Critical Review of Visual Models for Police Use of Force Decision-Making

Not according to plan: Cognitive failures in marksmanship due to effects of expertise, unknown environments, and the likelihood of shooting unintended targets

Shooting errors have multi-faceted causes with contributing factors that include sensorimotor activity and cognitive failures. Empirical investigations often assess mental errors through threat identification, yet other cognitive failures could contribute to poor outcomes. The current study explored several possible sources of cognitive failures unrelated to threat identification with live fire exercises. Experiment 1 examined a national shooting competition to compare marksmanship accuracy, expertise, and planning in the likelihood of hitting no-shoot or unintended targets. Experts demonstrated an inverse speed/accuracy trade-off and fired upon fewer no-shoot targets than lesser skilled shooters, yet overall, greater opportunity to plan produced more no-shoot errors, thereby demonstrating an increase in cognitive errors. Experiment 2 replicated and extended this finding under conditions accounting for target type, location, and number. These findings further dissociate the roles of marksmanship and cognition in shooting errors while suggesting that marksmanship evaluations should be re-designed to better incorporate cognitive variables.

Considering Objective and Subjective Measures for Police Use of Force Evaluation

In spite of significant interest in the application of police use of force (UOF) from organisations, researchers, and the general public, there remains no industry standard for how police UOF is trained, and by extension, evaluated. While certain UOF behaviours can be objectively measured (e.g., correct shoot/no shoot decision making (DM), shot accuracy), the subjective evaluation of many UOF skills (e.g., situation awareness, SA) falls to the discretion of individual instructors. The aim of the current brief communication is to consider the operationalisation of essential UOF behaviours as objective and subjective measures, respectively. Using longitudinal data from a sample of Canadian police officers (n = 57) evaluated during UOF training scenarios, we discuss how objective and subjective measures reflect changes in officer performance over time. Objective lethal force DM was measured as a binary ‘correct–incorrect’ outcome and subjective SA was measured on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from ‘unacceptable’ to ‘exceptional’. Subjective evaluation of SA demonstrated significant changes over time, while DM remained relatively high and stable. Given the practical and professional implications of UOF, we recommend that a combination of objective and subjective measures is systematically implemented at all stages of police UOF training and evaluation (i.e., basic, advanced, in-service).

Caught in the currents: evaluating the evidence for common downstream police response interventions in calls involving persons with mental illness

The origins of this report, and of the Mental Health and Policing Working Group, can be traced to the unique situation Canadians have faced as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic. The unique circumstances of this global outbreak, which have for many Canadians resulted in serious illness and death, intensified economic uncertainties, altered family and lifestyle dynamics, and generated or exacerbated feelings of loneliness and social dislocation, rightly led the Royal Society of Canada’s COVID-19 Taskforce to consider the strains and other negative impacts on individual, group, and community mental health. With the central role that police too often play in the lives of individuals in mental and (or) emotional crisis, we were tasked with exploring what can be reasonably said about the state of our current knowledge of police responses to persons with mental illness.