Goal-directed access to mental objects in working memory: The role of task-specific feature retrieval

What triggers explicit awareness in implicit sequence learning? Implications from theories of consciousness

This article aims to continue the debate on how explicit, conscious knowledge can arise in an implicit learning situation. We review hitherto existing theoretical views and evaluate their compatibility with two current, successful scientific concepts of consciousness: The Global Workspace Theory and Higher-Order Thought Theories. In this context, we introduce the Unexpected Event Hypothesis (Frensch et al., Attention and implicit learning, John Benjamins Publishing Company, 2003) in an elaborated form and discuss its advantage in explaining the emergence of conscious knowledge in an implicit learning situation.

Focus Switching in Working Memory

Abstract. Focus switching in working memory involves accessing an object in the focus of attention in order to retrieve its content. Objects in working memory can be viewed as consisting of two types of information: contents (e.g., numerical information) and contexts (e.g., cues to retrieve the contents). This study examined the extent to which content retrieval and context access may be separated. Three experiments were carried out in which object switching and content retrieval were manipulated. In addition, the alternation between the retrieval operations was also manipulated. The main result was that content retrieval required time over and above that needed to access the object. This finding supports the idea that contexts and their contents may be accessed independently when an object is brought into the focus.

Tied to expectations: Predicting features speeds processing even under adverse circumstances

When participants predict the upcoming stimulus in a randomized choice reaction task, a match between prediction and stimulus increases processing speed at a level similar to that observed in cueing studies with highly valid cues. This might be taken to suggest that people cannot help but fully use their self-generated, verbalized predictions for preparing task processing. Thus, we tested how flexibly participants can control formation and implementation of predictions. In Experiment 1, we varied validity and response-relevance of predictions. We observed that prediction effects on RT can be boosted by increasing validity, but prevail under adverse circumstances. This was not the case in a control group who read rather than predicted the feature words, suggesting that the effect was specific to predictions as such. Experiment 2 provided further evidence for limited control of participants over implementing and forming predictions. Participants were provided with practice on stimuli occurring with varying frequency, but neither learned to strategically choose predictions to maximize the number of match trials, nor did they reduce the amount of prediction-based preparation when predicting an infrequent stimulus. As sequential aftereffects of prediction match did not vary with validity, they were identified as an independent effect of verbalizing a response-relevant stimulus feature. The results are consistent with the view that the predicted stimulus feature is represented in the focus of attention in working memory and that the amount of implementation can be subject to weighting.

Expectation mismatch: differences between self-generated and cue-induced expectations

Expectation of upcoming stimuli and tasks can lead to improved performance, if the anticipated situation occurs, while expectation mismatch can lead to less efficient processing. Researchers have used methodological approaches that rely on either self-generated expectations (predictions) or cue-induced expectations to investigate expectation mismatch effects. Differentiating these two types of expectations for different contents of expectation such as stimuli, responses, task sets and conflict level, we review evidence suggesting that self-generated expectations lead to larger facilitating effects and conflict effects on the behavioral and neural level - as compared to cue-based expectations. On a methodological level, we suggest that self-generated as compared to cue-induced expectations allow for a higher amount of experimental control in many experimental designs on expectation effects. On a theoretical level, we argue for qualitative differences in how cues vs. self-generated expectations influence performance. While self-generated expectations might generally involve representing the expected event in the focus of attention in working memory, cues might only lead to such representations under supportive circumstances (i.e., cue of high validity and attended).