Judgments of learning reflect encoding fluency: conclusive evidence for the ease-of-processing hypothesis

According to the ease-of-processing hypothesis, judgments of learning (JOLs) rely on the ease with which items are committed to memory during encoding--that is, encoding fluency. Conclusive evidence for this hypothesis does not yet exist because encoding fluency and item difficulty have been confounded in all previous studies. To disentangle the effects of encoding fluency and item difficulty on JOLs, we used a variant of the learner-observer-judge method in which participants observed the study phase of another participant and indicated his or her JOLs. At the same time, the to-be-studied word pairs were concealed by strings of symbols. Our experiment revealed that participants use self-paced study time as a cue for JOLs when they themselves have studied and recalled word pairs before. This metacognitive monitoring of study time provides strong support for the ease-of-processing hypothesis.

Metamemory and memory for a wide range of font sizes: What is the contribution of perceptual fluency?

Words printed in a larger 48-point font are judged to be more memorable than words printed in a smaller 18-point font, although font size does not affect actual memory. To clarify the basis of this font size effect on metamemory and memory, 4 experiments investigated how presenting words in 48 (Experiment 1) or 4 (Experiments 2 to 4) font sizes between 6 point and 500 point affected judgments of learning (JOLs) and recall performance. Response times in lexical decision tasks were used to measure perceptual fluency. In all experiments, perceptual fluency was lower for words presented in very small and very large font sizes than for words presented in intermediate font sizes. In contrast, JOLs increased monotonically with font size, even beyond the point where a large font impaired perceptual fluency. Assessments of people's metacognitive beliefs about font size revealed that the monotonic increase in JOLs was not due to beliefs masking perceptual fluency effects (Experiment 3). Also, JOLs still increased across the whole range of font sizes when perceptual fluency was made salient at study (Experiment 4). In all experiments but Experiment 4, recall performance increased with increasing font size, although to a lesser extent than JOLs. Overall, the current study supports the idea that metacognitive beliefs underlie font size effects in metamemory. As important, it reveals that people's font size beliefs have some accuracy. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2018 APA, all rights reserved).

Cue integration in metamemory judgements is strategic

People base judgements about their own memory processes on probabilistic cues such as the characteristics of study materials and study conditions. While research has largely focused on how single cues affect metamemory judgements, a recent study by Undorf, Söllner, and Bröder found that multiple cues affected people's predictions of their future memory performance (judgements of learning, JOLs). The present research tested whether this finding was indeed due to strategic integration of multiple cues in JOLs or, alternatively, resulted from people's reliance on a single unified feeling of ease. In Experiments 1 and 2, we simultaneously varied concreteness and emotionality of word pairs and solicited (a) pre-study JOLs that could be based only on the manipulated cues and (b) immediate JOLs that could be based both on the manipulated cues and on a feeling of ease. The results revealed similar amounts of cue integration in pre-study JOLs and immediate JOLs, regardless of whether cues varied in two easily distinguishable levels (Experiment 1) or on a continuum (Experiment 2). This suggested that people strategically integrated multiple cues in their immediate JOLs. Experiment 3 provided further evidence for this conclusion by showing that false explicit information about cue values affected immediate JOLs over and above actual cue values. Hence, we conclude that cue integration in JOLs involves strategic processes.

Separation of Encoding Fluency and Item Difficulty Effects on Judgements of Learning

The fluency of information encoding has frequently been discussed as a major determinant of predicted memory performance indicated by judgements of learning (JOLs). Previous studies established encoding fluency effects on JOLs. However, it is largely unknown whether fluency takes effect above and beyond the effects of item difficulty. We therefore tested whether encoding fluency still affects JOLs when numerous additional cues indicating the difficulty of an item are available as well. In three experiments, participants made JOLs for another participant while observing his or her self-paced study phase. However, study times were swapped in one experimental condition, so that items with short study times (indicating high fluency) were presented for long durations, whereas items with long study times (indicating low fluency) were presented for short durations. Results showed that both item difficulty and encoding fluency affected JOLs. Thus, encoding fluency in itself is indeed an important cue for JOLs that does not become redundant when difficulty information is available in addition. This observation lends considerable support to the ease-of-processing hypothesis.

