Modeling filling-in of afterimages

A neurodynamic model of the interaction between color perception and color memory

The memory color effect and Spanish castle illusion have been taken as evidence of the cognitive penetrability of vision. In the same manner, the successful decoding of color-related brain signals in functional neuroimaging studies suggests the retrieval of memory colors associated with a perceived gray object. Here, we offer an alternative account of these findings based on the design principles of adaptive resonance theory (ART). In ART, conscious perception is a consequence of a resonant state. Resonance emerges in a recurrent cortical circuit when a bottom-up spatial pattern agrees with the top-down expectation. When they do not agree, a special control mechanism is activated that resets the network and clears off erroneous expectation, thus allowing the bottom-up activity to always dominate in perception. We developed a color ART circuit and evaluated its behavior in computer simulations. The model helps to explain how traces of erroneous expectations about incoming color are eventually removed from the color perception, although their transient effect may be visible in behavioral responses or in brain imaging. Our results suggest that the color ART circuit, as a predictive computational system, is almost never penetrable, because it is equipped with computational mechanisms designed to constrain the impact of the top-down predictions on ongoing perceptual processing.

Jump Across the Gap! A New Type of Colour Spreading Illusion

The present article reports a new illusory colour phenomenon. There have been previous reports of illusory colours that spread to an area in contact with a coloured object (e.g., neon-like spreading). However, according to our informal observations as well as the experiments reported here, illusory colour spreads even if the coloured and noncoloured areas are separated by a gap. The contour-based perception account as well as the interaction of some components of surround suppression in the visual cortex were discussed as possibilities to account for the present illusion. The effect reported in the present study may provide suggestions for further understanding of colour perception.

A Model for a Filling-in Process Triggered by Edges Predicts "Conflicting" Afterimage Effects

The goal of our research was to develop a compound computational model that predicts the "opposite" effects of the alternating aftereffects stimuli, such as the "color dove illusion" (Barkan and Spitzer, 2017), and the "filling in the afterimage after the image" (van Lier et al., 2009). The model is based on a filling-in mechanism, through a diffusion equation where the color and intensity of the perceived surface are obtained through a diffusion process of color from the stimulus edges. The model solves the diffusion equation with boundary conditions that takes the locations of the chromatic edges of the chromatic inducer (chromatic stimulus) and the achromatic remaining contours into account. These contours (edges) trigger the diffusion process. The same calculations are done for both types of afterimage effects, with the only difference related to the location of the remaining contour. While a gradient toward the inducing color produces a perception of the complementary color, an opposite gradient yields the perception of the same color as that of the chromatic inducer. Furthermore, we show that the same computational model can also predict new alternating aftereffects stimuli, such as the spiral stimulus, and the averaging of colors in alternating afterimage stimuli described by Anstis et al. (2012). The suggested model is able to predict most of the additional properties related to the "conflicting" phenomena that have been recently described in the literature, and thus supports the idea that a shared visual mechanism is responsible for both the positive and the negative effects.

Neural representation of form-contingent color filling-in in the early visual cortex

Perceptual filling-in exemplifies the constructive nature of visual processing. Color, a prominent surface property of visual objects, can appear to spread to neighboring areas that lack any color. We investigated cortical responses to a color filling-in illusion that effectively dissociates perceived color from the retinal input (van Lier, Vergeer, & Anstis, 2009). Observers adapted to a star-shaped stimulus with alternating red- and cyan-colored points to elicit a complementary afterimage. By presenting an achromatic outline that enclosed one of the two afterimage colors, perceptual filling-in of that color was induced in the unadapted central region. Visual cortical activity was monitored with fMRI, and analyzed using multivariate pattern analysis. Activity patterns in early visual areas (V1–V4) reliably distinguished between the two color-induced filled-in conditions, but only higher extrastriate visual areas showed the predicted correspondence with color perception. Activity patterns allowed for reliable generalization between filled-in colors and physical presentations of perceptually matched colors in areas V3 and V4, but not in earlier visual areas. These findings suggest that the perception of filled-in surface color likely requires more extensive processing by extrastriate visual areas, in order for the neural representation of surface color to become aligned with perceptually matched real colors.

