Causal events enter awareness faster than non-causal events

Exploring the influence of self-identification on perceptual judgments of physical and social causality

People tend to overestimate the causal contribution of the self to the observed outcome in various situations, a cognitive bias known as the 'illusion of control.' This study delves into whether this cognitive bias impacts causality judgments in animations depicting physical and social causal interactions. In two experiments, participants were instructed to associate themselves and a hypothetical stranger identity with two geometrical shapes (a circle and a square). Subsequently, they viewed animations portraying these shapes assuming the roles of agent and patient in causal interactions. Within one block, the shape related to the self served as the agent, while the shape associated with the stranger played the role of the patient. Conversely, in the other block, the identity-role association was reversed. We posited that the perception of the self as a causal agent might influence explicit judgments of physical and social causality. Experiment 1 demonstrated that physical causality ratings were solely shaped by kinematic cues. In Experiment 2, emphasising social causality, the dominance of kinematic parameters was confirmed. Therefore, contrary to the hypothesis anticipating diminished causality ratings with specific identity-role associations, results indicated negligible impact of our manipulation. The study contributes to understanding the interplay between kinematic and non-kinematic cues in human causal reasoning. It suggests that explicit judgments of causality in simple animations primarily rely on low-level kinematic cues, with the cognitive bias of overestimating the self's contribution playing a negligible role.

Taking consciousness for real: Increasing the ecological validity of the study of conscious vs. unconscious processes

The study of consciousness has developed well-controlled, rigorous methods for manipulating and measuring consciousness. Yet, in the process, experimental paradigms grew farther away from everyday conscious and unconscious processes, which raises the concern of ecological validity. In this review, we suggest that the field can benefit from adopting a more ecological approach, akin to other fields of cognitive science. There, this approach challenged some existing hypotheses, yielded stronger effects, and enabled new research questions. We argue that such a move is critical for studying consciousness, where experimental paradigms tend to be artificial and small effect sizes are relatively prevalent. We identify three paths for doing so-changing the stimuli and experimental settings, changing the measures, and changing the research questions themselves-and review works that have already started implementing such approaches. While acknowledging the inherent challenges, we call for increasing ecological validity in consciousness studies.

Dissociation between temporal attention and Consciousness: Unconscious temporal cue induces temporal expectation effect

The debate over the independence of attention and consciousness is ongoing. Prior studies have established that invisible spatial cues can direct attention. However, our exploration extends beyond spatial dimensions to temporal information as a potent guide for attention. A intriguing question arises: Can unconscious temporal cues trigger attentional orienting? To investigate, we employed a modified reaction-time task in Experiments 1 and 2, using Gabor stimuli or human facial stimuli as temporal cues rendered invisible through continuous flash suppression. We aimed to uncover temporal expectation effects (TE effects) without conscious awareness. Moreover, Experiments 3 and 4 probed the boundaries of this unconscious processing, assessing whether conscious temporal cues could modulate TE effects. Our results confirm that invisible temporal cues can induce TE effects, and these effects can be overridden by conscious temporal cues. This dissociation between temporal attention and consciousness provide a new perspective on our understanding of their relationship.

Improving causality perception judgments in schizophrenia spectrum disorder via transcranial direct current stimulation

BACKGROUND

Deficient causality perception and attribution may underlie key symptoms of schizophrenia spectrum disorder (SSD), such as delusions and ideas of reference. Although transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) can increase the influence of spatial information on perceptual causality judgments among healthy participants, its effect among patients with SSD remains unknown. We sought to determine whether tDCS modulates the contribution of stimulus characteristics to perceptual causality judgments among patients with SSD; we predicted that right parietal tDCS would increase the influence of spatial stimulus characteristics on patients' causality perception.

METHODS

Patients with SSD received frontal, parietal, frontoparietal and sham tDCS in 4 separate sessions. Pre- and post-tDCS, patients viewed video clips of ball A colliding with ball B. Spatial linearity (ball B's angle of egress) and temporal contiguity (delay between collision and ball B's movement) varied parametrically. After each launching event, patients rated perceived causality.

RESULTS

Among 19 patients with SSD, we found a brain region-dependent effect of tDCS regarding sensitivity to violations of spatial linearity. After right parietal anodal tDCS, the influence of angle variations on patients' perceptual causality judgments increased, reflected by a higher probability of perceived causality for stimuli with small angles and a lower probability of perceived causality for stimuli with high angles.

CONCLUSION

Transcranial direct current stimulation increased the influence of spatial stimulus characteristics on causality perception among patients with SSD. Future research should explore potential links between tDCS-induced changes in basic perceptual processes and clinical symptoms, such as delusions and ideas of reference.

