Trapped in a tight spot: Scaling effects occur when, according to the action-specific account, they should not, and fail to occur when they should

Size Perception of a Sport Target as a Function of Practice Success Conditions

Superior motor task success has been correlated with participants’ self-reports of a larger-than-actual size of a sport-related target. In the present study, we examined whether a putting practice condition with greater success would differentially impact participants’ self-reported perceptions of the size of the putting hole during acquisition and retention. We randomly assigned participants to one of three different practice conditions (success-early, success-late, and self-controlled success) and had them self-report their perceived size of the putting hole upon completion of each required putting distance (25, 50, 75, 100, 125, 150, 175, 200 cm). Although there were no statistically significant differences between motor task success in the acquisition or retention period for the practice conditions, self-reported perceptions of target size were impacted by practice condition. During the acquisition period, participants in the self-controlled success and success-late conditions self-reported that the putting hole was larger than did participants in the success-early condition. In the retention period, participants in the self-controlled success condition perceived the target as larger than those in the success-early condition. These findings are the first to show that practice condition, independent of task success, differentially impacted self-reported perception of a target size.

Getting a grasp on action-specific scaling: A response to Witt (2017)

Can higher level cognition directly influence visual spatial perception? Many recent studies have claimed so, on the basis that manipulating cognitive factors (e.g., morality, emotion, action capacity) seems to directly affect perception. However, Firestone and Scholl (Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 39, 1–77, 2016) argued that such studies often fall prey to at least one of six pitfalls. They further argued that if an effect could be accounted for by any of these pitfalls, it is not a true demonstration of a top-down influence of cognition on perception. In response to Firestone and Scholl (Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 39, 1–77, 2016), Witt (Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 24(4), 999–1021, 2017) discussed four action-specific scaling effects which, she argued, withstand all six pitfalls and thus demonstrate true perceptual changes caused by differences in action capacity. Her third case study was the influence of apparent grasping capacity on perceived object size. In this article, we provide new interpretations of previous findings and assess recent data which suggest that this effect is not, in fact, perceptual. Instead, we believe that many earlier studies showing this effect are subject to one or more of the pitfalls outlined by Firestone and Scholl (Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 39, 1–77, 2016). We substantiate our claims with recent empirical evidence from our laboratory which suggests that neither actual nor perceived grasping capacity directly influence perceived object size. We conclude that studies manipulating grasping capacity do not provide evidence for the action-specific account because variation in this factor does not directly influence size perception.