The first prior: From co-embodiment to co-homeostasis in early life

The idea that our perceptions in the here and now are influenced by prior events and experiences has recently received substantial support and attention from the proponents of the Predictive Processing (PP) and Active Inference framework in philosophy and computational neuroscience. In this paper we look at how perceptual experiences get off the ground from the outset, in utero. One basic yet overlooked aspect of current PP approaches is that human organisms first develop within another human body. Crucially, while not all humans will have the experience of being pregnant or carrying a baby, the experience of being carried and growing within another person's body is universal. Specifically, we focus on the development of minimal selfhood in utero as a process co-embodiment and co-homeostasis, and highlight their close relationship. We conclude with some implications on several critical questions fuelling current debates on the nature of conscious experiences, minimal self and social cognition.

I overthink-Therefore I am not: An active inference account of altered sense of self and agency in depersonalisation disorder

This paper considers the phenomenology of depersonalisation disorder, in relation to predictive processing and its associated pathophysiology. To do this, we first establish a few mechanistic tenets of predictive processing that are necessary to talk about phenomenal transparency, mental action, and self as subject. We briefly review the important role of 'predicting precision' and how this affords mental action and the loss of phenomenal transparency. We then turn to sensory attenuation and the phenomenal consequences of (pathophysiological) failures to attenuate or modulate sensory precision. We then consider this failure in the context of depersonalisation disorder. The key idea here is that depersonalisation disorder reflects the remarkable capacity to explain perceptual engagement with the world via the hypothesis that "I am an embodied perceiver, but I am not in control of my perception". We suggest that individuals with depersonalisation may believe that 'another agent' is controlling their thoughts, perceptions or actions, while maintaining full insight that the 'other agent' is 'me' (the self). Finally, we rehearse the predictions of this formal analysis, with a special focus on the psychophysical and physiological abnormalities that may underwrite the phenomenology of depersonalisation.

The functions of imitative behaviour in humans

This article focuses on the question of the function of imitation and whether current accounts of imitative function are consistent with our knowledge about imitation's origins. We first review theories of imitative origin concluding that empirical evidence suggests that imitation arises from domain-general learning mechanisms. Next, we lay out a selective account of function that allows normative functions to be ascribed to learned behaviours. We then describe and review four accounts of the function of imitation before evaluating the relationship between the claim that imitation arises out of domain-general learning mechanisms and theories of the function of imitation.

Whatever Next and Close to My Self-The Transparent Senses and the "Second Skin": Implications for the Case of Depersonalization

In his paper “Whatever next? Predictive brains, situated agents, and the future of cognitive science,” Andy Clark seminally proposed that the brain's job is to predict whatever information is coming “next” on the basis of prior inputs and experiences. Perception fundamentally subserves survival and self-preservation in biological agents, such as humans. Survival however crucially depends on rapid and accurate information processing of what is happening in the here and now. Hence, the term “next” in Clark's seminal formulation must include not only the temporal dimension (i.e., what is perceived now) but also the spatial dimension (i.e., what is perceived here or next-to-my-body). In this paper, we propose to focus on perceptual experiences that happen “next,” i.e., close-to-my-body. This is because perceptual processing of proximal sensory inputs has a key impact on the organism's survival. Specifically, we focus on tactile experiences mediated by the skin and what we will call the “extended skin” or “second skin,” that is, immediate objects/materials that envelop closely to our skin, namely, clothes. We propose that the skin and tactile experiences are not a mere border separating the self and world. Rather, they simultaneously and inherently distinguish and connect the bodily self to its environment. Hence, these proximal and pervasive tactile experiences can be viewed as a “transparent bridge” intrinsically relating and facilitating exchanges between the self and the physical and social world. We conclude with potential implications of this observation for the case of Depersonalization Disorder, a condition that makes people feel estranged and detached from their self, body, and the world.

