Davids versus Goliaths: Pharma and academia threats to individual scientists and clinicians

Background

We previously described experiences of clinicians who published adverse drug reaction reports. We now report on threats and intimidations leveled against clinicians and scientists who received publicly documented threats after communicating safety, efficacy, or data integrity findings contrary to corporate interests.

Methods

Data on threats and intimidations were obtained from transcripts of governmental hearings or agencies, university-affiliated reports, media interviews, and investigative journalism articles. Content and timing of threats and intimidation, subsequent harms, numbers of persons seriously injured or who died from individual toxicities, financial payments from sponsors related to safety, efficacy, or data integrity concerns, and civil settlements and criminal findings were evaluated.

Findings

Twenty-six individuals who communicated safety, efficacy, or data integrity concerns were targets of threats and intimidation from corporate employees (twenty-three individuals) or regulatory personnel (three). Seventeen individuals identified instances where pharmaceutical sponsors submitted fraudulent data in support of regulatory approval of a drug or device. Scientist and clinician communications were followed by drug/device withdrawals (fourteen drugs/devices), black box warnings (six drugs), withdrawal of a sponsor’s application for regulatory approval (one device), and delay of approval of a sponsor’s application for regulatory approval (one drug). Actions mainly occurred after persons communicated with pharmaceutical employees (fourteen). Intimidation efforts by corporate personnel included threats of lawsuits (eighteen individuals), hiring private investigators (nine), and public disparagement at conferences (eleven). Related intimidation efforts carried out by academia or regulatory agency superiors included threats of: loss of positions (six), loss of grant funding (two), delays in decisions regarding tenure (two); or reassignment to a low-level position (one). Academic harms included lost: hospital or university appointments (nine and six, respectively), grant funding (two), chairperson title of an international clinical trial group (one), and journal editorial board position (one). Corporate harms included payment of $1 million to defense attorneys in three cases filed against clinicians.

Interpretation

Threats and intimidation carried out by corporate employees and/or academic supervisors followed public communication of concerns regarding patient safety, drug efficacy, or data integrity, including instances where sponsors were identified as having submitted fraudulent data to regulatory or government agencies. Consideration should be given to filing criminal charges against pharmaceutical executives who are discovered by scientists or clinicians to have knowingly submitted fraudulent data to regulatory or governmental agencies, rather than causing the scientists and clinicians who submit such reports to risk losing their reputations and occupations.

Improving oncology biosimilar launches in the EU, the USA, and Japan: an updated Policy Review from the Southern Network on Adverse Reactions

The EU, the USA, and Japan account for the majority of biological pharmacotherapy use worldwide. Biosimilar regulatory approval pathways were authorised in the EU (2006), in Japan (2009), and in the USA (2015), to facilitate approval of biological drugs that are highly similar to reference products and to encourage market competition. Between 2007 and 2020, 33 biosimilars for oncology were approved by the European Medicines Agency (EMA), 16 by the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA), and ten by the Japan Pharmaceuticals and Medical Devices Agency (PMDA). Some of these approved applications were initially rejected because of manufacturing concerns (four of 36 [11%] with the EMA, seven of 16 [44%] with the FDA, none of ten for the PMDA). Median times from initial regulatory submission before approval of oncology biosimilars were 1·5 years (EMA), 1·3 years (FDA), and 0·9 years (PMDA). Pharmacists can substitute biosimilars for reference biologics in some EU countries, but not in the USA or Japan. US regulation prohibits substitution, unless the biosimilar has been approved as interchangeable, a designation not yet achieved for any biosimilar in the USA. Japan does not permit biosimilar substitution, as prescribers must include the product name on each prescription and that specific product must be given to the patient. Policy Reviews published in 2014 and 2016 in The Lancet Oncology focused on premarket and postmarket policies for oncology biosimilars before most of these drugs received regulatory approval. In this Policy Review from the Southern Network on Adverse Reactions, we identify factors preventing the effective launch of oncology biosimilars. Introduction to the market has been more challenging with therapeutic than for supportive care oncology biosimilars. Addressing region-specific competition barriers and educational needs would improve the regulatory approval process and market launches for these biologics, therefore expanding patient access to these products in the EU, the USA, and Japan.

