Hungry pigeons make suboptimal choices, less hungry pigeons do not

Comparative Cognition Research Demonstrates the Similarity between Humans and Other Animals

The field of comparative cognition represents the interface between the cognitive behavior of humans and other animals. In some cases, research demonstrates that other animals are capable of showing similar cognitive processes. In other cases, when animals show behavior thought to be culturally determined in humans, it suggests that simpler processes may be involved. This review examines research primarily with pigeons (out of convenience because of their visual ability). I start with the concept of sameness and follow with the concept of stimulus equivalence, the building blocks of human language. This is followed by research on directed forgetting, the cognitive ability to maintain or forget information. A hallmark of cognition is transitive inference performance (if A < B, and B < C, the understanding that A < C), but the variety of species that show this ability suggests that there may be simpler accounts of this behavior. Similarly, experiments that demonstrate a form of cognitive dissonance in animals suggest that dissonance may not be necessary to explain this biased behavior. Furthermore, examples of sunk cost in pigeons suggests that the human need to continue working on a failing project may also have a biological basis. Finally, pigeons show a preference for a suboptimal choice that is similar to unskilled human gambling, a finding that may clarify why humans are so prone to engage in this typically losing activity.

Good news is better than bad news, but bad news is not worse than no news

Under certain conditions, pigeons will reliably prefer an alternative that leads to a lower probability of food over an alternative that leads to a higher probability of food (i.e., demonstrate suboptimal choice). A critical aspect of the typical procedure is that the alternative associated with less food provides differential stimuli that signal trial outcomes, but the alternative associated with more food does not. Few studies have investigated how partial signaling of an alternative influences preference. In Experiments 1-3, pigeons chose between two alternatives that each led to food 60% of the time with partially signaled trial outcomes. One alternative occasionally provided a stimulus that always preceded food (i.e., "good news") and the other alternative occasionally provided a stimulus that always preceded no food ("bad news"). Experiments 2 and 3 also assessed preference in conditions in which alternatives were either completely unsignaled (provided no differential stimuli) or always led to food. Pigeons consistently preferred the "good news" alternative over the "bad news" alternative and preferred 100% food over the "bad news" alternative. The results from conditions in which pigeons chose between the "bad news" alternative and an unsignaled alternative were inconclusive, but suggestive of a preference for bad news. The results are used to evaluate and distinguish between competing explanations of suboptimal choice.

State impulsivity amplifies urges without diminishing self-control

A disproportionate amount of research on impulsivity has focused on trait-related aspects rather than state fluctuations. As a result, the relationship between state impulsivity and moment-to-moment behaviour is unclear. Impulsivity is assumed to negatively affect self-control, but an alternative explanation, yet to be tested, could be that changes in state impulsivity and its homeostatic drivers influence the intensity of urges. We tested whether state impulsivity and hunger affected behaviour through a dual-process model, affecting both the experience of various urges, and self-control, using a smartphone-based experience sampling approach. We found that state impulsivity is associated with stronger urges, but we found no evidence of an association with diminished self-control. Being hungry amplifies urges across different types of urges, and both hunger and late hours are negatively related to the likelihood of controlling urges. These findings imply that the influence of hunger is not limited to the food domain, and provide new insight into the role of state impulsivity in daily life.

Irrational behavior in dogs (Canis lupus familiaris): A violation of independence from irrelevant alternatives

We tested dogs for a violation of independence from irrelevant alternatives, which would indicate irrational behavior. In Experiment 1, we offered 10 dogs' choices among alternative passages. The target passage led to more food than the competitor passage but required dogs to enter a narrower passage. The decoy passage asymmetrically dominated the competitor passage because although it contained a larger amount of food, it was narrower than the target passage. We found that dogs increased their preference for the target passage in the presence of the decoy passage, which violated the assumption of independence from irrelevant alternatives. Our second experiment controlled for energetic hunger state because previous findings had suggested that the violation effect might arise from changes in energetic state (Schuck-Paim et al., 2004). We provided supplementary feedings to each dog between each trial such that each dog consumed the same amount of food on each trial. The violation of independence from irrelevant alternatives effect persisted, though to a lesser degree than in Experiment 1. Cognitive implications are discussed.

