Sustained conscious access to incidental memories in RSVP

Episodic-like memory in wild free-living blue tits and great tits

Episodic-like memory in non-human animals represents the behavioral characteristics of human episodic memory-the ability to mentally travel backward in time to "re-live" past experiences. A focus on traditional model species of episodic-like memory may overlook taxa possessing this cognitive ability and consequently its evolution across species. Experiments conducted in the wild have the potential to broaden the scope of episodic-like memory research under the natural conditions in which they evolved. We combine two distinct yet complementary episodic-like memory tasks (the what-where-when memory and incidental encoding paradigms), each targeting a different aspect of human episodic memory, namely the content (what-where-when) and process (incidental encoding), to comprehensively test the memory abilities of wild, free-living, non-caching blue tits (Cyanistes caeruleus) and great tits (Parus major). Automated feeders with custom-built programs allowed for experimental manipulation of spatiotemporal experiences on an individual-level basis. In the what-where-when memory experiment, after learning individualized temporal feeder rules, the birds demonstrated their ability to recall the "what" (food type), "where" (feeder location), and "when" (time since their initial visit of the day) of previous foraging experiences. In the incidental encoding experiment, the birds showed that they were able to encode and recall incidental spatial information regarding previous foraging experiences ("where" test), and juveniles, but not adults, were also able to recall incidentally encoded visual information ("which" test). Consequently, this study presents multiple lines of converging evidence for episodic-like memory in a wild population of generalist foragers, suggesting that episodic-like memory may be more taxonomically widespread than previously assumed.

Eurasian jays (Garrulus glandarius) show episodic-like memory through the incidental encoding of information

Episodic memory describes the conscious reimagining of our memories and is often considered to be a uniquely human ability. As these phenomenological components are embedded within its definition, major issues arise when investigating the presence of episodic memory in non-human animals. Importantly, however, when we as humans recall a specific experience, we may remember details from that experience that were inconsequential to our needs, thoughts, or desires at that time. This 'incidental' information is nevertheless encoded automatically as part of the memory and is subsequently recalled within a holistic representation of the event. The incidental encoding and unexpected question paradigm represents this characteristic feature of human episodic memory and can be employed to investigate memory recall in non-human animals. However, without evidence for the associated phenomenology during recall, this type of memory is termed 'episodic-like memory'. Using this approach, we tested seven Eurasian jays (Garrulus glandarius) on their ability to use incidental visual information (associated with observed experimenter made 'caches') to solve an unexpected memory test. The birds performed above chance levels, suggesting that Eurasian jays can encode, retain, recall, and access incidental visual information within a remembered event, which is an ability indicative of episodic memory in humans.

Conscious perception of flickering stimuli in binocular rivalry and continuous flash suppression is not affected by tACS-induced SSR modulation

The content of conscious perception is known to correlate with steady-state responses (SSRs), yet their causal relationship remains unclear. Can we manipulate conscious perception by directly interfering with SSRs through transcranial alternating current stimulation (tACS)? Here, we directly addressed this question in three experiments involving binocular rivalry and continuous flash suppression (CFS). Specifically, while participants (N = 24) viewed either binocular rivalry or tried to detect stimuli masked by CFS, we applied sham or real tACS across parieto-occipital cortex at either the same or a different frequency and phase as an SSR eliciting flicker stimulus. We found that tACS did not differentially affect conscious perception in the forms of predominance, CFS detection accuracy, reaction time, or metacognitive sensitivity, confirmed by Bayesian statistics. We conclude that tACS application at frequencies of stimulus-induced SSRs does not have perceptual effects and that SSRs may be epiphenomenal to conscious perception.

Raised visual contrast thresholds with intact attention and metacognition in functional motor disorder

Functional motor disorders (FMDs) are distinguished by signs that lack congruence with recognised patterns of organic disease and show inconsistency over time. Their pathophysiology is poorly understood, but there is evidence that irregularities in perceptual and cognitive processing lie at the heart of these conditions. Here, we draw on a predictive coding account of functional neurological disorders to study perceptual decision-making in three groups: 20 patients with FMDs (14 with functional movements and 6 with functional weakness), 20 with phenotypically-matched organic motor disorders, and 20 age-matched healthy controls. We examine four cognitive domains with putative roles in FMD pathogenesis: attention, expectations, sensory processing (perceptual sensitivity), and metacognition (introspective evaluation of performance). We augmented a dual-task paradigm, manipulating the visual contrast required for target detection to examine these domains in one design. With sensory input (stimulus contrast) psychometrically adjusted to staircase target detection at a fixed level for all groups, the FMD group exhibited statistically equivalent attentional, expectational and metacognitive processing to healthy controls. However, we demonstrate Bayesian evidence and a frequentist trend that FMD patients require higher visual contrast than controls to maintain the same detection sensitivity (BF₁₀ = 8.1, p_holm = .066). This was statistically equivalent to the visual contrast required by the organic group, and unlikely to be accounted for by medication use or comorbid psychopathology. The organic group showed differences in processing of attention and expectations for target detection that were not observed in either healthy controls or the functional group. The distinctive behavioural profile of FMDs may arise from abnormalities in basic sensory processing, while higher attentional, expectational and metacognitive mechanisms remain intact. Conceptualising functional neurological disorders under a predictive coding account may consolidate and refine existing pathophysiological theories about them.