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Ford D, Nieznański M. The effect of value on context and target recollection in memory for truth and falsity. Mem Cognit 2024; 52:1451-1462. [PMID: 38570437 PMCID: PMC11362491 DOI: 10.3758/s13421-024-01554-3] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Accepted: 03/12/2024] [Indexed: 04/05/2024]
Abstract
Memory for truth and falsity has recently been investigated from the perspective of the dual-recollection theory, showing better context and target recollection for truth than falsity. In this paper, we examine whether these memory effects obtained for true statements are similar to the value effect, whereby true statements are given higher priority in encoding. For this purpose, we implemented value-directed remembering (VDR) into the conjoint-recognition paradigm. In our first experiment, the primary goal was to verify how VDR influences the processes defined by dual-recollection theory. At study, prioritized/important items were linked to higher numerical values (e.g., 10), while unimportant ones had lower values (e.g., 1). At test, the participants' task was to recognize whether a particular sentence was important, unimportant, or new. We found that both context and target recollection were better for important items. In the second experiment, the main goal was to study the combined effects of importance and veracity on memory. In the between-subjects design, participants were monetarily rewarded for memorizing true or false sentences. The results demonstrated differences in the ability to prioritize truth over falsity. Specifically, we found a substantial increase in context recollection for prioritized true information but not for prioritized false information. Moreover, we found higher context recollection for true than false sentences in the true-prioritized condition, but not in the false-prioritized condition. These results indicated that people are able to prioritize true information better than false, and suggested that memory for truth may be a special case of the value effect.
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Affiliation(s)
- Daria Ford
- Institute of Psychology, Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński University in Warsaw, Warsaw, Poland.
- Department of Psychology, School of Social Sciences, University of Mannheim, Mannheim, Germany.
| | - Marek Nieznański
- Institute of Psychology, Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński University in Warsaw, Warsaw, Poland
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Berres S, Erdfelder E, Kuhlmann BG. Does sleep benefit source memory? Investigating 12-h retention intervals with a multinomial modeling approach. Mem Cognit 2024:10.3758/s13421-024-01579-8. [PMID: 38831160 DOI: 10.3758/s13421-024-01579-8] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Accepted: 04/22/2024] [Indexed: 06/05/2024]
Abstract
For retention intervals of up to 12 h, the active systems consolidation hypothesis predicts that sleep compared to wakefulness strengthens the context binding of memories previously established during encoding. Sleep should thus improve source memory. By comparing retention intervals filled with natural night sleep versus daytime wakefulness, we tested this prediction in two online source-monitoring experiments using intentionally learned pictures as items and incidentally learned screen positions and frame colors as source dimensions. In Experiment 1, we examined source memory by varying the spatial position of pictures on the computer screen. Multinomial modeling analyses revealed a significant sleep benefit in source memory. In Experiment 2, we manipulated both the spatial position and the frame color of pictures orthogonally to investigate source memory for two different source dimensions at the same time, also allowing exploration of bound memory for both source dimensions. The sleep benefit on spatial source memory replicated. In contrast, no source memory sleep benefit was observed for either frame color or bound memory of both source dimensions, probably as a consequence of a floor effect in incidental encoding of color associations. In sum, the results of both experiments show that sleep within a 12-h retention interval improves source memory for spatial positions, supporting the prediction of the active systems consolidation hypothesis. However, additional research is required to clarify the impact of sleep on source memory for other context features and bound memories of multiple source dimensions.
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Affiliation(s)
- Sabrina Berres
- Department of Psychology, School of Social Sciences, University of Mannheim, L13, 15-17, Room 425, 68161, Mannheim, Germany.
| | - Edgar Erdfelder
- Department of Psychology, School of Social Sciences, University of Mannheim, L13, 15-17, Room 425, 68161, Mannheim, Germany.
| | - Beatrice G Kuhlmann
- Department of Psychology, School of Social Sciences, University of Mannheim, L13, 15-17, Room 425, 68161, Mannheim, Germany.