The role of contingency discriminability in suboptimal choice

Suboptimal choice consists of a preference for an alternative with a lower probability of reinforcement (suboptimal alternative) over another with a higher probability of reinforcement (optimal alternative) when the former has discriminative stimuli that signal in which trials a reinforcer will be delivered and in which trials it will not. Discriminating the contingencies of reinforcement associated with the stimuli of the suboptimal alternative is necessary to produce suboptimal choice, but the impact of different degrees of discriminability has not been systematically studied. The discriminability of the contingencies of reinforcement depends on the difference in the probability of reinforcement of the two stimuli; higher differences yield higher discriminability. Pigeons were exposed to a procedure that presented a choice between two alternatives, each associated with two stimuli. The contingency discriminability of the suboptimal alternative was manipulated across conditions, while the contingency discriminability of the optimal alternative was absent in all conditions. The overall probability of reinforcement of each alternative remained the same throughout the experiment (p = .2 and p = .5 for the suboptimal and optimal alternatives, respectively). The preference for the suboptimal alternative increased as its discriminability increased. There was a positive correlation between discrimination index and preference for the suboptimal alternative. These results highlight the importance of contingency discriminability to generate suboptimal choice.

The Hunger Games: Homeostatic State-Dependent Fluctuations in Disinhibition Measured with a Novel Gamified Test Battery

Food homeostatic states (hunger and satiety) influence the cognitive systems regulating impulsive responses, but the direction and specific mechanisms involved in this effect remain elusive. We examined how fasting, and satiety, affect cognitive mechanisms underpinning disinhibition using a novel framework and a gamified test-battery. Thirty-four participants completed the test-battery measuring three cognitive facets of disinhibition: attentional control, information gathering and monitoring of feedback, across two experimental sessions: one after overnight fasting and another after a standardised meal. Homeostatic state was assessed using subjective self-reports and biological markers (i.e., blood-derived liver-expressed antimicrobial protein 2 (LEAP-2), insulin and leptin). We found that participants who experienced greater subjective hunger during the satiety session were more impulsive in the information gathering task; results were not confounded by changes in mood or anxiety. Homeostatic state did not significantly influence disinhibition mechanisms linked to attentional control or feedback monitoring. However, we found a significant interaction between homeostatic state and LEAP-2 on attentional control, with higher LEAP-2 associated with faster reaction times in the fasted condition only. Our findings indicate lingering hunger after eating increases impulsive behaviour via reduced information gathering. These findings identify a novel mechanism that may underpin the tendency to overeat and/or engage in broader impulsive behaviours.

Risk-Based Decision Making: A Systematic Scoping Review of Animal Models and a Pilot Study on the Effects of Sleep Deprivation in Rats

Animals, including humans, frequently make decisions involving risk or uncertainty. Different strategies in these decisions can be advantageous depending the circumstances. Short sleep duration seems to be associated with more risky decisions in humans. Animal models for risk-based decision making can increase mechanistic understanding, but very little data is available concerning the effects of sleep. We combined primary- and meta-research to explore the relationship between sleep and risk-based decision making in animals. Our first objective was to create an overview of the available animal models for risky decision making. We performed a systematic scoping review. Our searches in Pubmed and Psychinfo retrieved 712 references, of which 235 were included. Animal models for risk-based decision making have been described for rodents, non-human primates, birds, pigs and honey-bees. We discuss task designs and model validity. Our second objective was to apply this knowledge and perform a pilot study on the effect of sleep deprivation. We trained and tested male Wistar rats on a probability discounting task; a “safe” lever always resulted in 1 reward, a “risky” lever resulted in 4 or no rewards. Rats adapted their preferences to variations in reward probabilities (p < 0.001), but 12 h of sleep deprivation during the light phase did not clearly alter risk preference (p = 0.21).

