The temporality effect in counterfactual thinking about what might have been

Counterfactual thinking and recency effects in causal judgment

People tend to judge more recent events, relative to earlier ones, as the cause of some particular outcome. For instance, people are more inclined to judge that the last basket, rather than the first, caused the team to win the basketball game. This recency effect, however, reverses in cases of overdetermination: people judge that earlier events, rather than more recent ones, caused the outcome when the event is individually sufficient but not individually necessary for the outcome. In five experiments (N = 5507), we find evidence for the recency effect and the primacy effect for causal judgment. Traditionally, these effects have been a problem for counterfactual views of causal judgment. However, we argue that an extension of a recent counterfactual model of causal judgment explains both the recency and the primacy effect. In line with the predictions of our extended counterfactual model, we also find that, regardless of causal structure, people tend to imagine the counterfactual alternative to the more recent event rather than to the earlier one. Moreover, manipulating this tendency affects causal judgments in the ways predicted by this extended model: asking participants to imagine the counterfactual alternative to the earlier event weakens the interaction between recency and causal structure, and asking participants to imagine the counterfactual alternative to the more recent event strengthens the interaction between recency and causal structure. We discuss these results in relation to work on counterfactual thinking, causal modeling, and late-preemption.

What is and what never should have been: Children's causal and counterfactual judgments about the same events

Substantial research with adults has characterized the contents of individuals' counterfactual thoughts. In contrast, little is known about the types of events children invoke in their counterfactual thoughts and how they compare with their causal ascriptions. In the current study, we asked children open-ended counterfactual and causal questions about events in which a character's action enabled a force of nature to cause a minor mishap. Children aged 3.5-8 years (N = 160) tended to invoke characters' actions in their counterfactual judgments to explain how an event could have been prevented (e.g., "She should have closed the window") and tended to invoke forces of nature in their causal judgments (e.g., "The rain got it wet"). Younger children were also significantly more likely than older children to invoke forces of nature in their counterfactuals (e.g., "It shouldn't have rained"). These results indicate that, similar to reasoning patterns found in adults, children tend to focus on controllable enabling conditions when reasoning counterfactually, but the results also point to some developmental differences. The developmental similarities suggest that counterfactual reasoning may serve a similar function from middle childhood through adulthood.

Counterfactual Thinking: From Logic to Morality

People create counterfactual alternatives to reality when they imagine how things would have turned out differently “if only. . . .” They understand counterfactuals by constructing models that correspond to the conjecture, and to the presupposed facts. The dual meaning of counterfactuals leads people to make more inferences from them compared to ordinary conditionals. People create counterfactuals by changing an aspect of reality that has been represented explicitly in their models, and they zoom in on a “fault line,” such as an exceptional event. However, knowledge can modulate what is represented in models and so the fault lines can shift. Counterfactuals permeate much of mental life, including judgments about morality, such as blame or praise, and assessments of emotions, such as regret or relief.

Counterfactual Reasoning in Non-psychotic First-Degree Relatives of People with Schizophrenia

Counterfactual thinking (CFT) is a type of conditional reasoning that enables the generation of mental simulations of alternatives to past factual events. Previous research has found this cognitive feature to be disrupted in schizophrenia (Hooker et al., 2000; Contreras et al., 2016). At the same time, the study of cognitive deficits in unaffected relatives of people with schizophrenia has significantly increased, supporting its potential endophenotypic role in this disorder. Using an exploratory approach, the current study examined CFT for the first time in a sample of non-psychotic first-degree relatives of schizophrenia patients (N = 43), in comparison with schizophrenia patients (N = 54) and healthy controls (N = 44). A series of tests that assessed the "causal order effect" in CFT and the ability to generate counterfactual thoughts and counterfactually derive inferences using the Counterfactual Inference Test was completed. Associations with variables of basic and social cognition, levels of schizotypy and psychotic-like experiences in addition to clinical and socio-demographic characteristics were also explored. Findings showed that first-degree relatives generated a lower number of counterfactual thoughts than controls, and were more adept at counterfactually deriving inferences, specifically in the scenarios related to regret and to judgments of avoidance in an unusual situation. No other significant results were found. These preliminary findings suggest that non-psychotic first-degree relatives of schizophrenia patients show a subtle disruption of global counterfactual thinking compared with what is normally expected in the general population. Due to the potential impact of such deficits, new treatments targeting CFT improvement might be considered in future management strategies.

