Heuristic judgment of mass ratio in two-body collisions

Rotating objects cue spatial attention via the perception of frictive surface contact

We report a new attentional cueing effect, which shows how attention models the physical force of friction. Most objects we see are in frictive contact with a 'floor', such that clockwise rotation causes rightward movement and counterclockwise rotation leftward movement. Is this regularity encoded in spatial orienting responses? In Experiment 1, seeing a clockwise-rotating 'wheel' produced faster responses to subsequent targets appearing on the right vs. left (and vice versa for counterclockwise rotation). Thus, when viewing a lone rotating wheel, we orient attention toward where we predict it will move next, assuming frictive floor contact. But what happens if the rotating wheel is seen touching another visible surface? In Experiment 2, rotational cueing was stronger for wheels touching a visible floor, was abolished for wheels near but not touching another surface, and reversed for wheels touching a ceiling. We conclude that the visual system makes an assumption of frictive floor contact, and rapidly analyzes visual cues to frictive contact with other surfaces, in order to orient attention toward where objects are likely to move next.

Grounding Intuitive Physics in Perceptual Experience

This review article explores the foundation of laypeople's understanding of the physical world rooted in perceptual experience. Beginning with a concise historical overview of the study of intuitive physics, the article presents the hypothesis that laypeople possess accurate internalized representations of physical laws. A key aspect of this hypothesis is the contention that correct representations of physical laws emerge in ecological experimental conditions, where the scenario being examined resembles everyday life experiences. The article critically examines empirical evidence both supporting and challenging this claim, revealing that despite everyday-life-like conditions, fundamental misconceptions often persist. Many of these misconceptions can be attributed to a domain-general heuristic that arises from the overgeneralization of perceptual-motor experiences with physical objects. To conclude, the article delves into ongoing controversies and highlights promising future avenues in the field of intuitive physics, including action-judgment dissociations, insights from developmental psychology, and computational models integrating artificial intelligence.

Naturalistic embodied interactions elicit intuitive physical behaviour in accordance with Newtonian physics

The success of visuomotor interactions in everyday activities such as grasping or sliding a cup is inescapably governed by the laws of physics. Research on intuitive physics has predominantly investigated reasoning about objects' behaviour involving binary forced choice responses. We investigated how the type of visuomotor response influences participants' beliefs about physical quantities and their lawful relationship implicit in their active behaviour. Participants propelled pucks towards targets positioned at different distances. Analysis with a probabilistic model of interactions showed that subjects adopted the non-linear control prescribed by Newtonian physics when sliding real pucks in a virtual environment even in the absence of visual feedback. However, they used a linear heuristic when viewing the scene on a monitor and interactions were implemented through key presses. These results support the notion of probabilistic internal physics models but additionally suggest that humans can take advantage of embodied, sensorimotor, multimodal representations in physical scenarios.

What tool representation, intuitive physics, and action have in common: The brain's first-person physics engine

An overlapping set of brain regions in parietal and frontal cortex are engaged by different types of tasks and stimuli: (i) making inferences about the physical structure and dynamics of the world, (ii) passively viewing, or actively interacting with, manipulable objects, and (iii) planning and execution of reaching and grasping actions. We suggest the observed neural overlap is because a common superordinate computation is engaged by each of those different tasks: A forward model of physical reasoning about how first-person actions will affect the world and be affected by unfolding physical events. This perspective offers an account of why some physical predictions are systematically incorrect - there can be a mismatch between how physical scenarios are experimentally framed and the native format of the inferences generated by the brain's first-person physics engine. This perspective generates new empirical expectations about the conditions under which physical reasoning may exhibit systematic biases.

Limits on simulation approaches in intuitive physics

A popular explanation of the human ability for physical reasoning is that it depends on a sophisticated ability to perform mental simulations. According to this perspective, physical reasoning problems are approached by repeatedly simulating relevant aspects of a scenario, with noise, and making judgments based on aggregation over these simulations. In this paper, we describe three core tenets of simulation approaches, theoretical commitments that must be present in order for a simulation approach to be viable. The identification of these tenets threatens the plausibility of simulation as a theory of physical reasoning, because they appear to be incompatible with what we know about cognition more generally. To investigate this apparent contradiction, we describe three experiments involving simple physical judgments and predictions, and argue their results challenge these core predictions of theories of mental simulation.

