Interpretive monitoring in the caudate nucleus

Neural Representations of Post-Decision Accuracy and Reward Expectation in the Caudate Nucleus and Frontal Eye Field

Performance monitoring that supports ongoing behavioral adjustments is often examined in the context of either choice confidence for perceptual decisions (i.e., "did I get it right?") or reward expectation for reward-based decisions (i.e., "what reward will I receive?"). However, our understanding of how the brain encodes these distinct evaluative signals remains limited because they are easily conflated, particularly in commonly used two-alternative tasks with symmetric rewards for correct choices. Previously we used a motion-discrimination task with asymmetric rewards to identify neural substrates of forming reward-biased perceptual decisions in the caudate nucleus (part of the striatum in the basal ganglia) and the frontal eye field (FEF, in prefrontal cortex). Here we leveraged this task design to partially decouple estimates of accuracy and reward expectation and examine their impacts on subsequent decisions and their representations in those two brain areas. We identified distinguishable representations of these two evaluative signals in individual caudate and FEF neurons, with regional differences in their distribution patterns and time courses. We observed that well-trained monkeys (both sexes) used both evaluative signals, infrequently but consistently, to adjust their subsequent decisions. We found further that these behavioral adjustments had reliable relationships with the neural representations of both evaluative signals in caudate, but not FEF. These results suggest that the cortico-striatal decision network may use diverse evaluative signals to monitor and adjust decision-making behaviors, adding to our understanding of the different roles that the FEF and caudate nucleus play in a diversity of decision-related computations.

Contributions of the Basal Ganglia to Visual Perceptual Decisions

The basal ganglia (BG) make up a prominent nexus between visual and motor-related brain regions. In contrast to the BG's well-established roles in movement control and value-based decision making, their contributions to the transformation of visual input into an action remain unclear, especially in the context of perceptual decisions based on uncertain visual evidence. This article reviews recent progress in our understanding of the BG's contributions to the formation, evaluation, and adjustment of such decisions. From theoretical and experimental perspectives, the review focuses on four key stations in the BG network, namely, the striatum, pallidum, subthalamic nucleus, and midbrain dopamine neurons, which can have different roles and together support the decision process.

Blunted reward prediction error signals in internet gaming disorder

BACKGROUND

Internet gaming disorder (IGD) is a type of behavioural addictions. One of the key features of addiction is the excessive exposure to addictive objectives (e.g. drugs) reduces the sensitivity of the brain reward system to daily rewards (e.g. money). This is thought to be mediated via the signals expressed as dopaminergic reward prediction error (RPE). Emerging evidence highlights blunted RPE signals in drug addictions. However, no study has examined whether IGD also involves alterations in RPE signals that are observed in other types of addictions.

METHODS

To fill this gap, we used functional magnetic resonance imaging data from 45 IGD and 42 healthy controls (HCs) during a reward-related prediction-error task and utilised a psychophysiological interaction (PPI) analysis to characterise the underlying neural correlates of RPE and related functional connectivity.

RESULTS

Relative to HCs, IGD individuals showed impaired reinforcement learning, blunted RPE signals in multiple regions of the brain reward system, including the right caudate, left orbitofrontal cortex (OFC), and right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC). Moreover, the PPI analysis revealed a pattern of hyperconnectivity between the right caudate, right putamen, bilateral DLPFC, and right dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (dACC) in the IGD group. Finally, linear regression suggested that the connection between the right DLPFC and right dACC could significantly predict the variation of RPE signals in the left OFC.

CONCLUSIONS

These results highlight disrupted RPE signalling and hyperconnectivity between regions of the brain reward system in IGD. Reinforcement learning deficits may be crucial underlying characteristics of IGD pathophysiology.