Human Choice Predicted by Obtained Reinforcers, Not by Reinforcement Predictors

Macphail (1985) proposed that “intelligence” should not vary across vertebrate species when contextual variables are accounted for. Focusing on research involving choice behavior, the propensity for choosing an option that produces stimuli that predict the presence or absence of reinforcement but that also results in less food over time can be examined. This choice preference has been found multiple times in pigeons (Stagner and Zentall, 2010; Zentall and Stagner, 2011; Laude et al., 2014) and has been likened to gambling behavior demonstrated by humans (Zentall, 2014, 2016). The present experiments used a similarly structured task to examine adult human preferences for reinforcement predictors and compared findings to choice behavior demonstrated by children (Lalli et al., 2000), monkeys (Smith et al., 2017; Smith and Beran, 2020), dogs (Jackson et al., 2020), rats (Chow et al., 2017; Cunningham and Shahan, 2019; Jackson et al., 2020), and pigeons (Roper and Zentall, 1999; Stagner and Zentall, 2010). In Experiment 1, adult human participants showed no preference for reinforcement predictors. Results from Experiment 2 suggest that not only were reinforcement predictors not preferred, but that perhaps reinforcement predictors had no effect at all on choice behavior. Results from Experiments 1 and 2 were further assessed using a generalized matching equation, the findings from which support that adult human choice behavior in the present research was largely determined by reinforcement history. Overall, the present results obtained from human adult participants are different than those found from pigeons in particular, suggesting that further examination of Macphail (1985) hypothesis is warranted.

Information preferences across species: Pigeons, rats, and dogs

We tested the information preferences of three different species; pigeons, rats and dogs. Eight animals of each species received forced trials that produced one of two stimulus sequences. In the first sequence, response to an initial stimulus led to one of two other stimuli, one of which guaranteed a food reward was coming and the other of which guaranteed no food reward was coming. In the second sequence, response to an initial stimulus led to one of two other stimuli, both of which predicted food reward on 50 % of the trials. The net reinforcement rate for both of the sequences was 50 %. On probe test trials, both initial stimuli were presented, and the subject chose between the informative and the non-informative cue, and the percent choice of the information sequence, in which stimuli predicted food or no food reliably, was recorded for each species across 10 sessions. Statistical tests showed that although pigeons showed a preference for the information sequence, neither rats nor dogs showed this preference. Experimental and ecological explanations are discussed.

The influence of outcome delay on suboptimal choice

Under certain conditions pigeons will choose an option that provides less probable food over one that provides more probable food. This suboptimal choice behavior occurs when the outcomes are delayed and stimuli during the delay differentially signal the upcoming outcomes on the suboptimal alternative, but not the optimal alternative. The present study assessed whether duration of the outcome delay affects pigeons' suboptimal preference. Pigeons chose between a suboptimal alternative that provided food 20% of the time and an optimal alternative that provided food 80% of the time. Stimuli presented during the delays signaled the outcomes on the suboptimal alternative, but not on the optimal alternative. The outcome delays were 5 s in some conditions and 20 s in others. The results of two experiments demonstrate that behavior is generally more suboptimal when the outcome delays are longer but tends to stay relatively suboptimal if subjects experience the long delay condition before the short delay condition. The finding that behavior is more suboptimal with longer delays to the outcomes is consistent with the view that pigeons' suboptimal choice is influenced by both conditioned and primary reinforcement and is inconsistent with the view that suboptimal choice is influenced solely by signal value.