Newtonian Predictions Are Integrated With Sensory Information in 3D Motion Perception

Because the motions of everyday objects obey Newtonian mechanics, perhaps these laws or approximations thereof are internalized by the brain to facilitate motion perception. Shepard's seminal investigations of this hypothesis demonstrated that the visual system fills in missing information in a manner consistent with kinematic constraints. Here, we show that perception relies on internalized regularities not only when filling in missing information but also when available motion information is inconsistent with the expected outcome of a physical event. When healthy adult participants (Ns = 11, 11, 12, respectively, in Experiments 1, 2, and 3) viewed 3D billiard-ball collisions demonstrating varying degrees of consistency with Newtonian mechanics, their perceptual judgments of postcollision trajectories were biased toward the Newtonian outcome. These results were consistent with a maximum-likelihood model of sensory integration in which perceived target motion following a collision is a reliability-weighted average of a sensory estimate and an internal prediction consistent with Newtonian mechanics.

Intuitive physical reasoning about objects' masses transfers to a visuomotor decision task consistent with Newtonian physics

While interacting with objects during every-day activities, e.g. when sliding a glass on a counter top, people obtain constant feedback whether they are acting in accordance with physical laws. However, classical research on intuitive physics has revealed that people's judgements systematically deviate from predictions of Newtonian physics. Recent research has explained at least some of these deviations not as consequence of misconceptions about physics but instead as the consequence of the probabilistic interaction between inevitable perceptual uncertainties and prior beliefs. How intuitive physical reasoning relates to visuomotor actions is much less known. Here, we present an experiment in which participants had to slide pucks under the influence of naturalistic friction in a simulated virtual environment. The puck was controlled by the duration of a button press, which needed to be scaled linearly with the puck's mass and with the square-root of initial distance to reach a target. Over four phases of the experiment, uncertainties were manipulated by altering the availability of sensory feedback and providing different degrees of knowledge about the physical properties of pucks. A hierarchical Bayesian model of the visuomotor interaction task incorporating perceptual uncertainty and press-time variability found substantial evidence that subjects adjusted their button-presses so that the sliding was in accordance with Newtonian physics. After observing collisions between pucks, which were analyzed with a hierarchical Bayesian model of the perceptual observation task, subjects transferred the relative masses inferred perceptually to adjust subsequent sliding actions. Crucial in the modeling was the inclusion of a cost function, which quantitatively captures participants' implicit sensitivity to errors due to their motor variability. Taken together, in the present experiment we find evidence that our participants transferred their intuitive physical reasoning to a subsequent visuomotor control task consistent with Newtonian physics and weighed potential outcomes with a cost functions based on their knowledge about their own variability.

When it all falls down: the relationship between intuitive physics and spatial cognition

Our intuitive understanding of physical dynamics is crucial in daily life. When we fill a coffee cup, stack items in a refrigerator, or navigate around a slippery patch of ice, we draw on our intuitions about how physical interactions will unfold. What mental machinery underlies our ability to form such inferences? Numerous aspects of cognition must contribute - for example, spatial thinking, temporal prediction, and working memory, to name a few. Is intuitive physics merely the sum of its parts - a collection of these and other related abilities that we apply to physical scenarios as we would to other tasks? Or does physical reasoning rest on something extra - a devoted set of mental resources that takes information from other cognitive systems as inputs? Here, we take a key step in addressing this question by relating individual differences on a physical prediction task to performance on spatial tasks, which may be most likely to account for intuitive physics abilities given the fundamentally spatial nature of physical interactions. To what degree can physical prediction performance be disentangled from spatial thinking? We tested 100 online participants in an “Unstable Towers” task and measures of spatial cognition and working memory. We found a positive relationship between intuitive physics and spatial skills, but there were substantial, reliable individual differences in physical prediction ability that could not be accounted for by spatial measures or working memory. Our findings point toward the separability of intuitive physics from spatial cognition.