Consequences to patients, clinicians, and manufacturers when very serious adverse drug reactions are identified (1997-2019): A qualitative analysis from the Southern Network on Adverse Reactions (SONAR)

BACKGROUND

Adverse drug/device reactions (ADRs) can result in severe patient harm. We define very serious ADRs as being associated with severe toxicity, as measured on the Common Toxicity Criteria Adverse Events (CTCAE)) scale, following use of drugs or devices with large sales, large financial settlements, and large numbers of injured persons. We report on impacts on patients, clinicians, and manufacturers following very serious ADR reporting.

METHODS

We reviewed clinician identified very serious ADRs published between 1997 and 2019. Drugs and devices associated with reports of very serious ADRs were identified. Included drugs or devices had market removal discussed at Food and Drug Advisory (FDA) Advisory Committee meetings, were published by clinicians, had sales > $1 billion, were associated with CTCAE Grade 4 or 5 toxicity effects, and had either >$1 billion in settlements or >1,000 injured patients. Data sources included journals, Congressional transcripts, and news reports. We reviewed data on: 1) timing of ADR reports, Boxed warnings, and product withdrawals, and 2) patient, clinician, and manufacturer impacts. Binomial analysis was used to compare sales pre- and post-FDA Advisory Committee meetings.

FINDINGS

Twenty very serious ADRs involved fifteen drugs and one device. Legal settlements totaled $38.4 billion for 753,900 injured persons. Eleven of 18 clinicians (61%) reported harms, including verbal threats from manufacturer (five) and loss of a faculty position (one). Annual sales decreased 94% from $29.1 billion pre-FDA meeting to $4.9 billion afterwards (p<0.0018). Manufacturers of four drugs paid $1.7 billion total in criminal fines for failing to inform the FDA and physicians about very serious ADRs. Following FDA approval, the median time to ADR reporting was 7.5 years (Interquartile range 3,13 years). Twelve drugs received Box warnings and one drug received a warning (median, 7.5 years following ADR reporting (IQR 5,11 years). Six drugs and 1 device were withdrawn from marketing (median, 5 years after ADR reporting (IQR 4,6 years)).

INTERPRETATION

Because very serious ADRs impacts are so large, policy makers should consider developing independently funded pharmacovigilance centers of excellence to assist with clinician investigations.

FUNDING

This work received support from the National Cancer Institute (1R01 CA102713 (CLB), https://www.nih.gov/about-nih/what-we-do/nih-almanac/national-cancer-institute-nci; and two Pilot Project grants from the American Cancer Society's Institutional Grant Award to the University of South Carolina (IRG-13-043-01) https://www.cancer.org/ (SH; BS).

End of an era of administering erythropoiesis stimulating agents among Veterans Administration cancer patients with chemotherapy-induced anemia

