Decision and Coordination in a Dual-Channel Three-Layered Green Supply Chain

R&D mode and coordination of green products in sustainable supply chain considering power structures

Green product R&D has a significant impact on the sustainable development of the economy and environment, and green product R&D can be carried out by manufacturers, retailers, third-party companies, and enterprise alliances. The decision-making order in the supply chain depends on the power structures, which can affect the choice of the supply chain decision-making. To study the optimal choice of green product R&D mode in different power structures and the influence of power structure on product price, market demand, green level, and enterprise profits, This paper compares five modes including green product R&D by manufacturers, green product R&D by retailers, green product R&D outsourced by manufacturers to third-party companies, green product R&D outsourced by retailers to third-party companies and green product R&D by manufacturers and retailers in the three power structures of manufacturers as core enterprises, retailers as core enterprises, and equal power between manufacturers and retailers to study the selection strategy of green product R&D modes in the sustainable supply chain. The conclusion provides a strategic reference for the selection of green product R&D mode in different power structures. The findings indicate that when manufacturers are core enterprises, retailers' green product R&D is better than that of manufacturers. When retailers are core enterprises, manufacturers' green product R&D is better than that of retailers. In the same power structure, manufacturers' green product R&D is better than outsourcing to third-party companies, retailers' green product R&D is better than outsourcing to third-party companies, and manufacturers and retailers jointly conduct green product R&D better than manufacturers or retailers alone. When manufacturers and retailers have equal power, the market demand and the product green level are the highest, and the retail price is the lowest. When manufacturers are core enterprises, manufacturers' profits are the highest. When retailers are core enterprises, retailers' profits are the highest. Finally, a two-part pricing contract is used to coordinate the optimal selection strategies.

Strategic Integration Decision under Supply Chain Competition in the Presence of Online Channel

This study explores the pricing decisions of substitutable products for two competing supply chains in the presence of an online channel. Each supply chain consisting of a single manufacturer and an exclusive retailer and one of the manufacturers distributes products through the online channel. We examine optimal decisions under five scenarios to explore how the strategic cooperation between two manufacturers at the upstream horizontal level or with the retailer at the vertical level affects product pricing decisions and the performance of two supply chains? The results reveal that decisions for cooperation with competing manufacturers and opening an online channel are correlated. In the absence of an online channel, cooperation with their respective retailer can lead to a higher supply chain profit. However, if a manufacturer opens an online channel, then cooperation with competing manufacturers can lead to a higher supply chain profit. Under the vertical integration, total supply chain profit might be lower compared to a scenario where members in each supply chain remain independent. Consumers also need to pay more for products.

Coordinating a Green Agri-Food Supply Chain with Revenue-Sharing Contracts Considering Retailers’ Green Marketing Efforts

Serious environmental issues have drawn the attention of the agricultural sector. Consumers’ concerns about their personal health and food safety have stimulated the demand for green agri-food, which has also made it important to focus on the green agri-food supply chain to improve the food quality and reduce the associated environmental concerns. This paper discusses coordination issues of the green agri-food supply chain under the background of farmers’ green farming and retailers’ green marketing, and the impact of a revenue-sharing contract on key decisions of supply chain participants. On the basis of the two-echelon green agri-food supply chain composed of a farmer and a retailer, a revenue-sharing contract was established that takes the cost of farmer’s green farming and retailer’s green marketing into account. Through the comparison of the model results, it is concluded that the revenue-sharing contract is beneficial to not only increase the greening level, but also improve both the farmer’s profit and the retailer’s profit. Moreover, the effectiveness of the revenue-sharing contract is positively correlated with consumers’ sensitivity to the greening level. Finally, the conclusion is verified by numerical simulation and some management suggestions are given.

Optimal Decision in a Dual-Channel Supply Chain under Potential Information Leakage

The growing tendency for suppliers to encroach on the retailers’ market has forced the retailers, being independent entities, to distort shared information to maintain their information superiority. Previous studies on asymmetric information assumed that retailers share information truthfully or that demand satisfies a two-point distribution, which does not always conform to the reality of the dual-channel supply chain. Considering the potential information leakage problem, this paper studied the optimal strategies of the participants and focused on the strategic information management of the dual-channel supply chain. By introducing the retailers’ adverse selection behavior, a sequential game model under general uncertain demand was established, which replaced the classic high-low demand model. The perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium was characterized, which depended on stochastic demand disturbance, product heterogeneity, supply chain structure, and market investigation cost. The results showed that asymmetric information made the supply chain management inefficient. When the demand disturbance was within the threshold, the retailer distorted order quantity to maintain the information advantage under potential information leakage, and information acquisition was not always good for the retailer—in some cases due to adverse selection problems. A numerical example and a sensitivity analysis were done to validate the model. Our work provides participants in the dual-channel supply chain with decision-making support and direction for improving information management.