Rhesus macaques (Macaca mulatta) exhibit the decoy effect in a perceptual discrimination task

Ethical choice reversals

Understanding the systematic ways that human decision making departs from normative principles has been important in the development of cognitive theory across multiple decision domains. We focus here on whether such seemingly "irrational" decisions occur in ethical decisions that impose difficult tradeoffs between the welfare and interests of different individuals or groups. Across three sets of experiments and in multiple decision scenarios, we provide clear evidence that contextual choice reversals arise in multiples types of ethical choice settings, in just the way that they do in other domains ranging from economic gambles to perceptual judgments (Trueblood et al., 2013; Wedell, 1991). Specifically, we find within-participant evidence for attraction effects in which choices between two options systematically vary as a function of features of a third dominated and unchosen option-a prima facie violation of rational choice axioms that demand consistency. Unlike economic gambles and most domains in which such effects have been studied, many of our ethical scenarios involve features that are not presented numerically, and features for which there is no clear majority-endorsed ranking. We provide empirical evidence and a novel modeling analysis based on individual differences of feature rankings within attributes to show that such individual variations partly explains observed variation in the attraction effects. We conclude by discussing how recent computational analyses of attraction effects may provide a basis for understanding how the observed patterns of choices reflect boundedly rational decision processes.

Pre-acquired Functional Connectivity Predicts Choice Inconsistency

Economic choice theories usually assume that humans maximize utility in their choices. However, studies have shown that humans make inconsistent choices, leading to suboptimal behavior, even without context-dependent manipulations. Previous studies showed that activation in value and motor networks are associated with inconsistent choices at the moment of choice. Here, we investigated if the neural predispositions, measured before a choice task, can predict choice inconsistency in a later risky choice task. Using functional connectivity (FC) measures from resting-state functional magnetic resonance imaging (rsfMRI), derived before any choice was made, we aimed to predict subjects' inconsistency levels in a later-performed choice task. We hypothesized that rsfMRI FC measures extracted from value and motor brain areas would predict inconsistency. Forty subjects (21 females) completed a rsfMRI scan before performing a risky choice task. We compared models that were trained on FC that included only hypothesized value and motor regions with models trained on whole-brain FC. We found that both model types significantly predicted inconsistency levels. Moreover, even the whole-brain models relied mostly on FC between value and motor areas. For external validation, we used a neural network pretrained on FC matrices of 37,000 subjects and fine-tuned it on our data and again showed significant predictions. Together, this shows that the tendency for choice inconsistency is predicted by predispositions of the nervous system and that synchrony between the motor and value networks plays a crucial role in this tendency.

Available and unavailable decoys in capuchin monkeys (Sapajus spp.) decision-making

Decision-making has been observed to be systematically affected by decoys, i.e., options that should be irrelevant, either because unavailable or because manifestly inferior to other alternatives, and yet shift preferences towards their target. Decoy effects have been extensively studied both in humans and in several other species; however, evidence in non-human primates remains scant and inconclusive. To address this gap, this study investigates how choices in capuchin monkeys (Sapajus spp.) are affected by different types of decoys: asymmetrically dominated decoys, i.e., available and unavailable options that are inferior to only one of the other alternatives, and phantom decoys, i.e., unavailable options that are superior to another available alternative. After controlling for the subjective strength of initial preferences and the distance of each decoy from its target in attribute space, results demonstrate a systematic shift in capuchins' preference towards the target of both asymmetrically dominated decoys (whether they are available or not) and phantom decoys, regardless of what options is being targeted by such decoys. This provides the most comprehensive evidence to date of decoy effects in non-human primates, with important theoretical and methodological implications for future comparative studies on context effects in decision-making.

To eat, or not to eat: a phantom decoy affects information-gathering behavior by a free-ranging mammalian herbivore

When foraging, making appropriate food choices is crucial to an animal's fitness. Classic foraging ecology theories assume animals choose food of greatest benefit based on their absolute value across multiple dimensions. Consequently, poorer options are considered irrelevant alternatives that should not influence decision-making among better options. But heuristic studies demonstrate that irrelevant alternatives (termed decoys) can influence the decisions of some animals, indicating they use a relative rather than absolute evaluation system. Our aim was to test whether a decoy influenced the decision-making process-that is, information-gathering and food choice-of a free-ranging mammalian herbivore. We tested swamp wallabies, Wallabia bicolor, comparing their behavior toward, and choice of, two available food options over time in the absence or presence of the decoy. We used a phantom decoy-unavailable option-and ran two trials in different locations and seasons. Binary preferences (decoy absent) for the two available food options differed between trials. Irrespective of this difference, across both trials the presence of the decoy resulted in animals more likely to overtly investigate available food options. But, the decoy only shifted food choice, weakly, in one trial. Our results indicate that the decoy influenced the information-gathering behavior during decision-making, providing the first evidence that decoys can affect decision-making process of free-ranging mammalian herbivores in an ecologically realistic context. It is premature to say these findings confirm the use of relative evaluation systems. Whether the foraging outcome is more strongly affected by other decoys, food dimensions, or ecological contexts, is yet to be determined.

