Recallable but not recognizable: The influence of semantic priming in recall paradigms

Context familiarity is a third kind of episodic memory distinct from item familiarity and recollection

Episodic memory is accounted for with two processes: "familiarity" when generally recognizing an item and "recollection" when retrieving the full contextual details bound with the item. We tested a combination of item recognition confidence and source memory, focusing upon three conditions: "item-only hits with source unknown" ('item familiarity'), "low-confidence hits with correct source memory" ('context familiarity'), and "high-confidence hits with correct source memory" ('recollection'). Behaviorally, context familiarity was slower than the others during item recognition, but faster during source memory. Electrophysiologically, a triple dissociation was evident in event-related potentials (ERPs), which was independently replicated. Context familiarity exhibited a negative effect from 800 to 1200 ms, differentiated from positive ERPs for item-familiarity (400-600 ms) and recollection (600-900 ms). These three conditions thus reflect mutually exclusive, fundamentally different processes of episodic memory, and we offer a new, tri-component model of memory. Context familiarity is a third distinct process of episodic memory.

A third kind of episodic memory: Context familiarity is distinct from item familiarity and recollection

Episodic memory is accounted for with two processes: 'familiarity' when generally recognizing an item and 'recollection' when retrieving the full contextual details bound with the item. Paradoxically, people sometimes report contextual information as familiar but without recollecting details, which is not easily accounted for by existing theories. We tested a combination of item recognition confidence and source memory, focusing upon 'item-only hits with source unknown' ('item familiarity'), 'low-confidence hits with correct source memory' ('context familiarity'), and 'high-confidence hits with correct source memory' ('recollection'). Results across multiple within-subjects (trial-wise) and between subjects (individual variability) levels indicated these were behaviorally and physiologically distinct. Behaviorally, a crossover interaction was evident in response times, with context familiarity being slower than each condition during item recognition, but faster during source memory. Electrophysiologically, a Condition x Time x Location triple dissociation was evident in event-related potentials (ERPs), which was then independently replicated. Context familiarity exhibited an independent negative central effect from 800-1200 ms, differentiated from positive ERPs for item-familiarity (400 to 600 ms) and recollection (600 to 900 ms). These three conditions thus reflect mutually exclusive, fundamentally different processes of episodic memory. Context familiarity is a third distinct process of episodic memory.

Summary

Memory for past events is widely believed to operate through two different processes: one called 'recollection' when retrieving confident, specific details of a memory, and another called 'familiarity' when only having an unsure but conscious awareness that an item was experienced before. When people successfully retrieve details such as the source or context of a prior event, it has been assumed to reflect recollection. We demonstrate that familiarity of context is functionally distinct from familiarity of items and recollection and offer a new, tri-component model of memory. The three memory responses were differentiated across multiple behavioral and brain wave measures. What has traditionally been thought to be two kinds of memory processes are actually three, becoming evident when using sensitive enough multi-measures. Results are independently replicated across studies from different labs. These data reveal that context familiarity is a third process of human episodic memory.

The Effect of Prior Knowledge of Color on Behavioral Responses and Event-Related Potentials During Go/No-go Task

In daily life, the meaning of color plays an important role in execution and inhibition of a motor response. For example, the symbolism of traffic light can help pedestrians and drivers to control their behavior, with the color green/blue meaning go and red meaning stop. However, we don't always stop with a red light and sometimes start a movement with it in such a situation as drivers start pressing the brake pedal when a traffic light turns red. In this regard, we investigated how the prior knowledge of traffic light signals impacts reaction times (RTs) and event-related potentials (ERPs) in a Go/No-go task. We set up Blue Go/Red No-go and Red Go/Blue No-go tasks with three different go signal (Go) probabilities (30, 50, and 70%), resulting in six different conditions. The participants were told which color to respond (Blue or Red) just before each condition session but didn't know the Go probability. Neural responses to Go and No-go signals were recorded at Fz, Cz, and Oz (international 10-20 system). We computed RTs for Go signal and N2 and P3 amplitudes from the ERP data. We found that RT was faster when responding to blue than red light signal and also was slower with lower Go probability. Overall, N2 amplitude was larger in Red Go than Blue Go trial and in Red No-go than Blue No-go trial. Furthermore, P3 amplitude was larger in Red No-go than Blue No-go trial. Our findings of RT and N2 amplitude for Go ERPs could indicate the presence of Stroop-like interference, that is a conflict between prior knowledge about traffic light signals and the meaning of presented signal. Meanwhile, the larger N2 and P3 amplitudes in Red No-go trial as compared to Blue No-go trial may be due to years of experience in stopping an action in response to a red signal and/or attention. This study provides the better understanding of the effect of prior knowledge of color on behavioral responses and its underlying neural mechanisms.