Free-choice and forced-choice actions: Shared representations and conservation of cognitive effort

Action control costs in task selection: Agents avoid actions with incompatible movement and effect features

When a movement triggers effects with incompatible features, conflict between action and effect features creates costs for action planning and initiation. We investigated whether such action control costs also factor into action choices in terms of the principle of least effort. Participants completed a reaction-time experiment, where they were instructed to perform left and right mouse swipes in response to directional cues presented on the screen. Participants could select between two action options on each trial: Depending on which part of the screen (upper or lower) the action was performed in, the swipe resulted in a visual stimulus moving in the same (compatible) or in the opposite (incompatible) direction as the mouse. Incompatible action-effect mappings did indeed incur action control costs. In accordance with effort avoidance, the proportion of compatible choices was significantly above chance level, suggesting that action selection and initiation costs factor into participants preferences. Interestingly, however, participants' choice tendencies were not predicted by the actual increase in action-initiation costs in the incompatible condition. This indicates that effort-related decisions are not simply based on monitoring performance in the actual task, but they are also influenced by preestablished notions of action-planning costs.

Variable, sometimes absent, but never negative: Applying multilevel models of variability to the backward crosstalk effect to find theoretical constraints

When performing two tasks at the same time, the congruency of the second task's features influences performance in the first task. This is called the backward crosstalk effect (BCE), a phenomenon that influences both theories of binding and of dual-task capacity limitations. The question of whether the BCE is found in all participants at all times is relevant for understanding the basis of the effect. For example, if the BCE is based on strategic choices, it can be variable, but if it is automatic and involuntary, it should never vary in whether it is present or not. Variability in observed BCE sizes was already documented and discussed when the group average effect was first reported (Hommel, 1998). Yet the theories discussed at the time did not motivate a more direct analysis of this variability, nor did the readily available statistical tools permit it. Some statistical approaches recently applied in cognitive psychology allow such a variability-focused analysis and some more recent theoretical debates would benefit from this as well. We assessed the variability of the BCE as well as a BCE-like free-choice congruency effect by applying a Bayesian multilevel modeling approach to the data from a dual-tasking experiment. Trials consisted of a two- and a four-response task. We manipulated which task was presented first and whether the response to the four-choice task was free or forced choice. RT data were best predicted by a model in which the BCE is zero in part of the population and drawn from a normal distribution truncated at zero (and thus always positive) in the rest of the population. Choice congruency bias data were best predicted by a model assuming this effect to be drawn from a normal distribution truncated at zero (but, in contrast to the RT data, without the subset of the population where it is zero). The BCE is not an inflexible and universal phenomenon that is directly linked to an inherent structural trait of human cognition. We discuss theoretical constraints implied by these results with a focus on what we can infer about the traits of the factors that influence BCE size. We suggest that future research might add further major constraints by using multi-session experiments to distinguish between-person and within-person variability. Our results show that the BCE is variable. The next step is understanding along which axes it is variable and why it varies.

Drinking the waters of Lethe: Bringing voluntary choice into the study of voluntary forgetting

The directed forgetting paradigm has long been used to test whether humans can voluntarily choose to forget learned information. However, to date, nearly all directed forgetting paradigms have involved a forced-choice paradigm, in which the participants are instructed about which learned information they should forget. While studies have repeatedly shown that this directed forgetting does lead to a decreased ability to later remember the information, it is still unclear whether these effects would be present if participants were allowed to, of their own accord, choose which information they wanted to forget. In two experiments here, we introduce a free-choice variety of the item method directed forgetting paradigm and show that directed forgetting effects are robust, both for instructed and voluntary forgetting. We discuss the implications of our findings for notions of voluntary forgetting and for the self-choice effect in memory.

What is behind partial repetition costs? Event-files do not fully occupy bound feature codes

Feature binding accounts state that features of perceived and produced events are bound into event-files. Performance while responding to an event is impaired when some, as opposed to all or none, of this event's features already belong to a previous event-file. While these partial repetition costs are generally considered to be indicators of feature binding, their cause is still unclear. Possibly, features are fully occupied when bound in an event-file and must be unbound in a time-consuming process before they can enter a novel event-file. In this study, we tested this code occupation account. Participants responded to the font color (target) of a word (distractor) by pressing one of three keys (response) while ignoring the word meaning. We measured partial repetition costs from prime to probe while introducing an intermediate trial. We compared sequences in which this intermediate trial did not repeat any prime features and sequences in which it repeated either the prime response or distractor. Partial repetition costs occurred in the probe, even when one (vs. none) of the prime features repeated in the intermediate trial, although significantly reduced. Thus, single bindings do not fully occupy feature codes. By ruling out a possible mechanism behind partial repetition costs, the present study contributes to the further specification of feature binding accounts.