Context-effect bias in capuchin monkeys (Sapajus spp.): exploring decoy influences in a value-based food choice task

Decision making is known to be liable to several context effects. In particular, adding a seemingly irrelevant alternative (decoy) to a set of options can modify preferences: typically, by increasing choices towards whatever option clearly dominates the decoy (attraction effect), but occasionally also decreasing its appeal and generating a shift in the opposite direction (repulsion effect). Both types of decoy effects violate rational choice theory axioms and suggest dynamic processes of preference-formation, in which the value of each alternative is not determined a priori, but it is instead constructed by comparing options during the decision process. These effects are well documented, both in humans and in other species: e.g., amoebas, ants, honeybees, frogs, birds, cats, dogs. However, evidence of decoy effects in non-human primates remains surprisingly mixed. This study investigates decoy effects in capuchin monkeys (Sapajus spp.), manipulating time pressure across different conditions, to test whether such effects require time-consuming comparative processes among available alternatives. Whereas the time-dependent nature of decoy effects is a robust finding in the human literature, this is its first investigation in non-human animals. Our results show that capuchins exhibit an attraction effect with decoys targeting their preferred food, and that this effect disappears under time pressure; moreover, we observe preliminary evidence of a repulsion effect when decoys target instead the less-preferred food, possibly due to the larger distance between decoy and target in the attribute space. Taken together, these results provide valuable insight on the evolutionary roots of comparative decision making.

Bundling and segregation affect pheromone deposition, but not choice, in an ant

Behavioural economists have identified many psychological manipulations which affect perceived value. A prominent example of this is bundling, in which several small gains (or costs) are experienced as more valuable (or costly) than if the same total amount is presented together. While extensively demonstrated in humans, to our knowledge this effect has never been investigated in an animal, let alone an invertebrate. We trained individual Lasius niger workers to two of three conditions in which either costs (travel distance), gains (sucrose reward), or both were either bundled or segregated: (1) both costs and gains bundled, (2) both segregated, and (3) only gains segregated. We recorded pheromone deposition on the ants' return trips to the nest as measure of perceived value. After training, we offer the ants a binary choice between odours associated with the treatments. While bundling treatment did not affect binary choice, it strongly influenced pheromone deposition. Ants deposited c. 80% more pheromone when rewards were segregated but costs bundled as compared with both costs and rewards being bundled. This pattern is further complicated by the pairwise experience each animal made, and which of the treatments it experiences first during training. This demonstrates that even insects are influenced by bundling effects. We propose that the deviation between binary choice and pheromone deposition in this case may be due to a possible linearity in distance perception in ants, while almost all other sensory perception in animals is logarithmic.

Bumblebees retrieve only the ordinal ranking of foraging options when comparing memories obtained in distinct settings

Are animals' preferences determined by absolute memories for options (e.g. reward sizes) or by their remembered ranking (better/worse)? The only studies examining this question suggest humans and starlings utilise memories for both absolute and relative information. We show that bumblebees' learned preferences are based only on memories of ordinal comparisons. A series of experiments showed that after learning to discriminate pairs of different flowers by sucrose concentration, bumblebees preferred flowers (in novel pairings) with (1) higher ranking over equal absolute reward, (2) higher ranking over higher absolute reward, and (3) identical qualitative ranking but different quantitative ranking equally. Bumblebees used absolute information in order to rank different flowers. However, additional experiments revealed that, even when ranking information was absent (i.e. bees learned one flower at a time), memories for absolute information were lost or could no longer be retrieved after at most 1 hr. Our results illuminate a divergent mechanism for bees (compared to starlings and humans) of learned preferences that may have arisen from different adaptations to their natural environment.