Metamemory viewed through the judgment lens

Metamemory research makes extensive use of judgments, such as judgments of learning (JOLs). In a JOL, people predict their chance of remembering a recently studied item in a memory test. There is a general agreement that JOLs rely on probabilistic cues that are combined in an inference process. Accuracy as measured by the gamma correlation between JOLs and actual performance is usually mediocre, suggesting limited metacognitive abilities. In judgment and decision-making research, Brunswik's lens model is often used to decompose judgmental accuracy: A matching index G measures how adequately people's cue weights match the optimal weights, two reliability indices assess the predictability of judgments and environment, respectively, and a nonlinear component measures systematic variance not captured by the cues. We employed the lens model equation for the first time to analyze four published and one new JOL data sets. There was considerable interindividual variance in metamemory monitoring. Although gamma was on average higher than the Pearson correlation, it still underestimated metacognitive ability in terms of matching (G). Also, the nonlinear component was considerably higher than in other judgment domains, pointing to substantial item-person-interactions that we interpret as idiosyncratic encoding strategies. An exploratory cluster analysis suggests different metacognitive strategies used by subgroups of participants. We suggest the lens model as a potentially promising tool in metacognition research.

The Four-States Model of Memory Retrieval Experiences

Abstract. A memory measurement model is presented that accounts for judgments of remembering, knowing, and guessing in old-new recognition tasks by assuming four disjoint latent memory states: recollection, familiarity, uncertainty, and rejection. This four-states model can be applied to both Tulving's (1985) remember-know procedure (RK version) and Gardiner and coworker's ( Gardiner, Java, & Richardson-Klavehn, 1996 ; Gardiner, Richardson-Klavehn, & Ramponi, 1997 ) remember-know-guess procedure (RKG version). It is shown that the RK version of the model fits remember-know data approximately as well as the one-dimensional signal detection model does. In contrast, the RKG version of the four-states model outperforms the corresponding detection model even if unequal variances for old and new items are allowed for.We show empirically that the two versions of the four-statesmodelmeasure the same state probabilities. However, the RKG version, requiring remember-know-guess judgments, provides parameter estimates with smaller standard errors and is therefore recommended for routine use.

The Prototypical Majority Effect Under Social Influence

Majority views are reported with greater confidence and fluency than minority views, with the difference increasing with majority size. This Prototypical Majority Effect (PME) was attributed generally to conformity pressure, but Koriat et al. showed that it can arise from the processes underlying decision and confidence independent of social influence. Here we examined the PME under conditions that differ in social influence. In Experiment 1, a robust PME emerged in the absence of information about the majority views, but the provision sof that information increased the choice of the majority view and magnified the PME. In Experiment 2, a PME emerged in a minority-biased condition that misled participants to believe that the majority view was the minority view, but the PME was stronger in a majority-biased condition. The results were discussed in terms of a dual-process view: The PME observed under social influence may contain externally driven and internally driven components.

The neurocognitive basis of metamemory: Using the N400 to study the contribution of fluency to judgments of learning

Metamemory is crucial for monitoring, evaluating, and optimizing memory performance. The basis of metamemory, however, is a matter of considerable debate. In the present study, we examined the contribution of processing fluency-the ease of processing information during learning-to metamemory judgments. We recorded event-related potentials (ERPs) while participants studied related and unrelated word pairs across two study-test cycles in a judgment of learning (JOL) task. In the first study-test cycle, related pairs were associated with better cued recall, higher JOLs, and a reduced N400 amplitude than unrelated pairs. Crucially, between- and within subject correlational analyses indicated that reduced N400 amplitudes, indexing more fluent processing, were associated with higher JOLs. Furthermore, single-trial N400 mediated a small but significant portion of the relatedness effect on JOLs. In the second study-test cycle, relatedness still increased recall and JOLs. However, related and unrelated pairs did not differ in N400 amplitude. Rather, unrelated pairs elicited a parietal positivity in a later time window that partially mediated the relatedness effect on JOLs. Together, these results suggest that processing fluency, indexed by the N400, contributes to the relatedness effect on JOLs when novel word pairs are learned, but not when previously studied pairs are relearned. Our results also imply that aspects of fluency not captured by the N400 and/or explicit beliefs about memory contribute to JOLs. This study demonstrates the utility of ERPs in gaining new insights into the neurocognitive mechanisms of metamemory.

Do judgments of learning predict automatic influences of memory?

