Sensory memory of structure-from-motion is shape-specific

Reconstructing a disambiguation sequence that forms perceptual memory of multistable displays via reverse correlation method: Bias onset perception but gently

When multistable displays are presented intermittently with long blank intervals, their onset perception is determined by perceptual memory of multistable displays. We investigated when and how it is formed using a reverse correlation method and bistable kinetic depth effect displays. Each experimental block consisted of interleaved fully ambiguous probe and exogenously disambiguated prime displays. The purpose of the former was to "read out" the perceptual memory, whereas the latter contained purely random disambiguation sequences that were presented at the beginning of the prime display, throughout the entire presentation, or at the beginning and the end of the presentation. For each experiment and condition, we selected a subset of trials with disambiguation sequences that led to a change in perception of either the prime itself (sequences that modified perception) or the following fully ambiguous probe (sequences that modified perceptual memory). We estimated average disambiguation sequences for each participant using additive linear models. We found that an optimal sequence started at the onset with a moderate disambiguation against the previously dominant state (dominant perception for the previous probe) that gradually reduced until the display is fully ambiguous. We also show that the same sequence leads to an altered perception of the prime, indicating that perception and perceptual memory form at the same time. We suggest that perceptual memory is a consequence of an earlier evidence accumulation process and is informative about how the visual system treated ambiguity in the past rather than how it anticipates an uncertain future.

Priming and reversals of the perceived ambiguous orientation of a structure-from-motion shape and relation to personality traits

We demonstrate contributions of top-down and bottom-up influences in perception as explored by priming and counts of perceived reversals and mixed percepts, as probed by an ambiguously slanted structure-from-motion (SFM) test-cylinder. We included three different disambiguated primes: a SFM cylinder, a still image of a cylinder, and an imagined cylinder. In Experiment 1 where the prime and test sequentially occupied the same location, we also administered questionnaires with the Big-5 trait openness and vividness of visual imagery to probe possible relations to top-down driven priming. Since influences of gaze or position in the prime conditions in Experiment 1 could not be ruled out completely, Experiment 2 was conducted where the test cylinder appeared at a randomly chosen position after the prime. In Experiment 2 we also measured the number of perceptual reversals and mixed percepts during prolonged viewing of our ambiguous SFM-cylinder, and administered questionnaires to measure all Big-5 traits, autism, spatial and object imagery, and rational or experiential cognitive styles, associated with bottom-up and top-down processes. The results revealed contributions of position-invariant and cue-invariant priming. In addition, residual contributions of low-level priming was found when the prime and test were both defined by SFM, and were presented at the same location, and the correlation between the SFM priming and the other two priming conditions were weaker than between the pictorial and imagery priming. As previously found with ambiguous binocular rivalry stimuli, we found positive correlations between mixed percepts and the Big-5 dimension openness to experience, and between reversals, mixed percepts and neuroticism. Surprisingly, no correlations between the scores from the vividness of imagery questionnaires and influence from any of the primes were obtained. An intriguing finding was the significant differences between the positive correlation from the experiential cognitive style scores, and the negative correlation between rational style and the cue invariant priming. Among other results, negative correlations between agreeableness and all priming conditions were obtained. These results not only support the notion of multiple processes involved in the perception of ambiguous SFM, but also link these processes in perception to specific personality traits.

The Certainty of Ambiguity in Visual Neural Representations

Some images evoke bistable percepts: two different visual experiences seen in alternation while continuously viewing an unchanged stimulus. The Necker Cube and Rubin's Vase are classic examples, each of which gives alternating percepts of different shapes. Other bistable percepts are alternating colors or directions of motion. Although stimuli that result in salient bistability are rare and sometimes cleverly constructed to emphasize ambiguity, they have been influential for over 150 years, since the work of von Helmholtz, who considered them to be evidence for perceptual visual processes that interpret retinal stimuli. While bistability in natural viewing is uncommon, the main point of this review is that implicit ambiguity in visual neural representations is pervasive. Resolving ambiguity, therefore, is a fundamental and ubiquitous process of vision that routinely affects what we see, not an oddity arising from cleverly crafted images. This review focuses on the causes of widespread ambiguity, historical perspectives on it, and modern knowledge and theory about resolving it.

