Evolutionary Game Model of Internal Threats to Nuclear Security in Spent Fuel Reprocessing Plants Based on RDEU Theory

A study of steady-state strategies for collaborative quality improvement in new retail service supply chains considering emotional factors

How to improve the quality of the new retail service supply chain (RSSC) has become a hot topic for enterprises and consumers. Considering the influence of the new RSSC enterprises' emotional attitude on the decision-making of quality improvement, the theory of rank-dependent expected utility (RDEU) is combined with an evolutionary game, constructing an evolutionary game model of collaborative quality improvement of new RSSC, and analyzing the game strategy choice of each participant in collaborative quality improvement of new RSSC. The study shows that when only one party is emotional, the rationality of retail service integrators will promote the synergistic improvement of the quality of the new RSSC more than functional service providers. Moreover, pessimism and optimism have an inverted U-shaped effect on quality decisions. When both parties have emotions, functional service providers remain optimistic, and retail service integrators remain pessimistic or rational can promote the collaborative improvement of new RSSC quality. In addition, the effects of quality preference, peer mechanism, feedback mechanism, and risk mechanism on the collaborative quality improvement of new RSSC are analyzed. Based on the research findings, relevant countermeasures are proposed to incentivize new retailers to conduct collaborative improvement in quality in terms of establishing an open mechanism for negotiation and consultation, strengthening the emotion management of new retail node firms, and adjusting the transmission of quality signals, with a view to realizing the quality collaborative improvement of the new RSSC.

How Does Public Sentiment Affect the Socially Responsible Behavior of Construction Enterprises?

The negative environmental impact of the construction sector has garnered global attention, and as the “primary force” in achieving the “double carbon” target, green development is urgent, and social responsibility practices cannot be postponed. An evolutionary game model was constructed by combining the rank-dependent expected utility (RDEU) theory and the evolutionary game theory to understand the interaction mechanism between participants’ emotions and decisions, taking into account the characteristics of construction enterprises and the public regarding irrational decisions under heterogeneous emotional combinations. The study demonstrates that: (1) there is probability in the choice of rational strategies, and emotion is an irrational factor that can affect strategy choice. (2) The evolutionary trend of the strategy choice of the game subjects is altered by emotional intensity and emotional propensity. The optimism of construction enterprises inhibits their socially responsible practice, and the pessimism of the public promotes the probability of their negative strategy choice. Furthermore, moderate optimism is a safety valve for the public’s positive strategy choice. (3) The interaction of emotional states leads to a heterogeneity of strategy choices exhibited under different combinations of emotions, with the emotions of construction companies having a more dominant influence on strategy. Finally, we make some feasible recommendations for improving social responsibility practices and preventing mass incidents by boosting emotional monitoring and guidance for construction businesses and the general public. Overall, this study provides important information about how to be socially responsible, maintain good relationships with the public, and protect the environment.

Game Analysis of the Evolution of Energy Structure Transition Considering Low-Carbon Sentiment of the Decision-Makers in the Context of Carbon Neutrality

Countries have started to aggressively undertake energy structure transformation strategies in order to reach the objective of carbon neutrality. Both clean and efficient coal energy use and clean energy use will be crucial to the process of changing the energy structure since the two cannot be totally replaced within a short period of time. In this study, we quantify emotions as an irrational factor, combine them with an evolutionary game using RDEU theory, and build an evolutionary game model between government regulators and energy consumers. We then analyze how low-carbon emotions of decision-makers affect their choice of strategy and the transformation of the energy structure. The findings support that by affecting the relative importance of each strategic choice, emotions have a profound impact on the evolutionary steady state of the system. Appropriate stress and anxiety can increase decision-makers’ feelings of responsibility, while pleasant emotions frequently support strategic conduct. The main countermeasures are as follows: Allow government regulators and energy consumers to properly release positive information, with government regulators forming subsidies and energy consumers actively cooperating and promoting low-carbon activities. This will properly guide the low-carbon sentiment of game subjects to keep them realistically pessimistic.

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Shared Manufacturing Quality Innovation Synergetic Behavior Considering a Subject’s Heterogeneous Emotions

Shared manufacturing provides a new path for the transformation and development of the manufacturing industry, but challenges such as low quality and poor positivity for quality improvement limit the positive role of shared manufacturing. Considering the influences of heterogeneous emotions of subjects on quality decision making, the theory of rank-dependent expected utility (RDEU) and evolutionary game theory were integrated to establish an evolutionary game model of shared manufacturing quality innovation synergy with multi-agent participation and analyze how sentiment affects motivation for quality improvement. The study showed that: (1) emotions, an irrational factor, can significantly change the stable state of the evolution of the shared manufacturing quality innovation synergetic system by influencing the decision-making behavior of decision makers; (2) in terms of the specific microscopic influence mechanism, rationality is the key to ensuring that the behavioral decisions of decision makers do not enshrine large systemic deviations. (3) In terms of the mechanism of heterogeneous emotions, when one party is optimistic, the deepening of the other party’s pessimism tends to bring positive effects; when one party is pessimistic, the deepening of the other party’s optimism tends to bring negative effects. The main management insights are as follows: (1) correctly recognizing and treating heterogeneous emotions of decision makers and regulating the formation and role of heterogeneous emotions of decision makers; (2) appropriately creating an atmosphere of pessimistic emotions, and guiding shared manufacturing to pay attention to manufacturing quality innovation synergy; (3) appropriately releasing favorable information about quality innovation synergy, and continuously promoting high-quality development of shared manufacturing. This study broadens the path of quality improvement in shared manufacturing and the scope of application of emotion theory in a certain sense.

Analysis of Behavioral Strategies of Construction Safety Subjects Based on the Evolutionary Game Theory

In construction safety management practices, identifying key stakeholders and specifying their safety behavior patterns are critical to avoid unsafe practices, which are the major cause of construction accidents. This paper argues that the main contractor and construction workers are key safety stakeholders in the construction safety management in China. The purpose of this paper is to develop an evolutionary game model to explore the safety behavior strategies of the main contractor and construction workers. In this framework, we explored the effects of model parameter changes on the evolution of safety behavior strategies and verify the evolution paths under different initial values by numerical simulations. The findings of this paper are as follows: Firstly, the safety and stability of construction projects are related to the possible losses caused by accidents, the amount of work required by construction workers to comply with safety regulations, the gain of bravado, the probability of accidents, and cost savings from the main contractor’s lax supervision. Secondly, the role of restraining the unsafe behavior of construction workers through the form of fines is limited, and increasing the fines to the main contractor cannot effectively reduce the unsafe behaviors. Thirdly, strengthening safety education, creating a safe atmosphere, and optimizing operating procedures are effective measures to improve the effectiveness of safety behavior. This study further extends the application of evolutionary game theory to construction safety management, and the findings can provide clear guidance for the development of effective incentives and constraints on safety behavior.