Construal Level Theory and Moral Judgments: How Thinking Abstractly Modifies Morality

The effects of psychological distance on spontaneous justice inferences: A construal level theory perspective

Objective

The aim of this study was to examine the effects of psychological distance on spontaneous justice inferences.

Methods

Two experiments were conducted using the probe recognition paradigm to directly examine whether psychological distance affects spontaneous justice inferences. In Experiment 1, the spatial distance of justice actions from the perceivers was manipulated. In Experiment 2, temporal distance was manipulated.

Results

Consistent with our expectations, the results of Experiments 1 and 2 (for spatial distance and temporal distance, respectively) consistently demonstrated the effect of psychological distance on spontaneous justice inferences. In concrete terms, participants made stronger spontaneous justice inferences when confronted with situation descriptions of justice-implying events occurring in a spatially distant location than in a proximal location (Experiment 1) and in the distant-future condition than in the near-future condition (Experiment 2).

Conclusion

These findings indicate that psychological distance can influence influence simplicity, unintentional processing of justice inferences.

How Imagination and Memory Shape the Moral Mind

Interdisciplinary research has proposed a multifaceted view of human cognition and morality, establishing that inputs from multiple cognitive and affective processes guide moral decisions. However, extant work on moral cognition has largely overlooked the contributions of episodic representation. The ability to remember or imagine a specific moment in time plays a broadly influential role in cognition and behavior. Yet, existing research has only begun exploring the influence of episodic representation on moral cognition. Here, we evaluate the theoretical connections between episodic representation and moral cognition, review emerging empirical work revealing how episodic representation affects moral decision-making, and conclude by highlighting gaps in the literature and open questions. We argue that a comprehensive model of moral cognition will require including the episodic memory system, further delineating its direct influence on moral thought, and better understanding its interactions with other mental processes to fundamentally shape our sense of right and wrong.