Current memory theories generally assume that memory performance reflects both recollection and automatic influences of memory. Research on people's predictions about the likelihood of remembering recently studied information on a memory test, that is, on judgments of learning (JOLs), suggests that both magnitude and resolution of JOLs are linked to recollection. However, it has remained unresolved whether JOLs are also predictive of automatic influences of memory. This issue was addressed in 3 experiments. Using the process-dissociation procedure, we assessed the predictive accuracy of immediate and delayed JOLs (Experiment 1) and of immediate JOLs from a first and from a second study-test cycle (Experiments 2 and 3) for recollection and automatic influences. Results showed that each type of JOLs was predictive of both recollection and automatic influences. Moreover, we found that a delay between study and JOL improved the predictive accuracy of JOLs for recollection, while study-test experience improved the predictive accuracy of JOLs for both recollection and automatic influences. These findings demonstrate that JOLs predict not only recollection, but also automatic influences of memory. (PsycINFO Database Record

Is all metamemory monitoring spared from aging? A dual-process examination

Although recollection-based memory declines with age, relative metamemory monitoring is reported to be spared from aging. Based on a dual-process perspective on memory, we tested whether it is specifically the monitoring of automatic influences of memory (familiarity), but not of recollection, that is spared. In Experiment 1, we used the process-dissociation procedure (PDP) task from Undorf, Böhm, and Cüpper (2016) requiring modality-based exclusions and found older (61-83 years) adults' judgments of learning (JOLs) to predict both recollection and familiarity estimates. Comparisons to Undorf et al.'s younger-adult (18-34 years) data revealed fully spared familiarity monitoring but provided some evidence for impaired recollection monitoring, especially after study-test experience. We replicated aging-spared familiarity monitoring but impaired recollection monitoring in a second experiment, comparing the predictive value of younger (18-30 years) and older (60-87 years) adults' JOLs on a different PDP task that required recollection of the words' spatial positions. Furthermore, Experiment 2 found no evidence that mediator-based strategy use improved recollection monitoring in either age group, albeit significantly improving recollection. Taken together, the results suggest that not all metamemory monitoring is spared from aging. Instead, metamemory monitoring mirrored older adults' specific deficit in recollection whereas familiarity monitoring was fully spared. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2018 APA, all rights reserved).

Subjective Confidence in the Response to Personality Questions: Some Insight Into the Construction of People's Responses to Test Items

Drawing on research on subjective confidence, we examined how the confidence and speed in responding to personality items track the consistency and variability in the response to the same items over repeated administrations. Participants (N = 57) responded to 132 personality items with a true/false response format. The items were presented five times over the course of two sessions. Consistent with the Self-Consistency Model, the confidence and speed with which an item was endorsed at its first presentation predicted the likelihood of repeating that response across the subsequent presentations of the item, thus tracking test-retest reliability. Confidence and speed also predicted the likelihood that others will make the same response, thus tracking inter-person consensus. However, confidence and speed varied more strongly with within-person consistency than with inter-person consensus, suggesting some reliance on idiosyncratic cues in response formation. These results mirror, in part, findings obtained in other domains such as general knowledge, social attitudes, and personal preferences, suggesting some similarity in the decision processes underlying the response to binary items: responses to personality items are not retrieved ready-made from memory but constructed at the time of testing, based on the sampling of a small number of cues from a larger population of cues associated with the item’s content. Because confidence is based on the consistency with which the cues support a response, it is prognostic of within-person consistency and cross-person consensus. Theoretical and methodological implications are discussed.

Effect of impoverished information on multisensory integration in judgments of learning

According to the principle of inverse effectiveness (PIE), weaker responses to information in one modality (i.e., unisensory) benefit more from additional information in a second modality (i.e., multisensory; Meredith & Stein, 1986). We suggest that the PIE may also inform whether perceptual fluency affects judgments of learning (JOLs). If JOLs follow the PIE, the differences in JOLs for multisensory and unisensory items should increase as the unisensory study items become harder to perceive. That is, an influence of perceptual fluency should prompt a similar, interactive pattern across perceptual responses and JOLs. In 3 experiments, we systematically varied the signal intensity or noise in 1 modality to examine how responses might change with the inclusion of information in a second modality. In Experiment 1, written words in several font sizes were sometimes accompanied by spoken equivalents. In Experiments 2 and 3, spoken words in various background noise levels were sometimes accompanied by visual speech articulations. Consistent with the PIE, the multisensory benefits in response time and/or correct identification increased as responses to unisensory information decreased. Also, the multisensory formats received higher JOLs than the unisensory formats; however, unlike the predictions from PIE, this difference did not increase as study items became harder to perceive. Experiment 3 extended this finding to participants' explicit beliefs. In multisensory settings, JOLs may rely more on theory- than data-driven processes. We suggest that broadly defined processing fluency may always contribute to JOLs, but, regarding perceptual information, JOLs appear to track perceptual attributes rather than perceptual fluency. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).