Causal reports: Context-dependent contributions of intuitive physics and visual impressions of launching

Everyday causal reports appear to be based on a blend of perceptual and cognitive processes. Causality can sometimes be perceived automatically through low-level visual processing of stimuli, but it can also be inferred on the basis of an intuitive understanding of the physical mechanism that underlies an observable event. We investigated how visual impressions of launching and the intuitive physics of collisions contribute to the formation of explicit causal responses. In Experiment 1, participants observed collisions between realistic objects differing in apparent material and hence implied mass, whereas in Experiment 2, participants observed collisions between abstract, non-material objects. The results of Experiment 1 showed that ratings of causality were mainly driven by the intuitive physics of collisions, whereas the results of Experiment 2 provide some support to the hypothesis that ratings of causality were mainly driven by visual impressions of launching. These results suggest that stimulus factors and experimental design factors - such as the realism of the stimuli and the variation in the implied mass of the colliding objects - may determine the relative contributions of perceptual and post-perceptual cognitive processes to explicit causal responses. A revised version of the impetus transmission heuristic provides a satisfactory explanation for these results, whereas the hypothesis that causal responses and intuitive physics are based on the internalization of physical laws does not.

Inferring mass in complex scenes by mental simulation

After observing a collision between two boxes, you can immediately tell which is empty and which is full of books based on how the boxes moved. People form rich perceptions about the physical properties of objects from their interactions, an ability that plays a crucial role in learning about the physical world through our experiences. Here, we present three experiments that demonstrate people's capacity to reason about the relative masses of objects in naturalistic 3D scenes. We find that people make accurate inferences, and that they continue to fine-tune their beliefs over time. To explain our results, we propose a cognitive model that combines Bayesian inference with approximate knowledge of Newtonian physics by estimating probabilities from noisy physical simulations. We find that this model accurately predicts judgments from our experiments, suggesting that the same simulation mechanism underlies both peoples' predictions and inferences about the physical world around them.

Perceiving Possibilities for Action: On the Necessity of Calibration and Perceptual Learning for the Visual Guidance of Action

Tasks such as steering, braking, and intercepting moving objects constitute a class of behaviors, known as visually guided actions, which are typically carried out under continuous control on the basis of visual information. Several decades of research on visually guided action have resulted in an inventory of control laws that describe for each task how information about the sufficiency of one's current state is used to make ongoing adjustments. Although a considerable amount of important research has been generated within this framework, several aspects of these tasks that are essential for successful performance cannot be captured. The purpose of this paper is to provide an overview of the existing framework, discuss its limitations, and introduce a new framework that emphasizes the necessity of calibration and perceptual learning. Within the proposed framework, successful human performance on these tasks is a matter of learning to detect and calibrate optical information about the boundaries that separate possible from impossible actions. This resolves a long-lasting incompatibility between theories of visually guided action and the concept of an affordance. The implications of adopting this framework for the design of experiments and models of visually guided action are discussed.

Estimation of Lifted Weight and Produced Effort through Perception of Point-Light Display

It has been shown that human observers can estimate the weight of a box from the observation of a point-light display of a lifting motion. We asked observers to report the weight of the box and the effort produced by five lifters ranging in size and strength to determine if observers can perceive lifter size. In experiment 1, five or six weights from each of five lifters were shown to fourteen observers in a random order. Observers showed less error in estimating the amount of effort each lifter produced than in estimating the actual weight of the box. In experiment 2, the lifters were presented individually to forty observers to remove any effect observing a previous lift might have had on estimating the subsequent lift by a different lifter. The results showed an improvement in estimated weight but not in estimated effort. In experiment 3, the actual size of the lifters was given to thirty-four observers, and the estimations of both weight and effort improved. In experiment 4, observers did not improve when observing practice trials and estimating either only weight or only effort. The results from the four experiments suggest that observers are more sensitive to lifter's effort than to the weight lifted, and that observers tend to use changes in the velocity profile of the lift when making their estimates.

