responsibilities into the performance evaluation. Although existing literature suggests that RCS can reduce water pollution, the impact of RCS on energy efficiency has not been assessed. Therefore, this paper compiles data on industrial enterprises and industrial pollution in China from 2003 to 2013 and empirically examines the impact of RCS on green total factor energy efficiency (GTFEE) by using a multiple difference-in-difference approach. The results show that RCS significantly enhances firms' GTFEE, and a series of tests confirm the robustness of the findings. Second, we further explore how RCS affects GTFEE, the mechanism tests conclude that the RCS improves GTFEE mainly through optimizing energy structure and promoting technological innovation. Third, compared with small firms, exporters, and firms in non-heavy polluting industries, the RCS has a greater effect on improving the GTFEE of large firms, non-exporters, and firms in heavily polluting industries. This study provides new and novel ideas for emerging countries to improve environmental policies and achieve sustainable development.

What Makes the River Chief System in China Viable? Examples from the Huaihe River Basin

Eco-environmental issues are a complex problem for the development of contemporary China, among which river water pollution control is one of the most challenging issues. In the continuous pursuit of river pollution control, the Chinese government has adopted the river chief system (RCS) model to appoint government officials as river chiefs of each section. This review first analyzes the water quality data of the Huaihe River basin over the past five years using Origin 2021. A violin plot shows that the water quality of the Huaihe River basin improved, and CODMn and NH3-N were significantly reduced. Secondly, this review analyzes the effectiveness of the river chief system according to the “embeddedness theory”, which argues that the river chief system has been integrated into the traditional hierarchy of environmental governance in China through institutional embeddedness to activate the vitality of the subject’s control and spatial embeddedness to eliminate fragmented watershed governance and promote governance capacity. Practical suggestions and initiatives were proposed based on the existing RCS, including the rule of law construction, regional collaborative management, and public participation to restore the local ecology.

Managing Risks Arising from Conservation Complexities of Forests: Insights from China’s “Chief Scheme” Practice

Forests play a critical role in combating climate change. It takes China from timber production to ecosystem rehabilitation and then to the future of carbon neutrality. Even though China’s forestry has made great achievements, there remain many problems with its sustainable management, especially the difficult balance between rural livelihood and forest conservation. Under these circumstances, the forest chief scheme was transformed from local trials to a national mechanism. This article seeks to analyze the origin and evolution of the “forest chief” scheme and the complexities and challenges related to China’s sustainable forestry development. Taking the risk governance framework, this study provides a systematic overview of the functioning of the “forest chiefs” element integral to sustainable governance. It offers innovative ways of top-down participation in the specific context by integrating the adaptive risk governance approach, thereby provoking critical thinking about sustainable forest governance.

China’s River Chief Policy and the Sustainable Development Goals: Prefecture-Level Evidence from the Yangtze River Economic Belt

The River Chief Policy (RCP), an institutional innovation in China by which top party and government officials assume responsibility for water management, shapes the incentive structure of local governments and may have a huge influence on the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Using a staggered difference-in-difference approach and panel data from 91 cities in the Yangtze River Economic Belt, we estimate the impact of the RCP on an SDG index with eight local-specific indicators. The estimation results show that the RCP has improved the overall SDG index and significantly improved the levels of innovation, education, and consumption. Heterogeneity tests show that more affluent regions are more committed to investing in education, raising consumption, and increasing wages under the RCP. These results suggest that local governments in China have responded rationally and strategically to the RCP. In general, economic growth remains the central goal of local governments, while the strengthening of other responsibilities such as environmental protection will lead to more effort being made to achieve the SDGs during and after the COVID-19 pandemic.

When Collaborative Water Governance Meets Authoritarian Environmentalism: The Dilemma of Safe Water Supply Project in Coal Mining Villages of China’s Shanxi Province

The framework of collaborative water governance (CWG) has been championed as a promising model for water management across the globe. China is a country confronted by serious water pollution and shortage problems. In recent years, many scholars and practitioners have turned to CWG as an effective model for water crisis management in China. However, the political nature of CWG and China’s Authoritarian Environmentalism is inherently conflictual, hence, the development of CWG in China poses a theoretical puzzle, i.e., how the bottom-up CWG model can coexist with the top-down Authoritarian Environmentalism in China’s water politics. To better understand this puzzle, this article explores CWG’s intertwinement with environmental authoritarianism through a case study of “safe water supply project” in 11 coal-mining villages in Shanxi province of North China. Drawing on fieldwork between 2019 and 2021 in H city of Shangxi province, this research shows that the central government’s pledge to provide safe water to every villager in rural China has not materialized so far. The dilemma of safe water supply in coal mining villages in H city shows that, on one side, the central government attempted to show its great will and commitment to providing safe water to everyone in rural China through an approach of environmental authoritarianism; while on the other side, the local governments tended to select the CWG model as a method for practical implementation as well as a blame avoidance strategy. Our study identifies five stakeholders in the villages’ safe water supply projects: the Department of Water Resources of the City Government, the Township Government, Coal Mining Enterprises, village cadres and villagers. The outcome of the safe water supply project in these villages is constrained by the transparency and trust deficit among stakeholders when facing cooperation and conflict management obstacles.

The Effectiveness of “River Chief System” Policy: An Empirical Study Based on Environmental Monitoring Samples of China

There has been controversy in theory and practice among studies about the governance of the “River Chief System” (RCS) policy and the watershed management issues behind it. This paper uses the regression discontinuity (RD) method and the water pollution monitoring data of 150 state-controlled monitoring points in China from 2007 to 2018 at the China National Environmental Monitoring Station to empirically study the effect of the “River Chief System” on water pollution treatment and the influencing factors behind the effect of the “River Chief System”. The results show that the “River Chief System” policy has a positive impact on river pollution treatment in the observation term. The implementation effectiveness of the “River Chief System” is limited by factors such as the boundaries of the river chief’s jurisdictions, the administrative conflict among river chiefs, local government environmental expenditure capacity, and environmental pressure. It is believed that the key to basin governance is to further improve the synergistic model of basin governance among regions.

Public Participation of the River Chief System in China: Current Trends, Problems, and Perspectives

The River Chief System (RCS) is an effective measure for China to solve complex water problems and maintain the health of rivers and lakes. It is an institutional innovation to improve the water governance system and ensure national water security. Guiding and encouraging the public to participate in the construction of the RCS can promote the improvement of the level of social governance. The RCS is an effective supplement and supervision to the performance of the river chief and related departments, which can effectively promote the transformation of the RCS from nominal to practical and efficient. This study summarizes the innovative models and practical effects of, and public participation in, the RCS, analyzes the prominent problems, and proposes some measures to maximize the influence of public participation. The study provides insights on how to ensure the long-term operation of the RCS, a reference for countries around the world as a suitable solution for the sustainable management of water environments.