More evidence for a dual-process model of conditional reasoning

Interpretation of ambiguous trials along with reasoning strategy is related to causal judgements in zero-contingency learning

The dual strategy model suggests that people can use either a Statistical or a Counterexample reasoning strategy, which reflects two qualitatively different ways of processing information. This model has been shown to capture individual differences in a wide array of tasks, such as contingency learning. Here, we examined whether this extends to individual differences in the interpretation of contingency information where effects are ambiguous. Previous studies, using perceptually complex stimuli, have shown that the way in which participants interpret ambiguous effects predicts causal judgements. In two studies, we attempted to replicate this effect using a small number of clearly identifiable cues. Results show that the interpretation of ambiguous effects as effect present is related to final contingency judgements. In addition, results showed that Statistical reasoners had a stronger tendency to interpret ambiguous effects as effect present than Counterexample reasoners, which mediates the difference in contingency judgements.

A study on the social contract conditional reasoning of male substance abusers during detoxification

Previous studies on social contract reasoning of male substance abusers only examined individuals who are using drugs, and most of them compared social contract and nonsocial contract reasoning, and paid less attention to the characteristics of social contract reasoning of substance abusers during withdrawal. In addition, there is little research on the difference between the standard social contract rules and the switched social contract rules. To further explore this issue, experiment 1 examined the differences between 110 male substance abusers' conditional reasoning for descriptive and social contract rules; Experiment 2 examined the differences between 110 other male substance abusers' conditional reasoning for standard and switched social contracts. Results: (1) for male substance abusers, the performance of social contract conditional reasoning is significantly better than descriptive conditional reasoning; (2) the performance of standard social contract rules is significantly better than that of switched social contract rules.

Reasoning strategy vs cognitive capacity as predictors of individual differences in reasoning performance

The dual strategy model posits that reasoners rely on two information processing strategies when making inferences: The statistical strategy generates a rapid probabilistic estimate based on associative access to a wide array of information, and the counterexample strategy uses a more focused representation allowing for a search for potential counterexamples. In this paper, we focused on individual differences in strategy use as a predictor of performance on four reasoning tasks: Belief bias, base rate neglect, conjunction fallacy, and denominator neglect. Predictions from the strategy use model were contrasted with predictions from Dual Process Theories, which suggest that individual differences in performance reflect variations in cognitive ability. In each of four studies, a large number (N ≈ 200) completed one of the above reasoning tasks, a strategy use diagnostic questionnaire, and measures of IQ, cognitive reflection, and numeracy. In three of four studies, individual differences in strategy use predicted differences in reasoning performance when the effects of the other variables were eliminated. Bayesian analysis indicated that none of the individual differences measures predicted a significant portion of variance on the conjunction fallacy task, and that strategy use was a strong predictor on the remaining three tasks. This research suggests that the type of strategy that is adopted paves a road to successful reasoning that is independent of cognitive capacity.

Conditional content, explicit information and generating cases: Sources for suppressing inferences

In the present study, we evaluate the suppression effect by asking participants to make inferences with everyday conditionals ("if A, then B"; "if Ana finds a friend, then she will go to the theatre"), choosing between three possible conclusions ("she went to the theatre"; "she did not go to the theatre"; "it cannot be concluded"). We test how these inferences can be influenced by three factors: a) when the content of the conditional induces us to think about disabling conditions that prevent us from accepting the consequent (A and ¬B) or alternative conditions that induce us to think about other antecedents that could also lead to the consequent (¬A and B), b) when explicit information is given about what really happened (e.g. Ana found a friend but they did not go to the theatre; or Ana did not find a friend but she went to the theatre) and c) when participants have to look for concrete disabling (e.g. Ana's friend had to work) and alternative cases (e.g. Ana's sister wanted to go to the theatre) before making the inferences. Previous studies have shown what were called "suppression effects": disabling conditions reduced valid inferences while considering alternatives led to a reduction in fallacies. These two "suppression effects" were shown in Experiment 1: a) in an Implicit condition that included just the content factor of the conditional and b) with a greater magnitude in a second Explicit condition that included the three factors (content, explicit information and search for counterexamples). Experiment 2 compared the same Explicit condition with another in which participants, instead of looking for counterexamples, completed a control task of looking for synonyms. In addition, half the participants looked for a few items (2 cases) and the other half for many items (5 cases). Results again showed the suppressing effect in all the conditions, but the magnitude was greater in the counterexample condition. No relevant differences were obtained according to the number of cases generated; the most relevant result was that the factors provided an additive effect on the suppression.

