Evaluation of the Implementation Effect of the Ecological Compensation Policy in the Poyang Lake River Basin Based on Difference-in-Difference Method

A study of the evolutionary game of carbon offset involving tourism stakeholders under incentive and constraint mechanisms

Tourism carbon offsetting is a crucial pathway to achieving peak carbon and carbon neutrality in the tourism industry. Accurately grasping the collaborative evolutionary mechanisms among local governments, tourism enterprises, and tourists is key to promoting the implementation of tourism carbon offsetting. By constructing an evolutionary game model involving local governments, tourism enterprises, and tourists in carbon offsetting, this study uses MATLAB to simulate the evolutionary stable strategies under various conditions. Additionally, it dynamically simulates the collaborative strategies of the three parties under the influence of local government incentive and constraint mechanisms. The results indicate that under strong governmental constraint mechanisms, there is a promotion of active participation in carbon offsetting by local governments, tourism enterprises, and tourists. Incentive policies at certain levels also play a positive guiding role. As incentives increase, local subsidies and intervention costs also rise, leading to an evolution towards less enthusiastic participation among the three parties. Appropriately balanced government incentives and penalties are beneficial in achieving an equilibrium of benefits among multiple stakeholders involved in carbon offsetting, thus helping to attain carbon neutrality goals.

Interactive influences of ecosystem services and socioeconomic factors on watershed eco-compensation standard "popularization" based on natural based solutions

Watershed eco-compensation is a policy tool to realize watershed environment improvement and regional economic development. It is important to eliminate the influence of economic differences between upstream & downstream regions and realize the fairness of regional social development based on Natural based Solutions (NbS). At present, lack of clarity in coupling and coordination analysis of ecosystem services & socioeconomic based on NbS could hamper watershed eco-compensation standards "popularization" and reduce the ability to successfully ecological governance. To meet the needs of economic development and ecological service value realization, dynamic equilibrium game research based on multidimensional relationship coordination and a multi-objective optimization solution of economic benefit distribution was carried out. To achieve the bargaining Bayesian/Nash equilibrium of the watershed eco-compensation standard in the game, the existence conditions of the equilibrium solution of the eco-compensation standard based on the mixed equilibrium game implementation process were studied. To carry out the complete information dynamic game, the equilibrium solution of the watershed eco-compensation standard based on the dynamic transfer payment was solved, and the rational analysis of the dynamic Bayesian equilibrium game of bargaining based on the incentive compatibility mechanism was also discussed. Water quantity and quality eco-compensation can ensure balanced development between ecological protection and the social economy in the Mihe River Basin. Combined with the variation law of socioeconomic water intake-utilization standards and the water use value, the city of Shouguang City & Qingzhou City should pay Linqu County 4.78 million US$ and 1.29 million US$ as watershed eco-compensation standards per year based on NbS, respectively. To verify the rationality of the results derived from the economically optimal model, two modes of "bargaining" & "perfect competition", were used to study the characteristics of the protocols generated by the equilibrium game, and the applicable conditions of the nonzero-sum game solution upstream and downstream of the watershed were also explored. Based on the nonzero-sum processing of the survey results, the current relationship between the input value of eco-compensation and the willingness to pay satisfies v ≥ c + 1 / 4 . Based on the dynamic game & Bayesian equilibrium solution of bargaining, the watershed eco-compensation quota of water quantity & quality is 6.07 million US$, the willingness to pay is 65.63 US$/month. These findings contribute to the quantifying process of bargaining & dynamic equilibrium by transforming "ambiguous" information to achieve sustainable ecosystem service management and develop socioeconomic strategies associated with different compensation features based on NbS, thus helping to inform watershed management.

Quantitative Evaluation of China's Ecological Protection Compensation Policy Based on PMC Index Model

As a comprehensive benefit coordination mechanism, ecological protection compensation has received increasing attention internationally. China has also introduced a series of policies to promote ecological protection compensation mechanism improvement. The evaluation of ecological protection compensation policies is the main basis for the formulation, adjustment and improvement of the policy. Based on the front-end perspective of policy formulation, this paper selects 10 ecological protection compensation policies issued by the State Council and various ministries in China from 2006 to 2021. A text mining-based PMC index evaluation system using the ROSTCM tool is constructed to quantitatively evaluate these 10 typical policies, and four representative policies are selected for comparative analysis. The overall design of China's ecological protection compensation policies is reasonable, and 5 out of 10 policies have good PMC index scores, which are: P1, P2, P5, P7 and P9; and 5 are at acceptable levels, which are: P3, P4, P6, P8 and P10. However, the PMC surface and the concavity index indicate that there are still some limitations that need to be improved, including the obvious internal differentiation of the policies, the single effectiveness of the policies, and the insufficient incentive and guarantee measures. Finally, this paper provides suggestions for the optimization of ecological protection compensation policies accordingly.

Considering Farmers' Heterogeneity to Payment Ecosystem Services Participation: A Choice Experiment and Agent-Based Model Analysis in Xin'an River Basin, China

The concept of watershed ecological compensation is one payment for ecosystem services (PES) program that incentivizes stakeholders undertake environmental conservation activities that improve the provision of ecosystem services. Defining the heterogeneity of farmers' willingness to participate in watershed ecological compensation is critically important for fully understanding stakeholders' demands. Accordingly, we designed a choice experiment survey to analyze the heterogeneity of policy preferences and willingness to receive compensation between upstream and midstream farmers in Xin'an River basin, China. Moreover, we simulated the impact of farmers' social capitals' heterogeneity with an agent-based model. The results show that there are significant differences in the preferences of agricultural waste recycling rate and agricultural water quality between farmers in the upstream and midstream. The total willingness of farmers in the upstream and midstream to participate in ecological compensation are RMB 149.88 (USD 22.54)/month and RMB 57.40 yuan (USD 8.63)/month, respectively. Social network size has a negative effect on farmers' willingness to participate the programs. Our findings suggest that the characteristics of farmers' influence their willingness to participate in the PES program. The results of this research can be used to improve PES management policies in the future, as well as to support sustainable environmental development and rural revitalization.