"You don't know what this means to me" - Uncovering idiosyncratic influences on metamemory judgments

Studies of the mind often focus on general effects on cognitive processes, whereas influences of idiosyncratic interactions between participants and items evade experimental control or assessment. For instance, assessments of one's own learning and memory processes-metamemory judgments-are attributed to people's reliance on commonly shared characteristics of study materials (e.g., word frequency) or learning conditions (e.g., number of study opportunities). By contrast, few studies have investigated how idiosyncratic information such as the personal significance of items affects memory and metamemory. We propose that hitherto elusive idiosyncratic influences on metamemory can be measured by the C component of Egon Brunswik's (1952) lens model. In two experiments, we made randomly chosen items personally significant (Experiment 1) or assessed the personal significance of items (Experiment 2). Personal significance increased both metamemory judgments and memory performance. Including personal significance as a predictor in the lens model reduced C, whereas including familiarity from a previous encounter did not. Hence, at least part of the lens model's C parameter captures idiosyncratic influences on metamemory. The C parameter may serve as a useful tool for future research.

Why do judgments of learning modify memory? Evidence from identical pairs and relatedness judgments

Research has observed that monitoring one's own learning modifies memory for some materials but not for others. Specifically, making judgments of learning (JOLs) while learning word pairs improves subsequent cued-recall memory performance for related word pairs but not for unrelated word pairs. Theories that have attempted to explain this pattern of results assume that people attend to and process cue-target relatedness during learning more when making JOLs than they spontaneously do when not making JOLs. The present research directly tested this relatedness-processing assumption with unrelated and related word pairs as well as with hitherto unexamined materials: identical word pairs. In three experiments, participants studied word pairs while either making or not making JOLs. Results revealed that making JOLs improved memory for related word pairs as well as for identical word pairs, but not for unrelated word pairs. Importantly, in two of the experiments, participants were further asked to judge at test whether each cue appeared with an unrelated, related, or identical target before attempting to recall it. Results revealed that making JOLs improved the accuracy of these relatedness judgments independently from its effect on recall, thus providing direct evidence that people process cue-target relatedness when making JOLs more than they spontaneously do when not making JOLs. These findings contribute to a more comprehensive understanding of why judging one's own learning can modify memory and, more broadly, suggest that instructions to monitor learning can direct people's attention to information that is not or less processed otherwise. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).

On the pervasive effect of word frequency in metamemory

Predictions of one's future memory performance-judgements of learning (JOLs)-are based on the cues that learners regard as diagnostic of memory performance. One of these cues is word frequency or how often words are experienced in the language. It is not clear, however, whether word frequency would affect JOLs when other cues are also available. The current study aims to close this gap by testing whether objective and subjective word frequency affect JOLs in the presence of font size as an additional cue. Across three experiments, participants studied words that varied in word frequency (Experiment 1: high and low objective frequency; Experiment 2: a whole continuum from high to low objective frequency; Experiment 3: high and low subjective and objective frequency) and were presented in a large (48pt) or a small (18pt) font size, made JOLs, and completed a free recall test. Results showed that people based their JOLs on both word frequency and font size. We conclude that word frequency is an important cue that affects metamemory even in multiple-cue situations.

Hindsight bias in metamemory: outcome knowledge influences the recollection of judgments of learning

Hindsight bias describes people's tendency to overestimate how accurately they have predicted an event's outcome after obtaining knowledge about it. Outcome knowledge has been shown to influence various forms of judgments, but it is unclear whether outcome knowledge also produces a hindsight bias on Judgments of Learning (JOLs). Three experiments tested whether people overestimated the accuracy of their memory predictions after obtaining knowledge about their actual memory performance. In all experiments, participants studied 60 cue-target word pairs, made a JOL for each word pair, and tried to recall the targets in a cued-recall test. In Experiments 1a and 1b, people recollected their original JOLs after attempting to recall each target, that is, after they obtained outcome knowledge for all items. In Experiments 2 and 3, people recollected their original JOLs in a separate phase after attempting to recall half the targets so that they had outcome knowledge for some but not all items. In all experiments, recollected JOLs were closer to actual memory performance than original JOLs for items with outcome knowledge only. Thus, outcome knowledge produced a hindsight bias on JOLs. Our results demonstrate that people overestimate the accuracy of their memory predictions in hindsight.

Predicting the memorability of scene pictures: Improved accuracy through one's own experience

There are conflicting findings regarding the accuracy of metamemory for scene pictures. Judgements of stimulus memorability in general (memorability judgements [MJs]) have been reported to be unpredictive of actual image memorability. However, other studies have found that judgements of learning (JOLs)-predictions of one's own later memory performance for recently studied items-are moderately predictive of people's own actual recognition memory for pictures. The current study directly compared the relative accuracy and cue basis of JOLs and MJs for scene pictures. In Experiments 1 and 2, participants completed an MJ task and a JOL task in counterbalanced order. In the MJ task, they judged the general memorability of each picture. In the JOL task, they studied pictures and made JOLs during a learning phase, followed by a recognition memory test. Results showed that MJs were predictive of general scene memorability and relied on the same cues as JOLs, but MJ accuracy considerably improved after the JOL task. Experiment 3 demonstrated that prior learning experiences drove this increase in MJ accuracy. This work demonstrates that people can predict not only their own future memory performance for scene pictures with moderate accuracy but also the general memorability of scene pictures. In addition, experiences with one's own learning and memory support the ability to assess scene memorability in general. This research contributes to our understanding of the basis and accuracy of different metamemory judgements.

