Risk factors for African swine fever incursion in Romanian domestic farms during 2019

African swine fever (ASF) entered Georgia in 2007 and the EU in 2014. In the EU, the virus primarily spread in wild boar (Sus scrofa) in the period from 2014-2018. However, from the summer 2018, numerous domestic pig farms in Romania were affected by ASF. In contrast to the existing knowledge on ASF transmission routes, the understanding of risk factors and the importance of different transmission routes is still limited. In the period from May to September 2019, 655 Romanian pig farms were included in a matched case-control study investigating possible risk factors for ASF incursion in commercial and backyard pig farms. The results showed that close proximity to outbreaks in domestic farms was a risk factor in commercial as well as backyard farms. Furthermore, in backyard farms, herd size, wild boar abundance around the farm, number of domestic outbreaks within 2 km around farms, short distance to wild boar cases and visits of professionals working on farms were statistically significant risk factors. Additionally, growing crops around the farm, which could potentially attract wild boar, and feeding forage from ASF affected areas to the pigs were risk factors for ASF incursion in backyard farms.

Short time window for transmissibility of African swine fever virus from a contaminated environment

Since the introduction of African swine fever virus (ASFV) into the Baltic states and Poland in 2014, the disease has continued to spread within these regions. In 2017, the virus spread further west and the first cases of disease were reported in the Czech Republic and Romania, in wild boar and domestic pigs, respectively. To control further spread, knowledge of different modes of transmission, including indirect transmission via a contaminated environment, is crucial. Up until now, such an indirect mode of transmission has not been demonstrated. In this study, transmission via an environment contaminated with excretions from ASFV-infected pigs was investigated. Following euthanasia of pigs that were infected with an isolate of ASFV from Poland (POL/2015/Podlaskie/Lindholm), healthy pigs were introduced into the pens, in which the ASFV-infected pigs had been housed. Introduction was performed at 1, 3, 5 or 7 days, following euthanasia of the infected pig groups. Pigs, that were introduced into the contaminated environment after 1 day, developed clinical disease within 1 week, and both ASFV DNA and infectious virus were isolated from their blood. However, pigs introduced into the contaminated pens after 3, 5 or 7 days did not develop any signs of ASFV infection and no viral DNA was detected in blood samples obtained from these pigs within the following 3 weeks. Thus, it was shown that exposure of pigs to an environment contaminated with ASFV can result in infection. However, the time window for transmissibility of ASFV seems very limited, and, within our experimental system, there appears to be a rapid decrease in the infectivity of ASFV in the environment.

Biosecurity in 121 Danish sow herds

Herds are under constant risk of introducing new pathogens from different sources. In this article we describe biosecurity practices in Danish sow herds. Between December 1, 1999 and February 29, 2000, 121 sow units were interviewed regarding biosecurity on the site. The questionnaire contained 62 questions. The 121 units were situated in three areas with different swine densities. Sow units were described by their sizes (units with >110 sows were regarded as large herds) and health status (SPF herds or conventional herds). Of the 121 sow herds, 63 (52%) sold weaners. Most sow units (71%) used delivery facilities for the picking up of weaners, but half of these did not have a barrier between the loading area and the stable while loading. In 19% of the units, weaners were picked up directly from the stable, and in 10% the truck driver had access to the stables. Most units required the vehicle to be cleaned (16%) or cleaned and disinfected (48%) before the transport; large sites and SPF sites more often required stricter biosecurity measures, for example a quarantine period before the transport of weaners.

Biosecurity in 116 Danish fattening swineherds: descriptive results and factor analysis

Biosecurity measures are important for the herd's protection against diseases and also to provide nationwide protection against the introduction of exotic diseases. In this paper, we describe the farmers' choices and routines regarding biosecurity in Danish fattening herds. Overall, 116 Danish swine fattening herds in three areas of different pig density were interviewed. Of these herds, 78% purchased weaners from one sow herd only, whereas 10% purchased from >5 sow herds during 1 year. Large herds (>500 finishers) purchased weaners more often than smaller herds (< or =500 finishers). Only two swine producers purchased weaners from a market. Almost all herds (95%) received weaners from one sow herd at one time, and only one herd received from >5 sow herds in one batch. Twenty-one percent did not use an effective barrier between the loading area and the stables when delivering pigs for slaughter. Entry rooms (in which clothing and boots are changed) were common at the farm, and the numbers of visitors were generally low (<10 visitors a year). Factor analysis was performed to find underlying structures of the biosecurity measures in the herd; four factors were chosen (eigenvalue > 3.10). A site scoring high on factor 1 was a large SPF herd, which received weaners from a single source, had biosecurity requirements for the transport vehicles, and had a high level of biosecurity for visitors. A site scoring high on factor 2 was a multi-site farm, which had personnel working on more than one of the sites, only received weaners from one sow herd, had delivering herds placed close to the participating site, and transported animals themselves. A site scoring high on factor 3 was a site which hired commercial transport for slaughter, was situated far from the abattoir and had a high level of biosecurity when loading pigs. A production site scoring high on factor 4 was a large site, which used all-in/all-out management, washed and disinfected between each group, and purchased many weaners.