Temperature influences the interaction of ruminant PrP (TSE) with soil

Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy - A Review from the Perspective of Food Safety

Bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) is a fatal neurodegenerative disease that belongs to transmissible spongiform encephalopathy (TSE). Since the first case was identified in the UK in 1986, BSE spread to other countries including Japan. Its incidence peaked in 1992 in the UK and from 2001 to 2006 in many other countries, but a feed ban aimed at eliminating the recycling of the BSE agent and other control measures aimed at preventing food and feed contamination with the agent were highly effective at reducing the spread of BSE. In 2004, two types of atypical BSE, H-type BSE (H-BSE) and L-type BSE (L-BSE), which differ from classical BSE (C-BSE), were found in France and Italy. Atypical BSE, which is assumed to occur spontaneously, has also been detected among cattle in other countries including Japan. The BSE agent including atypical BSE agent is a unique food-safety hazard with different chemical and biological properties from the microbial pathogens and toxic chemicals that contaminate food. In this review, we summarize the reported findings on the tissue distribution of BSE prions in infected cattle and other aspects of BSE, as well as the control measures against the disease employed in Japan. Topics that require further studies are discussed based on the summarized findings from the perspective of food safety.

BSE infectivity survives burial for five years with only limited spread

The carcasses of animals infected with bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE), scrapie or chronic wasting disease (CWD) that remain in the environment (exposed or buried) may continue to act as reservoirs of infectivity. We conducted two experiments under near-field conditions to investigate the survival and dissemination of BSE infectivity after burial in a clay or sandy soil. BSE infectivity was either contained within a bovine skull or buried as an uncontained bolus of BSE-infected brain. Throughout the five-year period of the experiment, BSE infectivity was recovered in similar amounts from heads exhumed annually from both types of soil. Very low levels of infectivity were detected in the soil immediately surrounding the heads, but not in samples remote from them. Similarly, there was no evidence of significant lateral movement of infectivity from the buried bolus over 4 years although there was a little vertical movement in both directions. However, bioassay analysis of limited numbers of samples of rain water that had drained through the bolus clay lysimeter indicated that infectivity was present in filtrates. sPMCA analysis also detected low levels of PrP^Sc in the filtrates up to 25 months following burial, raising the concern that leakage of infectivity into ground water could occur. We conclude that transmissible spongiform encephalopathy infectivity is likely to survive burial for long periods of time, but not to migrate far from the site of burial unless a vector or rain water drainage transports it. Risk assessments of contaminated sites should take these findings into account.

Laboratory activities involving transmissible spongiform encephalopathy causing agents: risk assessment and biosafety recommendations in Belgium

Since the appearance in 1986 of epidemic of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE), a new form of neurological disease in cattle which also affected human beings, many diagnostic and research activities have been performed to develop detection and therapeutic tools. A lot of progress was made in better identifying, understanding and controlling the spread of the disease by appropriate monitoring and control programs in European countries. This paper reviews the recent knowledge on pathogenesis, transmission and persistence outside the host of prion, the causative agent of transmissible spongiform encephalopathies (TSE) in mammals with a particular focus on risk (re)assessment and management of biosafety measures to be implemented in diagnostic and research laboratories in Belgium. Also, in response to the need of an increasing number of European diagnostic laboratories stopping TSE diagnosis due to a decreasing number of TSE cases reported in the last years, decontamination procedures and a protocol for decommissioning TSE diagnostic laboratories is proposed.