Social Rejection but Not Ostracism Increases Cognitive Effort Avoidance

Purpose

Social exclusion has been found to have a significant impact on cognitive control processing. However, the existing research on this topic has yielded inconsistent findings, possibly due to variations in the type of exclusion and individuals' cognitive effort. Two studies were conducted to explore the influence of social rejection and ostracism on cognitive effort avoidance.

Participants and Methods

Study 1 involved forty-six adults who were randomly divided into a rejection group and a control group using a get-acquainted paradigm. The demand selection task (DST) was used to measure cognitive effort avoidance. In Study 2, forty-eight adults were recruited, Cyberball and DST paradigms were used to evoke ostracism and test cognitive effort avoidance, respectively.

Results

The results of study 1 showed that individuals who were socially rejected by their partners exhibited impaired response accuracy of cognitive control and increased cognitive effort avoidance. This indicates that social rejection has a negative impact on cognitive control processing and that individuals may be more likely to avoid cognitive effort when experiencing social rejection. The results of study 2 showed that ostracism had an impact on both response speed and accuracy, but it did not significantly affect cognitive effort avoidance. This indicates that social rejection affects cognitive control processing differently than ostracism, and individuals are more likely to avoid cognitive effort when experiencing social rejection.

Conclusion

These findings suggest that social rejection and ostracism have different effects on cognitive effort, which may contribute to the inconsistent cognitive performance during social exclusion. Future research may explore the underlying mechanisms that lead to these differences and examine how individuals can mitigate the negative effects of social exclusion on cognitive control processing.

Perception and action as viewed from the Theory of Event Coding: a multi-lab replication and effect size estimation of common experimental designs

The Theory of Event Coding (TEC) has influenced research on action and perception across the past two decades. It integrates several seminal empirical phenomena and it has continued to stimulate novel experimental approaches on the representational foundations of action control and perceptual experience. Yet, many of the most notable results surrounding TEC originate from an era of psychological research that relied on rather small sample sizes as judged by today's standards. This state hampers future research aiming to build on previous phenomena. We, therefore, provide a multi-lab re-assessment of the following six classical observations: response-effect compatibility, action-induced blindness, response-effect learning, stimulus-response binding, code occupation, and short-term response-effect binding. Our major goal is to provide precise estimates of corresponding effect sizes to facilitate future scientific endeavors. These effect sizes turned out to be considerably smaller than in the original reports, thus allowing for informed decisions on how to address each phenomenon in future work. Of note, the most relevant results of the original observations were consistently obtained in the present experiments as well.

Similar proactive effect monitoring in free and forced choice action modes

When our actions yield predictable consequences in the environment, our eyes often already saccade towards the locations we expect these consequences to appear at. Such spontaneous anticipatory saccades occur based on bi-directional associations between action and effect formed by prior experience. That is, our eye movements are guided by expectations derived from prior learning history. Anticipatory saccades presumably reflect a proactive effect monitoring process that prepares a later comparison of expected and actual effect. Here, we examined whether anticipatory saccades emerged under forced choice conditions when only actions but not target stimuli were predictive of future effects and whether action mode (forced choice vs. free choice, i.e., stimulus-based vs. stimulus-independent choice) affected proactive effect monitoring. Participants produced predictable visual effects on the left/right side via forced choice and free choice left/right key presses. Action and visual effect were spatially compatible in one half of the experiment and spatially incompatible in the other half. Irrespective of whether effects were predicted by target stimuli in addition to participants' actions, in both action modes, we observed anticipatory saccades towards the location of future effects. Importantly, neither the frequency, nor latency or amplitude of these anticipatory saccades significantly differed between forced choice and free choice action modes. Overall, our findings suggest that proactive effect monitoring of future action consequences, as reflected in anticipatory saccades, is comparable between forced choice and free choice action modes.