Frontal eye field and caudate neurons make different contributions to reward-biased perceptual decisions

Many decisions require trade-offs between sensory evidence and internal preferences. Potential neural substrates include the frontal eye field (FEF) and caudate nucleus, but their distinct roles are not understood. Previously we showed that monkeys’ decisions on a direction-discrimination task with asymmetric rewards reflected a biased accumulate-to-bound decision process (Fan et al., 2018) that was affected by caudate microstimulation (Doi et al., 2020). Here we compared single-neuron activity in FEF and caudate to each other and to accumulate-to-bound model predictions derived from behavior. Task-dependent neural modulations were similar in both regions. However, choice-selective neurons in FEF, but not caudate, encoded behaviorally derived biases in the accumulation process. Baseline activity in both regions was sensitive to reward context, but this sensitivity was not reliably associated with behavioral biases. These results imply distinct contributions of FEF and caudate neurons to reward-biased decision-making and put experimental constraints on the neural implementation of accumulation-to-bound-like computations.

Coding of self-motion-induced and self-independent visual motion in the rat dorsomedial striatum

Evolutionary development of vision has provided us with the capacity to detect moving objects. Concordant shifts of visual features suggest movements of the observer, whereas discordant changes are more likely to be indicating independently moving objects, such as predators or prey. Such distinction helps us to focus attention, adapt our behavior, and adjust our motor patterns to meet behavioral challenges. However, the neural basis of distinguishing self-induced and self-independent visual motions is not clarified in unrestrained animals yet. In this study, we investigated the presence and origin of motion-related visual information in the striatum of rats, a hub of action selection and procedural memory. We found that while almost half of the neurons in the dorsomedial striatum are sensitive to visual motion congruent with locomotion (and that many of them also code for spatial location), only a small subset of them are composed of fast-firing interneurons that could also perceive self-independent visual stimuli. These latter cells receive their visual input at least partially from the secondary visual cortex (V2). This differential visual sensitivity may be an important support in adjusting behavior to salient environmental events. It emphasizes the importance of investigating visual motion perception in unrestrained animals.

Learning about Expectation Violation from Prediction Error Paradigms - A Meta-Analysis on Brain Processes Following a Prediction Error

Modifying patients' expectations by exposing them to expectation violation situations (thus maximizing the difference between the expected and the actual situational outcome) is proposed to be a crucial mechanism for therapeutic success for a variety of different mental disorders. However, clinical observations suggest that patients often maintain their expectations regardless of experiences contradicting their expectations. It remains unclear which information processing mechanisms lead to modification or persistence of patients' expectations. Insight in the processing could be provided by Neuroimaging studies investigating prediction error (PE, i.e., neuronal reactions to non-expected stimuli). Two methods are often used to investigate the PE: (1) paradigms, in which participants passively observe PEs ("passive" paradigms) and (2) paradigms, which encourage a behavioral adaptation following a PE ("active" paradigms). These paradigms are similar to the methods used to induce expectation violations in clinical settings: (1) the confrontation with an expectation violation situation and (2) an enhanced confrontation in which the patient actively challenges his expectation. We used this similarity to gain insight in the different neuronal processing of the two PE paradigms. We performed a meta-analysis contrasting neuronal activity of PE paradigms encouraging a behavioral adaptation following a PE and paradigms enforcing passiveness following a PE. We found more neuronal activity in the striatum, the insula and the fusiform gyrus in studies encouraging behavioral adaptation following a PE. Due to the involvement of reward assessment and avoidance learning associated with the striatum and the insula we propose that the deliberate execution of action alternatives following a PE is associated with the integration of new information into previously existing expectations, therefore leading to an expectation change. While further research is needed to directly assess expectations of participants, this study provides new insights into the information processing mechanisms following an expectation violation.

Believer-Skeptic Meets Actor-Critic: Rethinking the Role of Basal Ganglia Pathways during Decision-Making and Reinforcement Learning

The flexibility of behavioral control is a testament to the brain's capacity for dynamically resolving uncertainty during goal-directed actions. This ability to select actions and learn from immediate feedback is driven by the dynamics of basal ganglia (BG) pathways. A growing body of empirical evidence conflicts with the traditional view that these pathways act as independent levers for facilitating (i.e., direct pathway) or suppressing (i.e., indirect pathway) motor output, suggesting instead that they engage in a dynamic competition during action decisions that computationally captures action uncertainty. Here we discuss the utility of encoding action uncertainty as a dynamic competition between opposing control pathways and provide evidence that this simple mechanism may have powerful implications for bridging neurocomputational theories of decision making and reinforcement learning.