Reasoning strategies predict use of very fast logical reasoning

The dual strategy model proposes that people use one of two potential ways of processing information when making inferences. The statistical strategy generates a rapid probabilistic estimate based on associative access to a wide array of information, while the counterexample strategy uses a more focused representation, allowing for a search for potential counterexamples. In the following studies, we explore the hypothesis that individual differences in strategy use are related to the ability to make rapid intuitive logical judgments. In Study 1, we show that this is the case for rapid judgments requiring a distinction between simple logical form and for a novel form of judgment, the ability to identify inferences that are not linked to their premises (non sequiturs). In Study 2, we show that strategy use is related to the ability to make the kinds of rapid logical judgments previously examined over and above contributions of working memory capacity. Study 3 shows that strategy use explains individual variability in rapid logical responding with belief-biased inferences over and above the contribution of IQ. The results of Studies 2 and 3 indicate that under severe time constraint cognitive capacity is a very poor predictor of reasoning, while strategy use becomes a stronger predictor. These results extend the notion that people can make rapid intuitive "logical" judgments while highlighting the importance of strategy use as a key individual difference variable.

Reasoning strategies and semantic memory effects in deductive reasoning

Growing evidence supports the dual-strategy model, which suggests that reasoners have access to both a statistical and a counterexample reasoning strategy. In this paper, we explore further the processes underlying strategy use. We report three studies, the aim of which was to clarify the relation between this model and two forms of everyday reasoning. One of the most robust effects found with conditional reasoning with meaningful premises is the effect of alternative antecedents on the endorsement of AC and DA inferences. In a first study, we presented participants with conditional reasoning problems having more or fewer accessible alternatives as well as our dual-strategy diagnostic questionnaire. As hypothesized, results showed that strategy use had an independent effect on the inferences made with the AC and DA forms, over and above the effect of the number of antecedents, but was not related to responding to the MP and the MT forms. In a second study, we found that this relation extended to reasoning from an incompatibility statement. Finally, a third study showed that this relationship did not hold with probabilistic rather than logical response instructions, suggesting that the way reasoners transform a probabilistic evaluation into a dichotomous judgment is a key determinant of strategy use.

Who resists belief-biased inferences? The role of individual differences in reasoning strategies, working memory, and attentional focus

A common explanation for individual differences in the ability to draw rule-based inferences, when a putative conclusion suggests a competing belief-based inference, is that the ability to do so depends on working memory capacity. In the following studies, we examined the hypothesis that the ability to draw rule-based inferences in belief bias tasks can also be explained by individual differences in reasoning strategies and in the related attentional focus. The dual-strategy model differentiates counterexample and statistical strategies that involve different information-processing styles. In the first study (N = 139), participants completed a working memory task (operation span), a strategy diagnostic questionnaire, and a belief bias task. The results showed that individual differences in strategy use predicted performance in the belief bias problems over and above any effects of working memory capacity, with counterexample reasoners producing rule-based inferences more often than statistical reasoners. In the second study (N = 196), an eye-tracking methodology was used as a process-tracing technique to investigate attentional differences between the two strategies. On problems showing a conflict between rule-based and belief-based information, counterexample reasoners demonstrated longer fixation times on the premises than did statistical reasoners, thus providing direct evidence that individual differences in strategy use reflect different processing styles. These results clearly indicate that individual differences in strategy use are an important determinant of the way that people make inferences when rule-based and belief-based cues are both present.

Reasoning strategy modulates gender differences in performance on a spatial rotation task

The dual-strategy model of reasoning has proposed that individual differences in reasoning can be understood as due to two general ways of processing information: an analytic, counterexample strategy that examines information for explicit potential counterexamples and an intuitive, statistical strategy that uses associative access to generate a likelihood estimate of putative conclusions. Previous studies have examined this model in the context of basic conditional reasoning tasks. However, the distinctions that underlie the dual-strategy model can be seen as a basic description of more general differences in information processing. A recent study examining interactions between gender and strategy use in processing of negative emotions found that gender differences were modulated by strategy, with the general advantage of females concentrated within statistical reasoners. Two studies were performed to extend this analysis to performance on a mental rotation task for which there also exist clear gender differences. The initial study presented rotation tasks with unlimited time. Results show that males perform better on more difficult rotation tasks than females, with the difference concentrated among statistical reasoners. The second study replicated this using a restricted time (4 s) to make each judgement and showed an increase in the effect of both gender and strategy. This provides additional evidence that the dual-strategy model captures an important individual difference in the general way that information is processed.