The brain is not mental! coupling neuronal and immune cellular processing in human organisms

Significant efforts have been made in the past decades to understand how mental and cognitive processes are underpinned by neural mechanisms in the brain. This paper argues that a promising way forward in understanding the nature of human cognition is to zoom out from the prevailing picture focusing on its neural basis. It considers instead how neurons work in tandem with other type of cells (e.g., immune) to subserve biological self-organization and adaptive behavior of the human organism as a whole. We focus specifically on the immune cellular processing as key actor in complementing neuronal processing in achieving successful self-organization and adaptation of the human body in an ever-changing environment. We overview theoretical work and empirical evidence on "basal cognition" challenging the idea that only the neuronal cells in the brain have the exclusive ability to "learn" or "cognize." The focus on cellular rather than neural, brain processing underscores the idea that flexible responses to fluctuations in the environment require a carefully crafted orchestration of multiple cellular and bodily systems at multiple organizational levels of the biological organism. Hence cognition can be seen as a multiscale web of dynamic information processing distributed across a vast array of complex cellular (e.g., neuronal, immune, and others) and network systems, operating across the entire body, and not just in the brain. Ultimately, this paper builds up toward the radical claim that cognition should not be confined to one system alone, namely, the neural system in the brain, no matter how sophisticated the latter notoriously is.

The Detached Self: Investigating the Effect of Depersonalisation on Self-Bias in the Visual Remapping of Touch

There is a growing consensus that our most fundamental sense of self is structured by the ongoing integration of sensory and motor information related to our own body. Depersonalisation (DP) is an intriguing form of altered subjective experience in which people report feelings of unreality and detachment from their sense of self. The current study used the visual remapping of touch (VRT) paradigm to explore self-bias in visual-tactile integration in non-clinical participants reporting high and low levels of depersonalisation experiences. We found that the high-DP group showed an increased overall VRT effect but a no-self-face bias, instead showing a greater VRT effect when observing the face of another person. In addition, across all participants, self-bias was negatively predicted by the occurrence of anomalous body experiences. These results indicate disrupted integration of tactile and visual representations of the bodily self in those experiencing high levels of DP and provide greater understanding of how disruptions in multisensory perception of the self may underlie the phenomenology of depersonalisation.

Back to square one: the bodily roots of conscious experiences in early life

Most theoretical and empirical discussions about the nature of consciousness are typically couched in a way that endorses a tacit adult-centric and vision-based perspective. This paper defends the idea that consciousness science may be put on a fruitful track for its next phase by examining the nature of subjective experiences through a bottom-up developmental lens. We draw attention to the intrinsic link between consciousness, experiences and experiencing subjects, which are first and foremost embodied and situated organisms essentially concerned with self-preservation within a precarious environment. Our paper suggests that in order to understand what consciousness 'is', one should first tackle the fundamental question: how do embodied experiences 'arise' from square one? We then highlight one key yet overlooked aspect of human consciousness studies, namely that the earliest and closest environment of an embodied experiencing subject is the body of another human experiencing subject. We present evidence speaking in favour of fairly sophisticated forms of early sensorimotor integration of bodily signals and self-generated actions already being established in utero. We conclude that these primitive and fundamentally relational and co-embodied roots of our early experiences may have a crucial impact on the way human beings consciously experience the self, body and the world across their lifespan.

Zoomed out: digital media use and depersonalization experiences during the COVID-19 lockdown

Depersonalisation is a common dissociative experience characterised by distressing feelings of being detached or 'estranged' from one's self and body and/or the world. The COVID-19 pandemic forcing millions of people to socially distance themselves from others and to change their lifestyle habits. We have conducted an online study of 622 participants worldwide to investigate the relationship between digital media-based activities, distal social interactions and peoples' sense of self during the lockdown as contrasted with before the pandemic. We found that increased use of digital media-based activities and online social e-meetings correlated with higher feelings of depersonalisation. We also found that the participants reporting higher experiences of depersonalisation, also reported enhanced vividness of negative emotions (as opposed to positive emotions). Finally, participants who reported that lockdown influenced their life to a greater extent had higher occurrences of depersonalisation experiences. Our findings may help to address key questions regarding well-being during a lockdown, in the general population. Our study points to potential risks related to overly sedentary, and hyper-digitalised lifestyle habits that may induce feelings of living in one's 'head' (mind), disconnected from one's body, self and the world.