Binocular rivalry reveals an out-of-equilibrium neural dynamics suited for decision-making

In ambiguous or conflicting sensory situations, perception is often ‘multistable’ in that it perpetually changes at irregular intervals, shifting abruptly between distinct alternatives. The interval statistics of these alternations exhibits quasi-universal characteristics, suggesting a general mechanism. Using binocular rivalry, we show that many aspects of this perceptual dynamics are reproduced by a hierarchical model operating out of equilibrium. The constitutive elements of this model idealize the metastability of cortical networks. Independent elements accumulate visual evidence at one level, while groups of coupled elements compete for dominance at another level. As soon as one group dominates perception, feedback inhibition suppresses supporting evidence. Previously unreported features in the serial dependencies of perceptual alternations compellingly corroborate this mechanism. Moreover, the proposed out-of-equilibrium dynamics satisfies normative constraints of continuous decision-making. Thus, multistable perception may reflect decision-making in a volatile world: integrating evidence over space and time, choosing categorically between hypotheses, while concurrently evaluating alternatives.

Shape specificity of neural persistence for the kinetic-depth effect matches perceptual adaptation but not sensory memory

When multistable displays-stimuli that are compatible with several comparably likely perceptual interpretations-are presented intermittently, the perceptual state at the stimulus onset shows a complex dependence on the duration of the preceding blank interval. Specifically, perception is maximally destabilized for interruptions that are approximately 500 ms long, but it is stabilized by the use of shorter or longer blank intervals. This nonmonotonic dependence of perceptual stability on the blank interval duration raises questions about a number of history effects that are involved and about their nature, including the underlying neural representations. One way to characterize history effects is by looking at their specificity to the change of display properties. Here we measured the shape specificity for perception of the kinetic-depth effect when interruptions were brief (50 ms). For this time interval, perception is thought to be stabilized by neural persistence, a lingering trace of the prior neural activity. We found that perceptual stability depended on the shapes of the objects presented both before and after the break, but not on the similarity between the objects. These results matched earlier reports of the shape specificity of neural adaptation (destabilizing aftereffect for blanks 200-800 ms long). However, our results were markedly different from the shape specificity of sensory memory of multistable perception (a stabilizing effect for blanks > 800-1,000 ms). We concluded that whereas neural persistence and adaptation both act on the same motion-selective neural representation, sensory memory depends on another, possibly partially overlapping, shape-selective neural ensemble.

Switch rates for orthogonally oriented kinetic-depth displays are correlated across observers

When continuously viewing multistable displays, which are compatible with several comparably likely interpretations, perception perpetually switches between available alternatives. Prior studies typically report the lack of consistent individual switch rates across different displays. However, this comparison is based on an assumption that neural representations of physically identical displays are consistent across observers. Yet, given how different individuals are already at the level of the retina, it is likely that the difference in other relevant factors might mask the correlation. To address this issue, we compared switch rates in two kinetic-depth displays (KDE) that rotated around orthogonal axes (45° counterclockwise vs. 45° clockwise relative to the vertical). This ensured that dynamics of multistable perception was based on highly similar, but different and independent neural representations. We also included a Necker cube (NC) display as a control. We report that switch rates were correlated between two kinetic-depth effect displays, but not between either of the KDE and NC displays. This demonstrates that the usual lack of correlation may not be evidence for the lack of a shared pacesetter mechanism of multistable perception, but reflect other factors, such as differently modulated inputs to competing representations. In addition, we asked participants to speed-up or slow-down perceptual alternations and found that only the former ability was correlated across different displays. This indicates that these two types of volitional control may differ in their use of attentional resources.