Erythropoisis stimulating agent (ESA) use was addressed in Food and Drug Administration (FDA) Oncology Drug Advisory Committee (ODAC) meetings between 2004 and 2008. FDA safety-focused regulatory actions occurred in 2007 and 2008. In 2007, black box warnings advised of early death and venous thromboembolism (VTE) risks with ESAs in oncology. In 2010, a Risk Evaluation Strategies (REMS) was initiated, with cancer patient consent that mortality and VTE risks were noted with ESAs. We report warnings and REMS impacts on ESA utilization among Veterans Administration (VA) cancer patients with chemotherapy-induced anemia (CIA). Data were from Veterans Affairs database (2003–2012). Epoetin and darbepoetin use were primary outcomes. Segmented linear regression was used to estimate changes in ESA use levels and trends, clinical appropriateness, and adverse events (VTEs) among chemotherapy-treated cancer patients. To estimate changes in level of drug prescription rate after policy actions, model-specific indicator variables as covariates based on specific actions were included. ESA use fell by 95% and 90% from 2005, for epoetin and darbepoetin, from 22% and 11%, respectively, to 1% and 1%, respectively, among cancer patients with CIA, respectively (p<0.01). Following REMS in 2010, mean hematocrit levels at ESA initiation decreased from 30% to 21% (p<0.01). Black box warnings preceded decreased ESA use among VA cancer patients with CIA. REMS was followed by reduced hematocrit levels at ESA initiation. Our findings contrast with privately- insured and Medicaid insured cancer patient data on chemotherapy-induced anemia where ESA use decreased to 3% to 7% by 2010–2012. By 2012, the era of ESA administration to VA to cancer patients had ended but the warnings remain relevant and significant. In 2019, oncology/hematology national guidelines (ASCO/ASH) recommend that cancer patients with chemotherapy-induced anemia should receive ESAs or red blood cell transfusions after risk-benefit evaluation.

Response to: letter to the editor: consideration on 'an evaluation of reports of ciprofloxacin, levofloxacin, and moxifloxacin association neuropsychiatric toxicities, long-term disability, and aortic aneurysms/dissections disseminated by the food and drug administration and the European medicines agency' by bennett et al

INTRODUCTION

Pulmonary fibrosis includes several lung disorders characterized by progressive fibrosis, of which idiopathic pulmonary fibrosis (IPF) is a particularly severe form with a median survival time of 3-5 years after diagnosis. Although numerous compounds have shown efficacy in attenuating pulmonary fibrosis using animal models, only a few compounds have shown their beneficial effects for IPF in clinical trials. Thus, there is an ongoing need to improve the preclinical development process to better identify, characterize and select clinically useful targets.

AREAS COVERED

In this review, we extensively describe current models of pulmonary fibrosis, focusing on rodent models, ex vivo models, and in vitro models.

EXPERT OPINION

Based upon our current understanding, improving the identification and characterization of clinically relevant molecules or pathways responsible for progressive fibrotic diseases and use of the robust preclinical model system to test these will be required to improve the drug development pipeline for pulmonary fibrosis. Combination of appropriate preclinical models with ex vivo (precision-cut lung slices) or in vitro models will benefit high-throughput drug discovery and validation of drug effects.

End of an era for erythropoiesis-stimulating agents in oncology

Erythropoiesis-stimulating agents (ESAs) are available to treat chemotherapy-induced anemia (CIA). In 2007-2008, regulatory notifications advised of venous thromboembolism and mortality risks while the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services' restricted ESA initiation to patients with hemoglobin <10 g/dl. In 2010, a Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategies required consent prior to administration. We evaluated ESA utilization from 2003 to 2012 and obtained private health insurer claims data for persons with lung, colorectal, or breast cancer from 2001 to 2012. ESA use for CIA was determined by an ESA claim after chemotherapy, up to 6 months after treatment. We identified 839,948 commercially insured patients, including 24,785 patients with ESA-treated CIA (3.2%). Darbepoetin use increased 3.9-fold from 2003 to 2007 (12.3% to 48.7%) and then decreased 95% to 2.6% by 2012. Epoetin use decreased 90% from 2003 to 2012 (30.3% to 3.1%). Between 2003 and 2012, mean epoetin dosing decreased 0.8-fold (244,979 in 2003 vs. 196,216 units in 2012), but increased 1.8-fold for darbepoetin-treated CIA (262 in 2003 to 467 μg in 2012). Among CIA patients, transfusions were low (4.5%) in 2002-2007, then increased 2.2-fold between 2008 and 2012. Safety initiatives between 2007 and 2010 facilitated reductions in ESA use combined with changes in coverage. These data show the efficacy of regulatory efforts, publication of adverse events and changes in reimbursement in reducing use of ESAs. Future studies are warranted to optimize deimplementation strategies to improve patient safety.

