No need for a social cue! A masked magician can also trick the audience in the vanishing ball illusion

Beyond the Tricks: The Science and Comparative Cognition of Magic

Magic is an art form that has fascinated humans for centuries. Recently, the techniques used by magicians to make their audience experience the impossible have attracted the attention of psychologists, who, in just a couple of decades, have produced a large amount of research regarding how these effects operate, focusing on the blind spots in perception and roadblocks in cognition that magic techniques exploit. Most recently, this investigation has given a pathway to a new line of research that uses magic effects to explore the cognitive abilities of nonhuman animals. This new branch of the scientific study of magic has already yielded new evidence illustrating the power of magic effects as a psychological tool for nonhuman animals. This review aims to give a thorough overview of the research on both the human and nonhuman perception of magic effects by critically illustrating the most prominent works of both fields of inquiry.

The Vanishing Coin Illusion: When sound congruence affects visual representation of motion

In the "classic" vanishing ball illusion (VBI), a magician pretends to throw a ball and the audience sees it go up and then disappear. To gain a better understanding of the mechanisms involved, we conducted two experiments to analyze the permeability of this type of illusion to auditory information. A modified version of the VBI (i.e., the Vanishing Coin Illusion [VCI]), was presented, and this was either accompanied by a sound or was not. The results show that the presence of a sound adds to the success of the illusion (Experiment 1), especially when this sound is congruent with the illusion (Experiment 2). Based on these results, we discuss the mechanisms at work in this illusion.

Investigating expert performance when observing magic effects

The use of magic effects to investigate the blind spots in attention and perception and roadblocks in the cognition of the spectator has yielded thought-provoking results elucidating how these techniques operate. However, little is known about the interplay between experience practising magic and being deceived by magic effects. In this study, we performed two common sleight of hand effects and their real transfer counterparts to non-magicians, and to magicians with a diverse range of experience practising magic. Although, as a group, magicians identified the sleights of hand as deceptive actions significantly more than non-magicians; this ability was only evidenced in magicians with more than 5 years in the craft. However, unlike the rest of the participants, experienced magicians had difficulty correctly pinpointing the location of the coin in one of the real transfers presented. We hypothesise that this might be due to the inherent ambiguity of this transfer, in which, contrary to the other real transfer performed, no clear perceptive clue is given about the location of the coin. We suggest that extensive time practising magic might have primed experienced magicians to anticipate foul play when observing ambiguous movements, even when the actions observed are genuine.

Fooling System 1 in the field of perception: Failure to intuitively detect attribute substitution in the flushtration count illusion

To facilitate our interactions with the surroundings, the human brain sometimes reshapes the situations that it faces to simplify them. This phenomenon has been widely studied in the context of reasoning, especially through the attribute substitution error. It has however been given much less attention in the field of perception. Recent research on the bat-and-ball problem suggests that reasoners are able to intuitively detect attribute substitution errors. Using a perceptual illusion drawn from the field of magic, we investigate the extent to which a perceptual form of attribute substitution depends on executive resources and can be detected. We also investigate the relationship between susceptibility to attribute substitution error in the flushtration count illusion and in a French adaptation of the bat-and-ball problem. Finally, we investigate the link between the intuitive cognitive style (assessed by the cognitive reflection test) and the susceptibility to the flushtration count illusion. Our results suggest that participants do not detect perceptual attribute substitution error, that this phenomenon could be independent of the executive resources allocated to the task, and could rest on mechanisms distinct from those that produce errors in reasoning. We discuss differences between these two phenomena, and factors that may explain them.

On the cognitive bases of illusionism

Cognitive scientists have paid very little attention to magic as a distinctly human activity capable of creating situations that are considered impossible because they violate expectations and conclude with the apparent transgression of well-established cognitive and natural laws. This illusory experience of the "impossible" entails a very particular cognitive dissonance that is followed by a subjective and complex "magical experience". Here, from a perspective inspired by visual neuroscience and ecological cognition, we propose a set of seven fundamental cognitive phenomena (from attention and perception to memory and decision-making) plus a previous pre-sensory stage that magicians interfere with during the presentation of their effects. By doing so, and using as an example the deconstruction of a classic trick, we show how magic offers novel and powerful insights to study human cognition. Furthermore, live magic performances afford to do so in tasks that are more ecological and context-dependent than those usually exploited in artificial laboratory settings. We thus believe that some of the mysteries of how the brain works may be trapped in the split realities present in every magic effect.