The Scientific Study of Consciousness Cannot and Should Not Be Morally Neutral

A target question for the scientific study of consciousness is how dimensions of consciousness, such as the ability to feel pain and pleasure or reflect on one's own experience, vary in different states and animal species. Considering the tight link between consciousness and moral status, answers to these questions have implications for law and ethics. Here we point out that given this link, the scientific community studying consciousness may face implicit pressure to carry out certain research programs or interpret results in ways that justify current norms rather than challenge them. We show that because consciousness largely determines moral status, the use of nonhuman animals in the scientific study of consciousness introduces a direct conflict between scientific relevance and ethics-the more scientifically valuable an animal model is for studying consciousness, the more difficult it becomes to ethically justify compromises to its well-being for consciousness research. Finally, in light of these considerations, we call for a discussion of the immediate ethical corollaries of the body of knowledge that has accumulated and for a more explicit consideration of the role of ideology and ethics in the scientific study of consciousness.

Explicit and implicit sense of agency in depersonalisation experiences

The sense of agency, the feeling of controlling one's bodily actions and the world is altered in Depersonalisation (DP), a condition that makes people feel detached from one's self and body. To investigate the link between depersonalisation and both implicit and explicit sense of agency, an online study was conducted using the influential Intentional Binding paradigm in a sample of non-clinical DP participants. The results did not reveal significant differences between individuals with low and high occurrences of DP experiences on the implicit and explicit sense of agency. However, participants with high occurrences of DP experiences showed a more time-sensitive explicit sense of agency and greater temporal distortions for short intervals in the absence of self-initiated motion. These results suggest that there is a discrepancy between implicit and explicit sense of agency in people with high levels of depersonalisation. Altogether, these findings call for further investigations of the key role of time perception on altered sense of self and agency in both non-clinical and clinical populations, to disentangle the mechanisms associated with the explicit and implicit sense of agency.

Examining the association between depersonalisation traits and the bodily self in waking and dreaming

Depersonalisation (DP) is characterized by fundamental alterations to the sense of self that include feelings of detachment and estrangement from one's body. We conducted an online study in healthy participants (n = 514) with DP traits to investigate and quantify the subjective experience of body and self during waking and dreaming, as the vast majority of previous studies focussed on waking experience only. Investigating dreams in people experiencing DP symptoms may help us understand whether the dream state is a 'spared space' where people can temporarily 'retrieve' their sense of self and sense of bodily presence. We found that higher DP traits-i.e. higher scores on the Cambridge Depersonalisation Scale (CDS)-were associated with more frequent dream experiences from an outside observer perspective (r = 0.28) and more frequent dream experiences of distinct bodily sensations (r = 0.23). We also found that people with higher CDS scores had more frequent dream experiences of altered bodily perception (r = 0.24), more frequent nightmares (r = 0.33) and higher dream recall (r = 0.17). CDS scores were negatively correlated with body boundary scores (r = - 0.31) in waking states and there was a negative association between CDS scores and the degree of trust in interoceptive signals (r = - 0.52). Our study elucidates the complex phenomenology of DP in relation to bodily selfhood during waking and dreaming and suggests avenues for potential therapeutic interventions in people with chronic depersonalisation (depersonalisation -derealisation disorder).

Lost in time and space? Multisensory processing of peripersonal space and time perception in people with frequent experiences of depersonalisation

Perception of one's own body in time and space is a fundamental aspect of self-consciousness. It scaffolds our subjective experience of being present, in the here and now, a vital condition for our survival and well-being. Depersonalisation (DP) is characterized by a distressing feeling of being 'spaced out', detached from one's self, as well as atypical 'flat' time perception. Using an audio-tactile paradigm, we conducted a study looking at the effect of DP experiences on peripersonal space (PPS) - the space close to the body - and time perception. Strikingly, we found no difference in PPS perception in people with higher DP experiences (High DPe) versus low occurrences of DP experiences (Low DPe). To assess time perception, we used the Mental Time Travel (MTT) task measuring the individuals' capacity to take one's present as a reference point for situating personal versus general events in the past and the future. We found an overall poorer performance in locating events in time relative to their present reference point in High DPe. By contrast, Low DPe showed significant variation in performance when answering to relative past events, while High DPe did not. Our study sheds light on the close link between altered sense of self and egocentric spatiotemporal perception in individuals with DP experiences, the third most common psychological symptom in the general population.

