Research on reliability index and failure probability of inherent defect insurance from the insurance perspective

With the continuous improvement of people 's living standards, people have put forward higher requirements for the safety and comfort of housing. Therefore, Inherent Defect Insurance, a financial method to guarantee the quality of construction projects, has also emerged. At present, China 's Inherent Defect Insurance has been gradually promoted, but its claim mechanism has not been analyzed and studied. From the perspective of construction engineering, this paper first makes a bibliometric analysis of the influencing factors of insurance claims that may be caused by construction engineering quality through VOSViewers, and the evaluation index system of inherent defects is constructed. Then, according to the influencing factors, the PSO-LSSVR model is adopted to fit the performance function of the inherent defects. Finally, based on the reliability design principle of engineering structure, the reliability index and failure probability of Inherent Defect Insurance are derived from the performance function of inherent defects. This paper also analyzes its application in insurance practice and determines the relationship between the number of insurance underwriting policies and the initial reserve of insurance at a certain risk level. This paper studies the probability of Inherent Defect Insurance by constructing the reliability model of inherent defect risks in construction quality, and analyzes the anti-risk ability of insurance companies from the perspective of claim, which provides scientific analysis methods and theoretical basis for the scientific decision-making of insurance companies.

Optimization of construction safety resource allocation based on evolutionary game and genetic algorithm

In the construction industry, ensuring the safety performance of a project relies heavily on the effective allocation of safety resources. As the importance of mental health in the construction industry increases, evolutionary game theory can be used to analyze the interaction mechanism of various factors affecting safety performance during the construction phase. The objective of this paper is to construct an analytical model that combines evolutionary game theory with genetic algorithms from the perspective of Leader-Member Exchange Ambivalence. The model aims to quantify and compare the various factors that influence achieving the expected safety state and identify the specific necessary constraints. Initially, we analyzed the relationships among construction site employees, divided them into superiors and subordinates, and established a game model and payoff matrix based on the research background. Next, we introduced genetic algorithms into the model via the replicator dynamic equation for optimization. We adjusted the coefficients of safety risk level, psychological expected return, moral identity, and other factors to simulate various construction site scenarios. Simulation and optimization results indicate that genetic algorithms provide more accurate reference values for safety resource allocation compared to preset or manually assigned values.

Developing a Decision-Making Model for Construction Safety Behavior Supervision: An Evolutionary Game Theory-Based Analysis

Without the active participation of enterprises and front-line workers, it is difficult for the government to perform effective supervision to ensure behavioral safety among front-line workers. To overcome inadequate government supervision and information attenuation caused by vertical management mode and limited resources, and to change passive supervision into active control with the proactive participation of enterprises and workers, this paper combines the entity responsibility mechanism and the third-party participation mechanism based on government supervision to analyze the decision-making process of government and enterprises on safety behavior supervision. An evolutionary game model was established to describe the decision-making interactions between the government and construction enterprises under the two mechanisms, and a simulation was performed to illustrate the factors influencing the implementation of the mechanisms. The results show that both mechanisms have a positive effect on government supervision, and the third-party participation mechanism was found to be working better. The implementation of the two mechanisms is influenced by punishment, subsidy, and cost, and it has different sensitivities to the three influencing factors. This study provides a theoretical framework for enhancing the government supervision mechanism, and the decision-making between the government and construction enterprises enhances the management form and guides their actual supervision practices.

Dynamic reward and penalty strategies of green building construction incentive: an evolutionary game theory-based analysis

Green building incentives are widely adopted in the world to promote green building construction. However, the incentives from the government are usually predetermined, which cannot obtain a stable effect in green construction practice. To better promote green building construction, this paper studies dynamic government's reward and penalty evolution during the construction process. Based on the prospect theory, the decision of government reward and penalty is formulated as evolutionary game model under four different scenarios: static reward and static penalty, dynamic reward and static penalty, static reward and dynamic penalty, and dynamic reward and dynamic penalty. Through theoretical analysis, our results revealed that the dynamic reward and static penalty is the best strategy to promote green building construction. More specifically, if the intensity of subsidy and penalty increases, contractors tend to green construction; while the probability of active supervision by government is inversely proportional to subsidy and positively proportional to penalty. This study can provide a useful insight for the policy makers to formulate effective reward and penalty policy, thereby standardizing the behavior of contractors, and reducing the negative impact of the construction industry on the environment.