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Nadarevic L, Bell R. Remembering the truth or falsity of advertising claims: A preregistered model-based test of three competing theoretical accounts. Psychon Bull Rev 2024:10.3758/s13423-024-02482-8. [PMID: 38528303 DOI: 10.3758/s13423-024-02482-8] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Accepted: 02/11/2024] [Indexed: 03/27/2024]
Abstract
Given the large amount of information that people process daily, it is important to understand memory for the truth and falsity of information. The most prominent theoretical models in this regard are the Cartesian model and the Spinozan model. The former assumes that both "true" and "false" tags may be added to the memory representation of encoded information; the latter assumes that only falsity is tagged. In the present work, we contrasted these two models with an expectation-violation model hypothesizing that truth or falsity tags are assigned when expectations about truth or falsity must be revised in light of new information. An interesting implication of the expectation-violation model is that a context with predominantly false information leads to the tagging of truth whereas a context with predominantly true information leads to the tagging of falsity. To test the three theoretical models against each other, veracity expectations were manipulated between participants by varying the base rates of allegedly true and false advertising claims. Memory for the veracity of these claims was assessed using a model-based analysis. To increase methodological rigor and transparency in the specification of the measurement model, we preregistered, a priori, the details of the model-based analysis test. Despite a large sample size (N = 208), memory for truth and falsity did not differ, regardless of the base rates of true and false claims. The results thus support the Cartesian model and provide evidence against the Spinozan model and the expectation-violation model.
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Affiliation(s)
- Lena Nadarevic
- Department of Psychology, School of Social Sciences, University of Mannheim, D-68131, Mannheim, Germany.
- University of Applied Sciences Fresenius Heidelberg, Heidelberg, Germany.
| | - Raoul Bell
- Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf, Germany
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Abel M, Bäuml KHT. Item-method directed forgetting and perceived truth of news headlines. Memory 2023; 31:1371-1386. [PMID: 37819019 DOI: 10.1080/09658211.2023.2267191] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/05/2023] [Accepted: 09/06/2023] [Indexed: 10/13/2023]
Abstract
Research on item-method directed forgetting (IMDF) suggests that memories can be voluntarily forgotten. IMDF is however usually examined with relatively simple study materials, such as single words or pictures. In the present study, we examined voluntary forgetting of news headlines from (presumably) untrustworthy sources. Experiment 1 found intact IMDF when to-be-forgotten headlines were characterised as untrustworthy and to-be-remembered headlines were characterised as trustworthy. Experiment 2 separated remember/forget cues and trustworthiness prompts. Forget cues alone had a large effect on memory, but only a small reducing effect on perceived truth. In contrast, trustworthiness prompts alone had essentially no effect on memory, but a large effect on perceived truth. Finally, Experiment 3 fully crossed forget/remember cues and trustworthiness prompts, revealing that forget cues can reduce memory irrespective of whether headlines are characterised as trustworthy or untrustworthy. Moreover, forget cues may bias source attributions, which can explain their small reducing effect on perceived truth. Overall, this work suggests that news headlines can be voluntarily forgotten. At least when people are motivated to forget information from untrustworthy sources, such forgetting may be helpful for curtailing the spread of false information.
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Affiliation(s)
- Magdalena Abel
- Department of Experimental Psychology, Regensburg University, Regensburg, Germany
| | - Karl-Heinz T Bäuml
- Department of Experimental Psychology, Regensburg University, Regensburg, Germany
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Bell R, Mieth L, Buchner A. Coping with high advertising exposure: a source-monitoring perspective. Cogn Res Princ Implic 2022; 7:82. [PMID: 36064819 PMCID: PMC9444107 DOI: 10.1186/s41235-022-00433-2] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 11/27/2021] [Accepted: 08/22/2022] [Indexed: 11/15/2022] Open
Abstract
Consumers are exposed to large amounts of advertising every day. One way to avoid being manipulated is to monitor the sources of persuasive messages. In the present study it was tested whether high exposure to advertising affects the memory and guessing processes underlying source attributions. Participants were exposed to high or low proportions of advertising messages that were intermixed with product statements from a trustworthy source. In a subsequent memory test, participants had to remember the sources of these statements. In Experiments 1 and 2, high advertising exposure led to increased source memory and decreased recognition of the statements in comparison to low advertising exposure. High advertising exposure also induced an increased tendency toward guessing that statements whose sources were not remembered came from advertising. The results of Experiment 3 suggest that the presence of advertising, relative to its absence, leads to a skeptical guessing bias. Being exposed to advertising thus has pronounced effects on the memory and guessing processes underlying source attributions. These changes in source monitoring can be interpreted as coping mechanisms that serve to protect against the persuasive influence of advertising messages.