Gambling in rhesus macaques (Macaca mulatta): The effect of cues signaling risky choice outcomes

Preference for a larger-variable "risky" option over a smaller-reliable "safe" option often depends upon the likelihood that the risky option will deliver a sufficiently sized reward to have an equivalent or superior expected value. However, preference for the risky option has been shown to increase under conditions where informative stimuli signaling the outcome of a risky choice is included between the choice and the outcome and this risk-prone preference persists even when the risky option has a lower expected value than the alternative safe option. In the present study, rhesus macaques chose between a risky option and a safe option across two experimental phases to determine whether the outcome signal affected the degree of preference for the risky option. Overall, six out of seven macaques showed a greater preference for the risky option in the signaled condition than in the unsignaled condition. The macaques' risky choices were sensitive to the expected value of the risky option and the signaled condition produced a general increase in risky choices independently of the expected value of the risky outcome. Overall, these results are consistent with those obtained with other animals, and this may relate to a process where animals show a biased preference for "good news." This process may model some of the relevant factors that explain the psychology of gambling in humans.

When good news leads to bad choices

Pigeons and other animals sometimes deviate from optimal choice behavior when given informative signals for delayed outcomes. For example, when pigeons are given a choice between an alternative that always leads to food after a delay and an alternative that leads to food only half of the time after a delay, preference changes dramatically depending on whether the stimuli during the delays are correlated with (signal) the outcomes or not. With signaled outcomes, pigeons show a much greater preference for the suboptimal alternative than with unsignaled outcomes. Key variables and research findings related to this phenomenon are reviewed, including the effects of durations of the choice and delay periods, probability of reinforcement, and gaps in the signal. We interpret the available evidence as reflecting a preference induced by signals for good news in a context of uncertainty. Other explanations are briefly summarized and compared.

Less means more for pigeons but not always

When humans are asked to judge the value of a set of objects of excellent quality, they often give this set higher value than those same objects with the addition of some of lesser quality. This is an example of the affect heuristic, often referred to as the less-is-more effect. Monkeys and dogs, too, have shown this suboptimal effect. But in the present experiments, normally hungry pigeons chose optimally: a preferred food plus a less-preferred food over a more-preferred food alone. In Experiment 2, however, pigeons on a less-restricted diet showed the suboptimal less-is-more effect. Choice on control trials indicated that the effect did not result from the novelty of two food items versus one. The effect in the less-food-restricted pigeons appears to result from the devaluation of the combination of the food items by the presence of the less-preferred food item. The reversal of the effect under greater food restriction may occur because, as motivation increases, the value of the less-preferred food increases faster than the value of the more-preferred food, thus decreasing the difference in value between the two foods.

Who are the real bird brains? Qualitative differences in behavioral flexibility between dogs (Canis familiaris) and pigeons (Columba livia)

Pigeons given a simultaneous spatial discrimination reversal, in which a single reversal occurs at the midpoint of each session, consistently show anticipation prior to the reversal as well as perseveration after the reversal, suggesting that they use a less effective cue (time or trial number into the session) than what would be optimal to maximize reinforcement (local feedback from the most recent trials). In contrast, rats (Rattus norvegicus) and humans show near-optimal reversal learning on this task. To determine whether this is a general characteristic of mammals, in the present research, pigeons (Columba livia) and dogs (Canis familiaris) were tested with a simultaneous spatial discrimination mid-session reversal. Overall, dogs performed the task more poorly than pigeons. Interestingly, both pigeons and dogs employed what resembled a timing strategy. However, dogs showed greater perseverative errors, suggesting that they may have relatively poorer working memory and inhibitory control with this task. The greater efficiency shown by pigeons with this task suggests they are better able to time and use the feedback from their preceding choice as the basis of their future choice, highlighting what may be a qualitative difference between the species.