Enhancing free choice masked priming via switch trials during repeated practice

The masked priming paradigm has been extensively used to investigate the indirect impacts of unconscious stimuli on conscious behaviors, and the congruency effect of priming on free choices has gained increasing attention. Free choices allow participants to voluntarily choose a response from multiple options during each trial. While repeated practice is known to increase priming effects in subliminal visual tasks, whether practice increases the priming effect of free choices in the masked priming paradigm is unclear. And it is also not clear how the proportions of free choice and forced choice trials in one block will affect the free choice masked priming effect. The present study applied repeated practice in the masked priming paradigm and found that after training, the participants were more likely to be influenced by masked primes during free choice, but this training process did not alter the visibility of masked stimuli. In addition, this study revealed that when the proportions of free choice and forced choice trials were equal during the training stage, this enhanced effect by practice was the strongest. These results indicated that practice could enhance masked stimulus processing in free-choice, and that the learning effect may mainly be derived from the early selection and integrated processing of masked stimuli.

Partial Repetition Costs are Reduced but not Eliminated with Practice

Often, we depart from an intended course of events to react to sudden situational demands (an intervening event) before resuming the originally planned action. Executing an action to an intervening event can be delayed if the features of this action plan partly overlap with an action plan retained in working memory (WM) compared to when they completely overlap or do not overlap. This delay is referred to as a partial repetition cost (PRC). PRCs are typically attributed to code confusion between action plans in WM. We tested this by training the component action plans extensively to reduce their reliance on WM. If PRCs are caused by code confusion within WM, then PRCs should be reduced and possibly eliminated with extensive practice. To test this, participants performed a partial repetition (PR) task after 0, 4 and 8.5 sessions of stimulus-response (S-R) training. In the PR task, participants saw two visual events. They retained an action to the first event while executing a speeded action to a second (intervening) event; afterwards, they executed the retained action. The two action plans either partly overlapped or did not overlap. Results showed that extensive (S-R and PR task) practice reduced but did not eliminate PRCs. A reduction in PRCs (code confusion) with practice is compatible with memory models that assume action events become more specific and less reliant on WM with practice. These findings merit expansions of PR tasks to other domains and broader conceptions of action plans that incorporate the formal structure of memory models.

Examination of a Response–Effect Compatibility Task With Continuous Mouse Movements: Free- Versus Forced-Choice Tasks and Sequential Modulations

According to ideomotor theory, we select actions by recalling and anticipating their sensory consequences, that is, their action effects. Compelling evidence for this theory comes from response–effect compatibility (REC) experiments, in which a response produces an effect with which it is either compatible or incompatible. For example, pressing a left/right response key is faster if it is predictably followed by an action effect on the same, compatible side compared with the other, incompatible side, even though the effect itself appears only after response time is measured. Recent studies investigated this effect with continuous responses (i.e., computer mouse movements) and reported an REC effect in a forced-choice but not in a free-choice task. From the keypressing literature, the opposite result pattern or no differences would have been expected. To clarify this issue, we report 3 experiments with mouse movement responses. Experiment 1 used a simpler scenario than in prior studies and found a similar result: The REC effect was evident in a forced- but not in a free-choice task. Also, sequential modulations of the REC effect were exploratorily analyzed and replicated with higher power in Experiment 2. However, Experiment 3 demonstrated that at least part of the REC effect with mouse movements can be attributed to stimulus–response compatibility (SRC), with a much smaller compatibility effect evident with a procedure for which SRC was reduced. We conclude that a sequentially modulated compatibility effect can be observed with mouse movements, but previous studies may have underestimated the contribution from SRC. The results are also discussed in terms of why the compatibility effect was observed in forced- but not free-choice tasks with mouse movement responses.

Are freely chosen actions generated by stimulus codes or effect codes?

A long-standing debate revolves around which mental codes allow humans to control behavior. The internal stimulus model (going back to Rudolf Hermann Lotze) proposes that behavior is controlled by codes of stimuli that had previously preceded corresponding motor activities. The internal effect model (going back to Emil Harleß) proposes that behavior is controlled by codes of perceptual effects that had previously resulted from corresponding motor activities. Here, we present a test of these two control models. We observed evidence for both models with stronger evidence for the internal stimulus model. We suggest that the proposed experimental setup might be a useful tool to study the relative strengths of stimulus control and effect control of behavior in various contexts.