The serial reproduction of an urban myth: revisiting Bartlett's schema theory

Frederic Bartlett's schema theory is still widely misunderstood as claiming that remembering is inevitably unreliable. However, according to the logic of his schema theory, remembering should, in relation to certain kinds of material, be relatively reliable. In this study we examined whether a "well-worn" urban myth (the Vanishing Hitchhiker) could be exempt from the fate of other material used in Bartlett's own research on serial reproduction. Supporting Bartlett's ideas, we found that recall of the Hitchhiker story was better (if not perfect) over a series of five reproductions than recall of the classic War of the Ghosts. Recall was also better for a strict (as opposed to a lenient) audience, in line with another prediction from Bartlett's social theory of remembering. Notwithstanding this, we conclude with some critical remarks on the serial reproduction method as an approach to cultural memory.

Increasing Perspectival Obliqueness Increases the Leaning Tower Illusion

The leaning tower illusion is a perceptual illusion in which two identical images of a tower photographed from below appear to diverge when juxtaposed. We manipulated the perceived obliqueness of the (upright) St Mark bell tower in Venice by modifying two parameters both related to the position of the camera with respect to the tower: (a) increasing the peripherality of the tower and (b) reducing the distance between the camera and the tower. The resulting images clearly show that the illusory leaning effect increases as a function of the obliqueness. Another crucial condition for the leaning tower effect must be that the twin images are perceived as parts of a unitary display: The illusion increases when the distance between the photos is progressively increased, but beyond a certain level of separation, the integration of the images should, of course, break down, and the illusion vanish.

R.G. Collingwood and the Idea of a Historical Psychology

R.G. Collingwood's antagonism to scientific psychology is notorious. As a philosopher, especially an Oxford philosopher, such antagonism was hardly exceptional. Yet, in fact, Collingwood's attitude to the new science of psychology was remarkably ambivalent. He showed a keen interest in developments in the new science, regarded Freud as one of the greatest living scientists, and indeed himself pursued a full course of analysis. Nevertheless, Collingwood's criticisms of scientific psychology were searching, and involved a variety of distinct (though largely complementary) arguments. In relation to particular theorists, he objected to self-contradictions, pursuit of `red herrings' arising from prevarication in the use of established terms, and `plagiarism'. More fundamentally, he rejected the `covert scepticism' of psychology in its adoption of a purely empirical, `non-criteriological', approach to the study of thinking, an approach he regarded as appropriate solely to a science of `feeling'. Closely linked to this was his other main criticism of psychology, its presumption that the objects of study are transhistorical universals. In The Idea of History, however, Collingwood raised, though hardly elaborated, an alternative conception for a scientific psychology, as an essentially historical study, whose aim `would be to detect types or patterns of activity, repeated over and over again in history itself' (Collingwood, 1946, p. 224). Collingwood's historical conception of psychology is explored in the light of his objections to scientific psychology.

On the Persistence of the ‘Problem of Other Minds’ in Psychology

In this paper we discuss the historical origins and conceptual debts of the Theory of Mind framework (ToM). We investigate its affinities to Chomsky’s psychology, and Paul Grice’s work on meaning. We find that the ToM framework is resourced by the ideas found in Chomsky and Grice, adding very little new to them, and suffering from the same problems of dualism. ToM inherits the traditional dualistic problem of other minds, tries to solve it, and ends up profoundly intellectualizing social interactions.

On How We Can Act

This paper focuses on two of the points raised in Sharrock and Coulter's (1998) critique of James Gibson's later theorizing. They argue that Gibson limited himself to an overly abstracted and unified notion of `perception', and that his theory of affordances involved an overly restrictive claim about the `objects' of perception. We suggest an alternative reading of the theory of affordances, namely as a challenge to the traditional theoretical schema of `perception'. Gibson's last book, we argue, is primarily about agency, about how we can act. We accept Sharrock and Coulter's point that ecological psychology needs to find a place for `concepts' in its account of human life, but we question their apparent a priori assumption that human `perceptual activities' are entirely `rule-governed'. The degree and manner in which concepts figure in human life is indeed a matter for investigation.