Studying the evolutionary ecology of cognition in the wild: a review of practical and conceptual challenges

Cognition is defined as the processes by which animals collect, retain and use information from their environment to guide their behaviour. Thus cognition is essential in a wide range of behaviours, including foraging, avoiding predators and mating. Despite this pivotal role, the evolutionary processes shaping variation in cognitive performance among individuals in wild populations remain very poorly understood. Selection experiments in captivity suggest that cognitive traits can have substantial heritability and can undergo rapid evolution. However only a handful of studies have attempted to explore how cognition influences life-history variation and fitness in the wild, and direct evidence for the action of natural or sexual selection on cognition is still lacking, reasons for which are diverse. Here we review the current literature with a view to: (i) highlighting the key practical and conceptual challenges faced by the field; (ii) describing how to define and measure cognitive traits in natural populations, and suggesting which species, populations and cognitive traits might be examined to greatest effect; emphasis is placed on selecting traits that are linked to functional behaviour; (iii) discussing how to deal with confounding factors such as personality and motivation in field as well as captive studies; (iv) describing how to measure and interpret relationships between cognitive performance, functional behaviour and fitness, offering some suggestions as to when and what kind of selection might be predicted; and (v) showing how an evolutionary ecological framework, more generally, along with innovative technologies has the potential to revolutionise the study of cognition in the wild. We conclude that the evolutionary ecology of cognition in wild populations is a rapidly expanding interdisciplinary field providing many opportunities for advancing the understanding of how cognitive abilities have evolved.

Translational research into intertemporal choice: the Western scrub-jay as an animal model for future-thinking

Decisions often involve outcomes that will not materialise until later, and choices between immediate gratification and future consequences are thought to be important for human health and welfare. Combined human and animal research has identified impulsive intertemporal choice as an important factor in drug-taking and pathological gambling. In this paper, we give an overview of recent research into intertemporal choice in non-human animals, and argue that this work could offer insight into human behaviour through the development of animal models. As an example, we discuss the role of future-thinking in intertemporal choice, and review the case for the Western scrub-jay (Aphelocoma californica) as an animal model of such prospective cognition. This article is part of a Special Issue entitled: Tribute to Tom Zentall.

When animals misbehave: analogs of human biases and suboptimal choice

Humans tend to value rewards more if they have had to work hard to obtain them (justification of effort). Similarly they tend to persist in a task even when they would be better off beginning a new one (sunk cost). Humans also often give greater value to objects of good quality than the same objects together with objects of lesser quality (the less is more effect). Commercial gambling (lotteries and slot machines) is another example of suboptimal choice by humans because on average the rewards are less than the investment. In another example of a systematic bias, when humans try to estimate the probability of the occurrence of a low probability event, they often give too much weight to the results of a test, in spite of the fact that the known probability of a false alarm reduces the predictive value of the test (base rate neglect). In each of these examples, we have found that pigeons show a similar tendency to choose suboptimally. When one can show comparable findings of suboptimal choice in animals it suggests that whereas culture may reinforce certain suboptimal behavior, the behavior is likely to result from the overgeneralization of basic behavioral processes or predisposed heuristics that may have been appropriate in natural environments. This article is part of a Special Issue entitled: "Tribute to Tom Zentall."

Reprint of "Suboptimal choice by pigeons: an analog of human gambling behavior"

Human gambling often involves the choice of a low probability but high valued outcome over a high probability (certain) low valued outcome (not gambling) that is economically more optimal. We have developed an analog of gambling in which pigeons prefer a suboptimal alternative that infrequently provides a signal for a high probability (or high magnitude) of reinforcement over an optimal alternative that always provides a signal for a lower probability (or lower magnitude) of reinforcement. We have identified two mechanisms that may be responsible for this suboptimal behavior. First, the effect of nonreinforcement results in considerably less inhibition of choice than ideally it should. Second, the frequency of the occurrence of the signal for a high probability or high magnitude of reinforcement is less important than ideally it should. Also analogous to human gambling is the finding that pigeons that are normally food restricted choose suboptimally, whereas those that are minimally food restricted choose optimally. In addition, pigeons that are singly housed choose suboptimally, whereas those that are exposed to a more enriched environment choose less suboptimally. We believe that these findings have implications for the understanding and treatment of problem gambling behavior.

