Mapping GPs' motivation — it's not all about the money: a nationwide cross-sectional survey study from Denmark

Do physicians' attitudes toward prioritization predict poor-health patients' access to care?

Physicians often face tight resource constraints, meaning they have to make trade-offs between which patients they care for and the amount of care received. Studies show that patients requiring many resources disproportionately suffer a loss of care when resources are constrained. This study uncovers whether physicians' attitudes toward prioritization of healthcare predicts poor-health patients' access to care. We combine unique survey data on Danish GPs' preferred prioritization principle with register data on their patients' contacts in general practice. We consider different types of contacts as the required effort could impact the need for prioritization. Our results show variation in GPs' prioritization principles, where a majority prefers a principle that may lead to an unequal distribution of services. We further find that GPs' attitudes toward prioritization predict some poor-health patients' access to general practice. GPs who state they prefer the principle of prioritizing patients in the poorest health state when resources tightened provide more contacts to poor-health patients. The additional contacts are typically high-effort contacts such as annual status meetings and home visits, but also low-effort contacts such as emails. Our findings indicate inequity in poor-health patients' access to care across general practices.

Financial incentives for integrated care: A scoping review and lessons for evidence-based design

BACKGROUND

In response to the increasing prevalence of people with chronic conditions, healthcare systems restructure to integrate care across providers. However, many systems fail to achieve the desired outcomes. One likely explanation is lack of financial incentives for integrating care.

OBJECTIVES

We aim to identify financial incentives used to promote integrated care across different types of providers for patients with common chronic conditions and assess the evidence on (cost-)effectiveness and the facilitators/barriers to their implementation.

METHODS

This scoping review identifies studies published before December 2021, and includes 33 studies from the United States and the Netherlands.

RESULTS

We identify four types of financial incentives: shared savings, bundled payments, pay for performance, and pay for coordination. Substantial heterogeneity in the (cost-)effectiveness of these incentives exists. Key implementation barriers are a lack of infrastructure (e.g., electronic medical records, communication channels, and clinical guidelines). To facilitate integration, financial incentives should be easy to communicate and implement, and require additional financial support, IT support, training, and guidelines.

CONCLUSIONS

All four types of financial incentives may promote integrated care but not in all contexts. Shared savings appears to be the most promising incentive type for promoting (cost-)effective care integration with the largest number of favourable studies allowing causal interpretations. The limited evidence pool makes it hard to draw firm conclusions that are transferable across contexts.