An Iconoclast's Triptych

Edward Reed (1954-1997) is best known for his work commenting upon and developing James Gibson's ecological approach to psychology. The three books reviewed in this article set out what Reed termed his ecological philosophy. Encountering the World has the appearance of an introduction to ecological psychology, but makes little reference to the work of other researchers in this field. Rather, it is a statement of Reed's own perspective, and a critique of the artificiality of modern psychology. However, as The Necessity of Experience goes on to point out, everyday life has itself become profoundly artificial. Finally, From Soul to Mind provides an impressive historical account of how modern psychology, conceived as a science of mind rather than soul, became such a narrow and complacent project. Yet these three titles, envisaged by Reed as a triptych, do not quite connect, and fail to convey the unity as well as scope of his important vision.

Theory of Mind

The ‘Theory of Mind’ approach has been associated with probably the fastest-growing body of empirical research in psychology over the last 25 years, and has given rise to a range of different theoretical positions and elaborations within those positions. The basic idea is that understanding other people involves bridging a gulf between observed ‘behaviour’ and hidden mental states by means of a theory. The articles in this Special Issue subject ‘Theory of Mind’ to sustained critical scrutiny, and also present alternative accounts of how we make sense of—and make sense to—other people. They trace the historical sources of ‘Theory of Mind’, criticize its fundamental assumptions and favoured methods, and examine its applications to child development and the explanation of schizophrenia and autism.

Socializing Affordances

Modern disciplines both reflect and perpetuate a basic dualism. The natural sciences deal with a `material world', abstracted from human concerns, while the social sciences have, in their turn, constructed a world of `agents' disconnected from material things. James Gibson's theory of affordances was an attempt to counter this deep schism in modern thought by emphasizing the material conditions of human activity. He came to see that psychology, as traditionally conceived, was itself a creation of dualistic thinking. Yet, Gibson failed to engage in a corresponding exploration of the sociality of the material. This paper examines the reasons why Gibson retained a dualism of the natural and socio-cultural in his theory; points to some of the ways in which the concept of affordances should be socialized; and, finally, raises the question: what would ecological psychology stand to lose if all affordances were social?

Failing to See the Irony in ‘Mind-Reading’

We are puzzled by Szilvia Papp's response to the recent Special Issue of Theory & Psychology devoted to critiques of and alternatives to Theory of Mind. Although Papp is a linguist with a special interest not only in Theory of Mind but also in ‘Relevance Theory’, we can find no reference in her response to the critical issues raised in the Special Issue, nor any defence of the dualist metaphysics behind Theory of Mind. Instead, she presents us with a further demonstration that if one starts from dualistic premises, then one does indeed end up with something along the lines of Theory of Mind with its resort to ‘mind-reading’.

Parents' experiences of introducing everyday object use to their children with autism

A semi-structured interview study, investigating the acquisition of everyday object use in children with autism and developmentally matched controls, is presented. Parents were asked to describe how their child currently used various everyday objects during mealtime and washing routines, the process by which this came about, and any problems encountered in attempting to introduce appropriate object use. Following transcription, the interviews were treated using a method combining phenomenological and content analysis. The statements generated were condensed, using progressive categorization, into three tables of summary statements. These represented the different sources of influence on the children's object use and the problems parents experienced in attempting to guide their child's actions. Relative to comparison groups, parents of children with autism reported that they experienced more problems and used more intensive teaching methods, and that their children were less actively involved. The findings are discussed in relation to the influence of other people in shaping object use and implications for intervention programmes.

Not Just Being Lifted: Infants are Sensitive to Delay During a Pick-Up Routine

In the present study we observed whether infants show online adjustments to the mother’s incipient action by looking at their sensitivity to changes as the pick-up unfolded. Twenty-three 3-month-old infants and their mothers were observed in the lab, where mothers were instructed (1) to pick-up their infants as they usually did (normal pick-up), and then (2) to delay the pick-up for 6 s after placing their hands on the infants’ waist (delayed pick-up). In both Normal and Delayed conditions infant’s body tension, affective displays and gaze shifts were coded during three phases: Approach, Contact, and Lift. Additionally, a measure of infants’ head support in terms of head lag at the beginning and end of Lift was computed. Results showed that during normal pick-up infants tensed up their body during the Approach phase and increased their tension during contact, maintaining it through Lift; their head was also supported and in line with their body during Lift. When the pick-up was delayed, infants also tensed their body during Approach, yet this tension did not increase during the Contact phase and was significantly lower at Lift. Their head support was also lower in the Delayed condition and they shifted their gazes away from their mothers’ face more often than in the Normal condition. These results suggest that infants are sensitive to changes of the timing of the pick-up sequence, which in turn may have affected their contribution to the interaction.

