Whatever the cost? Information integration in memory-based inferences depends on cognitive effort

Predicting an Outcome Less Probable yet More Desirable than the Other

Extant research suggests that the desirability of an outcome influences the way an individual makes a prediction. The current research investigated how an outcome’s desirability influences the extent to which an individual evaluates its probability when making a prediction. Two studies were conducted using a single binary prediction based on the urn model. Individuals predicted which color—red or blue—a ball drawn from a bag would be, while being aware of the proportion of each color in the bag. The results of the first study indicated that individuals predicted the more probable outcome regardless of the probabilities of two outcomes. However, when the less probable outcome was more desirable, the proportion of predictions became significantly correlated and better calibrated to the actual probability. This result was interpreted as showing that, when motivated to predict the more desirable but less probable outcome, individuals evaluate its probability more effortfully. This interpretation was tested in the second study. When the probabiity- matching motivation was implemented, the proportion of individuals who predicted the less probable outcome increased significantly. However, when the less probable outcome was more desirable, the same motivation did not significantly increase the proportion of such individuals. Taken together, these results imply that individuals likely process the same probability informatio differently based on whether this information is useful for predicting a desirable outcome.

Familiarity-Matching: An Ecologically Rational Heuristic for the Relationships-Comparison Task

Previous studies have shown that people often use heuristics in making inferences and that subjective memory experiences, such as recognition or familiarity of objects, can be valid cues for inferences. So far, many researchers have used the binary choice task in which two objects are presented as alternatives (e.g., "Which city has the larger population, city A or city B?"). However, objects can be presented not only as alternatives but also in a question (e.g., "Which country is city X in, country A or country B?"). In such a situation, people can make inferences based on the relationship between the object in the question and each object given as an alternative. In the present study, we call this type of task a "relationships-comparison task." We modeled the three inference strategies that people could apply to solve it (familiarity-matching [FM; a new heuristic we propose in this study], familiarity heuristic [FH], and knowledge-based inference [KI]) to examine people's inference processes. Through Studies 1, 2, and 3, we found that (a) people tended to rely on heuristics, and that FM (inferences based on similarity in familiarity between objects) well explained participants' inference patterns; (b) FM could work as an ecologically rational strategy for the relationships-comparison task since it could effectively reflect environmental structures, and that the use of FM could be highly replicable and robust; and (c) people could sometimes use a decision strategy like FM, even in their daily lives (consumer behaviors). The nature of the relationships-comparison task and human cognitive processes is discussed.

Predicting an Outcome Less Probable yet More Desirable than the Other

Extant research suggests that the desirability of an outcome influences the way an individual makes a prediction. The current research investigated how an outcome's desirability influences the extent to which an individual evaluates its probability when making a prediction. Two studies were conducted using a single binary prediction based on the urn model. Individuals predicted which color-red or blue-a ball drawn from a bag would be, while being aware of the proportion of each color in the bag. The results of the first study indicated that individuals predicted the more probable outcome regardless of the probabilities of two outcomes. However, when the less probable outcome was more desirable, the proportion of predictions became significantly correlated and better calibrated to the actual probability. This result was interpreted as showing that, when motivated to predict the more desirable but less probable outcome, individuals evaluate its probability more effortfully. This interpretation was tested in the second study. When the probabiity- matching motivation was implemented, the proportion of individuals who predicted the less probable outcome increased significantly. However, when the less probable outcome was more desirable, the same motivation did not significantly increase the proportion of such individuals. Taken together, these results imply that individuals likely process the same probability informatio differently based on whether this information is useful for predicting a desirable outcome.

Within-person adaptivity in frugal judgments from memory

Humans can exploit recognition memory as a simple cue for judgment. The utility of recognition depends on the interplay with the environment, particularly on its predictive power (validity) in a domain. It is, therefore, an important question whether people are sensitive to differences in recognition validity between domains. Strategic, intra-individual changes in the reliance on recognition have not been investigated so far. The present study fills this gap by scrutinizing within-person changes in using a frugal strategy, the recognition heuristic (RH), across two task domains that differed in recognition validity. The results showed adaptive changes in the reliance on recognition between domains. However, these changes were neither associated with the individual recognition validities nor with corresponding changes in these validities. These findings support a domain-adaptivity explanation, suggesting that people have broader intuitions about the usefulness of recognition across different domains that are nonetheless sufficiently robust for adaptive decision making. The analysis of metacognitive confidence reports mirrored and extended these results. Like RH use, confidence ratings covaried with task domain, but not with individual recognition validities. The changes in confidence suggest that people may have metacognitive access to information about global differences between task domains, but not to individual cue validities.

