Will Third-Party Treatment Effectively Solve Issues Related to Industrial Pollution in China?

All roads lead to Rome? The impact of heterogeneous green finance on carbon reduction of Chinese manufacturing enterprises

Based on the system theory and Pareto efficiency theory, this paper, based on the data of listed companies in China's A-share manufacturing industry in 2011-2022, explores the impact of market-driven green finance and government-guided green finance on the carbon emission intensity of manufacturing enterprises, and analyzes the intermediary role of debt financing cost. A negative "U" relationship exists in market-driven green finance/government-guided green finance and the carbon emission intensity of manufacturing enterprises. Further research shows that under the higher debt financing cost, market-driven green finance played a weaker carbon reduction effect. The heterogeneity analysis found that market-driven green finance can have a significant non-linear impact of "promoting growth first and weakening later" on the carbon emissions of energy-saving and environmental protection enterprises, large enterprises, and enterprises with high human capital levels. Government-guided green finance has a significant non-linear impact on non-energy-saving and environmental protection enterprises and small enterprises. This paper provides the theoretical basis and practical inspiration for the government to formulate relevant low-carbon development policies and promote the innovation of green financial tools in the financial market.

The Interaction Mechanism of Fiscal Pressure, Local Government Behavioral Preferences and Environmental Governance Efficiency: Evidence from the Yangtze River Delta Region of China

In environmental governance, local governments are the main actors, and their behavioral preferences between economic growth competition (EGC) and environmental regulation (ER) affect the inputs and outputs of environmental governance. Most studies discuss the relationship between government behaviors and the environment from the fiscal decentralization perspective, with few studies from the fiscal pressure (FP) perspective. Importantly, the bidirectional interaction mechanism is easily ignored. This study measured local government FP, EGC, ER, and environmental governance efficiency (EGE) in China's Yangtze River Delta (YRD) region from 2000 to 2020. Moran's I index was used to identify the change characteristics of local government behavioral preferences. The interaction mechanism was analyzed by a panel vector autoregression (PVAR) model. The results show that (1) from 2000 to 2020, FP was generally strengthened. EGE generally showed fluctuating and rising change characteristics, with more obvious fluctuating and rising characteristics before 2012 and after 2012, respectively. Local governments shifted from a strong alternative preference to a weak synergistic preference. (2) FP had a self-reinforcing effect. EGC and ER had a self-weakening effect. EGE had not only a self-weakening effect but also a weak self-dependence. (3) There is a double negative interaction mechanism between FP and local government behavioral preferences. FP made local governments prefer to reduce EGC and relax ER, but in fact, EGC and ER were conducive to alleviating FP. (4) There is a negative transitive influence mechanism between FP, local government behavioral preferences and EGE. The negative effect of FP on EGE can be transmitted by reducing EGC and ER. This paper provides a scientific basis for improving EGE in the YRD region and understanding the behavioral logic of local governments' environmental governance and a reference for other rapidly industrializing and urbanizing regions.

Can Carbon Offset Policies Be Effectively Implemented in All Regions of China? An Evolutionary Game Analysis of Decision-Making Dynamics of Local Governments

Carbon offset policies are an effective means of coordinating regional ecological conservation, promoting environmentally friendly economic development, and achieving carbon neutrality; they are being gradually implemented in all regions of China. This study analyzed the decision-making behavior of local governments before and after the introduction of incentive and restraint mechanisms. To this end, it constructed a dynamic evolutionary game model for local governments with a carbon surplus and those with a carbon deficit. The results indicate that it is difficult to implement carbon offset policies between regions without the intervention of the central government. They also show that the effects of different incentive and restraint mechanisms vary significantly. Specifically, a mechanism that targets both carbon surplus and carbon deficit local governments and a unilateral mechanism that targets only carbon deficit local governments are shown to be effective. Finally, the results indicate that the implementation costs of incentive and restraint mechanisms differ, and their implementation intensity affects the time required for carbon offset policies to be rolled out in all regions. Based on these findings, we propose policy recommendations for promoting the implementation of carbon offset policies in all regions of China and alleviating carbon emission pressure.