The "textbook Gibson": The assimilation of dissidence

We examine how the textbooks have dealt with one of psychology's most eminent dissidents, James Gibson (1904-1979). Our review of more than a hundred textbooks, dating from the 1950s to the present, reveals fundamental and systematic misrepresentations of Gibson. Although Gibson continues to figure in most of the textbooks, his work is routinely assimilated to theoretical positions he emphatically rejected: cue theory, stimulus-response psychology, and nativism. As Gibson's one-time colleague, Ulric Neisser, pointed out, psychologists are especially prone to trying to understand new proposals "by mapping it on to some existing scheme," and warned that when "an idea is really new, that strategy fails" (Neisser, 1990, p. 749). The "Textbook Gibson" is an example of such a failure, and perhaps also of the more general importance of assimilation-"shadow history"-within the actual history of psychology.

Jointly structuring triadic spaces of meaning and action: book sharing from 3 months on

This study explores the emergence of triadic interactions through the example of book sharing. As part of a naturalistic study, 10 infants were visited in their homes from 3–12 months. We report that (1) book sharing as a form of infant-caregiver-object interaction occurred from as early as 3 months. Using qualitative video analysis at a micro-level adapting methodologies from conversation and interaction analysis, we demonstrate that caregivers and infants practiced book sharing in a highly co-ordinated way, with caregivers carving out interaction units and shaping actions into action arcs and infants actively participating and co-ordinating their attention between mother and object from the beginning. We also (2) sketch a developmental trajectory of book sharing over the first year and show that the quality and dynamics of book sharing interactions underwent considerable change as the ecological situation was transformed in parallel with the infants' development of attention and motor skills. Social book sharing interactions reached an early peak at 6 months with the infants becoming more active in the coordination of attention between caregiver and book. From 7 to 9 months, the infants shifted their interest largely to solitary object exploration, in parallel with newly emerging postural and object manipulation skills, disrupting the social coordination and the cultural frame of book sharing. In the period from 9 to 12 months, social book interactions resurfaced, as infants began to effectively integrate manual object actions within the socially shared activity. In conclusion, to fully understand the development and qualities of triadic cultural activities such as book sharing, we need to look especially at the hitherto overlooked early period from 4 to 6 months, and investigate how shared spaces of meaning and action are structured together in and through interaction, creating the substrate for continuing cooperation and cultural learning.

Changing the game: exploring infants' participation in early play routines

Play has proved to have a central role in children's development, most notably in rule learning (Piaget, 1965; Sutton-Smith, 1979) and negotiation of roles and goals (Garvey, 1974; Bruner et al., 1976). Yet very little research has been done on early play. The present study focuses on early social games, i.e., vocal-kinetic play routines that mothers use to interact with infants from very early on. We explored 3-month-old infants and their mothers performing a routine game first in the usual way, then in two violated conditions: without gestures and without sound. The aim of the study is to investigate infants' participation and expectations in the game and whether this participation is affected by changes in the multimodal format of the game. Infants' facial expressions, gaze, and body movements were coded to measure levels of engagement and affective state across the three conditions. Results showed a significant decrease in Limbs Movements and expressions of Positive Affect, an increase in Gaze Away and in Stunned Expression when the game structure was violated. These results indicate that the violated game conditions were experienced as less engaging, either because of an unexpected break in the established joint routine, or simply because they were weaker versions of the same game. Overall, our results suggest that structured, multimodal play routines may constitute interactional contexts that only work as integrated units of auditory and motor resources, representing early communicative contexts which prepare the ground for later, more complex multimodal interactions, such as verbal exchanges.

'These psychiatrists rate themselves as gods': disengagement and engagement discourses of people living with severe mental illness

Positioning analysis, a variant of discourse analysis, was used to explore the narratives of 40 psychiatric patients (11 females and 29 males; mean age = 40 years) who had manifest difficulties with engagement with statutory mental health services. Positioning analysis is a qualitative method that captures how people linguistically position the roles and identities of themselves and others in their day-to-day lives and narratives. The language of disengagement incorporated the passive positioning of self in relation to their lives and treatment through the use of metaphor, the passive voice and them and us attribution, while the discourse of engagement incorporated more active positioning of self achieved through the use of the personal pronoun we and metaphoric references to balanced relationships. The findings corroborate previous thematic analysis that highlighted the importance of identity and agency in the 'making or breaking' of therapeutic relationships (Priebe et al. 2005). Implications are discussed in relation to how positioning analysis may help signal and emphasize important life and therapeutic experiences in spoken narratives as well as clinical consultations.