Counterfactual reasoning for regretted situations involving controllable versus uncontrollable events: the modulating role of contingent self-esteem

We report a study that examined the modulating impact of contingent self-esteem on regret intensity for regretted outcomes associated with controllable versus uncontrollable events. The Contingent Self-Esteem Scale (e.g., Kernis & Goldman, 2006) was used to assess the extent to which a person’s sense of self-worth is based on self and others’ expectations. We found that there was an influence of self-esteem contingency for controllable but not for uncontrollable regret types. For controllable regret types individuals with a high contingent (i.e., unstable) self-esteem reported greater regret intensity than those with a low contingent (i.e., stable) self-esteem. We interpret this finding as reflecting a functional and adaptive role of high contingent self-esteem in terms of mobilizing the application of counterfactual reasoning and planning mechanisms that can enable personal expectations to be achieved in the future.

The making of might-have-beens: effects of free will belief on counterfactual thinking

Counterfactual thoughts are based on the assumption that one situation could result in multiple possible outcomes. This assumption underlies most theories of free will and contradicts deterministic views that there is only one possible outcome of any situation. Three studies tested the hypothesis that stronger belief in free will would lead to more counterfactual thinking. Experimental manipulations (Studies 1-2) and a measure (Studies 3-4) of belief in free will were linked to increased counterfactual thinking in response to autobiographical (Studies 1, 3, and 4) and hypothetical (Study 2) events. Belief in free will also predicted the kind of counterfactuals generated. Belief in free will was associated with an increase in the generation of self and upward counterfactuals, which have been shown to be particularly useful for learning. These findings fit the view that belief in free will is promoted by societies because it facilitates learning and culturally valued change.

The effect of dynamic proximity cues on counterfactual plausibility

Previous research has found that people consult closeness or proximity cues when they evaluate the plausibility or likelihood of a counterfactual alternative to reality. In this paper we asked whether the plausibility of counterfactuals extends to dynamic proximity cues that signal a sense of propensity or acceleration in the lead-up to an outcome. Subjects gambled on obtaining either three heads or three tails from three coin-flips. When they lost the gamble they thought it was more likely that they could have won if they had lost on the third coin-flip that was revealed rather than the first or second coin-flip. We discuss how the sense of propensity was raised prior to the revelation of the final decisive losing coin-flip which created a perception of psychological momentum towards winning. Moreover, the consequence of this propensity effect was to positively bias perceptions of the likelihood of the counterfactual winning outcome.

"If only" counterfactual thoughts about exceptional actions

People create counterfactual alternatives that change an exceptional action to be like a usual one (e.g., "if he had placed his usual small bet he would have lost less"), as shown in Experiment 1. Experiments 2 and 3 eliminated and reversed this well-known effect: An exceptional action is instead changed to an exceptional alternative when it leads to a better outcome. Experiments 4 and 5 show that the reversal occurs whether or not the exceptional alternative is a justified action. The results indicate that the tendency to change an exceptional action to be like a usual one is guided by the optimality of the counterfactual outcome more than the exceptionality or justifiability of the action. The implications for theories of the counterfactual imagination are discussed.

Indicative and counterfactual 'only if' conditionals

We report three experiments to test the possibilities reasoners think about when they understand a conditional of the form 'A only if B' compared to 'if A then B'. The experiments examine conditionals in the indicative mood (e.g., A occurred only if B occurred) and counterfactuals in the subjunctive mood (A would have occurred only if B had occurred). The first experiment examines the conjunctions of events that reasoners judge to be consistent with conditionals, e.g., A and B, not-A and not-B. It shows that people think about one possibility to understand 'if' and two possibilities to understand 'only if'; they think about two possibilities to understand counterfactual 'if' and 'only if'. The second experiment shows that the possibilities people think about when they understand 'only if' are in a different temporal order (e.g., B and A) to the possibilities they think about for 'if' (A and B). The third experiment shows that people make different inferences from 'only if' and 'if' conditionals and counterfactuals. The implications of the results for theories of counterfactual conditionals are considered.

The relationship between counterfactual thinking and emotional reactions to event outcomes: does one account fit all?

