Spatial direction and grammatical form of instructions affect the solution of spatial problems

Linking brain structure and activation in anterior insula cortex to explain the trait empathy for pain

The ability to perceive, understand, and react to the feelings of others' pain is referred to as empathy for pain which is composed of two components, affective‐perceptual empathy and cognitive‐evaluative empathy. Recent reviews on the neural mechanisms of empathetic pain showed the anterior insula (AI) cortex as a core circuit for empathy. However, little is known about the modulation of brain anatomy and empathic responses by trait measures of empathy (trait empathy). Thus, we investigated whether individual variation in the personality trait of empathy is associated with individual variation in the structure of specific brain regions using voxel‐based morphometry (VBM). We further investigated the relationship between the trait empathy and the activity of the same regions using state measures of empathy for pain in a trial‐by‐trial fashion in the given situation. VBM analysis indicated a small but significant negative relationship between trait empathy and gray matter volume in the bilateral AI. Functional MRI study further demonstrated that experimentally induced activity of the bilateral AI during state empathy for pain was also correlated with trait empathy. An asymmetry exists between the right and left AI between the affective and cognitive empathy. The right AI was found to be involved in the affective‐perceptual form of empathy and the left AI was active in cognitive‐evaluative forms of empathy. The interindividual differences in trait empathy may be reflected both in the state empathy and more stable brain structure difference.

Egocentric spatial framework effects from single and multiple points of view

In three experiments, we tested the one-place, one-perspective rule formulated by Franklin, Tversky, and Coon (1992). This rule proposes that subjects take a neutral, external perspective when they must use multiple viewpoints to make decisions about the locations of objects in memorized scenes. We compared responding from a single viewpoint with responding from two viewpoints. In Experiments 1 and 2, we used a sentence verification procedure, and in Experiment 3, we compared a true-false verification procedure with a six-alternative forced-choice procedure. Under these various conditions, we observed egocentric spatial framework effects in that above-below judgments were faster than front-back judgments and front-back judgments were faster than right-left judgments. When responding from two points of view in a single place, our subjects took multiple intrinsic perspectives rather than one neutral external perspective as proposed by the one-place, one-perspective rule.

On the phylogeny of asymmetry and spatial discrimination

We define and develop the fundamental experimental conditions required for an organism to demonstrate the capacity for spatial discrimination. It is then shown that concomitant with evolutionary progression in organisms, there is a corresponding increase in the dimensions of functional asymmetry, and in the quantity and dimensionality of spatial discrimination. It is also shown that the mismatch in asymmetry between the human body form and functional mechanism, and a demonstrated weakness in left--right discrimination, implies that the human organism is in transition between archetypal stages of phylogeny. Implications for the phenomena of mirrorimage reversal and left--right confusion are discussed. It is further argued that the development of functional asymmetry is an inherent principle of evolution.