Perceiving animacy from kinematics: visual specification of life-likeness in simple geometric patterns

Since the seminal work of Heider and Simmel, and Michotte's research, many studies have shown that, under appropriate conditions, displays of simple geometric shapes elicit rich and vivid impressions of animacy and intentionality. The main purpose of this review is to emphasize the close relationship between kinematics and perceived animacy by showing which specific motion cues and spatiotemporal patterns automatically trigger visual perceptions of animacy and intentionality. The animacy phenomenon has been demonstrated to be rather fast, automatic, irresistible, and highly stimulus-driven. Moreover, there is growing evidence that animacy attributions, although usually associated with higher-level cognition and long-term memory, may reflect highly specialized visual processes that have evolved to support adaptive behaviors critical for survival. The hypothesis of a life-detector hardwired in the perceptual system is also supported by recent studies in early development and animal cognition, as well as by the issue of the "irresistibility" criterion, i.e., the persistence of animacy perception in adulthood even in the face of conflicting background knowledge. Finally, further support for the hypothesis that animacy is processed in the earliest stages of vision comes from recent experimental evidence on the interaction of animacy with other visual processes, such as visuomotor performance, visual memory, and speed estimation. Summarizing, the ability to detect animacy in all its nuances may be related to the visual system's sensitivity to those changes in kinematics - considered as a multifactorial relational system - that are associated with the presence of living beings, as opposed to the natural, inert behavior of physically constrained, form-invariant objects, or even mutually independent moving agents. This broad predisposition would allow the observer not only to identify the presence of animates and to distinguish them from inanimate, but also to quickly grasp their psychological, emotional, and social characteristics.

The evolutionary origins of syntax: Event cognition in nonhuman primates

Languages tend to encode events from the perspective of agents, placing them first and in simpler forms than patients. This agent bias is mirrored by cognition: Agents are more quickly recognized than patients and generally attract more attention. This leads to the hypothesis that key aspects of language structure are fundamentally rooted in a cognition that decomposes events into agents, actions, and patients, privileging agents. Although this type of event representation is almost certainly universal across languages, it remains unclear whether the underlying cognition is uniquely human or more widespread in animals. Here, we review a range of evidence from primates and other animals, which suggests that agent-based event decomposition is phylogenetically older than humans. We propose a research program to test this hypothesis in great apes and human infants, with the goal to resolve one of the major questions in the evolution of language, the origins of syntax.

Regression to the Mean Does Not Explain Away Nonconscious Processing

In studies that use subliminal presentations, participants may become aware of stimuli that are intended to remain subliminal. A common solution to this problem is to analyze the results of the group of participants for whom the stimuli remained subliminal. A recent article (Shanks, 2017) argued that this method leads to a regression to the mean artifact, which may account for many of the observed effects. However, conceptual and statistical characteristics of the original publication lead to overestimation of the influence of the artifact. Using simulations, we demonstrate that this overestimation leads to the mistaken conclusion that regression to the mean accounts for nonconscious effects. We conclude by briefly outlining a new description of the influence of the artifact and how it should be statistically addressed.

Larger capacity for unconscious versus conscious episodic memory

Episodic memory is the memory for experienced events. A peak competence of episodic memory is the mental combination of events to infer commonalities. Inferring commonalities may proceed with and without consciousness of events. Yet what distinguishes conscious from unconscious inference? This question inspired nine experiments that featured strongly and weakly masked cartoon clips presented for unconscious and conscious inference. Each clip featured a scene with a visually impenetrable hiding place. Five animals crossed the scene one-by-one consecutively. One animal trajectory represented one event. The animals moved through the hiding place, where they might linger or not. The participants' task was to observe the animals' entrances and exits to maintain a mental record of which animals hid simultaneously. We manipulated information load to explore capacity limits. Memory of inferences was tested immediately, 3.5 or 6 min following encoding. The participants retrieved inferences well when encoding was conscious. When encoding was unconscious, the participants needed to respond intuitively. Only habitually intuitive decision makers exhibited a significant delayed retrieval of inferences drawn unconsciously. Their unconscious retrieval performance did not drop significantly with increasing information load, while conscious retrieval performance dropped significantly. A working memory network, including hippocampus, was activated during both conscious and unconscious inference and correlated with retrieval success. An episodic retrieval network, including hippocampus, was activated during both conscious and unconscious retrieval of inferences and correlated with retrieval success. Only conscious encoding/retrieval recruited additional brain regions outside these networks. Hence, levels of consciousness influenced the memories' behavioral impact, memory capacity, and the neural representational code.