By enabling a comparison between what is and what might have been, counterfactual thoughts amplify our emotional responses to bad outcomes. Well-known demonstrations such as the action effect (the tendency to attribute most regret to a character whose actions brought about a bad outcome) and the temporal order effect (the tendency to undo the last in a series of events leading up to a bad outcome) are often explained in this way. An important difference between these effects is that outcomes are due to decisions in the action effect, whereas in the temporal order effect outcomes are achieved by chance. In Experiment 1, we showed that imposing time pressure leads to a significant reduction in the action but not in the temporal order effect. In Experiment 2, we found that asking participants to evaluate the protagonists ("who ought to feel worse?") led to a significant reduction in the temporal order but not in the action effect. The results suggest that the action and temporal order effects require different explanations and are consistent with other work that suggests that when decisions lead to bad outcomes a comparison of decision quality is an important determinant of the emotional response attributed to the protagonists. The stimulus materials used in our experiments may be downloaded from pbr.psychonomic-journals.org/content/supplemental.

Inferences from semifactual 'even if' conditionals

We report three experiments on semifactual conditionals such as 'even if he had worn his seatbelt he would have been injured'. Semifactuals contain a counterfactual antecedent (the presupposed fact is, he did not wear a seatbelt) and a true consequent (the fact is, he was injured). The experiments show that from the denial of the antecedent, 'he did not wear his seatbelt', reasoners do not infer the standard conclusion 'he was not injured' but instead they infer the asymmetric conclusion, 'he was injured'. From the affirmation of the consequent, 'he was injured', they do not infer the standard conclusion 'he wore his seatbelt' but instead they infer that there is no valid conclusion. The first experiment shows this pattern for 'even if' subjunctive conditionals compared to 'if' indicative conditionals, the second extends it to 'even if' subjunctive conditionals compared to 'even though' indicative concessives, and the third extends it to 'if...also/still' subjunctive conditionals. The results suggest that people think about two possibilities to understand a semifactual: the conjecture, he wore his seatbelt and he was injured, and the presupposed facts, he did not wear his seatbelt and he was injured.

Précis of The rational imagination: how people create alternatives to reality

The human imagination remains one of the last uncharted terrains of the mind. People often imagine how events might have turned out "if only" something had been different. The "fault lines" of reality, those aspects more readily changed, indicate that counterfactual thoughts are guided by the same principles as rational thoughts. In the past, rationality and imagination have been viewed as opposites. But research has shown that rational thought is more imaginative than cognitive scientists had supposed. In The Rational Imagination, I argue that imaginative thought is more rational than scientists have imagined. People exhibit remarkable similarities in the sorts of things they change in their mental representation of reality when they imagine how the facts could have turned out differently. For example, they tend to imagine alternatives to actions rather than inactions, events within their control rather than those beyond their control, and socially unacceptable events rather than acceptable ones. Their thoughts about how an event might have turned out differently lead them to judge that a strong causal relation exists between an antecedent event and the outcome, and their thoughts about how an event might have turned out the same lead them to judge that a weaker causal relation exists. In a simple temporal sequence, people tend to imagine alternatives to the most recent event. The central claim in the book is that counterfactual thoughts are organised along the same principles as rational thought. The idea that the counterfactual imagination is rational depends on three steps: (1) humans are capable of rational thought; (2) they make inferences by thinking about possibilities; and (3) their counterfactual thoughts rely on thinking about possibilities, just as rational thoughts do. The sorts of possibilities that people envisage explain the mutability of certain aspects of mental representations and the immutability of other aspects.

Counterfactual thinking: the temporal order effect

People often think about how things might have happened differently. Their counterfactual thoughts tend to mentally undo the most recent event in an independent sequence. Consider a game in which two players must each pick the same color card, both red or both black. The first picks black and the second picks red and so they lose. People think, "If only the second player had picked black." Our study tested the idea that the ways in which the players could have won provide counterfactual alternatives to the facts. In three experiments, the same set of facts (both players picked black cards), and the same winning conditions (to win in this new game they must pick different color cards) were presented, but the description of the winning conditions varied (e.g., "if one or the other but not both picks a red card" vs. "if one or the other but not both picks a black card"). The results showed that the temporal order effect can be produced or reversed by different descriptions. The descriptions make accessible different elements of the winning possibilities. A theory of the mental representations and cognitive processes underlying counterfactual thinking in the temporal order effect is described.