Intuitive understanding of the relationship between the elasticity of objects and kinematic patterns of collisions

Horizontal collisions have long been used as a tool for exploring people's intuitive understanding of elementary physical laws. Here, we explored intuitive understanding of the relationship between the kinematic patterns of collisions and the elasticity of the colliding objects. In Experiment 1A, we manipulated the simulated materials of two virtually colliding spheres and asked the participants to judge whether the simulated collisions appeared "natural" or "unnatural." We did the same in Experiments 1B and 2, but asked the participants to adjust the velocities until the collisions appeared to be "perfectly natural." In Experiment 3, we removed pictorial cues to the materials of the colliding spheres and asked the participants to rate the bounciness of the materials, in view of the kinematics of simulated collisions. Overall, the results showed that observers intuitively understood that collisions between more elastic objects subtend a higher coefficient of restitution than collisions between objects with lesser elasticity. The results also highlighted some discrepancies between the intuitive and Newtonian physics of collisions. Observers were somewhat insensitive to violations of the principle of energy conservation, and their responses were influenced by irrelevant kinematic features of the collisions, such as the collision type and precollision velocity. We discuss our experimental results in relation to salient theoretical perspectives on intuitive physics.

Testing Bayesian and heuristic predictions of mass judgments of colliding objects

Mass judgments of colliding objects have been used to explore people's understanding of the physical world because they are ecologically relevant, yet people display biases that are most easily explained by a small set of heuristics. Recent work has challenged the heuristic explanation, by producing the same biases from a model that copes with perceptual uncertainty by using Bayesian inference with a prior based on the correct combination rules from Newtonian mechanics (noisy Newton). Here I test the predictions of the leading heuristic model (Gilden and Proffitt, 1989) against the noisy Newton model using a novel manipulation of the standard mass judgment task: making one of the objects invisible post-collision. The noisy Newton model uses the remaining information to predict above-chance performance, while the leading heuristic model predicts chance performance when one or the other final velocity is occluded. An experiment using two different types of occlusion showed better-than-chance performance and response patterns that followed the predictions of the noisy Newton model. The results demonstrate that people can make sensible physical judgments even when information critical for the judgment is missing, and that a Bayesian model can serve as a guide in these situations. Possible algorithmic-level accounts of this task that more closely correspond to the noisy Newton model are explored.

The limits of visual mass perception

The theory of direct perception suggests that observers can accurately judge the mass of a box picked up by a lifter shown in a point-light display. However, accurate perceptual performance may be limited to specific circumstances. The purpose of the present study was to systematically examine the factors that determine perception of mass, including display type, lifting speed, response type, and lifter's strength. In contrast to previous research, a wider range of viewing manipulations of point-light display conditions was investigated. In Experiment 1, we first created a circumstance where observers could accurately judge lifts of five box masses performed by a lifter of average strength. In Experiments 2–5, we manipulated the spatial and temporal aspects of the lift, the judgement type, and lifter's strength, respectively. Results showed that mass judgement gets worse whenever the context deviates from ideal conditions, such as when only the lifted object was shown, when video play speed was changed, or when lifters of different strength performed the same task. In conclusion, observers’ perception of kinetic properties is compromised whenever viewing conditions are not ideal.

Brunswikian Resources for Event-Perception Research

Recent psychological research aimed at determining whether dynamic event perception is direct or mediated by cue-based inference convincingly demonstrates evidence of both modes of perception or apprehension. This work also shows that noise is involved in attaining any perceptual variable, whether it perfectly (invariantly) specifies or imperfectly (fallibly) indicates the value of a target or criterion variable. As such, event-perception researchers encounter both internal (sensory or inferential) and external ecological sources of noise or uncertainty, owing to the organism's possible use of imperfect or ‘nonspecifying’ variables (or cues) and cue-based inference. Because both sources play central roles in Egon Brunswik's theory of probabilistic functionalism and methodology of representative design, event-perception research will benefit by explicitly leveraging original Brunswikian and, more recent, neo-Brunswikian scientific resources. Doing so will result in a more coherent and powerful approach to perceptual and cognitive psychology than is currently displayed in the scientific literature.

Rotational kinematics influence multimodal perception of heaviness

Perceived heaviness has been shown to be specific to an object's rotational inertia (I), its resistance to rotational acceleration. According to the kinematic specification of dynamics (KSD) principle, we hypothesized that I is optically specified by rotational kinematics. Using virtual depictions of wielded objects, we investigated whether the visually detected rotational kinematics of wielded objects would influence perceived heaviness in a manner consistent with the inertial model of heaviness perception. We scaled the virtual object's movement so that it rotated more or less than its wielded counterpart, specifying lower and higher I, respectively. Perceived heaviness was inversely related to the rotational scaling factor, consistent with a KSD interpretation of the inertial model.