Reasoning strategies modulate gender differences in emotion processing

The dual strategy model of reasoning has proposed that people's reasoning can be understood asa combination of two different ways of processing information related to problem premises: a counterexample strategy that examines information for explicit potential counterexamples and a statistical strategy that uses associative access to generate a likelihood estimate of putative conclusions. Previous studies have examined this model in the context of basic conditional reasoning tasks. However, the information processing distinction that underlies the dual strategy model can be seen asa basic description of differences in reasoning (similar to that described by many general dual process models of reasoning). In two studies, we examine how these differences in reasoning strategy may relate to processing very different information, specifically we focus on previously observed gender differences in processing negative emotions. Study 1 examined the intensity of emotional reactions to a film clip inducing primarily negative emotions. Study 2 examined the speed at which participants determine the emotional valence of sequences of negative images. In both studies, no gender differences were observed among participants using a counterexample strategy. Among participants using a statistical strategy, females produce significantly stronger emotional reactions than males (in Study 1) and were faster to recognize the valence of negative images than were males (in Study 2). Results show that the processing distinction underlying the dual strategy model of reasoning generalizes to the processing of emotions.

Interactions between inferential strategies and belief bias

The dual strategy model of reasoning proposed by Verschueren, Schaeken, and d'Ydewalle (Thinking & Reasoning, 11(3), 239-278, 2005a; Memory & Cognition, 33(1), 107-119, 2005b) suggests that people can use either a statistical or a counterexample-based strategy to make deductive inferences. Subsequent studies have supported this distinction and investigated some properties of the two strategies. In the following, we examine the further hypothesis that reasoners using statistical strategies should be more vulnerable to the effects of conclusion belief. In each of three studies, participants were given abstract problems used to determine strategy use and three different forms of syllogism with believable and unbelievable conclusions. Responses, response times, and feeling of rightness (FOR) measures were taken. The results show that participants using a statistical strategy were more prone to the effects of conclusion belief across all three forms of reasoning. In addition, statistical reasoners took less time to make inferences than did counterexample reasoners. Patterns of variation in response times and FOR ratings between believable and unbelievable conclusions were very similar for both strategies, indicating that both statistical and counterexample reasoners were aware of conflict between conclusion belief and premise-based reasoning.

Aesthetic Rationality in Organizations: Toward Developing a Sensitivity for Sustainability

This article explains the coexistence and interaction of aesthetic experience and moral value systems of decision makers in organizations. For this purpose, we develop the concept of “aesthetic rationality,” which is described as a type of value-oriented rationality that serves to encourage sustainable behavior in organizations, and to complete the commonly held, “instrumentally rational” view of organizations. We show that organizations regularly exhibit not only an instrumental rationality but also an “aesthetic rationality,” which is manifested in their products and processes. We describe aesthetics, its underlying moral values, its evolutionary roots, and its links to virtue ethics as a basis for defining the concept of aesthetic rationality. We examine its links with human resources, organizational design, and other organizational elements. We examine these implications, identify how an aesthetic-driven ethic provides a potential for sustainable behavior in organizations, and suggest new directions for organizational research.

Additional evidence for a dual-strategy model of reasoning: Probabilistic reasoning is more invariant than reasoning about logical validity

One of the major debates concerning the nature of inferential reasoning is between counterexample-based strategies such as mental model theory and the statistical strategies underlying probabilistic models. The dual-strategy model proposed by Verschueren, Schaeken, and d'Ydewalle (2005a, 2005b) suggests that people might have access to both kinds of strategies. One of the postulates of this approach is that statistical strategies correspond to low-cost, intuitive modes of evaluation, whereas counterexample strategies are higher-cost and more variable in use. We examined this hypothesis by using a deductive-updating paradigm. The results of Study 1 showed that individual differences in strategy use predict different levels of deductive updating on inferences about logical validity. Study 2 demonstrated no such variation when explicitly probabilistic inferences were examined. Study 3 showed that presenting updating problems with probabilistic inferences modified performance on subsequent problems using logical validity, whereas the opposite was not true. These results provide clear evidence that the processes used to make probabilistic inferences are less subject to variation than those used to make inferences of logical validity.