Context effects on choice under cognitive load

The context-dependent nature of choice is well illustrated by decoy effects, in which adding an alternative to a choice set can change the preference relations among the other alternatives. The current within-subjects study tested whether manipulating cognitive load affects the magnitude of attraction and compromise decoy effects. Participants (n = 96) made simulated online grocery shopping choices from three options described by price and quality for each grocery item they encountered. On half the 96 trials, they had to memorize a telephone number prior to encountering the choice set, after which they recalled the number. The choice task was rated significantly more difficult under load, providing some face validity for the load manipulation. Across decoy types, context effects were large and unaffected by the load manipulation. Bayesian analysis provided substantial evidence in favor of this null effect, with the study powered at better than .95 to detect a moderate effect. Across individuals, the magnitude of decoy effects was positively correlated with perception of the greater difficulty of the task under load, with this relationship fully mediated by increases in response times. These results are consistent with the idea that compromise and attraction decoy effects can operate relatively automatically and require minimal effortful processing.

The repulsion effect in preferential choice and its relation to perceptual choice

People rely on the choice context to guide their decisions, violating fundamental principles of rational choice theory and exhibiting phenomena called context effects. Recent research has uncovered that dominance relationships can both increase or decrease the choice share of the dominating option, marking the two ends of an attraction-repulsion continuum. However, empirical links between the two opposing effects are scarce and theoretical accounts are missing altogether. The present study (N = 55) used eye tracking alongside a within-subject design that contrasts a perceptual task and a preferential-choice analog in order to bridge this gap and uncover the underlying information-search processes. Although individuals differed in their perceptual and preferential choices, they generally engaged in alternative-wise comparisons and a repulsion effect was present in both conditions that became weaker the more predominant the attribute-wise comparisons were. Altogether, our study corroborates the notion that repulsion effects are a robust and general phenomenon that theoretical accounts need to take seriously.

The elusiveness of context effects in decision making

Contextual features influence human and non-human decision making, giving rise to preference reversals. Decades of research have documented the species and situations in which these effects are observed. More recently, however, researchers have focused on boundary conditions, that is, settings in which established effects disappear or reverse. This work is scattered across academic disciplines and some results appear to contradict each other. We synthesize recent findings and resolve apparent contradictions by considering them in terms of three core categories of decision context: spatial arrangement, attribute concreteness, and deliberation time. We suggest that these categories could be understood using theories of choice representation, which specify how context shapes the information over which deliberation processes operate.

Conditional valuation for combinations of goods in primates

Valuing goods and selecting the one with the highest value forms the basis of adaptive behaviour across species. While it is obvious that the valuation of a given type of goods depends on ownership and availability of that type of goods, the effects of other goods on valuation of the original good are sometimes underappreciated. Yet, goods interact with each other, indicating that the valuation of a given good is conditional on the other goods it is combined with, both in the wild and the laboratory. Here, we introduce conditional valuation in the context of valuing multiple goods and briefly review how human and animal experimentalists can leverage economic tools for the study of interactions among goods. We then review evidence for conditional valuation for combined foods in both human and non-human primates. In the laboratory, non-human primates show increased valuation of certain combinations of foods but decreased valuation of other types of combinations. Thus, similarly to humans, monkeys appear to value combinations of goods in a conditional fashion. Additionally, both humans and monkeys appear to employ similar neural substrates for the valuation of single goods, such as the orbitofrontal cortex. Together, investigations of our evolutionary precursors may provide insights on how we value interacting goods. This article is part of the theme issue 'Existence and prevalence of economic behaviours among non-human primates'.

How do insects choose flowers? A review of multi-attribute flower choice and decoy effects in flower-visiting insects

Understanding why animals (including humans) choose one thing over another is one of the key questions underlying the fields of behavioural ecology, behavioural economics and psychology. Most traditional studies of food choice in animals focus on simple, single-attribute decision tasks. However, animals in the wild are often faced with multi-attribute choice tasks where options in the choice set vary across multiple dimensions. Multi-attribute decision-making is particularly relevant for flower-visiting insects faced with deciding between flowers that may differ in reward attributes such as sugar concentration, nectar volume and pollen composition as well as non-rewarding attributes such as colour, symmetry and odour. How do flower-visiting insects deal with complex multi-attribute decision tasks? Here we review and synthesise research on the decision strategies used by flower-visiting insects when making multi-attribute decisions. In particular, we review how different types of foraging frameworks (classic optimal foraging theory, nutritional ecology, heuristics) conceptualise multi-attribute choice and we discuss how phenomena such as innate preferences, flower constancy and context dependence influence our understanding of flower choice. We find that multi-attribute decision-making is a complex process that can be influenced by innate preferences, flower constancy, the composition of the choice set and economic reward value. We argue that to understand and predict flower choice in flower-visiting insects, we need to move beyond simplified choice sets towards a view of multi-attribute choice which integrates the role of non-rewarding attributes and which includes flower constancy, innate preferences and context dependence. We further caution that behavioural experiments need to consider the possibility of context dependence in the design and interpretation of preference experiments. We conclude with a discussion of outstanding questions for future research. We also present a conceptual framework that incorporates the multiple dimensions of choice behaviour.