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Vorms M, Harris AJL, Topf S, Hahn U. Plausibility matters: A challenge to Gilbert's "Spinozan" account of belief formation. Cognition 2022; 220:104990. [PMID: 35026693 DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2021.104990] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 11/21/2019] [Revised: 11/17/2021] [Accepted: 12/07/2021] [Indexed: 11/03/2022]
Abstract
Most of the claims we encounter in real life can be assigned some degree of plausibility, even if they are new to us. On Gilbert's (1991) influential account of belief formation, whereby understanding a sentence implies representing it as true, all new propositions are initially accepted, before any assessment of their veracity. As a result, plausibility cannot have any role in initial belief formation on this account. In order to isolate belief formation experimentally, Gilbert, Krull, and Malone (1990) employed a dual-task design: if a secondary task disrupts participants' evaluation of novel claims presented to them, then the initial encoding should be all there is, and if that initial encoding consistently renders claims 'true' (even where participants were told in the learning phase that the claims they had seen were false), then Gilbert's account is confirmed. In this pre-registered study, we replicate one of Gilbert et al.'s (1990) seminal studies ("The Hopi Language Experiment") while additionally introducing a plausibility variable. Our results show that Gilbert's 'truth bias' does not hold for implausible statements - instead, initial encoding seemingly renders implausible statements 'false'. As alternative explanations of this finding that would be compatible with Gilbert's account can be ruled out, it questions Gilbert's account.
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Affiliation(s)
- Marion Vorms
- University Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne, IHPST 13 rue du Four, 75006 Paris, France.
| | | | - Sabine Topf
- University College London, London, United Kingdom.
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Niedziałkowska D, Nieznański M. Recollection of "true" feedback is better than "false" feedback independently of a priori beliefs: an investigation from the perspective of dual-recollection theory. Memory 2021; 29:1186-1196. [PMID: 34468262 DOI: 10.1080/09658211.2021.1973037] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 10/20/2022]
Abstract
The processes underlying memory for truth and falsity have been explored and discussed in experimental psychology for over thirty years now. Psychologists have often referred to the Spinozan and Cartesian models about truth-value information "tagging" but, so far, experimental results have been inconsistent. This paper investigates memory for truth and falsity from the new perspective of the dual-recollection theory. We conducted two experiments using the conjoint recognition paradigm and multinomial modelling as a measurement model. Both our experiments confirmed a satisfactory goodness of fit of the data to the dual-recollection multinomial model. In Experiment 1, the context recollection parameter representing memory for feedback information was significantly higher for true than for false statements. This finding was replicated in the second experiment, which controlled the potential impact of participants' previous knowledge on memory performance. Experiment 2 indicated that the target recollection parameter representing memory for the sentence itself was significantly higher for true than for false sentences solely when participants believed this sentence to be true but not when they perceived it as false before the memory experiment. Our research was the first attempt to look at memory for truth and falsity from the perspective of the recently developed dual-recollection theory.
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Affiliation(s)
- Daria Niedziałkowska
- Institute of Psychology, Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński University in Warsaw, Warsaw, Poland
| | - Marek Nieznański
- Institute of Psychology, Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński University in Warsaw, Warsaw, Poland
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Abstract
Advertising is seen as an untrustworthy source because of the perceived self-interest of the advertisers in presenting product information in a biased or misleading way. Regulations require advertising messages in print and online media to be labeled as advertisements to allow recipients to take source information into account when judging the credibility of the messages. To date, little is known about how these source tags are remembered. Research within the source-monitoring framework suggests that source attributions are not only based on veridical source memory but are often reconstructed through schematic guessing. In two experiments, we examined how the credibility of advertising messages affects these source attribution processes. The source of the messages affected judgments of credibility at the time of encoding, but the source tags were forgotten after a short period of time. Retrospective source attributions in the absence of memory for the source tags were strongly influenced by the a priori credibility of the messages: Statements with a low a priori credibility were more likely to be (mis)attributed to advertising than statements with high a priori credibility. These findings suggest that the mere labeling of untrustworthy sources is of limited use because source information is quickly forgotten and memory-based source attributions are strongly biased by schematic influences.
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Abstract
AbstractThe present paper, which is the first of two twin opinion papers, offers a theoretical approach of literacy and critical literacy in relation to language, thought, and reasoning. Literacy acquisition and practice proceed through two stages, which partially overlap in terms of processing abilities: the first is achieved when the learner becomes a skilled reader and writer, characterized by automatic word processing; the second, when reading comprehension and written production become expert instruments in the communication of progressively more abstract and sophisticated, but always linguistically-mediated, knowledge and ideas. The destiny of literacy, depending on educational and social factors, is thus to be to fused with language, thought and reasoning. Oral language becomes literate language; and our cognitive activity becomes—as indicated in the title—“seeing thought”, which paves the way, we will argue, for reasoning skills. Making of literacy an epistemic and social tool of our own collective history requires a critical stance that raises itself and ourselves to a stage called critical literacy. In this paper we focus on some of the favorable and unfavorable factors influencing this achievement. The main challenge is to bring literate cognition up to the capacity of choosing between accept and verify, between belief and disbelief, by weighting evidence and reasoning, by arguing and debunking errors and falsities. Accordingly, our objective is essentially to narrate how literacy gives birth to critical literacy and explain why, at the end of this process, critical literacy becomes hard to distinguish from thinking and reasoning.
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