On modeling the correlates of conspiracy thinking

While a robust literature on the psychology of conspiracy theories has identified dozens of characteristics correlated with conspiracy theory beliefs, much less attention has been paid to understanding the generalized predisposition towards interpreting events and circumstances as the product of supposed conspiracies. Using a unique national survey of 2015 U.S. adults from October 2020, we investigate the relationship between this predisposition-conspiracy thinking-and 34 different psychological, political, and social correlates. Using conditional inference tree modeling-a machine learning-based approach designed to facilitate prediction using a flexible modeling methodology-we identify the characteristics that are most useful for orienting individuals along the conspiracy thinking continuum, including (but not limited to): anomie, Manicheanism, support for political violence, a tendency to share false information online, populism, narcissism, and psychopathy. Altogether, psychological characteristics are much more useful in predicting conspiracy thinking than are political and social characteristics, though even our robust set of correlates only partially accounts for variance in conspiracy thinking.

The Partisan Contours of Attitudes About Rights and Liberties

Americans of all political stripes abstractly support most of the rights and liberties guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution, such as free expression. Yet, we argue that attitudes regarding the basic mechanics of civil liberties-e.g., from whom they are protections-are divided across partisan lines. Because of elite rhetoric, we hypothesize that Republicans are more likely than Democrats to perceive rights violations, often by non-government entities (generally incapable of violations), and that they will perceive rights as under threat with greater frequency. Using a survey containing unique questions about rights, we first demonstrate that a large majority of the mass public has fixed preference structures regarding rights, suggesting that attitudes about liberties are not merely error-ridden, top-of-the-head assessments. These preference structures differ for Democrats and Republicans. Next, we find support for our theory that attitudes regarding rights, from whom they are protective, and their level of protectiveness are asymmetric across partisanship. Beyond implications for citizens' democratic capacities, our results also highlight potential concerns about the influence of partisan bias in demands on leaders regarding rights protection.

Supplementary Information

The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s11109-023-09860-3.

On the relationship between conspiracy theory beliefs, misinformation, and vaccine hesitancy

At the time of writing, nearly one hundred published studies demonstrate that beliefs in COVID-19 conspiracy theories and misinformation are negatively associated with COVID-19 preventive behaviors. These correlational findings are often interpreted as evidence that beliefs in conspiracy theories and misinformation are exogenous factors that shape human behavior, such as forgoing vaccination. This interpretation has motivated researchers to develop methods for "prebunking," "debunking," or otherwise limiting the spread of conspiracy theories and misinformation online. However, the robust literatures on conspiracy theory beliefs, health behaviors, and media effects lead us to question whether beliefs in conspiracy theories and misinformation should be treated as exogenous to vaccine hesitancy and refusal. Employing U.S. survey data (n = 2,065) from July 2021, we show that beliefs in COVID-19 conspiracy theories and misinformation are not only related to COVID-19 vaccine hesitancy and refusal, but also strongly associated with the same psychological, social, and political motivations theorized to drive COVID-19 vaccine hesitancy and refusal. These findings suggest that beliefs in conspiracy theories and misinformation might not always be an exogenous cause, but rather a manifestation of the same factors that lead to vaccine hesitancy and refusal. We conclude by encouraging researchers to carefully consider modeling choices and imploring practitioners to refocus on the worldviews, personality traits, and political orientations that underlie both health-related behaviors and beliefs in conspiracy theories and misinformation.

Christian Nationalism and Political Violence: Victimhood, Racial Identity, Conspiracy, and Support for the Capitol Attacks

What explains popular support for political violence in the contemporary United States, particularly the anti-institutional mob that attacked the U.S. Capitol in January 2021? Recent scholarship gives reason to suspect that a constellation of beliefs known as "Christian nationalism" may be associated with support for such violence. We build on this work, arguing that religious ideologies like Christian nationalism should be associated with support for violence, conditional on several individual characteristics that can be inflamed by elite cues. We turn to three such factors long-studied by scholars of political violence: perceived victimhood, reinforcing racial and religious identities, and support for conspiratorial information sources. Each can be exacerbated by elite cues, thus translating individual beliefs in Christian nationalism into support for political violence. We test this approach with original survey data collected in the wake of the Capitol attacks. We find that all the identified factors are positively related to each other and support for the Capitol riot; moreover, the relationship between Christian nationalism and support for political violence is sharply conditioned by white identity, perceived victimhood, and support for the QAnon movement. These results suggest that religion's role in contemporary right-wing violence is embedded with non-religious factors that deserve further scholarly attention in making sense of support for political violence.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION

The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s11109-021-09758-y.