A map of decoy influence in human multialternative choice

Imagine you are deciding between two goods: A is simple but inexpensive, B is luxurious but more costly. Introducing a less advantageous option (e.g., lower quality than A, same price) should not alter your choice between A and B. However, this principle is often violated; three classic biases known as “decoy effects” have been identified, each describing a stereotyped choice pattern in the presence of irrelevant information. Through behavioral testing in human participants and computer simulations, we show that these decoy effects are special cases of a wider principle, whereby stimulus value information is encoded in a relative, rather than an absolute, format. This work clarifies the origin of three behavioral phenomena that are widely studied in psychology and economics.

Human decisions can be biased by irrelevant information. For example, choices between two preferred alternatives can be swayed by a third option that is inferior or unavailable. Previous work has identified three classic biases, known as the attraction, similarity, and compromise effects, which arise during choices between economic alternatives defined by two attributes. However, the reliability, interrelationship, and computational origin of these three biases have been controversial. Here, a large cohort of human participants made incentive-compatible choices among assets that varied in price and quality. Instead of focusing on the three classic effects, we sampled decoy stimuli exhaustively across bidimensional multiattribute space and constructed a full map of decoy influence on choices between two otherwise preferred target items. Our analysis reveals that the decoy influence map is highly structured even beyond the three classic biases. We identify a very simple model that can fully reproduce the decoy influence map and capture its variability in individual participants. This model reveals that the three decoy effects are not distinct phenomena but are all special cases of a more general principle, by which attribute values are repulsed away from the context provided by rival options. The model helps us understand why the biases are typically correlated across participants and allows us to validate a prediction about their interrelationship. This work helps to clarify the origin of three of the most widely studied biases in human decision-making.

Anisotropy of perceived space in non-primates? The horizontal-vertical illusion in bearded dragons (Pogona vitticeps) and red-footed tortoises (Chelonoidis carbonaria)

The horizontal-vertical illusion is a size illusion in which two same-sized objects appear to be different if presented on a horizontal or vertical plane, with the vertical one appearing longer. This illusion represents one of the main evidences of the anisotropy of the perceived space of humans, an asymmetrical perception of the object size presented in the vertical and horizontal space. Although this illusion has been widely investigated in humans, there is an almost complete lack of studies in non-human animals. Here we investigated whether reptiles perceive the horizontal-vertical illusion. We tested two reptile species: bearded dragons (Pogona vitticeps) and red-footed tortoises (Chelonoidis carbonaria). In control trials, two different-sized food strips were presented and animals were expected to choose the longer one. In test trials, animals received two same-sized strips, presented in a spatial arrangement eliciting the illusion. Only bearded dragons significantly preferred the longer strip in control trials; in test trials, bearded dragons selected the strip arranged vertically, suggesting a human-like perception of this pattern, while no clear choice for either array was observed in tortoises. Our results raise the interesting possibility that the anisotropy of perceived space can exists also in a reptile brain.

Irrational behavior in C. elegans arises from asymmetric modulatory effects within single sensory neurons

C. elegans worms exhibit a natural chemotaxis towards food cues. This provides a potential platform to study the interactions between stimulus valence and innate behavioral preferences. Here we perform a comprehensive set of choice assays to measure worms' relative preference towards various attractants. Surprisingly, we find that when facing a combination of choices, worms' preferences do not always follow value-based hierarchy. In fact, the innate chemotaxis behavior in worms robustly violates key rationality paradigms of transitivity, independence of irrelevant alternatives and regularity. These violations arise due to asymmetric modulatory effects between the presented options. Functional analysis of the entire chemosensory system at a single-neuron resolution, coupled with analyses of mutants, defective in individual neurons, reveals that these asymmetric effects originate in specific sensory neurons.

VAMP (Voting Agent Model of Preferences): A computational model of individual multi-attribute choice

This paper proposes an original account of decision anomalies and a computational alternative to existing dynamic models of multi-attribute choice. To date, most models attempting to account for the "Big Three" decision anomalies (similarity, attraction, and compromise effects) are variants of evidence accumulation models, or rational Bayesian analysis. This paper provides an existence proof of a new approach in the form of a multi-agent system based on the principles of voting geometry. Assuming there are a number of neural systems (agents) within an individual's brain, the Big Three decision anomalies can arise as a natural consequence of aggregating preferences across these agents. We operationalize these principles in VAMP, (Voting Agent Model of Preferences), and compare its performance to existing computational models as well as to empirical data. This provides a fundamentally different lens for understanding decision anomalies in multi-attribute choice.