Perception of Human Motion

Humans, being highly social creatures, rely heavily on the ability to perceive what others are doing and to infer from gestures and expressions what others may be intending to do. These perceptual skills are easily mastered by most, but not all, people, in large part because human action readily communicates intentions and feelings. In recent years, remarkable advances have been made in our understanding of the visual, motoric, and affective influences on perception of human action, as well as in the elucidation of the neural concomitants of perception of human action. This article reviews those advances and, where possible, draws links among those findings.

Perception of kinematic characteristics of tennis strokes for anticipating stroke type and direction

The purpose of this study was to determine the sources of visual information used by highly skilled tennis players in anticipating their opponent's shots. In Experiment 1, motion analysis of the strokes showed that the relative motion between the racquet and forearm was different between the ground strokes and lobs, but there were no reliable kinematic differences when shot direction was varied. In Experiment 2, 12 skilled tennis players observed the opponent hitting strokes in a normal video or in a point-light display with different segments occluded. Players' anticipation accuracy was not degraded by the use of the point-light display. Occluding the racquet and forearm significantly reduced the participant's ability to determine the type of stroke produced.

Contributions of invariants, heuristics, and exemplars to the visual perception of relative mass

Some potential contributions of invariants, heuristics, and exemplars to the perception of dynamic properties in the colliding balls task were explored. On each trial, an observer is asked to determine the heavier of 2 colliding balls. The invariant approach assumes that people can learn to detect complex visual patterns that reliably specify which ball is heavier. The heuristic approach assumes that observers only have access to simple motion cues. The exemplar-based approach assumes that people store particular exemplars of collisions in memory, which are later retrieved to perform the task. Mathematical models of these theories are contrasted in 2 experiments. Observers may use more than 1 strategy to determine relative mass. Although observers can learn to detect and use invariants, they may rely on either heuristics before the invariant has been learned or exemplars when memory demands and similarity relations allow.

Causal impressions: predicting when, not just whether

In 1739, David Hume established the so-called cues to causality--environmental cues that are important to the inference of causality. Although this descriptive account has been corroborated experimentally, it has not been established why these cues are useful, except that they may reflect statistical regularities in the environment. One of the cues to causality, covariation, helps predict whether an effect will occur, but not its time of occurrence. In the present study, evidence is provided that spatial and temporal contiguity improve an observer's ability to predict when an effect will occur, thus complementing the utility of covariation as a predictor of whether an effect will occur. While observing Michotte's (1946/1963) launching effect, participants showed greater accuracy and precision in their predictions of the onset of movement by the launched object when there was spatial and temporal contiguity. Furthermore, when auditory cues that bridged a delayed launch were included, causal ratings and predictability were similarly affected. These results suggest that the everyday inference of causality relies on our ability to predict whether and when an effect will occur.

Perspective distortion of trajectory forms and perceptual constancy in visual event identification

Previous studies have shown that people can use the information in trajectory forms to recognize visual events. A trajectory form is composed of the path of motion and the change in speed along that path. In past studies, however, only sensitivity to trajectory forms viewed from a single perspective was examined. The optical components change when an event is viewed from different perspectives, and the projected form of the trajectory is transformed. Does event recognition exhibit constancy despite these changes? In Experiment 1, participants were familiarized with five different trajectory forms viewed from a single perspective. Then the participants had to identify the same events viewed from different perspectives: from the side, at an angle, and entirely in depth. The participants exhibited perceptual constancy. Experiment 2 revealed, however, that both the change in optical components and the perspective transformations affected recognition.

Causation, causal perception, and conservation laws

We investigated the perception of causation via the ability to detect conservation violations in simple events. We showed that observers were sensitive to energy conservation violations in free-fall events. Furthermore, observers were sensitive to gradually perturbed energy dynamics in such events. However, they were more sensitive to the effect of decreasing gravity than to that of increasing gravity. Displays with decreasing gravity were the only displays in which the energy profile was dominated by (apparent) potential energy, leading to an asymmetric trajectory.