Reducing cheap talk? How monetary incentives affect the accuracy of metamemory judgments

The accuracy of metacognitive judgments is rarely incentivized in experiments; hence, it depends on the participants' willingness to invest cognitive resources and respond truthfully. According to arguments promoted in economic research that performance cannot reach its full potential without proper motivation, metacognitive abilities might therefore have been underestimated. In two experiments (N = 128 and N = 129), we explored the impact of incentives on the accuracy of judgments of learning (JOLs), memory performance, and cue use in free recall of word lists. We introduced a payoff scheme with 5 cents maximum per judgment to promote the accuracy of predicting recall success while simultaneously discouraging strategic responding in the memory test. Incentivizing JOLs had no effect on memory performance. Metacognitive accuracy in terms of resolution (Kruskal's Gamma) was slightly improved in Experiment 1, but not in Experiment 2. On the more negative side, the incentives boosted JOLs indiscriminately, producing substantial overconfidence. A deeper analysis including cues like word concreteness, imagery, arousal, frequency, subjective relevance, and font size showed the usual and simultaneous cue effects on JOLs. However, cue effects were largely unaffected in size by incentivizing JOLs. In summary, incentives for accuracy do not improve the resolution of JOLs to an extent that outweighs the large inflation of overconfidence. Based on the current results, one cannot recommend the future use of incentivized studies in the field of metamemory.

Changes in learning strategies contribute to negative reactivity of immediate judgments of learning

There is evidence that asking people to predict their own memory performance during learning (immediate judgments of learning, JOLs) can alter memory. Changes in the use of learning strategies have been proposed to contribute to these reactive effects of JOLs. This study addresses the impact of making JOLs on the use of learning strategies and the contribution of learning strategies to JOL reactivity. Across six experiments, participants studied related and unrelated word pairs and did or did not make JOLs during study, completed a cued-recall test, and reported the learning strategies they had used for each word pair. When we manipulated the requirement to make JOLs between participants, making JOLs enhanced memory for related pairs and impaired memory for unrelated pairs. Further, the learning strategies participants used differed across the JOL and no-JOL groups, and these differences mediated the detrimental effects of making JOLs on memory for unrelated pairs. In contrast, when we manipulated the requirement to make JOLs within participants, making JOLs enhanced recall performance for related pairs but did not impact recall for unrelated pairs or the use of learning strategies. Overall, our findings indicate that changes in the use of learning strategies underlie detrimental effects of making JOL on memory for unrelated pairs but only play a minor role in positive effects of making JOLs for related word pairs. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2025 APA, all rights reserved).

The association between physical activity and memory interference

Habitual physical activity has been shown to improve memory performance, yet investigations into its effects concerning memory interference remain limited. Additionally, minimal research has evaluated the association between habitual physical activity behaviors occurring in different contexts (e.g., walking, basketball, swimming) and memory. Based on these gaps in the literature, the present set of six experiments evaluated the association between contextually-different physical activity behaviors (e.g., individual physical activities, physical activities performed in social settings) and memory interference among young adult samples from America and Germany. Across six experiments, we reliably demonstrated that Germans exhibited greater memory performance than Americans. We also reliably demonstrated that contextually-different physical activities are not associated with memory performance or attenuated memory interference.

The Effects of Group Conformity on the Prototypical Majority Effect for Confidence and Response Latency

The Prototypical Majority Effect (PME) refers to the observation that people endorse majority opinions faster and with greater confidence than minority opinions. Although the PME has been assumed to stem from social influence, recent studies showed that it can arise from internal processes underlying decision and confidence alone. We used a conformity paradigm adapted from Asch (1951) to examine the relative contributions of internal and external processes to the PME. Four participants responded in turn to items that had correct or wrong predetermined majority responses. A robust PME was observed before participants saw others’ responses. Seeing these responses, however, increased endorsement, confidence, and speed. Notably, social influence had a considerably weaker impact when it ran counter to the consensus observed in its absence. Thus, internal processes underlying decision and confidence constrain the impact of social conformity. The failure to consider these processes leads to overestimating the magnitude of social influence.