False reports of childhood events in appropriate interviews

The present study employed the "parental misinformation" paradigm to examine whether individuals report false events from their childhood even when they are interviewed in an appropriate manner by a trained interviewer. Each participant was interviewed on three occasions. By the final interview, one participant produced a "full" report, and six participants produced "partial" reports, of childhood events that did not occur. Although participants reported perceiving greater pressure to report the false events than the real events, independent judges' ratings of social pressure in the interviews did not differ as a function of what type of event participants were being asked about. Participants also reported higher confidence in their parents', compared to their own, recall of events from their childhood. False reports were also positively correlated with scores on both the full and the revised versions of the Dissociative Experiences Scale, and negatively correlated with score on the Self-Monitoring scale. These results indicate that, despite being interviewed in an appropriate manner by a trained interviewer, some participants will falsely report events from their childhoods.

Group differences in the mutual gaze of chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes)

A comparative developmental framework was used to determine whether mutual gaze is unique to humans and, if not, whether common mechanisms support the development of mutual gaze in chimpanzees and humans. Mother-infant chimpanzees engaged in approximately 17 instances of mutual gaze per hour. Mutual gaze occurred in positive, nonagonistic contexts. Mother-infant chimpanzees at a Japanese center exhibited significantly more mutual gaze than those at a center in the United States. Cradling and motor stimulation varied across groups. Time spent cradling infants was inversely related to mutual gaze. It is suggested that in primates, mutual engagement is supported via an interchangeability of tactile and visual modalities. The importance of mutual gaze is best understood within a perspective that embraces both cross-species and cross-cultural data.

A kinematic analysis of hand selection in a reaching task

A group of left- and right-handers was tested on a task requiring them to reach out and pick up an object with either the left or the right hand. We varied the eccentricity of the target object (a small glass) and the required accuracy level, by filling the glass with liquid. We recorded (a) frequency of left or right hand use, (b) hand preference using a handedness questionnaire, and (c) the trajectories of the reaches using a movement registration system. It was found that the stronger the hand preference, the further in contralateral space the shift occurred between left and right hand use. Not only did the transition point corresponding to the shift between the two hands correlate with the point where their deceleration times were equal, but these locations closely coincided. These findings suggest that people are highly skilled perceivers of their own action capabilities, and that they are able to select the action mode that is most suited to perform a given task. We argue that laterality should be understood in terms of asymmetries in action modes.

Drifting towards a diffuse control model of exploratory motor learning: A comparison of global and within-trial performance measures

Accurate measurement is crucial for understanding the processes that underlie exploratory patterns in motor learning. Accordingly, measures of learning should be sensitive to the changes that take place during skill acquisition. Most studies, however, use trial-based global measures that assess performance but do not actually measure gradual changes taking place within trials. The present study attempted to remedy this shortcoming by analysing a visual adaptation task, and comparing traditional global measures of learning with new, within-trial measures. Movement time was the only global measure sensitive to changes in the movement trajectory during learning. Three new measures were expected to reveal changes to the movement trajectory that are associated with learning: (i) the length of runs, (ii) change of trajectory angle in relation to the target, and (iii) drift (change in distance from the target). All three measures were sensitive to learning and indicated a gradual straightening of the movement trajectories over trials. Furthermore, three different methods to partition trajectories into segments were examined. The new within-trial measures, irrespective of partitioning method, prove promising for the development of a diffuse control model of exploratory learning.

Misremembering Bartlett: a study in serial reproduction

According to much of the recent psychological literature on memory, Bartlett should be credited with the insight that remembering can never be accurate but is, instead, more or less of a distortion (a view to which many modern authors themselves seem to subscribe). In the present paper, we argue that Bartlett did not himself provide such an unqualified account of remembering. Although he sought to challenge the idea that remembering is largely an accurate record of past events, he did not maintain that it is always inaccurate. Despite unqualified claims by Bartlett to the contrary, neither his own experiments nor his theoretical position warrant the conclusion that remembering is inherently unreliable. Indeed, as we explain, Bartlett himself provides several examples of impressively detailed and accurate recall, and sought to explain them within the framework of his schema theory.