Never Repeat the Same Trick Twice-Unless it is Cognitively Impenetrable

In their quest for creating magical experiences, magicians rely on a host of psychological factors. Here, we compare tricks based on attentional misdirection with tricks based on amodal completion. Based on the notion that amodal completion is a cognitively impenetrable perceptual phenomenon, we predicted that the tricks based on this perceptual effect should-to a much larger extent than tricks based on attentional misdirection-retain their deceptive power when the tricks are repeated. The results of an experiment with four magic tricks involving attentional misdirection and four magic tricks based on amodal completion lend strong support to this prediction. Asking subjects to try to figure out the secret behind these tricks after one, two, or three presentations of each trick, we found that the observed solution rates for tricks based on attentional misdirection increased much more with repeated viewing than those for tricks based on amodal completion, which remained very low throughout. Thus, the results lend further support to the idea that amodal completion is based on cognitively impenetrable perceptual mechanisms.

Scientific Study of Magic: Binet's Pioneering Approach Based on Observations and Chronophotography

In 1894, French psychologist Alfred Binet (1857-1911) published an article titled "The Psychol- ogy of Prestidigitation" that reported the results of a study conducted in collaboration with two of the best magicians of that period. By using a new method and new observation techniques, Binet was able to reveal some of the psychological mechanisms involved in magic tricks. Our article begins by presenting Binet's method and the principal professional magicians who par- ticipated in his studies. Next, we present the main psychological tools of magicians described by Binet and look at some recent studies dealing with those mechanisms. Finally, we take a look at the innovative technique used by Binet for his study on magic: the chronophotograph.

The ball vanishes in the air: can we blame representational momentum?

In the vanishing ball illusion (VBI), the magician throws a ball up into the air twice and then pretends to do a third throw. On the third (fake) throw, the audience sees the ball go up and then disappear. In this article, we study the psychological mechanisms at play in this magic trick. We test the hypothesis that the illusion is based on representational momentum (RM), a psychological phenomenon in which the observer perceives the stopping point of a moving scene as being located farther ahead in the direction of motion than it really is. To determine whether the mechanisms involved in VBI are similar to those underlying RM, we compared the results of a standard VBI task to those obtained on an RM task designed to be very close to the VBI task. The results showed that VBI sensitivity was not associated with a higher anticipation score on the RM task. Unexpectedly, we found that participants who were sensitive to the illusion even obtained a weaker RM effect. We discuss several hypotheses that might account for these results.

The Phantom Vanish Magic Trick: Investigating the Disappearance of a Non-existent Object in a Dynamic Scene

Drawing inspiration from sleight-of-hand magic tricks, we developed an experimental paradigm to investigate whether magicians’ misdirection techniques could be used to induce the misperception of “phantom” objects. While previous experiments investigating sleight-of-hand magic tricks have focused on creating false assumptions about the movement of an object in a scene, our experiment investigated creating false assumptions about the presence of an object in a scene. Participants watched a sequence of silent videos depicting a magician performing with a single object. Following each video, participants were asked to write a description of the events in the video. In the final video, participants watched the Phantom Vanish Magic Trick, a novel magic trick developed for this experiment, in which the magician pantomimed the actions of presenting an object and then making it magically disappear. No object was presented during the final video. The silent videos precluded the use of false verbal suggestions, and participants were not asked leading questions about the objects. Nevertheless, 32% of participants reported having visual impressions of non-existent objects. These findings support an inferential model of perception, wherein top-down expectations can be manipulated by the magician to generate vivid illusory experiences, even in the absence of corresponding bottom-up information.