Perceptual overloading reveals illusory contour perception without awareness of the inducers

B or 13? Unconscious Top-Down Contextual Effects at the Categorical but Not the Lexical Level

Contextual effects require integration of top-down predictions and bottom-up visual information. Given the widely assumed link between integration and consciousness, we asked whether contextual effects require consciousness. In two experiments (total N = 60), an ambiguous stimulus (which could be read as either B or 13) was presented alongside masked numbers (12 and 14) or letters (A and C). Context biased stimulus classification when it was consciously and unconsciously perceived. However, unconsciously perceived contexts evoked smaller effects. This finding was replicated and generalized into another language in a further experiment (N = 46) using a different set of stimuli, strengthening the claim that symbolic contextual effects can occur without awareness. Moreover, four experiments (total N = 160) suggested that these unconscious effects might be limited to the categorical level (numbers context vs. letters context) and do not extend to the lexical level (words context vs. nonwords context). Taken together, our results suggest that although consciousness may not be necessary for effects that require simple integration or none at all, it is nevertheless required for integration over larger semantic windows.

Perceptual organization of line configurations: Is visual awareness necessary?

We examined whether configuring, which determines the appearance of grouped elements as a global shape, requires visual awareness, using a priming paradigm and two invisibility-inducing methods, CFS and sandwich masking. The primes were organized into configurations based on closure, collinearity, and symmetry (collinear primes), or on closure and symmetry (noncollinear primes). The prime-target congruency could be in configuration or in elements. During CFS, no significant response-priming was observed for invisible primes. When masking induced invisibility, a significant configuration response-priming was found for collinear and noncollinear primes, visible and invisible, with larger magnitude for the former. An element response-priming of equal magnitude was evident for visible and invisible noncollinear primes. Our results suggest that configuring can be accomplished in the absence of visual awareness when stimuli are rendered invisible by sandwich masking, but it benefits from visual awareness. Our results also suggest sensitivity to the available grouping cues in unconscious processing.

Working Memory and Consciousness: The Current State of Play

Working memory (WM), an important posit in cognitive science, allows one to temporarily store and manipulate information in the service of ongoing tasks. WM has been traditionally classified as an explicit memory system-that is, as operating on and maintaining only consciously perceived information. Recently, however, several studies have questioned this assumption, purporting to provide evidence for unconscious WM. In this article, we focus on visual working memory (VWM) and critically examine these studies as well as studies of unconscious perception that seem to provide indirect evidence for unconscious WM. Our analysis indicates that current evidence does not support an unconscious WM store, though we offer independent reasons to think that WM may operate on unconsciously perceived information.

Weak experiences sufficient for creating illusory figures that influence perception of actual lines

The question of whether conscious experience is best viewed as graded or dichotomous has received much scientific attention in recent years as the answer is relevant not only to models of consciousness, but also to the examination of neural markers of consciousness in patients and infants. Although some studies have found evidence of graded perception, it is unclear whether such perception is simply composed of individual stimulus features perceived in an all-or-none manner. Here, we examined whether the Kanizsa triangle (an illusory figure that is supposedly only perceived when all its parts are visible) has an impact on line length discrimination across four degrees of subjective visibility. We found that the presence of the Kanizsa triangle biases line length judgments (a phenomenon called the Ponzo illusion) when participants reported any experience (even a weak glimpse) of the stimulus. The results support the view that consciousness is a graded phenomenon. The strength of this support depends on the assumption that all parts of the illusory figure must be perceived for the illusion to work but this assumption is not resolved in the present literature. Currently, evidence can be found both for and against this notion.