Perceptual coupling induces co-rotation and speeds up alternations in adjacent bi-stable structure-from-motion objects

When two bi-stable structure-from-motion (SFM) spheres are presented simultaneously, they tend to rotate in the same direction. This effect reflects a common state bias that is present for various multistable displays. However, it was also reported that when two spheres are positioned so that they touch each other, they tend to counterrotate instead. The latter effect is interpreted as a frictional interaction, indicating the influence of the embedded physics on our visual perception. Here, we examined the interplay between these two biases in two experiments using a wide range of conditions. Those included two SFM shapes, two types of disambiguation cues, the presence or absence of the disambiguation cues, different layout options, and two samples of observers from two different universities (in sum 26 participants). Contrary to the prior report, we observed a robust common state bias for all conditions, including those that were optimized for frictional and "gear meshing" interactions. We found that stronger coupling of perceptual states is accompanied by more frequent synchronous perceptual reversals of the two objects. However, we found that the simultaneity of the individual switches does not predict the duration of the following dominance phase. Finally, we report that stronger perceptual coupling speeds up perceptual alternations.

Perception and the strongest sensory memory trace of multi-stable displays both form shortly after the stimulus onset

We investigated the relation between perception and sensory memory of multi-stable structure-from-motion displays. The latter is an implicit visual memory that reflects a recent history of perceptual dominance and influences only the initial perception of multi-stable displays. First, we established the earliest time point when the direction of an illusory rotation can be reversed after the display onset (29-114 ms). Because our display manipulation did not bias perception towards a specific direction of illusory rotation but only signaled the change in motion, this means that the perceptual dominance was established no later than 29-114 ms after the stimulus onset. Second, we used orientation-selectivity of sensory memory to establish which display orientation produced the strongest memory trace and when this orientation was presented during the preceding prime interval (80-140 ms). Surprisingly, both estimates point towards the time interval immediately after the display onset, indicating that both perception and sensory memory form at approximately the same time. This suggests a tighter integration between perception and sensory memory than previously thought, warrants a reconsideration of its role in visual perception, and indicates that sensory memory could be a unique behavioral correlate of the earlier perceptual inference that can be studied post hoc.

The Visual Priming of Motion-Defined 3D Objects

The perception of a stimulus can be influenced by previous perceptual experience, a phenomenon known as perceptual priming. However, there has been limited investigation on perceptual priming of shape perception of three-dimensional object structures defined by moving dots. Here we examined the perceptual priming of a 3D object shape defined purely by motion-in-depth cues (i.e., Shape-From-Motion, SFM) using a classic prime-target paradigm. The results from the first two experiments revealed a significant increase in accuracy when a “cloudy” SFM stimulus (whose object structure was difficult to recognize due to the presence of strong noise) was preceded by an unambiguous SFM that clearly defined the same transparent 3D shape. In contrast, results from Experiment 3 revealed no change in accuracy when a “cloudy” SFM stimulus was preceded by a static shape or a semantic word that defined the same object shape. Instead, there was a significant decrease in accuracy when preceded by a static shape or a semantic word that defined a different object shape. These results suggested that the perception of a noisy SFM stimulus can be facilitated by a preceding unambiguous SFM stimulus—but not a static image or a semantic stimulus—that defined the same shape. The potential neural and computational mechanisms underlying the difference in priming are discussed.

Transformation priming helps to disambiguate sudden changes of sensory inputs

Retinal input is riddled with abrupt transients due to self-motion, changes in illumination, object-motion, etc. Our visual system must correctly interpret each of these changes to keep visual perception consistent and sensitive. This poses an enormous challenge, as many transients are highly ambiguous in that they are consistent with many alternative physical transformations. Here we investigated inter-trial effects in three situations with sudden and ambiguous transients, each presenting two alternative appearances (rotation-reversing structure-from-motion, polarity-reversing shape-from-shading, and streaming-bouncing object collisions). In every situation, we observed priming of transformations as the outcome perceived in earlier trials tended to repeat in subsequent trials and this repetition was contingent on perceptual experience. The observed priming was specific to transformations and did not originate in priming of perceptual states preceding a transient. Moreover, transformation priming was independent of attention and specific to low level stimulus attributes. In summary, we show how "transformation priors" and experience-driven updating of such priors helps to disambiguate sudden changes of sensory inputs. We discuss how dynamic transformation priors can be instantiated as "transition energies" in an "energy landscape" model of the visual perception.