Dissociating conscious and unconscious influences on visual detection effects

The scope of unconscious processing is highly debated, with recent studies showing that even high-level functions such as perceptual integration and category-based attention occur unconsciously. For example, upright faces that are suppressed from awareness through interocular suppression break into awareness more quickly than inverted faces. Similarly, verbal object cues boost otherwise invisible objects into awareness. Here, we replicate these findings, but find that they reflect a general difference in detectability not specific to interocular suppression. To dissociate conscious and unconscious influences on visual detection effects, we use an additional discrimination task to rule out conscious processes as a cause for these differences. Results from this detection-discrimination dissociation paradigm reveal that, while face orientation is processed unconsciously, category-based attention requires awareness. These findings provide insights into the function of conscious perception and offer an experimental approach for mapping out the scope and limits of unconscious processing.

The Perception of Relations

The world contains not only objects and features (red apples, glass bowls, wooden tables), but also relations holding between them (apples contained in bowls, bowls supported by tables). Representations of these relations are often developmentally precocious and linguistically privileged; but how does the mind extract them in the first place? Although relations themselves cast no light onto our eyes, a growing body of work suggests that even very sophisticated relations display key signatures of automatic visual processing. Across physical, eventive, and social domains, relations such as support, fit, cause, chase, and even socially interact are extracted rapidly, are impossible to ignore, and influence other perceptual processes. Sophisticated and structured relations are not only judged and understood, but also seen - revealing surprisingly rich content in visual perception itself.

Windows of Integration Hypothesis Revisited

In the ongoing research of the functions of consciousness, special emphasis has been put on integration of information: the ability to combine different signals into a coherent, unified one. Several theories of consciousness hold that this ability depends on - or at least goes hand in hand with - conscious processing. Yet some empirical findings have suggested otherwise, claiming that integration of information could take place even without awareness. Trying to reconcile this apparent contradiction, the "windows of integration" (WOI) hypothesis claims that conscious access enables signal processing over large integration windows. The hypothesis applies to integration windows defined either temporally, spatially, or semantically. In this review, we explain the hypothesis and re-examine it in light of new studies published since it was suggested. In line with the hypothesis, these studies provide compelling evidence for unconscious integration, but also demonstrate its limits with respect to time, space, and semantic distance. The review further highlights open questions that still need to be pursued to demonstrate the applicability of the WOI hypothesis as a guiding principle for understanding the depth and scope of unconscious processes.

Retinotopic adaptation reveals distinct categories of causal perception

We can perceive not only low-level features of events such as color and motion, but also seemingly higher-level properties such as causality. A prototypical example of causal perception is the 'launching effect': one object (A) moves toward a stationary second object (B) until they are adjacent, at which point A stops and B starts moving in the same direction. Beyond these motions themselves - and regardless of any higher-level beliefs - this display induces a vivid visual impression of causality, wherein A is seen to cause B's motion. Do such percepts reflect a unitary category of visual processing, or might there be multiple distinct forms of causal perception? While launching is often simply equated with causal perception, researchers have sometimes described other phenomena such as 'triggering' (in which B moves faster than A) and 'entraining' (in which A continues to move alongside B). We used psychophysical methods to determine whether these labels really carve visual processing at its joints, and how putatively different forms of causal perception relate to each other. Previous research demonstrated retinotopically specific adaptation to causality: exposure to causal launching makes subsequent ambiguous events in that same location more likely to be seen as non-causal 'passing'. Here, after replicating this effect, we show that exposure to triggering also yields retinotopically specific adaptation for subsequent ambiguous launching displays, but that exposure to entraining does not. Collectively, these results reveal that visual processing distinguishes some (but not all) types of causal interactions.

Phenomenal Causality and Sensory Realism

One of the most important tasks for humans is the attribution of causes and effects in all wakes of life. The first systematical study of visual perception of causality-often referred to as phenomenal causality-was done by Albert Michotte using his now well-known launching events paradigm. Launching events are the seeming collision and seeming transfer of movement between two objects-abstract, featureless stimuli ("objects") in Michotte's original experiments. Here, we study the relation between causal ratings for launching events in Michotte's setting and launching collisions in a photorealistically computer-rendered setting. We presented launching events with differing temporal gaps, the same launching processes with photorealistic billiard balls, as well as photorealistic billiard balls with realistic motion dynamics, that is, an initial rebound of the first ball after collision and a short sliding phase of the second ball due to momentum and friction. We found that providing the normal launching stimulus with realistic visuals led to lower causal ratings, but realistic visuals together with realistic motion dynamics evoked higher ratings. Two-dimensional versus three-dimensional presentation, on the other hand, did not affect phenomenal causality. We discuss our results in terms of intuitive physics as well as cue conflict.