An evaluation of reports of ciprofloxacin, levofloxacin, and moxifloxacin-association neuropsychiatric toxicities, long-term disability, and aortic aneurysms/dissections disseminated by the Food and Drug Administration and the European Medicines Agency

Introduction: Ciprofloxacin, levofloxacin, and moxifloxacin belong to the fluoroquinolone class of antibiotics and are amongst the most commonly prescribed antibiotics. In 2018 and 2019, Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and the European Medicine Agency (EMA) requested that manufacturers harmonize FQ safety information related to neuropsychiatric, aortic dissection, and long-term disability. The authors hypothesize that FDA and EMA epidemiologists support a strong association between these drugs and the three toxicities. Areas covered: Studies of FQ-associated neuropsychiatric toxicity, long-term disability, and aortic ruptures/dissections. Clinical sources include FDA Advisory Committee documents, a 2014 Citizen Petition filed with the FDA requesting safety information additions to FQ labels for neuropsychiatric toxicities (partially granted in 2018), an under-review Citizen Petition under review by the FDA requesting a FQ Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategy, and safety notifications from the EMA. Expert opinion: FDA and the EMA report state that neuropsychiatric toxicity, long-term disability, and aortic dissections//aneurysms occur with all FQs. Disability and neuropsychiatric toxicity can occur after one dose or several months after FQs. United States' and European' regulators warn physicians not to prescribe FQs for uncomplicated acute urinary tract infection, sinusitis, or bronchitis, unless other possible choices are tried first, as risks outweigh benefits in these settings.

Caveat Medicus: Clinician experiences in publishing reports of serious oncology-associated adverse drug reactions

Oncology-associated adverse drug/device reactions can be fatal. Some clinicians who treat single patients with severe oncology-associated toxicities have researched case series and published this information. We investigated motivations and experiences of select individuals leading such efforts. Clinicians treating individual patients who developed oncology-associated serious adverse drug events were asked to participate. Inclusion criteria included having index patient information, reporting case series, and being collaborative with investigators from two National Institutes of Health funded pharmacovigilance networks. Thirty-minute interviews addressed investigational motivation, feedback from pharmaceutical manufacturers, FDA personnel, and academic leadership, and recommendations for improving pharmacovigilance. Responses were analyzed using constant comparative methods of qualitative analysis. Overall, 18 clinicians met inclusion criteria and 14 interviewees are included. Primary motivations were scientific curiosity, expressed by six clinicians. A less common theme was public health related (three clinicians). Six clinicians received feedback characterized as supportive from academic leaders, while four clinicians received feedback characterized as negative. Three clinicians reported that following the case series publication they were invited to speak at academic institutions worldwide. Responses from pharmaceutical manufacturers were characterized as negative by 12 clinicians. One clinician’s wife called the post-reporting time the “Maalox month,” while another clinician reported that the manufacturer collaboratively offered to identify additional cases of the toxicity. Responses from FDA employees were characterized as collaborative for two clinicians, neutral for five clinicians, unresponsive for negative by six clinicians. Three clinicians endorsed developing improved reporting mechanisms for individual physicians, while 11 clinicians endorsed safety activities that should be undertaken by persons other than a motivated clinician who personally treats a patient with a severe adverse drug/device reaction. Our study provides some of the first reports of clinician motivations and experiences with reporting serious or potentially fatal oncology-associated adverse drug or device reactions. Overall, it appears that negative feedback from pharmaceutical manufacturers and mixed feedback from the academic community and/or the FDA were reported. Big data, registries, Data Safety Monitoring Boards, and pharmacogenetic studies may facilitate improved pharmacovigilance efforts for oncology-associated adverse drug reactions. These initiatives overcome concerns related to complacency, indifference, ignorance, and system-level problems as barriers to documenting and reporting adverse drug events- barriers that have been previously reported for clinician reporting of serious adverse drug reactions.