Learning to visually perceive the relative mass of colliding balls in globally and locally constrained task ecologies

Novice observers differ from each other in the kinematic variables they use for the perception of kinetic properties, but they converge on more useful variables after practice with feedback. The colliding-balls paradigm was used to investigate how the convergence depends on the relations between the candidate variables and the to-be-perceived property, relative mass. Experiment 1 showed that observers do not change in the variables they use if the variables with which they start allow accurate performance. Experiment 2 showed that, at least for some observers, convergence can be facilitated by reducing the correlations between commonly used nonspecifying variables and relative mass but not by keeping those variables constant. Experiments 3a and 3b further demonstrated that observers learn not to rely on a particular nonspecifying variable if the correlation between that variable and relative mass is reduced.

Postcoincidence trajectory duration affects motion event perception

In a two-dimensional display, identical visual targets moving toward and across each other with equal, constant speed can be perceived either to reverse their motion directions at the coincidence point (bouncing percept) or to stream through one another (streaming percept). Although there is a strong tendency to perceive the streaming percept, various factors have been reported to induce the bouncing percept, such as a sound or a visual flash at the moment of the visual target coincidence. By changing duration of the postcoincidence trajectory (PCT), we investigated how long it would take for such bounce-inducing factors to be maximally effective after the visual coincidence. With bounce-inducing factors, the percentage of the bouncing percept did not reach its maximal level immediately after the coincidence but increased as a function of PCT duration up to 150-200 msec. The results clearly reject the possibility of the cognitive-bias hypothesis about the bounce-inducing effect and suggest rather that the bounce-inducing factors have to interact with the PCT for some period after the coincidence to be maximally effective.

Learning to perceive the relative mass of colliding balls: the effects of ratio scaling and feedback

The theory of direct perception holds that competent observers are able to detect optical patterns that specify the relative mass of colliding balls. Heuristic theorists, on the other hand, claim that judgments of relative mass are based on variables that do not specify relative mass. We contrasted these views with an experiment in which participants were given feedback on their ratio-scaled estimates of the relative mass of simulated colliding balls. Correlations between judged relative mass and various kinetic and kinematic measures of the collisions revealed that (1) judgments of relative mass become more accurate with feedback, (2) different observers use different variables, (3) during training, many observers change which variables they use, (4) before training, observers tend to use nonspecifying variables or combinations thereof, (5) after a minimal amount of training, at least some observers seem to detect mass-specifying information, and (6) the judgments do not support a generalization of the heuristic model of Gilden and Proffitt (1989, 1994). These findings suggest that direct perception of relative mass is a skill that can be developed through appropriate training.

The role of eye height in perceiving affordances and object dimensions

In four experiments on perceived object height and width, the effects of shifting participants' effective eye height (EEH) on affordance (intrinsic) and apparent size (extrinsic) judgments were contrasted. In Experiment 1, EEH shifts produced comparable overestimations of height in intrinsic and extrinsic tasks. A similar result was found with a more abstract extrinsic height task (Experiment 2). However, Experiment 3 revealed a dissociation between intrinsic and extrinsic tasks of perceived width. Affordance judgments were affected by EEH shifts, whereas apparent size judgments were not. Experiment 4 compared participants' performance on comparable extrinsic tasks of height and width. Height judgments were affected by EEH shifts, but width judgments were again unaffected. It is concluded that eye height may be a more natural metric for object height than for width. Moreover, this difference reflects a basic flexibility within the human visual system for selectively attuning to the most accessible sources of size information.

Perception of Kinematic Characteristics in the Motion of Lifted Weight

It has been widely shown that human observers are able to perceive lifted weight from the observation of a point-light display of the lifter's action. In the experiments reported here, the kinematic information used by observers to perceive a lifted weight was determined. In Experiment 1, observers (N = 30) were able to identify weights (5, 10, 15, 20, and 25 kg) successfully by observing only the lift phase of the action. Other procedures, such as walking while holding the weight and placing the weight on a table, did not result in significantly improved estimations. In Experiment 2, the kinematic patterns used by 4 lifters with weights varying from 5 to 25 kg were examined. Changes in weight lifted resulted in changes in lift velocity, hip angle, and dwell time. In Experiment 3, in which 15 observers participated, these 3 kinematic variables were experimentally manipulated. The results indicated that observation was most significantly influenced by variations in lift velocity. The results are discussed in relation to kinematic specification of dynamics and heuristic approaches.