When the Good Looks Bad: An Experimental Exploration of the Repulsion Effect

When people are choosing among different options, context seems to play a vital role. For instance, adding a third option can increase the probability of choosing a similar dominating option. This attraction effect is one of the most widely studied phenomena in decision-making research. Its prevalence, however, has been challenged recently by the tainting hypothesis, according to which the inferior option contaminates the attribute space in which it is located, leading to a repulsion effect. In an attempt to test the tainting hypothesis and explore the conditions under which dominated options make dominating options look bad, we conducted four preregistered perceptual decision-making studies with a total of 301 participants. We identified two factors influencing individuals' behavior: stimulus display and stimulus design. Our results contribute to a growing body of literature showing how presentation format influences behavior in preferential and perceptual decision-making tasks.

The Effect of Expected Value on Attraction Effect Preference Reversals

The attraction effect shows that adding a third alternative to a choice set can alter preference between the original two options. For over 30 years, this simple demonstration of context dependence has been taken as strong evidence against a class of parsimonious value‐maximising models that evaluate alternatives independently from one another. Significantly, however, in previous demonstrations of the attraction effect alternatives are approximately equally valuable, so there was little consequence to the decision maker irrespective of which alternative was selected. Here we vary the difference in expected value between alternatives and provide the first demonstration that, although extinguished with large differences, this theoretically important effect persists when choice between alternatives has a consequence. We use this result to clarify the implications of the attraction effect, arguing that although it robustly violates the assumptions of value‐maximising models, it does not eliminate the possibility that human decision making is optimal. © 2016 The Authors Journal of Behavioral Decision Making Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.

Capuchins (Cebus apella) fail to show an asymmetric dominance effect

The asymmetric dominance effect (ADE) occurs when the introduction of a partially dominated decoy option increases the choice share of its dominating alternative. The ADE is a violation of regularity and the constant-ratio rule, which are two derivations of the independence of irrelevant alternatives axiom, a core tenant of rational choice. The ADE is one of the most widely reported human choice phenomena, leading researchers to probe its origins by studying a variety of non-human species. We examined the ADE in brown capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella), a species that displays many other decision biases. In Experiment 1, we used a touchscreen method to elicit choice-based preferences for food rewards in asymmetrically dominated choice sets. In Experiments 2 and 3, we distinguished between different types of judgments and used a free selection task to elicit consumption-based preferences for juice rewards. However, we found no evidence for the ADE through violations of regularity or the constant-ratio rule, despite the similarity of our stimuli to other human and non-human experiments. While these results appear to conflict with existing literature on the ADE in non-human species, we point out methodological differences-notably, the distinction between value-based and perception-based stimuli-that have led to a collection of phenomena that are difficult to understand under a unitary theoretical framework. In particular, we highlight key differences between the human and non-human research and provide a series of steps that researchers could take to better understand the ADE.

Why contextual preference reversals maximize expected value

Contextual preference reversals occur when a preference for one option over another is reversed by the addition of further options. It has been argued that the occurrence of preference reversals in human behavior shows that people violate the axioms of rational choice and that people are not, therefore, expected value maximizers. In contrast, we demonstrate that if a person is only able to make noisy calculations of expected value and noisy observations of the ordinal relations among option features, then the expected value maximizing choice is influenced by the addition of new options and does give rise to apparent preference reversals. We explore the implications of expected value maximizing choice, conditioned on noisy observations, for a range of contextual preference reversal types-including attraction, compromise, similarity, and phantom effects. These preference reversal types have played a key role in the development of models of human choice. We conclude that experiments demonstrating contextual preference reversals are not evidence for irrationality. They are, however, a consequence of expected value maximization given noisy observations. (PsycINFO Database Record

The development of the asymmetrically dominated decoy effect in young children

One classic example of context-independent violations is the asymmetrically dominated decoy effect, in which adding a decoy option (inferior option) to a set of original options often increases the individual’s preference for one option over the other original option. Despite the prevalence of this effect, little is known about its developmental origins. Moreover, it remains contentious whether the decoy effect is a result of biological evolution or is learned from social experience. Here, we investigated the decoy effect in 3- to 7-year-old children (n = 175) and young adults (n = 52) using a simple perceptual task. Results showed that older children (5-year-olds and 7-year-olds), but not younger children (3-year-olds), exhibited a decoy effect. Nevertheless, children as young as age 5 exhibited a decoy effect that was not significantly different from that shown by young adults. These findings suggest that humans start to appreciate the relative values of options at around age 5.