Flexible color perception depending on the shape and positioning of achromatic contours

In this study, we present several demonstrations of color averaging between luminance boundaries. In each of the demonstrations, different black outlines are superimposed on one and the same colored surface. Whereas perception without these outlines comprises a blurry colored gradient, superimposing the outlines leads to a much clearer binary color percept, with different colors perceived on each side of the boundary. These demonstrations show that the color of the perceived surfaces is flexible, depending on the exact shape of the outlines that define the surface, and that different positioning of the outlines can lead to different, distinct color percepts. We argue that the principle of color averaging described here is crucial for the brain in building a useful model of the distal world, in which differences within object surfaces are perceptually minimized, while differences between surfaces are perceptually enhanced.

Afterimage watercolors: an exploration of contour-based afterimage filling-in

We investigated filling-in of colored afterimages and compared them with filling-in of “real” colors in the watercolor illusion. We used shapes comprising two thin adjacent undulating outlines of which the inner or the outer outline was chromatic, while the other was achromatic. The outlines could be presented simultaneously, inducing the original watercolor effect, or in an alternating fashion, inducing colored afterimages of the chromatic outlines. In Experiment 1, using only alternating outlines, these afterimages triggered filling-in, revealing an “afterimage watercolor” effect. Depending on whether the inner or the outer outline was chromatic, filling-in of a complementary or a similarly colored afterimage was perceived. In Experiment 2, simultaneous and alternating presentations were compared. Additionally, gray and black achromatic contours were tested, having an increased luminance contrast with the background for the black contours. Compared to “real” color filling-in, afterimage filling-in was more easily affected by different luminance settings. More in particular, afterimage filling-in was diminished when high-contrast contours were used. In the discussion we use additional demonstrations in which we further explore the “watercolor afterimage.” All in all, comparisons between both types of illusions show similarities and differences with regard to color filling-in. Caution, however, is warranted in attributing these effects to different underlying processing differences.

Simulations of induced visual scene fading with boundary offset and filling-in

Blurred images can appear to fade to uniform brightness and color when viewed with some types of visual transient stimuli. Simons et al. (2006) identified the conditions where such scene fading occurs and noted that their findings were inconsistent with mechanisms that have been used to explain other fading effects. We show that their empirical findings are consistent with a neural model of visual perception that hypothesizes filling-in of brightness and color that is constrained by signals from a boundary contour system. Certain types of transients can weaken the boundary responses and thereby induce scene fading. The simulations explain how even small transient changes can produce scene fading effects across large parts of an image.

Consciousness and attention: on sufficiency and necessity

Recent research has slowly corroded a belief that selective attention and consciousness are so tightly entangled that they cannot be individually examined. In this review, we summarize psychophysical and neurophysiological evidence for a dissociation between top-down attention and consciousness. The evidence includes recent findings that show subjects can attend to perceptually invisible objects. More contentious is the finding that subjects can become conscious of an isolated object, or the gist of the scene in the near absence of top-down attention; we critically re-examine the possibility of "complete" absence of top-down attention. We also cover the recent flurry of studies that utilized independent manipulation of attention and consciousness. These studies have shown paradoxical effects of attention, including examples where top-down attention and consciousness have opposing effects, leading us to strengthen and revise our previous views. Neuroimaging studies with EEG, MEG, and fMRI are uncovering the distinct neuronal correlates of selective attention and consciousness in dissociative paradigms. These findings point to a functional dissociation: attention as analyzer and consciousness as synthesizer. Separating the effects of selective visual attention from those of visual consciousness is of paramount importance to untangle the neural substrates of consciousness from those for attention.

Capturing lightness between contours

Homogeneously coloured bars may exhibit lightness differences at the intersections. A well-known example is the Hermann grid illusion, where crossing white bars on a black background show dark patches at the crossings. Jung (1973, Handbook of Sensory Physiology volume VII/3, pp 1-152) found that the dark patches persist when thin outlines are drawn at the intersections, and are even visible in foveal vision. Recently, it has been shown that making distortions to the contours of a Hermann grid-like configuration results in the disappearance of the illusory dark spots (Geier et al, 2008 Perception 37 651 665). We show that thin outlines at the crossings of the distorted Hermann grid induce lightness differences in the same direction as in the original Hermann grid illusion, even in foveal vision and in displays consisting of two crossing bars. Our experiments reveal that the induced lightness differences are independent of the luminance polarity and shape of the contours at the intersection. We suggest that the effect results from lateral inhibition and an additional spreading and capturing of these differences between luminance contours. A similar capturing between collinear contours may play a role in peripheral vision in the original Hermann grid.