Further evidence for the memory state heuristic: Recognition latency predictions for binary inferences

According to the recognition heuristic (RH), for decision domains where recognition is a valid predictor of a choice criterion, recognition alone is used to make inferences whenever one object is recognized and the other is not, irrespective of further knowledge. Erdfelder, Küpper-Tetzel, and Mattern (2011) questioned whether the recognition judgment itself affects decisions or rather the memory strength underlying it. Specifically, they proposed to extend the RH to the memory state heuristic (MSH), which assumes a third memory state of uncertainty in addition to recognition certainty and rejection certainty. While the MSH already gathered significant support, one of its basic and more counterintuitive predictions has not been tested so far: In guessing pairs (none of the objects recognized), the object more slowly judged as unrecognized should be preferred, since it is more likely to be in a higher memory state. In this paper, we test this prediction along with other recognition latency predictions of the MSH, thereby adding to the body of research supporting the MSH.

Measuring the Zero-Risk Bias

Abstract. Uncertainty is a dynamic state that is perceived as discomforting and individuals are highly motivated to reduce these feelings. With regard to risky decision making, people tend to overweigh the value of certainty and opt for zero-risk solutions, even if this results in a less favorable outcome. This phenomenon is referred to as the zero-risk bias and it has been demonstrated in varying contexts and with different methods. However, there is a high variance in the emergence of the bias reported by the existing literature, leaving it unclear to what extent the bias was evoked by the method or whether other psychological factors influenced people’s decision making. Four studies were conducted in order to investigate methodological and situational factors on the bias, comparing its emergence within different task formats (questionnaires vs. behavioral tasks), decision types (forced choice vs. free resource allocation), and different decision domains. Results indicate that the zero-risk bias is persistent over different methods but highly sensitive to contextual factors: abstractness of the task, decision domain, and appropriateness of the zero-risk option. First, its emergence varied between the task formats, in that it was shown more often in abstract than in concrete tasks. Second, participants’ choice of zero-risk did not correlate between different tasks, indicating effects of decision domain. Third, a zero-risk strategy seemed to be appropriate for dividing risks on objects (lottery urns in a gambling task) but not on persons (in a health scenario). In the latter situation, aspects like fairness influenced choice. Future research is needed to explore the relation between these factors and identify their underlying mechanisms.

Individual differences in use of the recognition heuristic are stable across time, choice objects, domains, and presentation formats

The recognition heuristic (RH) is a simple decision strategy that performs surprisingly well in many domains. According to the RH, people decide on the basis of recognition alone and ignore further knowledge when faced with a recognized and an unrecognized choice object. Previous research has revealed noteworthy individual differences in RH use, suggesting that people have preferences for using versus avoiding this strategy that might be causally linked to cognitive or personality traits. However, trying to explain differences in RH use in terms of traits presupposes temporal and cross-situational stability in use of the RH, an important prerequisite that has not been scrutinized so far. In a series of four experiments, we therefore assessed the stability in RH use across (1) time, (2) choice objects, (3) domains, and (4) presentation formats of the choice objects. In Experiment 1, participants worked on the same inference task and choice objects twice, separated by a delay of either one day or one week. Experiment 2 replicated Experiment 1 using two different object sets from the same domain, whereas Experiment 3 assessed the stability of RH use across two different domains. Finally, in Experiment 4 we investigated stability across verbal and pictorial presentation formats of the choice objects. For all measures of RH use proposed so far, we found strong evidence for both temporal and cross-situational stability in use of the RH. Thus, RH use at least partly reflects a person-specific style of decision making whose determinants await further research.

Use of the recognition heuristic depends on the domain's recognition validity, not on the recognition validity of selected sets of objects

According to the recognition-heuristic theory, decision makers solve paired comparisons in which one object is recognized and the other not by recognition alone, inferring that recognized objects have higher criterion values than unrecognized ones. However, success-and thus usefulness-of this heuristic depends on the validity of recognition as a cue, and adaptive decision making, in turn, requires that decision makers are sensitive to it. To this end, decision makers could base their evaluation of the recognition validity either on the selected set of objects (the set's recognition validity), or on the underlying domain from which the objects were drawn (the domain's recognition validity). In two experiments, we manipulated the recognition validity both in the selected set of objects and between domains from which the sets were drawn. The results clearly show that use of the recognition heuristic depends on the domain's recognition validity, not on the set's recognition validity. In other words, participants treat all sets as roughly representative of the underlying domain and adjust their decision strategy adaptively (only) with respect to the more general environment rather than the specific items they are faced with.