Taxing reproduction: the full transfer cost of rearing children in Europe

What are the intergenerational resource transfer contributions of parents and non-parents in Europe? Using National Transfer Accounts and National Time Transfer Accounts for 12 countries around 2010, we go beyond public transfers (net taxes) to also value two statistically much less visible transfers in the family realm: of market goods and of unpaid household labour (time). Non-parents contribute almost exclusively to public transfers. But parents additionally provide still larger private transfers: mothers mainly time, fathers mainly market goods. Estimating transfer stocks over the working life, the average parental/non-parental contribution ratio in Europe flips from 0.73 (public transfers alone) to 2.66 (all three transfers combined). The highest combined parental/non-parental contribution ratios are in Sweden and Finland. The metaphorical tax rates implicitly imposed thereby on rearing children in Europe are multiples of the value-added tax rates in place on consumption goods. Unveiling the sheer magnitude of these invisible transfer asymmetries carries multiple implications for policy debates. For instance, it raises the question whether ageing European societies unwittingly tax, rather than subsidise, their own reproduction. Family friendly policy models, such as the Nordic welfare states, do not mitigate this effect. They help parents work, but do not lower the implicit tax parents pay.

Welfare states as lifecycle redistribution machines: Decomposing the roles of age and socio-economic status shows that European tax-and-benefit systems primarily redistribute across age groups

Social scientists identify two core functions of modern welfare states as redistribution across (a) socio-economic status groups (Robin Hood) and (b) 'the lifecycle' (the piggy bank). But what is the relative importance of these functions? The answer has been elusive, as the piggy bank is metaphorical. The intra-personal time-travel of resources it implies is based on non-quid-pro-quo transfers. In practice, 'lifecycle redistribution' must operate through inter-age-group resource reallocation in cross-section. Since at any time different birth cohorts live together, 'resource-productive' working-aged people are taxed to finance consumption of 'resource-dependent' younger and older people. In a novel decomposition analysis, we study the joint distribution of socio-economic status, age, and respectively (a) all cash and in-kind transfers ('benefits'), (b) financing contributions ('taxes'), and (c) resulting 'net benefits,' on a sample of over 400,000 Europeans from 22 EU countries. European welfare states, often maligned as ineffective Robin Hood vehicles riddled with Matthew effects, are better characterized as inter-age redistribution machines performing a more important second task rather well: lifecycle consumption smoothing. Social policies serve multiple goals in Europe, but empirically they are neither primarily nor solely responsible for poverty relief and inequality reduction.

Vaccine alliance building blocks: a conjoint experiment on popular support for international COVID-19 cooperation formats

The design principles of institutions that visibly and significantly affect citizens' lives are likely to be politically salient. Popular support for these principles is in turn crucial for institutional viability and effectiveness. Transboundary pandemics are a case in point. Understanding citizens' preferences regarding the design of international alliances set up to mass-produce and distribute vaccines is likely to determine citizens' subsequent cooperation with vaccination campaigns. This study explores Germans' preferences for international COVID-19 vaccine alliance design principles. We conducted a conjoint experiment at a recurring cognitive moment in many pandemics' cycles, between the initial outbreak and a more devastating but still-unknown second wave, when infection rates were very low, yet no policy solutions had been developed. We analyzed preferences regarding four building blocks: (1) alliance composition (size; EU-centrism), (2) alliance distribution rules (joining cost; vaccine allocation), (3) vaccine nationalism (cost per German household; coverage in Germany) and (4) vaccine producer confidence (origin; type). Distribution rules, political ideology and personal perceptions of pandemic threat matter little. But a larger alliance size and dominant EU-country composition increase alliance support. And vaccine nationalism is key: support increases with both lower costs and larger coverage for own-nation citizens. Moreover, support goes down for Chinese and American producers and increases for Swiss and especially own-nation producers. In sum, a realist and technocratic outlook is warranted at the cognitive stage in pandemic cycles when no solutions have been found, yet the worst already seems to be over, as national self-interest reigns supreme in popular attitudes.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION

The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s11077-021-09435-1.