Top-down influences on ambiguous perception: the role of stable and transient states of the observer

The world as it appears to the viewer is the result of a complex process of inference performed by the brain. The validity of this apparently counter-intuitive assertion becomes evident whenever we face noisy, feeble or ambiguous visual stimulation: in these conditions, the state of the observer may play a decisive role in determining what is currently perceived. On this background, ambiguous perception and its amenability to top-down influences can be employed as an empirical paradigm to explore the principles of perception. Here we offer an overview of both classical and recent contributions on how stable and transient states of the observer can impact ambiguous perception. As to the influence of the stable states of the observer, we show that what is currently perceived can be influenced (1) by cognitive and affective aspects, such as meaning, prior knowledge, motivation, and emotional content and (2) by individual differences, such as gender, handedness, genetic inheritance, clinical conditions, and personality traits and by (3) learning and conditioning. As to the impact of transient states of the observer, we outline the effects of (4) attention and (5) voluntary control, which have attracted much empirical work along the history of ambiguous perception. In the huge literature on the topic we trace a difference between the observer's ability to control dominance (i.e., the maintenance of a specific percept in visual awareness) and reversal rate (i.e., the switching between two alternative percepts). Other transient states of the observer that have more recently drawn researchers' attention regard (6) the effects of imagery and visual working memory. (7) Furthermore, we describe the transient effects of prior history of perceptual dominance. (8) Finally, we address the currently available computational models of ambiguous perception and how they can take into account the crucial share played by the state of the observer in perceiving ambiguous displays.

What you see depends on what you saw, and what else you saw: the interactions between motion priming and object priming

Both visual object priming and motion priming have been reported independently, but the interactions between the two are still largely unexplored. Here we investigated this question using a novel type of SFM stimuli, 3-D helixes, and found that the motion direction perception of an ambiguous helix can be biased by the motion direction of a preceding SFM stimulus - a classic motion priming effect. However, the effectiveness of motion priming depends on object priming: a neutral object priming produced a weak motion priming, a congruent object priming led to a strong motion priming, and critically, an incongruent object priming abolished and overpowered the motion priming. In contrast, object priming alone (in the absence of motion overlap) had little effects biasing motion perception. Taken together, these results suggest that there exists an integrated neural representation of motion and structure of 3-D SFM stimuli, and motion priming of 3-D SFM stimuli might happen at an intermediate stage between MT/V5 (which is not shape selective) and LO (lateral occipital, which is not motion selective). This novel type of stimuli, 3-D helixes, along with the prime-target paradigm, thus might offer a unique tool to examine neural bases underlying the perception of 3-D SFM stimuli and perceptual priming.

Perceptual adaptation to structure-from-motion depends on the size of adaptor and probe objects, but not on the similarity of their shapes

