The perceived duration of expected events depends on how the expectation is formed

The role of perceptual processing in the oddball effect revealed by the Thatcher illusion

When a novel stimulus (oddball) appears after repeated presentation of an identical stimulus, the oddball is perceived to last longer than the repeated stimuli, a phenomenon known as the oddball effect. We investigated whether the perceptual or physical differences between the repeated and oddball stimuli are more important for the oddball effect. To manipulate the perceptual difference while keeping their physical visual features constant, we used the Thatcher illusion, in which an inversion of a face hinders recognition of distortion in its facial features. We found that the Thatcherized face presented after repeated presentation of an intact face induced a stronger oddball effect when the faces were upright than when they were inverted (Experiment 1). However, the difference in the oddball effect between face orientations was not observed when the intact face was presented as the oddball after repeated presentation of a Thatcherized face (Experiment 2). These results were replicated when participants performed both the intact-repeated and Thatcherized-repeated conditions in a single experiment (Experiment 3). Two control experiments confirmed that the repeated presentation of the preceding stimuli is necessary for the difference in duration distortion to occur (Experiments 4 and 5). The results suggest the considerable role of perceptual processing in the oddball effect. We discuss the discrepancy in the results between the intact-repeated and Thatcherized-repeated conditions in terms of predictive coding.

Enhanced electrophysiological responses to explicitly predicted and pre-imagined inputs, with confirmation from online decoding with neuro-feedback

Neural responses to sensory inputs can scale with the likelihood of encountering the input. This is consistent with the predictive coding framework, in that the human brain is expected to be less responsive to predicted inputs. Typically, however, prediction is not explicitly measured. It is inferred from the probability of encountering an event. When an input is explicitly predicted, responses to predicted inputs can be enhanced. Here, we ask if this effect can be ascribed to a generic priming effect, from pre-cogitating about one of two possible inputs. Consistent with this, we find that P300s (a relatively late event-related potential measured with electroencephalography) are greater for explicitly predicted audio and visual inputs, and that this effect cannot be distinguished from a priming effect from pre-imagining audio or visual presentations. Evidence indicates that participants engaged in pre-imagining presentations, as we were able to decode online what type of presentation (audio or visual) they were imagining with a high success rate (approx. 73%), and we encouraged compliance with neuro-feedback regarding this success rate. Our data confirm that human cortex can be more responsive to inputs that have been subject to pre-cogitation-including explicit predictions. This highlights that while anticipatory processes can reduce responding to likely inputs, they can also enhance responding to explicitly predicted inputs.