More than a feeling: physiological measures of affect index the integration of effort costs and rewards during anticipatory effort evaluation

Mind the instructions: Reward cues are liked first, wanted later

Current theories propose that mental effort is invested only when the anticipated benefits, such as rewards, outweigh the associated costs, like task difficulty. Yet, it remains unclear whether this motivational and mitigating aspect of reward processing is reflected in the evaluation of reward/difficulty cues as such, and to what extent it depends on task experience. In a pre-registered experiment (N = 84), we used the affect misattribution procedure (AMP) to gauge affective evaluations of nonword cues predicting reward and task difficulty levels. Contrary to previous studies, the AMP was administered at the outset, after cue instructions, and after the cues were used in a random dot motion (RDM) task. Compared to baseline, cues predicting a larger reward were evaluated more positively after RDM task experience, and most importantly, already after cue instructions, with no difference between the two phases. This evaluative effect manifested in increased performance after larger reward cues in the RDM task. Our results suggest that AMP effects may generally capture performance expectations which are independent of task experience. Importantly, these instructed expectations of reward and difficulty play a crucial role in the evaluation and subsequent investment of mental effort.

Context effects in cognitive effort evaluation

When given a choice, people will avoid cognitively effortful courses of action because the experience of effort is evaluated as aversive and costly. At the same time, a body of work spanning psychology, economics, and neuroscience suggests that goods, actions, and experiences are often evaluated in the context in which they are encountered, rather in absolute terms. To probe the extent to which the evaluation of cognitive effort is also context-dependent, we had participants learn associations between unique stimuli and subjective demand levels across low-demand and high-demand contexts. We probed demand preferences and subjective evaluation using a forced-choice paradigm as well by examining effort ratings, taken both on-line (during learning) and off-line (after choice). When choosing between two stimuli objectively identical in terms of demand, participants showed a clear preference for the stimulus learned in the low- versus high-demand context and rated this stimulus as more subjectively effortful than the low-demand context in on-line but not off-line ratings, suggesting an assimilation effect. Finally, we observed that the extent to which individual participants who exhibited stronger assimilation effects in off-line demand ratings were more likely to manifest an assimilation effect in demand preferences. Broadly, our findings suggest that effort evaluations occur in a context-dependent manner and are specifically assimilated to the broader context in which they occur.

Bumpy ride ahead: Anticipated effort as emotional evidence?

Conscious reportable (un)pleasantness feelings were shown to be successfully described by a process in which evidence favoring pleasant and unpleasant feelings accumulates until one response wins the race. This approach is challenged by (a) insufficient specification of "evidence," and (b) incomplete verification that participants report their truly experienced (un)pleasant feelings and not what they expect to feel. In each trial in this preregistered experiment, the (un)pleasant feeling reports regarding emotion evoking pictures was embedded in a period when participants expected a low-effort task (feature visual search) or a high-effort task (feature-conjunction search). Fitting the Linear Ballistic Accumulator model to the feeling report data shows that anticipated effort was associated with a higher rate of unpleasant evidence accumulation, but only when the emotion evoking pictures were normatively unpleasant and not when they were normatively pleasant. These results suggest that anticipated effort may be one source of "evidence," but only given a certain interpretation of the findings, and that genuinely felt emotions contribute to the emotion reports, assuming that participants intended to react to the pictures, as instructed, and not to the anticipated effort.

What Is Mental Effort: A Clinical Perspective

Although mental effort is a frequently used term, it is poorly defined and understood. Consequently, its usage is frequently loose and potentially misleading. In neuroscience research, the term is used to mean both the cognitive work that is done to meet task demands and the subjective experience of performing that work. We argue that conflating these two meanings hampers progress in understanding cognitive impairments in neuropsychiatric conditions because cognitive work and the subjective experience of it have distinct underlying mechanisms. We suggest that the most coherent and clinically useful perspective on mental effort is that it is a subjective experience. This makes a clear distinction between cognitive impairments that arise from changes in the cognitive apparatus, as in dementia and brain injury, and those that arise from subjective difficulties in carrying out the cognitive work, as in attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder, depression, and other motivational disorders. We review recent advances in neuroscience research that suggests that the experience of effort has emerged to control task switches so as to minimize costs relative to benefits. We consider how these advances can contribute to our understanding of the experience of increased effort perception in clinical populations. This more specific framing of mental effort will offer a deeper understanding of the mechanisms of cognitive impairments in differing clinical groups and will ultimately facilitate better therapeutic interventions.