Judgment dissociation theory: An analysis of differences in causal, counterfactual and covariational reasoning

Research suggests that causal judgment is influenced primarily by counterfactual or covariational reasoning. In contrast, the author of this article develops judgment dissociation theory (JDT), which predicts that these types of reasoning differ in function and can lead to divergent judgments. The actuality principle proposes that causal selections focus on antecedents that are sufficient to generate the actual outcome. The substitution principle proposes that ad hoc categorization plays a key role in counterfactual and covariational reasoning such that counterfactual selections focus on antecedents that would have been sufficient to prevent the outcome or something like it and covariational selections focus on antecedents that yield the largest increase in the probability of the outcome or something like it. The findings of 4 experiments support JDT but not the competing counterfactual and covariational accounts.

Temporal and causal order effects in thinking about what might have been

When people think counterfactually about what might have been different for a sequence of events, they are influenced by the order in which the events occurred. They tend to mentally undo the most recent event in a temporal sequence of two events. But they tend to mentally undo the first event in a causal sequence of four events. We report the results of two experiments that show that the temporal and causal order effects are not dependent on the number of events in the sequence. Our first experiment, with 300 participants, shows that the temporal order effect occurs for sequences with four events as well as for sequences with two events. Our second experiment, with 372 participants, shows that the causal order effect occurs for sequences with two events as well as for sequences with four events. We discuss the results in terms of the mental representations that people construct of temporal and causal sequences.

Conditionals: a theory of meaning, pragmatics, and inference

The authors outline a theory of conditionals of the form If A then C and If A then possibly C. The 2 sorts of conditional have separate core meanings that refer to sets of possibilities. Knowledge, pragmatics, and semantics can modulate these meanings. Modulation can add information about temporal and other relations between antecedent and consequent. It can also prevent the construction of possibilities to yield 10 distinct sets of possibilities to which conditionals can refer. The mental representation of a conditional normally makes explicit only the possibilities in which its antecedent is true, yielding other possibilities implicitly. Reasoners tend to focus on the explicit possibilities. The theory predicts the major phenomena of understanding and reasoning with conditionals.

Reasoning counterfactually: combining and rending

Counterfactual reasoning occurs when people are asked to assume for the sake of argument that a fact they previously thought was true is now false and to draw a conclusion on that basis. To accomplish this sort of reasoning requires a revising of one's beliefs, which was simulated in the present study. Students were shown a set of statements that they were to assure themselves was consistent. They were then asked to accept a counterfactual assumption as true and reconcile resulting inconsistencies among the set of statements. In these problems, one statement is a generality (e.g., All trees on the plaza are elms), another is a particular (e.g., This tree is a pine), and one is a counterfactual (e.g., Assume this tree is on the plaza). Students preferred to reconcile the inconsistency by identifying the generality as "true" and the particular as "false." They did this more often when the assumption combined categories than when it dislodged categories and when real beliefs were at stake rather than arbitrary generalities. This study tested current models of inference for their ability to account for counterfactual reasoning and found the results to be consistent with natural deduction system, mental models, and conceptual-integration network approaches to everyday reasoning.

Understanding microworlds

Little is known about how individuals understand change in complex systems. In the natural world, for instance, the effects of change need to be understood in terms of two-way (interdependent) causal processes. Based on subject's ratings of the causal likelihood that a given change will yield a target effect and on subjects' ratings of the impact of a given change on specified populations in a microworld, White (1997, 2000) argued that individuals in fact understand change in terms of one-way causal processes and assume that causal effects decline with distance from the source of the change. An alternative view is that the ratings reflect individuals' mental simulations of change as elicited by the tasks. Experiments 1 and 2 confirm that such ratings are task dependent and that individuals make no general assumption that causal effects decrease with distance. Experiment 3 shows that when required to explain a pattern of change in the size of a population individuals can construct two-way causal explanations consistent with this mental simulation proposal.

Counterfactual thinking about controllable events

When people think about what might have been, they mentally undo controllable rather than uncontrollable events. We report the results of two experiments in which we examined this controllability effect in counterfactual thinking. The experiments show that the mutability of controllable events is influenced by the perceived appropriateness or inappropriateness of the events. The first experiment shows that people change inappropriate controllable actions more than appropriate controllable ones. The second experiment shows that people mutate inappropriate controllable events whether the outcome is exceptional or normal with respect to intrapersonal habitual norms, and whether the outcome is positive or negative. We discuss the implications for alternative theories of counterfactual thinking.