Perceptual adaptation destabilizes the phenomenal appearance of multistable visual displays. Prolonged dominance of a perceptual state fatigues the associated neural population, lowering the likelihood of renewed perception of the same appearance (Nawrot & Blake in Perception & Psychophysics, 49, 230-44, 1991). Here, we used a selective adaptation paradigm to investigate perceptual adaptation for the illusory rotation of ambiguous structure-from-motion (SFM) displays. Specifically, we generated SFM objects with different three-dimensional shapes and presented them in random order, separating successive objects by brief blank periods, which included a mask. To assess the specificity of perceptual adaptation to the shape of SFM objects, we established the probability that a perceived direction of rotation persisted between successive objects of similar or dissimilar shape. We found that the strength of negative aftereffects depended on the volume, but not the shape, of adaptor and probe objects. More voluminous objects were both more effective as adaptor objects and more sensitive as probe objects. Surprisingly, we found these volume effects to be completely independent, since any relationship between two shapes (such as overlap between volumes, similarity of shape, or similarity of velocity profiles) failed to modulate the negative aftereffect. This pattern of results was the opposite of that observed for sensory memory of SFM objects, which reflects similarity between objects, but not volume of individual objects (Pastukhov et al. in Attention, Perception & Psychophysics, 75, 1215-1229, 2013). The disparate specificities of perceptual adaptation and sensory memory for identical SFM objects suggest that the two aftereffects engage distinct neural representations, consistent with recent brain imaging results (Schwiedrzik et al. in Cerebral Cortex, 2012).

Sensory memory of illusory depth in structure-from-motion

When multistable displays (stimuli consistent with two or more equally plausible perceptual interpretations) are presented intermittently, their perceptions are stabilized by sensory memory. Independent memory traces are generated not only for different types of multistable displays (Maier, Wilke, Logothetis, & Leopold, Current Biology 13:1076-1085, 2003), but also for different ambiguous features of binocular rivalry (Pearson & Clifford, Journal of Vision 4:196-202, 2004). In the present study, we examined whether a similar independence of sensory memories is observed in structure-from-motion (SFM), a multistable display with two ambiguous properties. In SFM, a 2-D planar motion creates a vivid impression of a rotating 3-D volume. Both the illusory rotation and illusory depth (i.e., how close parts of an object appear to the observer) of an SFM object are ambiguous. We dissociated the sensory memories of these two ambiguous properties by using an intermittent presentation in combination with a forced-ambiguous-switch paradigm (Pastukhov, Vonau, & Braun, PLoS ONE 7:e37734, 2012). We demonstrated that the illusory depth of SFM generates a sensory memory trace that is independent from that of illusory rotation. Despite this independence, the specificities levels of the sensory memories were identical for illusory depth and illusory rotation. The history effect was weakened by a change in the volumetric property of a shape (whether it was a hollow band or a filled drum volume), but not by changes in color or size. We discuss how these new results constrain models of sensory memory and SFM processing.

Perceptual memory drives learning of retinotopic biases for bistable stimuli

The visual system exploits past experience at multiple timescales to resolve perceptual ambiguity in the retinal image. For example, perception of a bistable stimulus can be biased toward one interpretation over another when preceded by a brief presentation of a disambiguated version of the stimulus (positive priming) or through intermittent presentations of the ambiguous stimulus (stabilization). Similarly, prior presentations of unambiguous stimuli can be used to explicitly “train” a long-lasting association between a percept and a retinal location (perceptual association). These phenonema have typically been regarded as independent processes, with short-term biases attributed to perceptual memory and longer-term biases described as associative learning. Here we tested for interactions between these two forms of experience-dependent perceptual bias and demonstrate that short-term processes strongly influence long-term outcomes. We first demonstrate that the establishment of long-term perceptual contingencies does not require explicit training by unambiguous stimuli, but can arise spontaneously during the periodic presentation of brief, ambiguous stimuli. Using rotating Necker cube stimuli, we observed enduring, retinotopically specific perceptual biases that were expressed from the outset and remained stable for up to 40 min, consistent with the known phenomenon of perceptual stabilization. Further, bias was undiminished after a break period of 5 min, but was readily reset by interposed periods of continuous, as opposed to periodic, ambiguous presentation. Taken together, the results demonstrate that perceptual biases can arise naturally and may principally reflect the brain's tendency to favor recent perceptual interpretation at a given retinal location. Further, they suggest that an association between retinal location and perceptual state, rather than a physical stimulus, is sufficient to generate long-term biases in perceptual organization.