The Relationship Between Social Media Use and Beliefs in Conspiracy Theories and Misinformation

Numerous studies find associations between social media use and beliefs in conspiracy theories and misinformation. While such findings are often interpreted as evidence that social media causally promotes conspiracy beliefs, we theorize that this relationship is conditional on other individual-level predispositions. Across two studies, we examine the relationship between beliefs in conspiracy theories and media use, finding that individuals who get their news from social media and use social media frequently express more beliefs in some types of conspiracy theories and misinformation. However, we also find that these relationships are conditional on conspiracy thinking--the predisposition to interpret salient events as products of conspiracies--such that social media use becomes more strongly associated with conspiracy beliefs as conspiracy thinking intensifies. This pattern, which we observe across many beliefs from two studies, clarifies the relationship between social media use and beliefs in dubious ideas.

Supplementary Information

The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s11109-021-09734-6.

Do conspiracy beliefs form a belief system? Examining the structure and organization of conspiracy beliefs

Despite regular reference to conspiracy theories as a “belief system,” few studies have attempted to explore the structure and organization of conspiracy beliefs beyond an examination of correlations between those beliefs. Employing unique data from two national surveys that includes respondent beliefs in 27 conspiracy theories, we decipher the substantive dimensions along which conspiracy beliefs are organized, as well as subgroupings within those dimensions. We find that variation in these conspiracy beliefs can be accounted for with two dimensions: the first regards partisan and ideological identities, while the other is composed of anti-social orientations, such as narcissism, Machiavellianism, psychopathy, and acceptance of political violence. Importantly, these two dimensions are uncorrelated. We also find that conspiracy beliefs group together by substantive content, such as those regarding partisan actors or science/medicine. Our findings also demonstrate that inferences about the correlates of conspiracy beliefs are highly contingent on the specific conspiracy theories employed by researchers. We provide suggestions for future research in this vein.

Are misinformation, antiscientific claims, and conspiracy theories for political extremists?

Extremist political groups, especially “extreme” Republicans and conservatives, are increasingly charged with believing misinformation, antiscientific claims, and conspiracy theories to a greater extent than moderates and those on the political left by both a burgeoning scholarly literature and popular press accounts. However, previous investigations of the relationship between political orientations and alternative beliefs have been limited in their operationalization of those beliefs and political extremity. We build on existing literature by examining the relationships between partisan and nonpartisan conspiracy beliefs and symbolic and operational forms of political extremity. Using two large, nationally representative samples of Americans, we find that ideological extremity predicts alternative beliefs only when the beliefs in question are partisan in nature and the measure of ideology is identity-based. Moreover, we find that operational ideological extremism is negatively related to nonpartisan conspiracy beliefs. Our findings help reconcile discrepant findings regarding the relationship between political orientations and conspiracy beliefs.

'Why Me?' The Role of Perceived Victimhood in American Politics

Despite growing recognition among journalists and political pundits, the concept of victimhood has been largely ignored in empirical social science research. In this article, we develop a theory about, and use unique nationally-representative survey data to estimate, two manifestations of victimhood: an egocentric one entailing only perceptions of one's own victimhood, and one focused on blaming "the system." We find that these manifestations of victimhood cut across partisan, ideological, and sociodemographic lines, suggesting that feelings of victimhood are confined to neither "actual" victims nor those partisans on the losing side of elections. Moreover, both manifestations of victimhood, while related to candidate support and various racial attitudes, prove to be distinct from related psychological constructs, such as (collective) narcissism, system justification, and relative deprivation. Finally, an experiment based on candidate rhetoric demonstrates that some political messaging can make supporters feel like victims, which has consequences for subsequent attitudes and behavior.