The space contraction asymmetry in Michotte's launching effect

Previous studies have found that, compared with noncausal events, spatial contraction exists between the causal object and the effect object due to the perceived causality. The present research aims to examine whether the causal object and the effect object have the same effect on spatial contraction. A modified launching effect, in which a bar bridges the spatial gap between the final position of the launcher and the initial position of the target, was adopted. Experiment 1 validates the absolute underestimation of the bar's length between the launcher and the target. Experiment 2a finds that in the direct launching effect, the perceived position of the bar's trailing edge that was contacted by the final launcher was displaced along the objects' direction of movement. Meanwhile, the perceived position of the bar's leading edge that was contacted by the initial target was displaced in opposite direction to the moving direction. The magnitude of the former's displacement was significantly larger than that of the latter, displaying a significant contraction asymmetry. Experiment 2b demonstrates that the contraction asymmetry did not result from the launcher remaining in contact with the edge of the bar. Experiment 3 indicates that contraction asymmetry showed a type of postdictive effect; that is, to some extent, this asymmetry depends on what happens after contact. In conclusion, the space between the causal object and effect object contracts asymmetrically in the launching effect, which implies that the causal object and effect object are perceived as shifting toward each other nonequidistantly in visual space.

Emotion in Chinese Words Could Not Be Extracted in Continuous Flash Suppression

Previous studies have demonstrated the automatic vigilance effect for faces and pictures and have attributed it to the brain's prioritized unconscious evaluation of early evolutionary stimuli that are critical to survival. Whether this effect exists for evolutionarily more recent stimuli, such as written words, has become the center of much debate. Apparently contradicting results have been reported in different languages, such as Hebrew, English, and Traditional Chinese (TC), with regard to the unconscious processing of emotional words in breaking continuous flash suppression (b-CFS). Our current study used two experiments (with two-character words or single-character words) to verify whether the emotional valence or the length of Simplified Chinese (SC) words would modulate conscious access in b-CFS. We failed to replicate the findings reported in Yang and Yeh (2011) using TC, but found that complex high-level emotional information could not be extracted from interocularly suppressed words regardless of their length. Our findings comply with the distinction between subliminal and preconscious states in Global Neuronal Workspace Theory and support the current notion that preconsciousness or partial awareness may be indispensable for high-level cognitive tasks such as reading comprehension.

"Real-life" continuous flash suppression (CFS)-CFS with real-world objects using augmented reality goggles

Continuous flash suppression (CFS) is a popular method for suppressing visual stimuli from awareness for relatively long periods. Thus far, this method has only been used for suppressing two-dimensional images presented on screen. We present a novel variant of CFS, termed “real-life” CFS, in which a portion of the actual immediate surroundings of an observer—including three-dimensional, real-life objects—can be rendered unconscious. Our method uses augmented reality goggles to present subjects with CFS masks to the dominant eye, leaving the nondominant eye exposed to the real world. In three experiments we demonstrated that real objects can indeed be suppressed from awareness for several seconds, on average, and that the suppression duration is comparable to that obtained using classic, on-screen CFS. As supplementary information, we further provide an example of experimental code that can be modified for future studies. This technique opens the way to new questions in the study of consciousness and its functions.

Causal reports: Context-dependent contributions of intuitive physics and visual impressions of launching

Everyday causal reports appear to be based on a blend of perceptual and cognitive processes. Causality can sometimes be perceived automatically through low-level visual processing of stimuli, but it can also be inferred on the basis of an intuitive understanding of the physical mechanism that underlies an observable event. We investigated how visual impressions of launching and the intuitive physics of collisions contribute to the formation of explicit causal responses. In Experiment 1, participants observed collisions between realistic objects differing in apparent material and hence implied mass, whereas in Experiment 2, participants observed collisions between abstract, non-material objects. The results of Experiment 1 showed that ratings of causality were mainly driven by the intuitive physics of collisions, whereas the results of Experiment 2 provide some support to the hypothesis that ratings of causality were mainly driven by visual impressions of launching. These results suggest that stimulus factors and experimental design factors - such as the realism of the stimuli and the variation in the implied mass of the colliding objects - may determine the relative contributions of perceptual and post-perceptual cognitive processes to explicit causal responses. A revised version of the impetus transmission heuristic provides a satisfactory explanation for these results, whereas the hypothesis that causal responses and intuitive physics are based on the internalization of physical laws does not.

Categories and Constraints in Causal Perception

When object A moves adjacent to a stationary object, B, and in that instant A stops moving and B starts moving, people irresistibly see this as an event in which A causes B to move. Real-world causal collisions are subject to Newtonian constraints on the relative speed of B following the collision, but here we show that perceptual constraints on the relative speed of B (which align imprecisely with Newtonian principles) define two categories of causal events in perception. Using performance-based tasks, we show that triggering events, in which B moves noticeably faster than A, are treated as being categorically different from launching events, in which B does not move noticeably faster than A, and that these categories are unique to causal events (Experiments 1 and 2). Furthermore, we show that 7- to 9-month-old infants are sensitive to this distinction, which suggests that this boundary may be an early-developing component of causal perception (Experiment 3).