Gesture sonification for enhancing agency: an exploratory study on healthy participants

Background

Body awareness (BA) and proprioception, which are essential components of the sense of agency (SA), are often altered in various mental disorders such as posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD). However, the relationship between BA, proprioception, and SA, as well as the methods to manipulate them, remain unclear. This study explored using real-time gesture sonification (GS), i.e., wearable technology transforming body movements into sounds, to enhance proprioception, BA, and thus the SA.

Methods

In this within-subjects design, 17 healthy adults (mean age = 25.5 years) with varying dance expertise (novice, amateur, expert) improvised movements to match sounds with and without auditory feedback from motion sensors on wrists/ankles modulated by their gestures. BA, immersion, pleasure, and self-efficacy were measured.

Results

Sonification significantly increased body awareness, reward, and immersion (all p < 0.05).

Conclusion

GS can enhance BA and the SA, pleasure, and control during physical activity. This highlights potential mental health applications, such as agency-based therapies for PTSD. Manipulating bodily perception could improve symptoms and embodiment. Further research should replicate this in clinical populations and explore neurocognitive mechanisms.

Depersonalization affects self-prioritization of bodily, but not abstract self-related information

Depersonalization is a common and distressing experience characterized by a feeling of estrangement from one's self, body, and the world. In order to examine the relationship between depersonalization and selfhood we conducted an experimental study comparing processing of three types of self-related information between nonclinical groups of people experiencing high and low levels of depersonalization. Using a sequential matching task, we compared three types of biases for processing of self-related information: prioritization of one's name, of self-associated abstract stimuli (geometrical shapes), and of self-associated bodily stimuli (avatar faces). We found that both groups demonstrated the standard pattern of results for self-prioritization of one's name and geometrical shapes, but they differed with regard to avatar faces. While people with low depersonalization showed the standard prioritization of avatar faces, people with high depersonalization showed overall better response accuracy with avatar faces, and faster response times for stranger-associated avatar faces. These results were complemented by the additional finding that people with high depersonalization reported being more likely to use avatars of a different gender to their own outside of the experimental context. Finally, in this large sample (N = 180) we investigated the relationships between different measures of self-related processing and self-identification, finding no correlation between explicit reports of self-identification with self-associated avatar faces and geometrical shapes, self-prioritization of these stimuli, and prioritization of one's name. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).

Nested Selves: Self-Organization and Shared Markov Blankets in Prenatal Development in Humans

The immune system is a central component of organismic function in humans. This paper addresses self-organization of biological systems in relation to-and nested within-other biological systems in pregnancy. Pregnancy constitutes a fundamental state for human embodiment and a key step in the evolution and conservation of our species. While not all humans can be pregnant, our initial state of emerging and growing within another person's body is universal. Hence, the pregnant state does not concern some individuals but all individuals. Indeed, the hierarchical relationship in pregnancy reflects an even earlier autopoietic process in the embryo by which the number of individuals in a single blastoderm is dynamically determined by cell- interactions. The relationship and the interactions between the two self-organizing systems during pregnancy may play a pivotal role in understanding the nature of biological self-organization per se in humans. Specifically, we consider the role of the immune system in biological self-organization in addition to neural/brain systems that furnish us with a sense of self. We examine the complex case of pregnancy, whereby two immune systems need to negotiate the exchange of resources and information in order to maintain viable self-regulation of nested systems. We conclude with a proposal for the mechanisms-that scaffold the complex relationship between two self-organising systems in pregnancy-through the lens of the Active Inference, with a focus on shared Markov blankets.