Suboptimal choice by pigeons may result from the diminishing effect of nonreinforcement

Pigeons prefer an alternative that provides them with a stimulus 20% of the time that predicts 10 pellets of food and a different stimulus 80% of the time that predicts 0 pellets, over an alternative that provides them with a stimulus that always predicts 3 pellets of food, even though the preferred alternative provides them with considerably less food. It appears that the stimulus that predicts 10 pellets acts as a strong conditioned reinforcer, despite the fact that the stimulus that predicts 0 pellets occurs 4 times as often. In the present research, we tested the hypothesis that early in training conditioned inhibition develops to the 0-pellet stimulus, but later in training it dissipates. We trained pigeons with a hue as the 10-pellet stimulus and a vertical line as the 0-pellet stimulus. To assess the inhibitory value of the vertical line, we compared responding to the 10-pellet hue with responding to the compound of the 10-pellet hue and the vertical line early in training and once again late in training, using both a within-subject design (Experiment 1) and a between-groups design (Experiment 2). We found that there was a significant reduction in inhibition between the early test (when pigeons chose optimally) and late test (when choice was suboptimal). Thus, the increase in suboptimal choice may result from the decline in inhibition to the 0-pellet stimulus. Implications for human gambling behavior are considered.

Suboptimal choice by pigeons: an analog of human gambling behavior

Human gambling often involves the choice of a low probability but high valued outcome over a high probability (certain) low valued outcome (not gambling) that is economically more optimal. We have developed an analog of gambling in which pigeons prefer a suboptimal alternative that infrequently provides a signal for a high probability (or high magnitude) of reinforcement over an optimal alternative that always provides a signal for a lower probability (or lower magnitude) of reinforcement. We have identified two mechanisms that may be responsible for this suboptimal behavior. First, the effect of nonreinforcement results in considerably less inhibition of choice than ideally it should. Second, the frequency of the occurrence of the signal for a high probability or high magnitude of reinforcement is less important than ideally it should. Also analogous to human gambling is the finding that pigeons that are normally food restricted choose suboptimally, whereas those that are minimally food restricted choose optimally. In addition, pigeons that are singly housed choose suboptimally, whereas those that are exposed to a more enriched environment choose less suboptimally. We believe that these findings have implications for the understanding and treatment of problem gambling behavior.

Decision making by humans in a behavioral task: do humans, like pigeons, show suboptimal choice?

Consistent with human gambling behavior but contrary to optimal foraging theory, pigeons show a strong preference for an alternative with low probability and high payoff (a gambling-like alternative) over an alternative with a greater net payoff (Zentall & Stagner, Proceedings of the Royal Society B, 278, 1203-1208, 2011). In the present research, we asked whether humans would show suboptimal choice on a task involving choices with probabilities similar to those for pigeons. In Experiment 1, when we selected participants on the basis of their self-reported gambling activities, we found a significantly greater choice of the alternative involving low probability and high payoff (gambling-like alternative) than for a group that reported an absence of gambling activity. In Experiment 2, we found that when the inhibiting abilities of typical humans were impaired by a self-regulatory depletion manipulation, they were more likely to choose the gambling-like alternative. Taken together, the results suggest that this task is suitable for the comparative study of suboptimal decision-making behavior and the mechanisms that underlie it.

Do Pigeons Gamble? I Wouldn’t Bet Against It

Human gambling generally involves suboptimal choice because the expected return is usually less than the investment. We have found that animals, too, choose suboptimally under similar choice conditions. Pigeons, like human gamblers, show an impaired ability to objectively assess overall probabilities and amounts of reinforcement when a rare, high-value outcome (analogous to a jackpot in human gambling) is presented in the context of more frequently occurring losses. More specifically, pigeons prefer a low-probability, high-reward outcome over a guaranteed low-reward outcome with a higher overall value. Furthermore, manipulations assumed to increase impulsivity (pigeons maintained at higher levels of motivation for food and pigeons housed in individual cages) result in increased suboptimal choice. They do so presumably because they function to increase attraction to the signal for the low-probability, high-reward outcomes rather than consider the more global probability of reinforcement associated with each alternative.