Taking a closer look at functional play in children with autism

Research evidence indicates that children with autism may experience problems with functional play, in addition to their well-documented deficits in symbolic play. However, as a result of the tendency of previous studies to group all functional play into a single category, the precise nature and extent of this deficit remains unclear. The present study undertook a more refined analysis of such play, subtyping the functional acts into various categories, in terms of the developmental progression suggested by research with typical infants. The functional play of children with autism was compared to that of developmentally matched children with Down syndrome and typical infants. Although there were no group differences in overall measures of the proportion of total play time spent in functional play and in the number of functional acts performed, a closer analysis of the composition of this play did reveal striking, qualitative differences. The functional play of the autism group was less elaborated, less varied, and less integrated than that of the controls. The implications of these findings are explored in relation to current theoretical models of autism and in relation to the role of other people in mediating the appropriate use of objects.

Children with autism experience problems with both objects and people

Kanner (1943), in his classic account, described autism as a specific impairment in interpersonal relations which leaves the child's uses of objects relatively unaffected. This combination of the difficulties in relating to people and the supposedly "excellent" relations to objects figures centrally within many of the current theories of autism, which have had relatively little to say on the question of object use. This paper draws attention to evidence of widespread impairments in relating to objects, not only in interpersonal aspects of object use but also in early sensorimotor exploration and the functional and conventional uses of objects. In stressing these problems with objects, our purpose is not to downplay the social dimension of autism, but rather to highlight the reciprocal nature of the interactions between the child, other people, and objects. Given the evidence that other people play an important role in introducing objects to children, we propose that an impairment in interpersonal relations should itself lead us to expect corresponding disruption in the autistic child's use of objects. Conversely, an unusual use of objects is likely to manifest itself in disturbances in relating to other people, given the importance of a shared understanding and use of objects in facilitating interaction.

Dire straits: the divisive legacy of the 1898 Cambridge anthropological expedition

Bartlett's claim that the Cambridge anthropological expedition of 1898 to the Torres Strait "put a social and ethnological stamp upon Cambridge psychology" does not bear close examination. Rivers pursued his interests in both anthropology and psychology but came to regard them as largely independent pursuits. Myers, through the influence of Rivers, came to identify himself primarily as a psychologist. McDougall was very quickly marginalized. There were two occasions when the promise of the Torres Strait began to be fulfilled: first, the reunion of Rivers, Myers, McDougall, and Seligman, all medically trained, at Maghull Hospital to help in the treatment of shell-shocked soldiers; second, Bartlett's attempt, early in his career, to establish a sociocultural psychology. However, the remarkable "academy" at Maghull was disbanded at the end of the war, and Bartlett, in his attempt to promote the "upstart subject" of psychology at Cambridge, increasingly came to distance his department from social and ethnological concerns. There is a neglected legacy of the Torres Strait expedition, the curious belief that the methods of experimental psychology, and indeed psychophysics, could (somehow) be foundational to the human sciences. This legacy has served both to suggest that psychology must have something to do with anthropology, while perpetually deferring any actual integration between the two disciplines.

Visual perception of lifted weight from kinematic and static (photographic) displays

Observers of patch-light videotape displays can reliably discriminate levels of lifted weight; accuracy of judgments sometimes approximates that achieved when the observers themselves lift weighted boxes. Results of 6 studies reveal impressive levels of visual weight discrimination based on static displays (photographs) of certain action phases sampled from videos of entire lifting-carrying events. Slow and controlled actions (e.g., walking, placing box on table) supported optimum weight discrimination for both photographic and video displays, whereas the action of lifting a box yielded high levels of discrimination only for video displays. Static and kinematic specification of dynamics, as well as the work by painters and photographers to depict humans and other animals in action, is discussed.

Visual perception of lifted weight from kinematic and static (photographic) displays

Observers of patch-light videotape displays can reliably discriminate levels of lifted weight; accuracy of judgments sometimes approximates that achieved when the observers themselves lift weighted boxes. Results of 6 studies reveal impressive levels of visual weight discrimination based on static displays (photographs) of certain action phases sampled from videos of entire lifting-carrying events. Slow and controlled actions (e.g., walking, placing box on table) supported optimum weight discrimination for both photographic and video displays, whereas the action of lifting a box yielded high levels of discrimination only for video displays. Static and kinematic specification of dynamics, as well as the work by painters and photographers to depict humans and other animals in action, is discussed.